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In this dissertation I analyze how presidentiability is discursively constructed in relation to the 
functioning of the Spanish contemporary political field. In particular I will analyze presidential 
debates as a privileged stage from which to observe the constitution, workings and representation of 
the political field, since they epitomize the fight between agents in changing the relations of force 
existing within it. Debates homologically represent the structure of the political field and its internal 
struggles. Since political struggle is mainly conducted with words, and debates are (or are framed as) 
the main communicative events of electioneering, they comprise the central space for the discursive 
construction of presidentiability. The analysis will show that the discourse produced by the 
candidates is determined by the political field structure and expresses its dynamics: in particular, it 
will be seen that candidates spend much of their time on the front-stage of debates to implement 
their electoral strategies using moves and devices designed to increase their presidentiability and 
decrease that of their opponent.  
From my multidisciplinary theoretical standpoint, I link Bourdieu’s reflections on political 
field and capital(s), Rhetorical and Argumentative reflections on ethos and Goffman’s reflections on 
image or face for the purpose of subsuming them under the label of presidentiability: i.e. the 
capability of being president in accordance with certain attributes. These attributes are rationally 
considered as necessarily inherent in the president by a large majority of people from both parties 
(global attributes such as ability, coherence, sincerity, selflessness, etc.) or by the large majority of 
people from each party (local attributes as supportiveness, dialogue, optimism, etc. in the case of the 
Left and toughness, strictness, etc. for the Right). 
My discussion on the construction of presidentiability in debates can be conceived as a 
triangle whose surface is covered by discourse and whose sides are: 1) the topics of the debate in 
relation to which candidates are attacking each other; 2) the attributes of the presidentiable person 
that emerge as being relevant and 3) the discursive devices employed as well as the moves made by 
candidates in order to implement their electoral strategies. Within the debates, candidates manage 
presidentiability in relation to certain themes that are or have been constructed as contextually 
relevant for the Spanish electorate: the economy, immigration, terrorism and Catalan nationalism; 
their presidentiability rises or falls depending on their ability to present themselves with or without 
certain attributes constructed as relevant in relation to themes; they implement their strategies of 
presidentiability management by making discursive moves of dis/alignment and employing 
discursive devices such as metaphors, deixis, arguments, quotes, etc.  
The analysis deployed in this dissertation will show how a discourse generated in a certain 
political field and that expresses its dynamics works: essentially, it will shed light on the rules of the 




0. INTRODUCTION. The political field and the discursive construction of 





This dissertation analyses the discursive construction of presidentiability in the two 
2008 Spanish presidential debates, related to the functioning of Spanish political field. I 
decided to focus on the two televised presidential debates for many reasons: 1) they 
were the first debates between presidential candidates since 1993 (the year of the first of 
such debates); 2) they were created and presented as a media event and achieved a large 
audience share; 3) they reveal how politicians perform on the front-stage; 4) they 
epitomize the electoral struggle; 5) they were constructed as a competitive discussion 
around the main themes of the Spanish election campaign; at the same time they gave 
relevance to these issues and contributed to the construction and dissemination of a 
certain dominant discourse and ideology; 6) they are a small-scale representation of the 
dynamics of the Spanish (institutional) political field and at the same time they 
contribute to consolidating the status quo, for instance by sanctioning the bipolarism 
between PP and PSOE and their duopoly; 7) they reveal the growing similarities 
between the discourse of the two major parties.  
In particular I will show that presidential debates have a crucial place in the 
construction, working and representation of political field. They are a privileged front-
stage (Wodak 2009a) where (also in a theatrical sense) the struggles between the agents 
(or actors) of the political field emblematically take place and are represented in order to 
change the relations of force existing within the field. Presidential debates thus 
epitomize the political field, its structure and the struggles taking place within it. More 
particularly, since the political struggle is conducted with words (Edelman 1964) and 
debates are (or are framed as) the main communicative events of the electioneering, 
they become a central space for the discursive construction of presidentiability. From 
this perspective, analyzing the debates will allow me to pinpoint the role that discourse 
and communicative practices play in the construction and functioning of political field. 
This is the reason why debates are of such major interest for linguists concerned with 
the study of language and/in society. The aim is to show how discourse is at work 
within the political field, how it is determined by field structure and how it expresses 
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field dynamics. From this standpoint, I will analyze debates as communicative events, 
going beyond the communicative event itself, in order to investigate its articulations 
with the political field and the dynamics of those sectors of Spanish society that find a 
means of expression within the debates.  
The analysis of the dynamics of the two debates carried out in this dissertation 
draws attention to the fact that, remarkably, their main feature is the candidates’ use of 
strategies, moves and devices in order to boost their presidentiability, presenting 
themselves in a positive light, and decreasing that of their opponents by focusing on 
negative considerations. My work addresses two main questions related to these aspects 
of debate, namely the reasons why candidates interact in this way and the ways 
candidates manage their presidentiability. In particular I will try to answer the following 
questions: the topics they use as terrain for managing their presidentiability; the 
attributes they mobilize and the values they invoke (related to certain topics), the 
moves they make and the discursive devices they deploy. 
My discussion on the construction of presidentiability in the debates can be 
conceived as a triangle whose surface is covered by discourse and whose sides are the 
topics, attributes and discursive devices. 
1) I will focus on the topics of debate in relation to which candidate manages to 
increase his presidentiability (through positive self-presentation) and decrease the 
other’s one (through negative presentation). The candidates manage presidentiability in 
terms of certain areas of political conflict that are or have been constructed as 
contextually relevant for the Spanish electorate: the economy, immigration, terrorism 
and Catalan nationalism. 
2) I will analyze the attributes of the presidentiable person that emerge as relevant 
and whose presence/absence increases or decreases their presidentiability. Candidates 
manage presidentiability representing themselves as having or lacking certain attributes 
constructed as relevant in relation to certain topics. These attributes are rationally 
considered as necessary for the president by the vast majority of people from both 
parties (global attributes such as ability, coherence, sincerity, selflessness, etc.) or by 
the large majority of people belonging to one particular party (local attributes such as 
supportiveness, dialogue, optimism, etc. for the Left and toughness, strictness, etc. for 
the Right). Presidentiability can be easily conceived as the capability of being president, 
which is in turn based on a set of qualities considered necessary in order to be (a good) 
president. The analysis will determine the key attributes involved in the construction of 
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presidentiability. The reflection on the features that make a candidate presidentiable has 
a certain sociological and cultural value and can shed light on Spanish society in the age 
of Late Capitalism. 
3) Since the construction of presidentiability in the debates is essentially 
discursive, I will focus on the discursive devices deployed by the two candidates in 
implementing their global or local electoral strategies. The candidates manage their 
presidentiability by making discursive moves and employing discursive devices as 
metaphors; presuppositions; narratives; reported speech; deixis; arguments, 
fallacies, and loci. 
As one can see, the construct of presidentiability is quite complex: it articulates 
together the concepts of ethos, face, and political capital, and operationalizes these 
concepts within the frame of processes of de-legitimation (which is the way how 
presidentiability is constructed) in terms of themes, attributes, moves and discursive 
devices. 
 
0.1.1. The rules of the political game 
Providing an answer to the question why politicians interact the way they do within the 
debates – basically positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of the other – 
implies revealing the rules of the political game. 
This metaphor of Politics as a game is the underlying concept of the entire 
dissertation. In line with Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) definition of metaphor, rather than 
being just a (figurative) way of describing Politics, this metaphor is actually a way of 
conceptualizing it (spread equally among actors and analysts of the political field). 
According to this formulation, electioneering can be conceived as a social practice with 
its own field, agents (players), rules, stakes, and even its spectators. 
Electioneering is a special kind of game, i.e., a non-cooperative game, or, rather, a 
zero-sum game (Carmichael 2005; Davis 1983; Morrow 1994; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern 1953[1944]), where players merely win or lose, and where one player’s 
gain means a loss for the other player(s). Games are forms of sublimated struggles, 
where the fight is regulated, metaphorized and staged, with none of the violence of real 
fights (Salen & Zimmerman 2004: 80; Avedon & Sutton-Smith 1971: 7; Crawford 
1984): this concept can easily be translated to the ritualized and fictional character of 
the political struggle, as highlighted by many scholars (Martin-Rojo 2000; Rey-Fuentes 
et al. 1999; Huici-Módenes 1996; Abélès 1989; Edelman 1964; 1971; 1988, etc.). From 
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this perspective, we can see that the candidates of the two parties that together account 
for practically the whole of Spanish institutional Politics, act out the opposition. This is 
especially significant considering, as the analysis will show, that the discourse of the 
two main Spanish parties is becoming increasingly similar. 
Electioneering can be seen as ‘political behavior’ par excellence; since the most 
prominent and explicit feature of this socio-discursive practice is the struggle for power. 
Consequently the debate, which is the main place for discursively staging and enacting 
the fight for power, can be considered the epitome of the political game. 
The rules of the political game are determined by the structure of the Spanish 
political field, whose aspect is in turn shaped by the dynamics of the actors obeying its 
rules: in other words it is the structure of the political field that obliges candidates to 
struggle for social capital (votes) through the management of presidentiability. 
Furthermore, the structure of political field (and the necessity of changing the relations 
of force within it) makes it necessary for candidates to present themselves in a positive 
light in order to enhance their presidentiability and present the opponents negatively to 
decrease their presidentiability. 
Presidentiability is the key construct of this dissertation, mainly because it 
allows for the articulation of the why-question with the how-question: i.e. it makes it 
possible to consider the way the two candidates behave in the light of the conceptual 
framework used to conceive the structure of the political field. From my 
multidisciplinary theoretical standpoint, I link Bourdieu’s reflections on political field 
and capital (see below), crucial for understanding the structure of the field, with the 
Rhetorical and Argumentative reflections on ethos (Aristotle 1985; Amossy 1999; 
2010a; 2010b; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 490), aimed at highlighting the 
pre/discursive construction of credibility and Goffman’s reflections on image or face 
(Goffman 1959; 1972[1967]: 5). In turn, this enables me to insist on the interactivity of 
the process of presidentiability management in the debates. These three concepts are all 
subsumed under the label of presidentiability: i.e. the capability of being president in 
accordance with the interactive allocation of certain attributes in relation to particular 
topics. 
Since one of the main ideas underlying this dissertation is that the way candidates 
interact is determined by the structure of the political field, the concepts of fields and 
capital are central to this work. My reflection on the structure of political field is based 
entirely on Bourdieu’s sociological theory of fields (1981; 2002a[1984]; 1995; 2000; 
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see also Bonnewitz 2002[1988]; Wacquant 2004; Fritsch 2000) and capitals (1980; 
1982; 1986[1983]; 1987; 1989[1987]; 1991[1982]). 
According to Bourdieu, one can think of the political field “à la fois comme 
champ de forces et comme champ des luttes visant à transformer le rapport de forces qui 
confère à ce champ sa structure à un moment donné” (1981: 3). In line with this 
definition the social space of (institutional) Politics can be seen as a place where certain 
kinds of struggle take place for specific ends, which naturally includes obtaining greater 
power. In Bourdieuian thinking, power equates capital: having power means at the 
same time having some kinds of capital (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic), and 
using it for specific purposes, normally for obtaining more capital. These two concepts 
of power and capital cannot be conceived as distinct, but rather as two faces of the same 
coin. Power and capital are at once material (salaries, emoluments, etc.) and symbolic 
resources (recognition, prestige, etc.). Capital is not only a means or a power for make-
do something to someone (faire-faire), but also for make-know (faire-savoir) or make-
believe (faire-croire) something to someone. Bourdieu is also clear on this issue, when 
he states that symbolic power is the power for imposing the legitimate principle of 
vision and division of the world
1, or, in other words, the power for imposing one’s own 
ideology. 
One of the main features of capital is its convertibility: capital has the intrinsic 
ability to change its nature. For instance, economic capital (material resources) can be 
converted into cultural capital (diploma), which in turn can give rise to social positions 
that guarantee more material resources (economic capital), etc. In particular, the 
political field is characterized by the struggle for a special form of (symbolic) capital: 
political capital. Bourdieu defines it as a capital based on recognizability and 
reputation. This conception is linked to those of face or image and ethos: candidates 
discursively manage their face and intervene in that of their opponents in order to 
increase their own credibility and decrease that of their opponents. As stated above, 
political capital, face, ethos, can all be subsumed under the construct of 
presidentiability. 
Thanks to its convertibility, political capital can be transformed into social capital 
(votes) and economic capital (resources). Candidates fight to boost their political capital 
                                                          
1
 Bourdieu says: “the categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the 
words, the names which constructs social reality as much as they express it, are the stake par excellence 
of political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division” (1989: 
20-21, my italics). 
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and reduce that of their opponents in order to convert it into social capital. As Bourdieu 
shows, social capital and political capital are closely intertwined. Thanks to the logic of 
representation (Bourdieu 1981, 1984b), votes metaphorically represent the width of the 
social support of a party, or, in other words, the social representativity of a party, i.e., 
which part of the society a party represents and how big it is; or, again, how widely 
shared is the partial principle of vision or division of the world, which is a form of 
defining the ideology. Since in the so-called ‘representative democracies’ power is 
distributed on the basis of representativity, votes – which are a way for representing the 
social support – mean power. This is the moment when political capital becomes social 
capital, i.e. this is the moment when one form of power is transformed into another. For 
candidates, votes represent the legal and popular legitimacy of a president, yet they also 
represent the legitimacy of parties, the party system and representativity: they legitimate 
not only the president and the party that won the elections, but also the entire 
representative party system. 
 
0.1.2. The management of presidentiability 
This dissertation also attempts to answer a second question: how candidates manage 
their presidentiability. The starting point is to acknowledge that Politics is an activity 
conducted through discourse and in particular through symbols (Edelman 1964). The 
way candidates obtain (more) votes is through discourse: candidates ask for votes, since 
every other means of obtaining them, such as buying them or physically forcing or 
intimidating the electorate, should in no sense whatsoever be considered political, since 
such practices cannot be considered ‘fair play’ according to the rules of the political 
game. But 1) candidates rarely ask the electorate directly for their vote; instead, they 
present themselves as the best option and the other as the worst; 2) candidates do not 
only ask their own voters for votes. If electors were stable in their choices there would 
be no game at all and the election results would always be the same. Hence the goal of 
the game is on the one hand to maintain one’s own voters, and on the other hand to 
deduct votes from the other(s) candidate(s): the aim is to prevent one’s own electors 
from giving their vote to other candidates, and to win votes from voters who (could) 
vote for other candidates. 
Political communication has often been termed ‘persuasive’ and of course it is; in 
this dissertation I try to define what it is that receivers are persuaded about. Receivers, 
i.e. electors, are persuaded that the candidate to whom they should give their vote is the 
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best one, the most presidentiable, whilst the other candidates are the worst, the least 
presidentiable. In other words, candidates are constantly engaged in a struggle to 
increase their own presidentiability by presenting themselves positively, and to decrease 
that of other by presenting them in a negative light. This discourse is ideological, not 
only because it expresses political ideologies and stances, but especially since one of the 
main functions of ideology is legitimizing the group and the way it categorizes the 
world and actions within it and delegitimizing others (van Dijk 1998; Larraín 1979; 
Chilton & Schaffner 1997). In presenting themselves as the most presidentiable, 
candidates construct their legitimacy and destruct other’s legitimacy through discourse, 
prior to obtaining electoral legitimacy. 
In order to shed light on how the discursive management of presidentiability 
(construction, deconstruction, increasing, decreasing, attack, defense, etc.) works within 
the debates, I will analyze the main discursive strategies, moves and devices employed 
by the candidates within the two televised debates. The candidates use metaphors, 
presuppositions, narratives, reported speech and quotations, deixis, arguments, mainly 
ad hominem, and loci to strategically describe actors and actions, with the aim of 
presenting themselves in a positive manner whilst presenting their opponent in a 
negative light, basing their arguments on a series of key topics.   
The description of the dynamics of the two debates (the answer to the how-
question) together with the description of the political field (the answer to the why-
question) will allow us to highlight the fact that this dynamic of reciprocal attacks is 
determined by the actual structure of the Spanish political field: if, according to the 
logic of representation and to the working of the field, the candidates achieve social 
capital (votes) by taking it away from their opponent, and if social capital is a function 
of political capital, it goes without saying that the candidates will attack each other in 
order to reduce their opponent’s political capital. This dissertation shows how this 
dynamics worked in the 2008 Spanish elections. 
This discussion on the structure of the political field and the dynamics of the 
candidates’ interaction in the two debates will allow us to draw some conclusions 
regarding the main features of Spain’s institutional political field. We will see, for 
instance, that as a consequence of the mediatization of politics (and for the need for 
simplification that it induces) and of people’s need for symbols, electoral discourse is 
somewhat reduced to a staged fight between heroes and villains. Moreover, due to a 
structural feature of the field as the need for the two parties to win over voters form the 
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center of the political spectrum, i.e. from the most undecided electors, their discourses 
become increasingly similar. This symbolic, simplified, and ritual representation of 
politics allows the two main Spanish parties to maintain their monopoly in the political 
field. The critical implication of this point is that only a new structure of the Spanish 
political field could determine new socio-discursive dynamics.  
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0.2. Structure of the dissertation 
This work is structured in two parts. Part one presents the main general theoretical 
issues, whilst part two includes the analysis of the debates.   
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework. It begins with a clarification of the 
term political discourse. It then goes on to introduce the idea that Politics is conceivable 
as a struggle between parties: I will provide some definitions of party, highlighting the 
competitiveness as the main feature of party system. I will then introduce the two main 
theoretical concepts of this work: the Bourdieuian concepts of field and capital, 
focusing on social and political capital. I will then articulate the Bourdieuian theory of 
political field and of political capital with the Argumentation theory, crucial for 
understanding a persuasive discourse such as that deployed by the two candidates 
during the debates. The point of contact between these two theories will be the 
relationship between the Bourdieuian concept of political capital, the Aristotelian 
concept of ethos, and the Goffmanian concept of face. These three concepts can be 
subsumed under the label of presidentiability. The concept of capital refers to the 
structure and function of the field, whilst the concept of ethos refers to the discursive 
nature of the construction of the image of presidentiable. Finally, the concept of face 
insists on the existence of socially relevant attributes, the interactivity of stance taking 
and the construction of presidentiability. 
Chapter 2 addresses the main social, historical and ideological features of the 
Spanish political field. Section 1 deals with the Spanish political and administrative 
structure: I will sketch the main electoral processes at the four levels (state, region, 
province, and city) and provide charts and figures in order to easily visualize the 
relations of force between the main actors of Spanish political field. I will show the 
monopoly on politics exerted by PP and PSOE. Section two addresses Spanish party 
systems, introducing the main Spanish national and regional parties. Finally, I will focus 
on the three main Spanish parties: PP, PSOE and IU; I will provide historical data, point 
out the principal ideological features (with a specific focus on how the parties describe 
themselves), and present their figures (MPs and votes).  
Chapter 3 explains how the data was collected and organized. It also justifies the 
choice of using a simplified transcription for audiovisual data. 
Chapter 4 presents the analytical framework that articulates interactional 
approaches with discursive analytical approaches. After discussing the interactivity of 
stance taking and face-work, section two of this chapter presents the main discursive 
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devices that have emerged as vital in implementing the strategies and moves for 
constructing presidentiability: metaphors; presuppositions; narratives; reported speeches 
and quotations; deixis; arguments, and loci. This section provides a brief introduction 
for each, including examples of how these discursive devices are used as resources for a 
positive self-presentation and a negative presentation of the other with the aim of 
de/increasing presidentiability. 
Part two of the dissertation, which focuses specifically on the analysis, starts with 
chapter 5, which presents the presidential debate as a stage for constructing 
presidentiability. It focuses on the debate as a communicative event: it begins by 
framing Spanish presidential debates within the history of presidential debates in the 
main Western democracies, referring to trends in debate analysis. It goes on to highlight 
the rituality of debates, insisting on the fact that they are mediatized communicative 
(pseudo)events. It also contains a description of the structure and the key features of the 
2008 Spanish presidential debates. Finally, the section stresses the importance of the 
debates for candidates’ construction of presidentiability. 
Debating candidates take stances about something; therefore presidentiability is 
constructed in relation to certain topics. The topics presented roughly match the 
thematic division of debates and this division is related to the main cleavages existing in 
Spanish society. Chapter 6 deals with the traditional and new cleavages that divide the 
three main parties and introduces the main topics and terrains of struggle in the 2008 
electoral campaign: this section will help us understand the thematic organization of the 
debates and the way candidates construct their presidentiability around certain topics 
which are relevant or have been framed as such for contemporary Spanish society. The 
main terrains of struggle for managing presidentiability are: Economy, Immigration, 
Terrorism, and the Catalan question.  
I will discuss each of these terrains and in this order in chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
Each chapter includes a brief introduction of the topic and its relevance in the agenda, 
also in relation with the wider socio-historic and cultural context of Spanish society. 
Part two of each chapter presents an analysis of the main strategies, moves and devices 
employed in constructing presidentiability. They also include a more detailed sequential 
analysis of the interaction on a particular topic: the first question that Rajoy asked 
Zapatero in the Congreso; the xenophobia; the 11M attack; and the alleged persecution 
of Castilian speakers in Catalonia. Each chapter concludes with observations about the 
main moves and devices used and the main features of the discourse produced.  
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Finally, Chapter 11 presents a summary of the work done, the main conclusions, some 
final remarks and some perspectives for further research and developments. 
The appendix provides readers with the transcriptions of the two televised 
debates, a glossary with the names of the main Spanish parties and the transcriptions of 
other secondary data, such as videos, slogans, and other materials.  
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1.1. Introducing the theoretical framework 
The basic idea upon which my theoretical framework is built is that institutional Politics 
is a struggle between parties to reach power through the imposition of an ideology –
discursively constructed and spread– that must be shared by the majority. In articulating 
this framework, my first step will be to define political discourse, I will then go on to 
discuss the concept of multidisciplinarity, since my approach is related to more than one 
discipline; I will then present a discussion on political parties as the main agents of 
institutional politics; providing some definitions of party, and highlighting the 
competitiveness of party system.  
Following Bourdieu’s sociology of fields, I will then describe Politics as a field, 
and will problematize the actions of politicians, their stakes, the logic of representation, 
and the relationships between the elected and electors, also at the light of Edelman’s 
work on the symbolism of politics. 
Since I postulate that politicians fight for some kind of capital, I will discuss the 
Bourdieuian concept of capital and in particular social and political capital; this will 
help shed some light on the structure of the field and the reasons why agents of this 
particular field act the way they do. I will then articulate the conception of political 
competition seen in the light of Bourdieuian theory of political field and of political 
capital with the argumentation theory, crucial for understanding persuasive discourses 
such as those produced by candidates during the debates. The point of contact will be 
the relationship existing between three concepts: Bourdieuian political capital, 
Aristotelian ethos, and Goffmanian face. These three concepts provide an explanation 
for the candidates’ positive self-presentation (legitimation) and negative presentation of 
the other (delegitimation) in order to obtain votes in a process that I define as the 
discursive construction of presidentiability. The section on presidentiability will be 
preceded by some reflections on ideology and its relationship with de/legitimation.  
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1.2. Defining political discourse 
Politics is essentially done through discourse (Edelman 1964: especially 114). Whilst 
discourse itself is a fuzzy term (Widdowson 2004: 1-16; Cameron 2001; for the 
definitions I will use here as a process of social interaction based on linguistic acts see 
Fairclough 1989: 24; Wodak & Meyer 2001b: 66; Calsamiglia-Blancafort & Tusón-
Valls 1999: 15; Fairclough 1992: 64; see also van Dijk 1997a; 1997b), things are 
certainly no easier for the category of political discourse (van Dijk 2000: 46), mainly 
because it is difficult to establish categories as definite containers. This is particularly 
true if we consider hybridation as a central feature of our postmodern society (Bertens 
& Natoli 2002; Blommaert 2005: 31; Fairclough 2001: 133, in the specific case of 
political discourse). 
According to Santulli (2005), any definition of political discourse –as a textual 
type with specific and distinctive features– is by nature complex and uncertain. It is 
difficult to distinguish a political discourse from a non-political one, firstly because 
politicalness intersects all spaces of social life; secondly, discourse is political – 
although perhaps a more correct term would be ideological
2– because it constitutes an 
interaction that actualizes a relationship between speaker and hearer, who are always in 
a certain relation of power (see also Mazzoleni 1998: 140; Benveniste 1966). Santulli 
stresses that discourse is a form of power, and that every linguistic interaction is the 
exercise of this power, hence every form of discourse could be considered political 




Nevertheless, even if every discourse is political, from a narrower perspective 
some discourses are more political than others. As van Dijk says: 
 
Political discourse is identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians [...]. Politicians in this 
sense are the group of people who are being paid for their (political) activities, and who are being 




                                                          
2
 Roughly I use the term here as referring to every system of values shared by a social group, even if 
redefined by individuals, with social cognitive functions of orienting individuals’ thought and behavior, 
and aimed at achieving group ends (see sub-section on Ideology). 
3
 On the Foucaultian view of discourse and its relationship with power, see Jäger (2001; especially 33-
38).  
4
 On this see also Wilson (2001). 
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We can observe that for van Dijk, the definition of political discourse is a function 
between textual and contextual features. 
I will use the term political discourse here as the discourse spoken by politicians 
(even if it is multi-authored or polyphonic, i.e. written by other and spoken by 
candidates) in more or less institutionalized political contexts and for institutional 
political aims. Moreover, according to the point of view adopted here of politics as a 
spectacle and a competitive game, I consider electoral discourse as the political 




My approach is clearly multidisciplinary or pluridisciplinary as defined, among others, 
by van Dijk (2001a: 95-96), who says that “without being eclectic, good scholarship 
[…] should integrate the best work of many people, famous or not, from different 
disciplines, countries, cultures and directions of research”. I will not engage here in an 
overview of other terms used for referring to the mixing or crossing of disciplines, as 
interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity. It should simply be noted that some scholars 
consider multidisciplinarity and pluridisciplinarity as synonyms (Darbellay 2005: 46; 
Darbellay & Paulsen 2008: 3-5), as I do, while others distinguish between these two 
concepts (Charaudeau 2010). In the field of (Critical) Discourse Studies many authors 
have posited crossing disciplines (Blommaert 2005; Fairclough 2001; van Dijk 1995b; 
1997b; 1997c; 2001a; Wodak & Fairclough 1997; Weiss & Wodak 2003; Fairclough 
2005; van Leeuwen 2005). This way of proceeding, this lack of methodology, is 
probably the main feature of CDA (van Dijk 1993d; 2001b: 352; Wodak & Meyer 
2001a; Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000; Wodak 1999: 186; 2006; Fairclough 2001), and the 
main argument for its critics, together with an overly textual approach (Cameron 2001; 
Widdowson 2004). 
My approach might appear eclectic or “undisciplined”, as Morin (2005: 79) 
provocatively puts it, especially from a perspective of scientific discipline as 
regimenting category (Foucault 1970); however, I am convinced that the complexity of 
political discourse can only be addressed from multiple perspectives, using a wide range 
of analytical tools, approaches, and perspectives. In conceptualizing the political field, 
my inspiration stems from the Bourdieuian theory of field and concept of capital. Set 
against the background of this reflection is the work of Edelman and his idea of Politics 
as a spectacle, with its rites and myths. In order to theoretically sustain the idea of 
legitimation and delegitimation, I will link three concepts from different disciplines, 
such as that of political capital, developed by Bourdieu; that of face, developed by 
Goffman, and that of ethos, as developed in the rhetoric and argumentation. As we will 
see in chapter 4, in analyzing the discourse deployed by candidates during the debates, I 
will integrate two approaches: an interactional one, focused on stance-taking and 
facework in interaction, and a discourse analytical one, which will analyze more in 
particular textual features including metaphors, presuppositions, inferences, and 
implicatures, narratives, deixis, arguments, topoi, and the interdiscursivity (reported 
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speech). Since the starting point is the definition of the structure of the political field, I 
will begin my discussion with the main actors of the political fields.  
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1.4. Parties as the main agents of institutional Politics 
The role played by parties in contemporary democratic or totalitarian societies is widely 
recognized (LaPalombara & Weiner 1966: 3). Consensus regarding the central role 
played by parties is so large that some scholars define current democracies as parties’ 
democracies (Mella-Márquez 2003[1997]: 5; Hernández-Bravo 2003[1997]: 27, who 
refers to Cotarelo 1981: 149). Nevertheless, there is no agreement on a single definition 
of political party. Without intending to provide an exhaustive vision, here I will provide 
a number of operational definitions. 
For Spanish law (BOE 2002), a political party is “un ente privado de base 
asociativa [an associative private body]”. According to Giddens, a political party: 
 
Is a group of individuals who work together because they have common backgrounds, aims or 
interests. Often a party works in an organized fashion, towards a specific goal, which is in the 
interest of the party membership (2009: 441).  
 
Giddens goes on to define a party as “an organization established with the aim of 
achieving governmental power by electoral means and using that power to pursue a 
specific programme” (id.: 128).  
Definitions given by political scientists are more specific. According to 
LaPalombara & Weiner, a political party is defined by: 
 
(1) continuity in organization-that is, an organization whose expected lifespan is not dependent on 
the life span of current leaders; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local 
level, with regularized communications and other relationships between local and national units; 
(3) self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and to hold 
decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of 
power; and (4) a concern on the part of organization for seeking followers at the polls or in some 
manner striving for popular support (1966: 6). 
 
The main elements of this definition (continuity, for the will to exert power, and 
participation in elections) are also present in the definition given by Cotarelo (1985: 
14). Sartori (2005[1976]: 56) instead presents a minimalist definition of a political party 
as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections and is 
capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for public offices” 
(for an overview, see Alcántara-Sáez 2003[1997]).  
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Parties shape and mobilize public opinion, represent social interests, guarantee some 
level of stability and order even when changes take place, limiting changes and 
containing them within (legal or non-violent) channels; in particular, they circularly 
legitimize the political system since they build and articulate citizens’ confidence in the 
party system and its own rules. In some sense they are the mediators between citizens 
and the State. Through parties, the political elites of a country are co-opted, who in turn 
constitute parliaments, institutions, governments, etc. Parties guarantee the functioning 
of politics and circularly the continuity of party systems (see Lapalombara & Weiner 
1966: 3). 
From a psychosocial point of view, a party is a group, membership of which is 
voluntary. Albeit not completely, members of party share a set of ideas whereby they 
categorize the world, i.e. phenomena, causality, social actors and social actions. This set 
of ideas is not only descriptive, in the sense that it describes the world, but also 
prescriptive, since it directs members’ behavior. This set of ideas can be roughly 
defined as ideology. One of the main elements of the thought (cognition) of members of 
a group is social categorization, i.e. the way individuals define or represent self and 
others (Tajfel 1970, 1982; Tajfel & Turner 1979; 2004 [1986]). Social definition, 
representation and categorization are discursive and are based upon two crucial 
categories: in-group (us) vs. out-group (them).  
Groups can cooperate or compete; during electioneering groups compete with 
other groups to control certain limited resources, so that categorization also is highly 
polarized. This polarization structures and reinforces the argumentation of speakers 
engaged in a competitive discursive practice such as electioneering; polarization is also 
perceived as constitutive of the situation by receivers (it is contextually relevant) and 
actually influences receivers’ interpretation of discourse. 
Summing up, political parties are organically structured and institutionalized 
groups whose goal is to achieve –through electioneering– manage and increase power; 
they need popular support and therefore need to convince people to embrace the 
ideology they propose. 
It is clear to all that politicians contend for power, and that competition is one of 
the central features of democratic party-systems (Méndez de Hoyos 2003). This is 
especially evident in the case of electioneering. In ordinary language, electioneering is 
also defined as a ‘competition’, as a ‘war’ or as a ‘game’. The use of these metaphors to 
describe Politics is neither new nor surprising (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004; 
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Fritsch 2000: 27-28). French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, from whom I will draw 
extensively on the following pages, also considers Politics as a space for enacting 
struggles, and defines it – albeit in a broader sense than commonly understood– as a 
“jeu [game]” (1981: 6). As in every game, there is a field, the space(s) where 
participants compete delimited and separated from the rest; a number of participants, 
differentiated from those who are not taking part in the game, spectators; a set of rules, 
which are constitutive of the game itself; and above all a reward for which participants 
compete. The following section addresses these issues.  
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1.5. Politics as a zero-sum game 
We have seen that electioneering, with parties competing for a reward, can be conceived 
through the well-known metaphor of the game. Indeed, electioneering is a particular 
kind of game: a zero-sum game. Roughly it is a sub-type of “constant sum games”, i.e. 
games where the total amount of what can be won or lost remains unchanged; since in 
this kind of game if one player wins, other(s) lose(s), it is a non-cooperative game, 
characterized by conflict. The concept of game and game theory is the result of research 
aimed at the application of mathematical methods to the analysis and prediction of 
human behavior
5
. This theory and its concepts have been applied firstly and most often 
to economic behavior, but also to political behavior
6
. 
The definition of the zero-sum game provided above applies to electioneering; 
since in political elections only one party can win, i.e. run the government, while the 
other(s) lose(s). Nevertheless, even though running the government is the ultimate aim, 
it is reached by firstly obtaining a fundamental resource, namely social capital. Given a 
fixed amount of the winnable resources, of social capital, competitors act out strategies 
designed to achieve the maximum amount of social capital by taking it away from 
other(s). It is social capital that guarantees access to resources (a deeper analysis of 
social capital is given in section 1.6.4). This conception of electioneering is also 
extremely clear for political agents: note for instance the definition provided by Joan 
Campmany, the advertiser responsible for the 2004 electoral campaign for the PSOE, 
won by Zapatero7:  
 
In Politics, if one wins, another loses. [...] In Politics, there is no doubt about the fact that votes 
sum or subtract in a perfect arithmetical way; peaceful coexistence between parties is simply 
impossible (2005: 86, my translation).  
 
This situation of the zero-sum game is especially evident in two-party-systems, as in 
Spain, where only one of the two main parties (PP and PSOE) can obtain a majority.  
                                                          
5
 See for instance the seminal book written by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1953[1944]: especially p. 
46-49) or Davis (1983: chs. 2 and 3). For an easy introduction see Carmichael (2005: i-xx and on zero-
sum games p. 12).  
6
 See, for instance, Colomer (1995) or Morrow (1994). 
7
 Joan Campmany (agency DDB) organized the PSOE 2004 electoral campaign, while PSOE 2008 
campaign was run by the agency Sra Rushmore. These statements obviously do not exclude the fact that 
the competition could be fictitious. 
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In order for candidates to obtain more social capital to access power they must remove 
it from their competitors. We will see below that social capital, i.e. the social support 
measurable by votes, is a function of political capital, i.e. recognizability and 
reputation; so that more recognizability and reputation = more votes. To achieve more 
social capital (votes) candidates need to convince their own electors to continue voting 
for them, whilst at the same time persuading those voting for other candidates to change 
and vote for them. They do so by increasing their own political capital. Candidates 
increase their political capital by enhancing their recognizability and reputation and that 
of the party they belong to. Obviously this is linked to image management. Candidates 
must be known: electors must know them and recognize them from amongst other 
candidates; but electors must also have a favorable opinion of candidates in order to 
vote for them. This issue is related to the marketization of politics (branding the leader, 
making him recognizable to the audience) and the efforts to generate associations of the 
leader with positive values (presenting him as desirable). One can easily see that this 
exercise could be labeled as face-work (in Goffmanian terms) and is related to the 
question of ethos as used in classical and modern Rhetoric (see below). Since, according 
to Bourdieu, the political field is relational, the increase in one’s own social capital 
implies the decrease of that of others (voters that once voted for X now vote for Y); 
homologically, the increase in one’s own political capital (reputation) is accompanied 
by a decrease in others’ reputation: for this reason candidates are constantly engaged in 
positively presenting themselves and negatively presenting others. 
A way of measuring social capital is to measure consensus. One of the most 
accepted and popular ways of doing this is computing votes (see Sartori 2005[1976]). 
Votes are a way of representing social capital. The way votes are represented as a 
totality, as a “fromage [cheese]” in TV graphics (Bourdieu 1988: 3), shows that votes 
can be considered as a whole, as the reward of the political game. Political parties 
attempt to obtain a majority share in this “fromage”. This is so because institutional 
politics works according to the logic of representation; within this logic, the number –
the number of persons represented by a successful candidate– is of considerable 
significance, since the representative’s power (and legitimacy) grows in relation to the 
number of people he represents (Bourdieu 2000: 84). This issue is addressed in greater 
depth in the next section.   
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1.6. The logic of representation and the functioning of the field 
The way parties strive to obtain power could not be adequately understood without 
taking into account the logic of representation as explained by Bourdieu and Politics as 
characterized by professionalization, delegation, and concentration of social capital.  
Together with journalists, Bourdieu considers politician to be the main agents of 
the political field, which they constitute and perpetuate. Politicians are the players; they 
are inside the political field, while voters are outside it, since they do not partake of 
politicians’ stakes. Nevertheless, even though they are external to the game, voters are 
necessary for its perpetuation, which prevents the political field from being completely 
autonomous: politicians must regularly submit to voters’ judgment (Bourdieu 2000: 63). 
Politics is not for everybody (Bourdieu 2002b[1984]), since in order to acquire 
political competence a vast amount of capital is needed: economic capital, time and 
education are needed to acquire political habitus, i.e. to know how to behave as a 
politician
8
. Politicians are competent in politics; they are professionals of Politics 
(“initiated”, “clergy” or “ministries”), while voters are laymen (“profanes”). Politicians 
represent laymen; but this concept of representation is far from simple. Politicians 
express and defend the interests of persons as if they were a group. But to act as a group 
and wield greater force, individuals have to lose their individual forces, conceding them 
to an individual who concentrates their voices into one voice (Bourdieu 1984b: 49). 
Consequently, representative groups exist when isolated individuals with the same 
principle of vision and division of the world (the same ideology) delegate their power to 
permanent organs with the plena potestas dicendi et agendi, the party. In further degrees 
of delegation, the party delegates a group within the party (permanent committee) to 
represent the Party, and in turn this permanent organ delegates one person to represent 
itself, the entire Party and its voters (id.: 50). This concentration of voices, actually a 
concentration of capital, and by extension of power, is the way representation works 
(Bourdieu 1981; 1984a; 1984b; 1988). 
It should be noted that since the representative acts/speaks in the name of and in 
the place of others, the greater the number of others, the more powerful the 
representative will be. This is the reason why candidates and parties fight for votes, to 
increase the amount of social capital (votes are a form of measuring this) and political 
                                                          
8
 Habitus can be roughly defined as the system of long-lasting dispositions or schemata determined by 
social structure and that determine the way individuals perceive the world and behave in it (see Bourdieu 
1980: chs. 3 and 4; 2000[1972a]; 2000[1972b]). 
23 
 
capital (increasing the number of persons that can identify with the politician/party). Yet 
votes as social capital, and recognizability and reputation as political capital, are at the 
same time a means and an aim (which is a quality of all the forms of capital, see below). 
The way Bourdieu puts it is especially clear:  
 
Dans les démocraties parlementaires, la lutte pour conquérir l’adhésion des citoyens (leur vote, 
leur cotisations, etc.) est aussi une lutte pour maintenir ou subvertir la distribution du pouvoir sur 
les pouvoir publics (ou si l’on préfère, pour le monopole de l’usage légitime des ressources 
politiques objectivées, droit, armée, police, finances publique, etc.). Les agents par excellence de 
cette lutte sont le partis, organisations de combat spécialement aménagées en vue de mener cette 
forme sublimée de guerre civile en mobilisant durablement par des prévisions prescriptives le plus 
grand nombre possible d’agents dotée de la même vision du monde social et de son avenir. Afin 
d’assurer cette mobilisation durable, les partis doivent d’une part élaborer et imposer une 
représentation du monde social capable d’obtenir l’adhésion du plus grand nombre possible de 
citoyens e d’autre part conquérir des postes (de pouvoir ou non) capables d’assurer un pouvoir sur 
leurs attributaires politiques (Bourdieu 1981: 8). 
 
The passage highlights that political field is the social space where struggles for power 
take place. But what is this power parties are constantly seeking for? Concrete resources 
(money, cars, apartments, etc.) as well as symbolic resources (influence on others, their 
thinking and behavior). As is evident from the previous point, and as Bourdieu claims, 
power is capital and vice versa (1986[1983]: 243). Therefore, since capital equates 
power, we can see the way one form of capital can circularly transform itself into 
another form of capital: social capital is necessary for acquiring and maintaining power, 
which is the real aim of politicians. However, social capital is in itself a power. For this 
reason capital or power is also an aim and a resource, a means. 
The fact that political field is the place in which the struggle for power is enacted 
is evident in Campmany’s statements about the nature of electioneering: “an electoral 
campaign has the virtue of clearly representing the fight for power” (2005: 9, my 
translation). Analyzing electoral discourse as a (special) form of discourse of power, we 
can unveil the ideologies that underlie signs and discourses of opposed addressers, 
uncovering the language that speakers employ when in power, or when striving to 
achieve it (Blommaert 2005: 25; Wodak & Meyer 2001a: 65; Mey 1985; Voloshinov 
1929; van Dijk 1997a). This is my intention, here, through the analysis of the way 
candidates manage presidentiability with processes of de/legitimation. In this 
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perspective, an electoral campaign is a privileged point for witnessing the (semiotic) 
fight for symbolic supremacy: competitors struggle to impose their own words, 
interpretations, symbols and (preferred) meanings over those of others, in order to 
construct and transmit an image of reality that favors the achievement of their own 
social ends, i.e. to increase their social capital in order to control other resources, and 
thereby control power. This vision of the political space as an arena could explain why 
the discourse produced by candidates is aimed at telling voters that one option 
(themselves) is legitimate, whilst another (the other) is not. The struggle to achieve 
greater power, thus, passing through the struggle for political and social capital, is, as 
Bourdieu himself as well as Edelman noted, a symbolic struggle: a battle of words, of 
meanings. As Bourdieu puts it, it is a way of imposing the group’s principle of vision and 
of division of the society (a principle which is functional to the achievement of group’s 
interest), i.e. for achieving and maintaining symbolic power, or, semiotic hegemony. 
Hegemony is reached when the partial (etymologically intended as ‘belonging to the 
party’) principle of vision and division is naturalized as objective and inevitable, so that it 
is impossible to imagine something different, it becomes common sense thanks to 
consensus. In other words, as symbolic power, hegemony is power acknowledged but not 
recognized as power or domination: it is domination interiorized as natural, and 
consequently does not need coercion to be exerted. In this sense, hegemonic discourse is 
discourse perceived not as dominating, but rather as natural
9
. 
In his works, Bourdieu states that every political field is bipolar, i.e. organized 
around two opposite poles: for instance, right/left, liberal/conservative, etc. (1981: 10), 
both fighting to impose their principle of vision and of division of the world, i.e. their 
ideologies. Therefore, since in order to achieve more power (power, for instance, to 
decide about state-owned resources and the way of managing them) candidates need to 
obtain the maximum amount of social capital (support = votes) and political capital 
(visibility and reputation), candidates have to present themselves in a positive light and 
present their opponents negatively. In short, during electioneering candidates’ 
discourses are aimed at accrediting (legitimizing) themselves and discrediting 
(delegitimizing) their opponents.  
                                                          
9
 Power, Bourdieu says, is always arbitrary and powerful people always try to naturalize the arbitrariness 
of their power in order to make it more acceptable (1977: 164; cf. also Briggs 1992). Naturalization is 
related to the Gramscian concept of common sense (Gramsci 1971: 322, 323-326, 422, 424; see also 
Raiter 2001; 2003). 
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1.7. Conceptual frame 
 
1.7.1. Fields  
The Bourdieuian concept of field (Bourdieu 1981; 1995; 2000; 2002a[1984]; for an 
introduction see Bonnewitz 2002: 41-75; see also Wacquant 2004) will be the main 
starting point for the analysis deployed here of the Spanish political field and the way 
presidentiability is constructed. According to Bourdieu, social space is constituted by 
delimitated sub-spaces of social practice and habitus, called fields. These fields are 
more or less autonomous and interrelated in different degrees: artistic, intellectual, 
scientific, economic, political field, etc. Fields are fields of forces (“champs de force”), 
where agents with specific habitus and knowledge compete for limited specific capitals, 
for different forms of capital (see below), and to dominate the field, thereby changing 
the relations of power existing at each moment in a given field. The most prominent 
agents of each field are those who have the most pertinent capital within the 
corresponding field. Positions within the field are relative and temporarily limited; 
hence the situation is dynamic. 
Even though fields differ from each other in relation to “enjeux [stakes]”, 
composition, etc., they do have some laws in common. (a) A field has a specific stake, 
which could be considered useless or go unnoticed outside it or in other fields. For the 
perpetuation of field, agents must believe in the game, play it, and share the same 
illusions about the importance of the game and of its stakes, which can be material or 
symbolic. (b) Within the field agents are secretly in collusion with each other. Even 
though they compete, they share common interests, such as the survival of the field 
itself. (c) The stake for each field is the monopoly or exclusive control of the specific 
authority. Agents compete to maintain or improve their position. The best way to do this 
is by dominating the principle of hierarchization
10
. Dominating a field means setting the 
game rules, the pertinent capitals, etc. For every field there are orthodox/heterodox, 
legitimate/illegitimate positions, as well as gate keeping for agents and capital.  
We will now specifically address the question of political field.  
                                                          
10
 Bourdieu says “imposer la vision légitime du monde social” (1995: 16) or the legitimate principle of 
vision and division (1981: 4, 8 et seq.). 
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1.7.2. Political field 
In general terms, the political field comprises the political structure of a given country 
(a given political system) at a given moment, as well as the set of the agents acting 
within the field: their aims, the game rules, and the forces that regulate their actions. 
Bourdieu defines it as follows: 
 
le champ [politique] est un microcosme, c’est une sorte de monde séparé, de monde à part, fermé 
sur lui même, en grand partie, pas complètement, sinon la vie politique serait impossible, mais 
assez ferme sur lui même et assez indépendant de ce qui se passe a l’extérieur. Et c’est dans ce 
petit monde, ce microcosme, que se joue un jeu tout à fait particulier dans lequel s’engendrent des 
intérêts particuliers. Je crois que c’est la chose la plus importante: dans ce jeu auquel participent 
évidemment les hommes politiques, les députés, etc., mais aussi des journalistes, des 
commentateurs politiques, des sondeurs, etc. se définissent des intérêts qui sont indépendants des 
intérêts des simples votants, de la clientèle (2000: 35). 
 
In this definition three things need to be highlighted: a) the separation and the relative 
autonomy of the field from the rest of society, something on which Bourdieu insists on 
various occasions (2000: 52); b) the fact that politicians’ interests are different from 
citizens’ interests, something that matches with Edelman’s observations (1964); c) the 
role of journalists (and more generally of the media system) as agents of the political 
field rather than simple observers, as journalists try to portray themselves (2000: 76; 
Champagne 1988).This leads Bourdieu to talk about a real “connivance” between 
politicians and journalists; on this particular point Bourdieu also clarifies the circular 
circulation of doxa (received ideas, dominant thought and discourse) among politicians 
and journalists: 
 
Je pense qu’il y a une [...] connivence entre les très grands journalistes politiques, ceux qui sont 
connus par la télévision, etc. et les hommes politiques; connivence qui repose sur une familiarité 
réelle: ce sont des gens qui se voient constamment. [...] Il s’ensuit que les uns et les autres 
s’imprègnent mutuellement d’idées qui circulent circulairement –et que j’appelle la doxa politique, 
c’est-à-dire un ensemble d’idées reçues qui sont en deçà même de la croyance, par exemple, 
actuellement la vision néolibérale. [...] Et ces connivences reposant sur la familiarité [...] sont, je 
pense, un des facteurs de la fermeture du monde politique. Et les journalistes qui se pensent 
comme des observateurs du champ politique sont en fait des agents du champ politique [...] par les 




This last point, as we will see more in detail in the analytical chapters, will be visible in 
the dominant discourse or doxa, created and spread by politicians during the debate on 
certain topics. Like other fields, the political field is “un champ de forces et un champ 
de lutte pour transformer ces rapports de force” (2000: 41), but it works as a game 
whose stake is to impose the legitimate principles of vision and division, i.e. the right 
principles of categorization of the social world (2000: 67). This latter point shows that 
the main stake for politicians is to impose their ideology: 
 
Dans le champ politique, si je dis que la division majeure est celle des riches et des pauvres, 
j’obtiens une certaines structure sociale. Si je dis que c’est la division entre les Français et les 
étrangers, j’obtiens toute une autre structure. […] Si le principe de division que je propose est 
reconnu de tous, […] si tout le monde voit le monde comme je le vois, j’aurais alors derrière moi 
toute la force des gens qui partagent ma vision (2000: 63). 
 
It is clear that social capital, the social support underpinning an idea, equates to the 
number of persons behind it, i.e. the number of people that believe they are represented 
by that idea. 
As we have seen, the political field is partially but not totally closed, since 
politicians are obliged to periodically submit themselves to the electorate’s judgment; 
even though politicians may be more concerned with relations between themselves, and 
with the action aimed at perpetuating the field and its apparatuses which assure their 
existence within the field
11
, they have to interact with those who give them their 
‘power’, those who delegate their voice to them, i.e. electors. Moreover, electors give 
politicians legitimacy through their vote. For these reasons, a considerable number of 
politicians’ actions target their electors, including propaganda. Bourdieu refers several 
times to this issue of the elections as a periodical, ritual contact between the agents of 
the field (politicians) and those who are excluded from it (electors) (2000: 39), between 
players and spectators. His observations remind us that electioneering is crucial for the 
continuity of the field itself. 
The partial autonomy and the closedness of the political field also determine the 
increasing distance between electors’ and politicians’ interests (2000: 58). This point 
explains the “political deficit” many scholars have referred to (for instance, Wodak 
                                                          
11
 Bourdieu states that a great amount of the actions performed by politicians are inspired by the desire of 
and are aimed at reproducing the apparatus and politicians by the reproduction of the apparatus that 
guarantees the reproduction, i.e. its members’ political existence (2000: 66, 67).  
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2009a) and echoes Edelman’s reflections on the Politics as a spectacle whose actors 
defend their own interests (1964). Bourdieu’s observations also explain on the one hand 
politicians’ necessity of being ”plebiscited” (and therefore legitimized) by citizens 
through their vote, and on the other hand the fact that the battle taking place in the 
political field is fictive, since politicians’ first aim is to perpetuate the game (2000: 60; 
Martin-Rojo 2000a; 2000b: 173, 180-183). The fact that electioneering is a ritualized 
and performed competition means that instead of being, as political mythology presents 
them, the highest moment of political participation, it is instead a form of 
demobilization and depoliticization (Bourdieu 1986: 241, footnote 1). Interestingly 
enough, together with this latter issue, Bourdieu often also draws a very common 
parallelism whereby electors are buyers, clients, consumers and parties are producers of 
political products (Bourdieu 2000). 
As we have seen, in his definition of political field, Bourdieu openly refers to 
competitiveness: in fact, he defines it as an “arena”, a term which metaphorically recalls 
spectacular battle and fights, as a space where struggles take place: 
 
Le champ politique est une ‘arène’ qui se donne comme telle et dans laquelle il y a des combats, 
des affrontements déclarés. Comme dans touts les champs, il y a accumulation de force, de capital 
politique, c’est-à-dire de réputation (c’est ce qui fait que les hommes politiques sont 
particulièrement vulnérables aux scandales). C’est de la réputation, de la renommée, si possible de 
la bonne renommée […]. Ce capital politique, qui s’accumule selon une logique tout à fait 
particulière, s’accumule à la fois vis-à-vis des profanes mais aussi à l’intérieur du champ politique 
(2000: 39-40). 
 
The previous passage also refers to the main point, i.e. that one of the main forces of the 
political field is political capital. It is at the same time a goal and a means, which thanks 
to its convertibility, inherent to every form of capital, can be used to achieve further 
aims. 




Capital is one of the main concepts in Bourdieu’s sociology. Capital, Bourdieu says, can 
be summed up in the amount of accumulated labor. It has the “potential capacity to 
produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form” (1986: 241). 
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Bourdieu also distinguished the guises that capital can take: it can be economic, social, 
cultural or symbolic (1982; 1986; 1987). Economic capital is the amount of material 
resources: money, property, cars, etc. Cultural capital is the accumulation of 
culture/knowledge: embodied in individuals, i.e. their knowledge; objectivized in the 
material form of books, paintings, statues, etc.; or institutionalized in form of degrees 
and other academic qualifications. Social capital is the total amount of potential/actual 
resources derived from one’s own network of relationships, the resources based on 
belonging to a group. Symbolic capital is the amount of capital that does not seem to be 
capital at all, i.e. prestige, charisma, status, etc. is “the form that the various species of 
capital assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” (Bourdieu 
1989[1987]: 17). In another sense of ‘symbolic’, we can say that it is capital that is 
constructed and transmitted mainly semiotically, i.e. created and interchanged by signs, 
and more particularly by symbols. 
The four types of capital are strictly and problematically intertwined and can be 
converted from one another. For instance, a specific knowledge and specific habitus of 
behaving as a politician as well as specific degrees or qualifications are needed to 
acquire political capital. Obtaining these habitus and specific knowledge/degrees 
individuals takes time, which must be stolen from the work for subsistence (people can 
only study if they are not obliged to work for their living), so a certain amount of 
economic capital is needed; also a solid network of social relations (family, 
acquaintances and friends) is necessary in order to enter political groups, hence of the 
need for some social capital (and in turn some economic capital is needed to maintain 
social capital); some charisma or at least a certain amount of recognizability is needed 
for achieving political posts, etc. 
Obviously the above example does not show all the possible interrelations 
between the different forms of capital or the different kinds of possible conversions. In 
the following sub-section I will consider the issue of social capital and political capital 
in greater depth. 
 
1.7.4. Social capital and political capital 
The notion of social capital (Bourdieu 1980; 1986) is of particular interest for the 
purpose of this work. I argue that it can be measured by computing the number of votes 





. In order to provide a clear definition of this kind of capital 
which, together with the political capital is the most useful tool for understanding how 
political field works and the process of construction of presidentiability, it is worth 
quoting Bourdieu: 
 
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition –or in other words, to membership in a group– which provides each of its members 
with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in 
the various senses of the word. These relationships may exist only in the practical state, in material 
and/or symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and 
guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a 
school, a party, etc.) and by a whole set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and 
inform those who undergo them; in this case, they are more or less really enacted and so 
maintained and reinforced, in exchanges […]. The volume of the social capital possessed by a 
given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and 
on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each 
of those to whom he is connected […] (1986: 248-249). 
 
As we can see, Bourdieu explicitly refers to parties as socially instituted groups that 
embody a social network. Bourdieu also takes into account the fact that producing 
social capital requires an effort, ongoing work which entails a loss of time and energy, 
hence directly or indirectly, a loss of economic capital, and states that: “this is one of the 
factors which explain why the profitability of this labor of accumulating and 
maintaining social capital rises in proportion to the size of the capital” (1986: 250); this 
latter point explains politicians’ efforts to keep their electors, given the importance of 
the rewards of the political game. Bourdieu goes on to analyze the institutionalization of 
social capital and establish the main feature of the logic of representation, and therefore 
the main feature of the functioning of political parties, i.e. the concentration of social 
capital:    
                                                          
12
 Even if Bourdieu’s concept of social capital is more related to physical practices, it is possible to 
expand it beyond its original definition by acknowledging that social relationships, especially in 
contemporary societies, are increasingly mediated (Thompson 1995). 
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Every group has its more or less institutionalized forms of delegation which enable it to 
concentrate the totality of the social capital, which is the basis of the existence of the group (a 
family or a nation, of course, but also an association or a party), in the hands of a single agent or a 
small group of agents and to mandate this plenipotentiary, charged with plena potestas agendi et 
loquendi, to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and so, with the aid of this 
collectively owned capital, to exercise a power incommensurate with the agent’s personal 
contribution […]. The mechanisms of delegation and representation (in both the theatrical and the 
legal senses) which fall into place –that much more strongly, no doubt, when the group is large and 
its members weak– as one of the conditions for the concentration of social capital (among other 
reasons, because it enables numerous, varied, scattered agents to act as one man and to overcome 
the limitations of space and time) also contain the seeds of an embezzlement or misappropriation 
of the capital which they assemble (1986: 251). 
 
This is a crucial point, which refers to the fact that some members of a group, receiving 
and managing the power from other members of the same groups, dispossess them of 
the power they receive. Yet this feature is a constant in political representation. As 
Bourdieu continues: 
 
This embezzlement is latent in the fact that a group as a whole can be represented, in the various 
meanings of the word, by a subgroup, clearly delimited and perfectly visible to all, known to all, 
and recognized by all, that of the nobiles, the ‘people who are known,’ the paradigm of whom is 
the nobility, and who may speak on behalf of the whole group, represent the whole group, and 
exercise authority in the name of the whole group […]. Similarly, phenomena such as the 
‘personality cult’ or the identification of parties, trade unions, or movements with their leader are 
latent in the very logic of representation. Everything combines to cause the signifier to take the 
place of the signified, the spokesmen that of the group he is supposed to express, not least because 
his distinction, his ‘outstandingness,’ his visibility constitute the essential part, if not the essence, 
of this power, which, being entirely set within the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment, is 
fundamentally a symbolic power; but also because the representative, the sign, the emblem, may 
be, and create, the whole reality of groups which receive effective social existence only in and 
through representation (1986: 251-252). 
 
In this passage we can see the reasons why Politics becomes increasingly personalized, 
as well as the leaders’ need for visibility. It is worth focusing on what Bourdieu adds 
(id.: footnote 17), since it allows us to relate social and symbolic capital: “social capital 
is so totally governed by the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment that it always 
functions as symbolic capital”. This means that social and symbolic capital, as well as 
political capital (which is a particular case of symbolic capital) are strictly intertwined, 
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since they all work following the logic of connaissance, reconnaissance and 
méconnaissance: politicians’ political capital (visibility and reputation) is inseparable 
from the social relationships created and maintained within the group that recognizes 
politicians as the mandated; at the same time political capital is a form of symbolic 




1.7.4.1. Social capital and votes 
Bourdieu says that votes are the symbolic and material force offered by laymen to 
politicians (1981: 14). Before reaching this conclusion, Bourdieu explains the 
relationship between capital and votes: he claims, for instance, that the force of political 
discourse depends on social and symbolic capital; on the number of persons that 
recognize themselves in it (1981: 12-13).  
 
La force d’un discours dépende moins de ses propriétés intrinsèques que de la force mobilisatrice 
qu’il exerce, c’est-à-dire, au moins pour une part, du degré auquel il est reconnu par un groupe 
nombreux et puissant qui se reconnait en lui et dont il exprime les intérêts (sous une forme plus ou 
moins transfigure et méconnaissable) (1981: 12-13). 
 
Bourdieu also states that politicians fight to increase the number of people they 
represent, for the monopoly of the right to speak and act on behalf of and instead of 
laymen, who in turn confer a voice and force on politicians through their votes.    
 
Le champ politique est donc le lieu d’une concurrence pour le pouvoir qui s’accomplit par 
l’intermédiaire d’une concurrence pour les profanes, ou mieux, pour le monopole du droit de 
parler et d’agir au nom d’une partie ou de la totalité des profanes. Le porte-parole s’approprie non 
seulement la parole du groupe, c’est à dire, la plupart du temps son silence, mais aussi la force 
même de ce groupe, qu’il contribue à produire en lui prêtant une parole reconnue comme légitime 
dans le champ politique. La force des idées qu’il propose se mesure [...] à la force de mobilisation 
qu’elles enferment, c’est à dire à la force du groupe qui les reconnait [...] et qu’il peut manifester 
en recueillant ses voix (1981: 13). 
 
Therefore, in politicians’ fight for the monopoly of representation, the importance of a 
party is measured by the number of voices/votes (these two terms are interestingly 
                                                          
13
 Remember that, according to Bourdieu, symbolic capital is “the recognition, institutionalized or not, 
that [agents] receive from a group” (1991[1982]: 72) and that “political capital is a form of symbolic 
capital, credit, founded on credence or belief and recognition” (id.: 192). 
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synonymous in French) that the party represents (id.). Also in Sartori (2005[1976]) 
votes are the measure of the power of a party. 
 
1.7.4.2. Political capital as symbolic capital 
We will now take a closer look at political capital, as it is crucial in order to understand 
the reasons why politicians accredit themselves and discredit others. As Bourdieu says: 
 
Le capital politique est une forme de capital symbolique, crédit fondé sur la croyance et la 
reconnaissance [...] l’homme politique tient sa force politique de la confiance qu’un groupe place 
en lui (1981: 14). 
 
The specific nature of political capital must be stressed here: namely the fact that it is 
based 1) on recognizability and 2) credibility. On the one hand, it depends on the 
visibility of the candidate, and on the other hand, on the faith of the persons that 
recognize him. So in order to be recognized and to secure the attention they constantly 
require (Atkinson 1984; Wodak 2009a), candidates must exibit themselves.This is 
particularly true in the case of their television appearances
14
. On the other hand 
candidates must appear to be credible and associated with positive values (even if these 
values are disputed, so that what is positive for some electors is negative for others). 
This leads us to consider the fact that political capital is personalized, embodied into an 
individual, in the candidate. This explains not only the increasing personalization of 
politics (Mazzoleni 1998; Livolsi 2000), its peopleization (Charaudeau 2008) and 
mediatization
15
; but also the fact that politicians are constantly engaged in maintaining 
their much-cherished and delicate reputation against all forms of scandal (Bourdieu 
1981: 18), as well as the fact that political discourse is based on personal attacks, or 
argumentum ad hominem. As Bourdieu states
16
:  
                                                          
14
 Bourdieu himself draws attention on the role of TV. Also an ‘inside man’ as Campmany stressed that 
elections are won with TV (2005: 141); on the importance of TV for politicians for mediating interaction 
see Thompson (1995); on the role of TV and the transformation of politicians in celebrities see 
Champagne (1988: 81-83). 
15
 See, for instance, Grandi (1998b). As I posited (Screti 2013a), these terms indicate the interdependency 
between politics and the media, as well as the fact that politicians act like media celebrities (Bourdieu 
2000; Wodak 2009), but especially what has been alternatively defined as the ‘eventization’, 
‘theatrization’ or ‘spectacularization’ of politics (Rieffel 1989; as for Spain, see for instance, Del Rey-
Moratò 1989; Muñoz-Alonso 1989; Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999). 
16
 As many other authors, Bourdieu confuses argumentum ad hominem and ad personam, the latter 
(personal attack and disqualification) being a particular case of the former (Amossy 2010: 131-133). Even 
though it is now common to use the two terms interchangeably, the term ad personam would have had the 
merit of highlighting the embodied feature of political capital. 
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La violence de la polémique politique, et le recours constant à la mise en question éthique, qui 
s’arme le plus souvent d’arguments ad hominem, s’explique aussi par le fait que les idées-force 
doivent une partie de leur crédit au crédit de la personne que les professe et qu’il ne s’agit pas 
seulement de les refuser, par une argumentation purement logique et scientifique, mais de les 
discréditer en discréditant leur auteur. Par la licence qu’elle donne de combattre les adversaires 
dans leurs idées mais aussi dans leur personne, la logique du champ politique fournit un terrain 




This quote shows how personalized political discourse is and the way it works: by 
increasing and defending one’s own political capital, as well as attacking that of others. 
In other words, it works through the positive self-presentation or self-legitimation and 
the negative presentation or delegitimation of the other(s).  
As we have seen, political capital is a special form of symbolic capital, based on 
recognizability, fame, and reputation (1991[1982]: 192). The following definition is 
particularly clear: 
 
Il s’agit d’un capital réputationnel qui est lié à la notoriété, au fait d’être connu et reconnu, 
notable, d’où le rôle très important de la télévision, qui a introduit quelque chose d’extraordinaire 
car les gens qui n’étaient connue que par les réunions électorales sous les préaux d’école n’ont 
plus rien à voir avec ces sous-ministres dont tout le monde connait la tête pourvu qu’ils soient 
assez puissants dans leur parti pour passer à la télé. Le capital symbolique est une espèce de capital 
réputationnel, un capital symbolique lié à la manière d’être perçu (2000: 64-65). 
 
So political capital means visibility and especially a (good) reputation; for this reason 
politicians fight to be visible, recognizable, and to construct and promote a positive self-
image. This quote points out the importance of television in the construction and 
management of self-image. I will return to this in chapter 5 in order to consider 
politicians’ performance and the mediatization of politics. 
The following section provides a summary of a number of observations, before 
going on to articulate the concept of political capital with the notions of face and ethos.  
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 As many other, Bourdieu confuses argumentum ad hominem and ad personam, this latter (personal 
attack and disqualification) being a particular case of the former (Amossy 2010: 131-133). Even if it is 
now common to interchangeably use the two terms, the term ad personam would have had the merit of 




As we have seen, Bourdieu points out the competitive nature of the political game, but 
also the fact that politicians fight to change the relations of force existing within the 
field; the fact that field is (partially) separated from rest of society, and that politicians 
fight for stakes that differ from the laymen’s interests. Bourdieu also points out the 
politicians’ need for citizens’ legitimation (vote); the fact that politicians’ behavior is 
competitive but its main stake is the perpetuation of the field (connivance among 
initiated); the fact that politicians need to be visible and recognized, and the importance 
of political capital, as a particular form of symbolic capital, based on (good) reputation, 
crucial for obtaining popular support, i.e., social capital (votes). Bourdieu also states the 
paradox of representation: giving people voice silences people. All these points are 
crucial for the present work. For instance, the competitive feature of the political game 
led me to refer to politics as a zero-sum game. The politicians’ need for citizens’ 
legitimation, while they are fighting for particular ends (different from those concerning 
citizens) led me to consider Politics as spectacle. The idea that Politics is a spectacle and 
that politicians are in connivance to perpetuate the game despite the fight (reciprocal 
attacks and defense), led me to draw attention to the fact that conflict between 
politicians is only partial and often performed or overrepresented. In this way 
politicians, with the support of media system, legitimate the political system as plural, 
even if its plurality is limited. Finally, conceiving political capital as a symbolic capital 
made up of embodied and personal recognizability and reputation, led me to discuss the 
importance of ethos and facework in the way political field functions.  
In short, the political field works in the following way: politicians fight for social 
capital (popular support measurable through votes), which allows them to manage 
power (other forms of capital). Politicians try to achieve social capital by increasing 
their political capital (which is a particular form of symbolic capital), i.e. increasing 
their recognizability (which explains the importance of being visible, of showing off) 
and their reputation (which explains the importance of positive self-presentation). In 
order to obtain voters’ support, politicians must present themselves as credible, 
reputable, honest, etc. Yet at the same time they have reduce the popular support of 
other politicians, which is achieved by presenting them in a negative light. This positive 
self-presentation (self-legitimation) and negative presentation of the other 
(delegitimation) is essentially a discursive process which I have defined as the 
discursive construction of presidentiability. In order to construct the concept of 
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presidentiability, the following section articulates the Bourdieuian notion of political 




1.7.6. Self-presentation: Political capital, ethos, face 
If we agree in considering the two presidential debates as the epitome of the electoral 
campaign due to their features (maximum degree of polarization, personalization, 
eventization, concentration of all the strategies for being re-elected, performance of 
electoral discourse, etc.), the notions of political capital, ethos and face turn out to be 
fundamental for understanding the (discursive) behavior of the two candidates during 
the debate, their efforts to positively present themselves and negatively present the 
opponent. 
As we have seen above, in Bourdieu’s perspective, the political capital is a 
particular kind of highly feeble symbolic capital embodied in the person who possesses 
it, making it totally personal. Political capital is the reputation, credit, and credibility a 
politician enjoys, together with the confidence a group has deposited on him. Political 
capital is in sum, the quality of being credible, of inspiring belief. The importance of 
credibility for persuasive discourses and political discourse in particular is generally 
well-known (Pratkanis & Aronson 1992; Holly 1989). For inspiring credibility in the 
receivers the speakers must act and speak (the relationship between these two activities 
should be more deeply problematized) as if they were credible; i.e. they must perform 
as credible. 
This conception of political behavior as a performance, aimed at constructing and 
giving an impression of the self leads us to consider not only the classical theatrical 
metaphor of human behavior as occurring on a life stage (Goffman 1959, although he 
was not the first to use this metaphor!), or the notion of the spectacle applied to politics 
(Edelman 1964; 1988), but in particular the notion of face and face work or impression 
management (on this see also Brown & Levinson 1978). The notion of face allows us to 
insist on the issue of approved attributes: 
 
Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in face-to-face or 
mediated contact with other participants. In each of this contact he tends to act out what is 
                                                          
18
 Note that even if he agreed with the explicative potential of the theatrical metaphors for understanding 
Politics, Bourdieu warns against possible abuses of Goffmanian symbolic-interactionism theories (2000: 
41). Also note that other scholars have already shown the relationship existing between these three 
concepts (Amossy 1999; 2001; 2010; Maingueneau 1999). 
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sometimes called a line –that is a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his 
view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants [...]. The term face may be 
defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others 
assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of 
approved social attributes (Goffman 1972 [1967]: 5) 
 
In reality both the idea of performance and that of face are related to that of strategy, in 
the sense that (social) actors act (perform) in ways useful to the achievement of their 
particular ends. What is remarkable about Goffman’s definition of face is the fact that 
actors employ verbal and nonverbal acts in an attempt to present themselves as having 
approved (positive) social attributes. As we will see below, this issue of attributes is 
crucial for the construction of presidentiability. 
Since politicians’ behavior is eminently discursive (Edelman 1964: ch. 5), and this 
is especially true in the case of televised debates, for politicians face work is essentially 
discursive. Politicians act and speak as if they had positive social attributes, as if they 
were good and therefore credible. This latter observation brings us to the issue of 
discursive ethos. 
Ethos is one of the most complex concepts of rhetoric (Gill & Whedbee 1997: 
158, 165; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 426-432; Pratkanis & Aronson 1992; 
D’Hondt & Vanacker 2013; for a survey see Amossy 1999c; 2010a[2000]: 61-72; 
2010). One of the main areas of discussion concerns the relation between ethos and 
discourse: whether ethos is discursive, i.e. built throughout discourse, or extra-
discursive, and especially pre-discursive, i.e. whether it exists before discourse. Ethos 
would appear to be both, so we have an extra/pre-discursive ethos, which corresponds to 
the Ciceronian and Quintilian perspective, and a discursive ethos, which corresponds 
more strictly to the Aristotelian one (Amossy 1999a: 19; 1999b; 2010[2000]: 61-64; 
Maingueneau 1999: 78). Both are intertwined and influence each other (Amossy 1999b: 
especially 147-154; Haddad 1999). Even though I here I will focus mainly on discursive 
ethos, i.e. the self-image built and projected by the speaker through discourse
19
, I am 
not claiming that the construction of ethos is only discursive (see Amossy 1999b), and 
that it is independent from extra-textual (for instance socio-structural) or pre-discursive 
elements.  
                                                          
19
 For a relationship between ethos and the Bourdieuian habitus see Amossy (1999a: 29; 2010a[2000]: 
68-69); see also Maingueneau (1999: 79). 
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I will define ethos as the image (or face) built up by speakers in order to persuade their 
audience. As Barthes puts it: 
 
Ethé sont les attributs de l’orateur […]: ce sont les traits de caractère que l’orateur doit montrer à 
l’auditoire (peu importe sa sincérité) pour faire bonne impression: ce sont ses airs. […]: je dois 
signifier ce que je veux être pour l’autre. […] l’orateur énonce une information et en même temps 
il dit: je suis ceci, je ne suis pas cela (1970: 212). 
 
In this definition, there are some important elements: 1) the impression of management 
as a work that is not necessarily related to sincerity (Amossy 2010a[20000]: 64), but 
rather 2) to strategies for achieving particular ends; 3) the discursive character of ethos, 
which is built by and within discourse (Eggs 1999: 33; Dascal 1999: 69; Perelman 1977: 
111 apud Adam 1999: 101; Amossy 2010a[2000]; Maingueneau 2002); 4) the 
differential construction of ethos or self-image as opposed to the other one’s, which is 
related to the dialectic of interaction and its extreme polarization.  
Indeed, during the debates that constitute my corpus the two politicians manage 
their face or ethos or political capital by positively presenting themselves and negatively 
presenting the other independently from “reality”, with the sole end of obtaining more 
votes. They do so discursively, asking, answering, describing situations, telling stories, 
presenting arguments (most of them ad hominem), etc. and through their speech and 
particularly the way they speak, each trying to present himself as a good debater, person 
and president. Moreover, given the polarization of the communicative event and the 
structure of the political field, every time a candidate presents himself positively, he 
casts a negative light on his opponent.  
Even if in their seminal book the treatment of ethos is marginal and somewhat 
problematic (Leff 2009), it is interesting to see how Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca deal 
with this issue. First of all, they highlight the importance of discourse as “la 
manifestation par excellence de la personne” and that receivers judge speakers by their 
discourse; they also state that in demonstrative discourses or in formal deduction the 
role of speaker is less important than in argumentative discourses (1958: 426). Then 
they insist on the importance of discourse in the receivers’ evaluation of the speaker: 
 
Tenant compte des rapports qui existent entre l’opinion que l’on a de l’orateur et la manière dont 
on juge son discours, les maîtres anciens de rhétorique en ont, depuis longtemps, tiré des conseils 
pratiques, recommandant aux orateurs de donner une impression favorable de leur personne, de 
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s’attirer l’estime, la bienveillance, la sympathie de leur auditoire; leurs adversaires devaient, par 
contre, s’efforcer de les dévaluer, en attaquant leur personne et leurs intentions. L’orateur doit, en 
effet, inspirer confiance: sans elle, son discours ne mérite pas créance. Pour réfuter une accusation, 
Aristote conseille “accuser à notre tour, quiconque nous accuse, car ce serait l’absurdité même que 
l’accusateur fût jugé indigne de confiance et que ses paroles méritassent confiance” (id.: 428). 
 
In these lines we can see the importance the authors place on positive self-presentation 
(inspiring confidence) and the negative presentation of the other (attacking the other for 
presenting him as untrustworthy) through discourse. They go further than this, stating 
that discourse determines the opinion receivers have of the speaker, and providing a 
discursive definition of ethos: “Ce que les Anciens appelaient l’éthos oratoire se résume 
à l’impression que l’orateur, par ses propos, donne de lui-même” (id.: 429). Since ethos 
is incorporated in the person, it is evident that the negative presentation of the other will 
extensively use argumentum ad personam (Amossy 2001). Interestingly, Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that open ad personam attacks are sometimes 
counterproductive for the attacker; but the same applies to self-praising (id.: 428-429), 
which leads us to consider that indirectness either in attacks or in self-praise is more 
effective. So it is not through explicit utterances about his own goodness that the 
speaker convinces receivers of his presidentiability, but rather through utterances aimed 
at making them infer it. Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca also refer to the role played by 
the media (press and television) in constructing and representing the life of a public 
speaker as a pre-discursive ethos (id.: 430). On the one hand, this reference to pre-
discursive ethos reminds us of the role of context, or more precisely the pre-textual 
conditions of the text (Widdowson 2004), and highlights the importance of the media in 
constructing politicians’ public image. In connection with this idea of publicity, 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca are very clear in defining the role of discourse in building 
the speaker’s image, especially in situations where discussants debate in front of a 
public, as is the case here for presidential debates that become a duel as a consequence 
of the solidarity between speaker and speech: 
 
A cause de l’interaction constante entre le jugement que l’on porte sur l’orateur et celui que l’on 
porte sur son discours, celui qui argumente expose constamment quelque peu son prestige, qui 
s’accroît ou décroît selon les effets de l’argumentation. Une argumentation honteuse, faible ou 
incohérente, ne peut que nuire à l’orateur; la vigueur du raisonnement, la clarté et la noblesse du 
style, disposeront, par contre, en sa faveur. A cause de la solidarité entre le discours et l’orateur, la 
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plupart des discussions, spécialement devant témoins, ressemblent quelque peu à un duel, où l’on 
cherche moins l’accord que la victoire: on connaît les abus auxquels a conduit l’éristique. Mais 
rechercher des victoires, ce n’est pas seulement aspiration puérile ou manifestation d’orgueil, c’est 
aussi un moyen pour l’orateur de s’assurer de meilleures conditions pour persuader (id.: 430). 
 
This observation explains why candidates try to present themselves as good debaters; 
since a good debater is supposed to be a good person and/or a good president (see also 
Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2013e). 
Interestingly, this connection between the speech and the candidate’s character 
has been treated also by Silverstein (2011) under the label of “message”, which through 
its semiotic resonances, has the advantage of insisting on the inter-actional and 
communicational aspect of ethos or face. Silverstein traces a parallel between the term 
message and that of brand (2011: 204), but at the same time he enhances its scope, 
saying that: 
 
‘message’ is the caracteriological aura of a persona, much like a character in realist literature, who 
has not only said and done things, but who has the potential, in the fictive universe of a plot, to be 
imaginable as acting in certain ways in situations still unrealized in plot space-time (ibid.).  
 
Silverstein’s reflections also emphasize the agonistic feature of electoral campaigns, the 
competitive nature of the political game (he also uses this metaphor) and the two-fold 
nature of the political message which is always positive (candidate) and negative 
(opponent): he also insists on the mediatization of politics, giving account of the 
connivance between politicians and journalists, and in particular the fictionality and 
spectacularity of politics: as a narrative concerning heros vs. villains. As far as I 
understand it, the term message roughly matches with the political capital, and what 
Silverstein calls messaging is what I have defined as the “management of 
presidentiability”, i.e. the process of legitimation through positive self-presentation and 
delegitimation through negative presentation of the other. 
In short, the Bourdieuian notion of political capital as embodied in the candidate 
can be related to the Goffmanian notion of face and the rhetorical notion of ethos 
(discursive or extra-discursive): Goffman’s concept is more general and metaphorically 
refers to embodiment (face is a part of the body), and highlights the role of social 
interaction as well as the importance of some social attributes; Bourdieu’s concept is far 
more narrowly linked to political discourse, referring clearly to the structure of political 
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field and the relational feature of capital management; in contrast, ethos is more 
comprehensive, as it is at the same time product and process and firmly places discourse 
as the central space for negotiation. In this work the term presidentiability is used to 
subsum the three concepts of political capital, face and ethos (see section 1.6.9.). 
Before analyzing in further detail the discursive construction of presidentiability, 
i.e. how the two candidates discursively protect their ethos, and attack the other’s ethos 
or face, in order to reduce his political capital, i.e. his credibility, I will make a brief 
reference to the concept of ideology, a term which is used extensively in this work. 
 
1.7.7. Ideology 
In democratic systems, in order to obtain power, parties must win elections. As 
mentioned earlier, this is achieved by increasing their social capital, their social support, 
or, in other words, increasing the number of persons they represent. Parties achieve this 
objective by increasing the number of persons that embrace their principle of vision and 
division, their ideology. This is the reason why party discourse, which is the means by 




The vast amount of literature on ideology has as yet failed to provide a clear 
definition for this concept: indeed, scholars’ only area of consensus would appear to be 
that they are unable to agree on a definition for it (Blommaert 2005: 161; Eagleton 
1991: 1; de Beaugrande 1999: 259; Wodak 2009a: 214, footnote 6; Larrain 1979: 13). 
One of the most problematic issues is whether ideology has a negative or a positive 
meaning: 
 
On one hand, ideology may be conceived in eminently negative terms as a critical concept which 
means a form of false consciousness or necessary deception which somehow distorts men’s 
understanding of social reality […]. On the other hand, the concept of ideology may be conceived 
in positive terms
21
 as the expression of the world-view of a class. To this extent one can talk of 
‘ideologies’, in plural, as the opinions, theories and attitudes formed within a class in order to 
promote its interests (Larrain 1979: 14).  
                                                          
20
 It is evident that Rhetoric is inherent to political discourse (Santulli 2005; Pujante 1998), but it seems to 
be related even to the very activity of thinking (Billig 1991). 
21
 Rather in ‘neutral’ terms (see Eagleton 1991: 6), as vox media.  
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I am unable to resolve the insidious issues concerning the concept of ideology, and 
furthermore, this is not my aim. Instead, I am going to use it in an operative way, which, 
of course arises from the Marxist approach to ideology as “false consciousness” 
(Larrain 1979: chapter 2, especially pages 47-51; Eagleton 1994: 23-49; 1991: 1-31), 
for overcoming it without denying it. It should be noted that the negative approach to 
ideology (Fairclough 1996a[1989]: 33; 1995: 17-19; 2003a: 9; Thompson 1990: 6-7) 
differs radically from van Dijk’s definition. Whilst Fairclough accepts traditional 
(Neo)Marxist ideas about ideology, i.e. that it pertains to dominant groups and is 
essentially negative, since it veils reality in order to serve the interests of dominant 
groups, van Dijk (1998), who developed a socio-cognitive theory of ideology, considers 
that ideologies can also be positive, such as feminism, socialism or ecologism, which 
are progressive. Attaching a negative or a positive value to ideology also affects the 
relationship between legitimation and ideology (see, for instance, van Dijk 1998: ch. 26; 
but also Eagleton 1994: 6-10; 1991: 5; Larrain 1979: 47). In the negative approach to 
ideology, the ruling class proposes its own way of thinking as natural and neutral, as 
common sense (Gramsci 1971), legitimating itself and its ideology as natural. This 
process of naturalization is related to the Gramscian concept of hegemony (id.) as well 
as the Bourdieuian notion of symbolic power
22
. 
For van Dijk an ideology is “a shared framework of social beliefs that organize 
and coordinate the social interpretations and practices of groups and their members, and 
in particular also power and other relations between groups” (1998: 8)23. Van Dijk also 
highlighted that ideologies emerge when two or more groups have conflicting interests 
and compete for some limited (material or symbolic) resources (2003: 49). This 
dialectic feature of ideologies already featured in Marx’s thought (Larrain 1979: 50, 62) 
and also appears, together with the categorizing function, in Bourdieu’s definitions of 
what he calls the “principle of vision and division of the world”:  
                                                          
22
 Hegemony is achieved when the ruling class’ self-legitimizing discourse (see Marx & Engels’ 
statement (1845) that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”) is assumed as 
natural, as common sense, by subaltern classes, with no (more) need for coercion (Gramsci 1971: 322, 
323-6, 422, 424). This perspective is coherent with Bourdieu’s reflection on symbolic power, i.e. the 
power recognized as such through the misrecognition of its coercion (1977a; 1977b: ch. 4). On 
naturalization see also Raiter (2001; 2003). 
23
 As for other conceptions of ideology, it is worth referring to Lakoff (2004), where ideology seems to be 
a mental framework, something like the Weltanschauung of social actors. On the other hand, Blommaert 
stresses ideologies’ hybridation and complexity; he considers them ideal phenomena materialized and 
implemented in social practices, and represents them as systemic, polycentric, and stratified constructions 
of different layers collapsed into one (2005: 164-174; on the complexity of ideologies and their 




The categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the words, the 
names which constructs social reality as much as they express it, are the stake par excellence of 
political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division 
(Bourdieu 1989: 20-21, my italics). 
 
This quote clearly shows that ideology is mainly discursive or semiotic. And even 
though discourse is not the only societal ideological practice carried out by the members 
of a group, ideologies are essentially built and spread throughout discourse
24
. Moreover, 
discourse has long been recognized as a special form of action (Austin 1962; 1979) that 
has become increasingly important in our contemporary logocratic societies. Therefore, 
if we wish to determine the appearance, workings and reproduction of ideologies it is 
necessary to analyze their discursive manifestation (van Dijk 1998: 6). 
 
1.7.8. Ideology and de/legitimation 
One of the main social functions of ideologies is self-legitimation through discourse 
(van Dijk 1998: 255 et seq.; see also van Dijk 1995a; 2005a; 2006a): the self-
legitimation of the principles of vision and division of the world, of the principles of 
categorization, as well as of the fight for certain stakes and of the persons involved in 
this fight. Furthermore, every move for self-legitimizing in-group members, their 
ideology and their behaviors, are sided by moves for delegitimizing the ideology of 
others, their person, expressions, etc. (Chilton & Schäffner 1997: 213; Chilton 2004: 
45-47)
25
. Self-legitimation is achieved through the use of expressions with a positive 
evaluative dimension, and delegitimation through negative evaluative expressions (van 
Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). This de/legitimizing function seems to be typical of political 
discourse (van Dijk 1998: 256; 2003; 2005a; 2006c). In situations of the highest 
polarization, the intrinsic ideological-evaluative feature of any discourse (Voloshinov 
1973[1929]) reaches its greatest degree of explicitness. In this sense, it is interesting to 
recall Campmany’s statements on electioneering as a competitive zero-sum game (2005: 
86) or the following statements of the prominent Spanish politician Leopoldo Calvo 
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 Voloshinov has stressed the intrinsic ideological-evaluative value of the word (1973[1929]: 33). 
Voloshinov’s conception of ideology is clearly Marxist. 
25
 Legitimization and dialectic constitute two points of contact between Marxist and van Dijk vision of 
ideology: actually, according to Marxist, one of the main features of ideology (which is always ruling 
class’ ideology) is legitimizing ruling class’ power. 
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Sotelo, a former Spanish Minister and Prime Minister, supporting the idea that political 
discourse is belligerent: 
 
Todo el mundo sabe que en los parlamentos antes que la verdad se busca la eficacia del ataque 
político […]. El ámbito de la política es primariamente, para la oposición, el acoso y derribo del 
gobierno (apud De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 3-4). 
 
So in order to get a majority of social capital (measurable through the votes obtained), 
i.e. to defeat the opponent in the electoral battle/game
26
, candidates need to secure their 
support and win votes from their opponent. This implies convincing their own (former) 
electors to vote again for them, and convince the opponent’s (current or potential) 
electors to vote for them. To do this, candidates need to present themselves as credible 
(Grandi 1998a) and their opponents as untrustworthy; the fact of reducing the 
opponent’s credibility to some extent increases their own trustworthiness (De Santiago-
Guervós 1996: 5). Candidates do so by strategic discursive representations of the social 
actors and of the reality (van Leeuwen 2003[1996]) that highlight one’s positive 
qualities and the negative qualities of opponent. I use the term strategy as “a more or 
less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a 
particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim” (Wodak & Meyer 2001b: 73; 
Wodak 2009a: 40; Wodak et al. 1999: 31-32; for some typologies of strategies see 
Chilton & Schäffner 1997; Chilton 2004; Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 44-56, in particular 
for strategies on racist discourse). They can be more or less unconscious, but they can 
be inferred by the speakers’ discursive behaviors. De Santiago-Guervós bluntly 
describes the dynamic of the political discourse in general: 
 
Defensa y ataque, estereotipo positivo y estereotipo negativo; embellecimiento y envilecimiento; 
neologismo, adjetivación dudosa, palabrería, eufemismo. […] se parte de la realidad para preparar 
la estrategia política y crear los estereotipos que marcarán, por una parte, el ennoblecimiento de la 
propuesta política propia y, por otra, el envilecimiento de la propuesta contraria, envilecimiento 
que se plasma en un ataque político […] cuyo fin último es la lucha por el electorado. Tal es el fin 
del discurso político y así hay que entenderlo (1996:24). 
 
All the discursive devices employed by candidates, namely metaphors, narratives, 
presuppositions and implicatures, deixis, topoi, quotes, reported speech, argumenta ad 
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 De Santiago-Guervós states that electoral lexis is a “belligerent” lexis (1996: 9). 
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hominem, ad verecundiam, etc., which will be analyzed in chapter 4, are used to 
implement all the strategies and moves that constitute what I have defined the 
management of the presidentiability, a notion under which I include Bourdieu’s concept 
of political capital, Goffman’s concept of face and Aristotle’s notion of ethos. The 
following section provides a more detailed discussion of presidentiability. 
 
1.7.9. Presidentiability and attributes of the presidentiable candidate 
Presidentiability is the candidate’s capacity to be a potentially (good) president, i.e. to 
be presidentiable: it is based on the assumption that a (good) president should have 
certain general attributes, on which there is a general agreement even among members 
of different groups (parties), and some particular attributes, on which members of the 
same group (party) generally agree, but that are not shared by members of different 
groups
27
. As for the first set of attributes, it could be claimed that all electors, even those 
belonging to different electoral groups and having different ideologies, could reasonably 
vote for a candidate who deals with their problems (regardless of their nature); in fact, it 
would be as unreasonable and irrational for a voter to choose a candidate who is not 
going to deal with electors’ interests, as a candidate to present himself as someone who 
fails to address electors’ interests. Candidates thus play with voters’ interests and 
construct them, i.e. they discursively present and build what are to be considered as 
citizens’ interests. 
As for the second set of attributes, I refer to those that receive a different 
evaluation/appraisal depending on the electoral group or ideology. For instance, we can 
consider that left-wing electors will be more inclined to consider solidarity and dialogue 
as pertinent attributes, whilst right-wing electors will be more inclined to consider 
strength and authority as pertinent attributes of the president.  
                                                          
27
 On agreement (accord) see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: ch. 1). According to these authors, 
some issues seem to be universally accepted (accord universelle), but others are more contingent (accord 
selon l’auditoire). Obviously things are not that straightforward and probably what can also be taken as 
universally agreed is actually negotiated according to situation. For a study on accord in French 
presidential debates, see Doury & Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2011). 
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Therefore, presidentiability depends on candidates’ ability to present themselves as 
possessing the set of attributes that a candidate should have to be a (good) president in 
relation both to the in-group and out-group (since each candidate has to convince 
electors of both groups). 
After analyzing the discourse produced by the two candidates to present 
themselves as presidentiable, we can list the set of general and particular attributes that 
they assume as necessary for a president. Among the general attributes, emerging 
from the candidates’ discourse, we can cite the following28: 
 
 Unity (a good president unifies, a bad president divides) 
 Centerness (a good president is moderate, a bad president is not) 
 Sincerity29 (a good president is sincere, a bad president is not) 
 Strength (a good president is strong, a bad president is not) 
 Realism (a good president is realistic, a bad president is not) 
 Loyalty (a good president respects the rules of democracy, a bad president does not) 
 Coherence [doing the same of what one says; saying the same of what one does]  
(a good president is coherent, a bad president is not) 
 Consistency [saying the same of what one said; doing the same of what one did]  
(a good president is consistent, a bad president is not) 
 Defending Spaniards’ interests (a good president defends Spaniards’ interests, a bad 
president does not) 
 Supportiveness (a good president is supportive, a bad president is not) 
 Activity, capacity, efficacy (a good president is active, capable and effective, a bad 
president is not)  
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 In such a highly polarized and competitive discursive practice as the face-to-face presidential debate 
and in the competitive context of an electioneering, the construction of self-image and the destruction of 
the image of the other are two faces of the same coin: the construction of the self-image is based on an 
affirmation (I am X) and on a negation (I am not Y); at the same time the self-attribution of a positive 
feature (I am P+ or I have P+) occurs together with the implicit or explicit subtraction of the same 
attribute to the other (you are not P+ or you do not have P+); but this attribution process can also have a 
negative form (I do not have Q-; you have Q-). 
29




According to these attributes, each candidate tries to present himself positively and to 
present the opponent negatively: for example, in relation to the attribute of unity, each 
candidate presents himself as the person who has favored or is going to favor unity, and 
presents the other as the candidate that has favored or is going to favor division.  
Beside general attributes, there are the particular attributes, about which there is 
no agreement because they are based on the ideology of each party or elector group. 
They include the following, sorted into two general sets roughly corresponding to 
Lakoff’s frames (2004). 
 
 Being a nurturing father  
(includes: being dialoguing, optimistic; not being authoritarian, pessimistic) 
 Being a strict father  
(includes: exerting authority, being realistic; not being feeble, utopist) 
 
Those latter attributes are disputable and disputed, in the sense that in these attributes, 
as I stated above, there is no agreement: RJ prefers to (re)present himself as a leader that 
takes decisions rather than dialoguing, ZP prefers to (re)present himself as an optimistic 
rather than a realistic leader, etc. Presumably, both candidates make their choice also 
according to the image that they have of the electors they address with their persuasive 
discourse. 
In the management of presidentiability, then, each candidate attributes to himself 
certain general presidential attributes and presents the opponent as lacking them. At the 
same time, he contests the values of the frame employed by the opponent, denying, 
underestimating, dismissing, disputing, minimizing, erasing, twisting, re-framing them, 
etc. 
Since presidentiability management is a dialogic and dialectic process, involving 
two candidates fighting to impose their own principle of vision and division of the 
world, the candidates’ interaction is almost never aimed at reaching agreement: 
candidates contradict, deny and attack each other, try to defend themselves, retake the 
(part of) other’s discourse to deny them or argue against them; they refer to other 
previous deeds or words in order to frame them negatively or contest words, data or 
figures; they interrupt, violating the turn-taking
30
; they accuse each other of lying, 
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 This is not very common in these two debates, due to their regimented structure. 
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especially in order to construct or demonstrate dealignment with the candidate and 
alignment with targeted electors. 
As I have already pointed out in the introduction, the management of 
presidentiability can be conceived as a triangle whose surface is covered by discourse 
and whose sides are constituted by: a) the attributes; b) the campaign themes; and c) the 
discursive devices for implementing the strategies, as shown in the following diagram.  
 
 
Figure 1. Diagram showing the discursive construction of presidentiability 
 
The attributes have already been discussed above; the following lines provide a brief 
insight into the themes and devices (a deeper analysis is included in chapters 6 and 4 
respectively). 
Candidates construct their presidentiability in relation to some themes, i.e. some 
particular events and situations of the present Spanish society. As I will show more in 
detail in chapter 6, different issues were dealt with during the campaign and the debates, 
but according to the debate division in blocks, my personal observations, the 
declarations of Gabriel Elorriaga (apud Crawford 2008) and triangulations with other 
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sociological and statistical studies (Pujol 2008; Ruiz-Jiménez 2010), the main issues 
were the economy, immigration, terrorism and the Catalan question.   
Candidates also manage their presidentiability according to general, global, or 
overarching strategies and local moves that they implement through several discursive 
devices. For instance, the main PP strategy is to separate ZP from laymen and his 
electors; the local moves range from presenting him as inactive or passive, to framing 
him as unpatriotic, unrealistic, etc. These moves are implemented through argument ad 
hominem, reporting the speeches, metaphors, etc. The devices will be analyzed in 




This chapter has addressed the theoretical framework. The basic assumption is that the 
field of institutional Politics works as a battlefield where the main actors, i.e. candidates 
(with the active contribution of journalists) fight to achieve power by imposing their 
ideology, their principles of vision and division of the world, on the majority. Since 
politics is mainly done by discourse, I have started the discussion by defining political 
discourse. I then went on to describe the structure of political field by its main agents: 
parties. I have provided some definitions of party, and highlighted the competitiveness 
of party system. 
The starting point of my theoretical framework is the concept of political field as 
posited in Bourdieu’s sociology. Drawing extensively to Bourdieu and referring to 
Edelman, I have thus conceived Politics as a field where a symbolic struggle takes place 
for different forms of capital. Again drawing on Bourdieu, I have discussed the concept 
of capital and in particular social capital (support) and political capital (visibility and 
reputation). The structure of political field and its workings as a competitive zero-sum 
game, where candidates fight for capital, can help to explain why politicians are 
constantly engaged in positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other: 
essentially because candidates build up capital by taking it away from their opponents.  
In a clear example of multidisciplinarity, and in order to move from structure to 
discourse, I have articulated the Bourdieuian theory of political field and of political 
capital with the argumentation theory. The point where these two theories meet is the 
relationship that can be traced to link these three concepts: the Bourdieuian concept of 
political capital, the Aristotelian concept of ethos, and the Goffmanian concept of face. 
In particular, the last point allows for the insistence on the interactive feature of 
discursive practices such as presidential debates in relation with social structure (field). 
The concepts of political capital, ethos and face can thus provide explanations for 
presidentiability management, a process whereby candidates’ present themselves 
positively (legitimation) and present the other (delegitimation) in a negative light in 
order to obtain votes.  
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2. THE POLITICAL FIELD AS TERRAIN. Social, historical and ideological 




2.1. Introducing the Spanish political field 
This chapter is composed of two main subsections. The first deals with the Spanish 
political and administrative structure and the second with the Spanish party systems and 
synthetically introduces the main Spanish national and regional parties, focusing in 
particular on the three main Spanish parties: PP, PSOE and IU. 
Section one introduces some central features of Spanish democracy, such as the 
division of power and the administrative division (regions, province, and city councils). 
I will then outline the main electoral processes at the four levels (state, region, province, 
and city). I will provide charts and figures in order to easily visualize the relations of 
force between the mains actors of the Spanish political field.  
Section two outlines the main features of the Spanish political party system. I 
will introduce the issue of cleavages, which will be discussed more extensively later on. 
I will then briefly present each of the main Spanish parties, starting with the national 
ones (from left to center to right), then the regional ones (in order of relative 
importance). I will conclude the section with some general observations on the Spanish 
political party system. 
The final part of section two focuses specifically on the three main national 
parties (PP, PSOE and IU). I will firstly recall recent Spanish history, and then I will 
provide historical data, pointing out the main ideological features (centering my 
attention on how the parties describe themselves), and present the figures (MPs and 
votes) of these three parties (PP, POSE and IU, in this order). I will conclude the section 
with some general remarks on the three parties and their relative situation within the 
Spanish political field.  
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2.2. Spain’s political and administrative structure 
This section briefly presents the structure of the Spanish State
31
. This is not the place for 
an in-depth analysis, and I will therefore merely outline a number of points necessary in 
order to understand how Spanish democracy works, as well as to comprehend the power 
relationships between parties. This will enable me to highlight the monopoly of the 
political field exerted by the two major parties (PP and PSOE), as well as the relative 
importance of regionalist parties (CiU, PNV, ERC, PAR, CHA, etc.) in detriment of IU, 
which despite being the third most voted party, is underrepresented.  
 
2.2.1. Division of powers 
Spain has been a parliamentary monarchy since 1978, the year of the positive response 
in the referendum for the new democratic Spanish constitution. Like many other 
democratic states, and according to the 1978 Spanish Constitution (CE 1978), power is 
distributed between legislative, executive and judiciary powers.  
Legislative power is constituted by the two branches of the Parliament. On the 
one hand there is the Congreso de Diputados, whose MPs are elected by universal 
suffrage
32
 normally every 4 years; their number is established by law
33
 and currently 
stands at 350 MPs, elected by a proportional system with blocked lists and distributed 
according to D’Hondt law34. On the other hand, there is the Senado de España, formed 
by representatives of the Spanish regions; their number is variable and is established by 
law. It currently consists of 266 members, elected in a mixed way: some of them (208) 
are elected directly by universal suffrage normally every 4 years (together with 
Congreso members), and with a majoritarian plurinominal system (electors express 
preferences), whilst others are elected by the Regional Parliaments (according to the 
local coalitions) of each Comunidad Autónoma or Region (hereafter CA or CCAA). 
Both the Congreso and Senado have legislative competencies and initiatives but the 
Senado is subordinated to the Congreso, in that the Government only responds for its 
                                                          
31
 For this chapter the main reference is Solsten & Meditz (1990). 
32
 All the Spanish citizens over 18 years old can vote. 
33
 Like many other aspects of electoral process (call of elections, electioneering, polling day, results, etc.) 
this issue is also regulated by the LOGRE (Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General de 1985), 
approved by PSOE Government, essentially similar to the previous electoral law (Real Decreto-Ley de 
marzo de 1977), approved by UCD Government during the Transition. 
34
 D’Hondt Law, named after the Belgian mathematician Victor D’Hondt, is the most commonly-used 
method within the Spanish electoral system for converting votes into seats (it is used in the elections of 
Congreso, Parlamentos Autonómicos, and Ayuntamientos). It is a formula of proportional representation. 
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actions to the latter, so that the real legislative power is in the Congreso, which is the 
cornerstone of the Spanish political system. 
According to the Constitution, the executive power, the Government, is 
constituted by the President of the Government (hereafter PoG) and its vice-
president(s), Ministries and Sub-secretaries (vice-ministers). The members of the 
Government form the Council of Ministers, which in turn represents the Government, 
the executive power. The Government administrates the State, directing internal and 
foreign policies, civil and military administration and implementing laws (promulgated 
by Parliament). According to Spanish law, the PoG has the faculty to name and dismiss 
ministries, he
35 responds for his own or the Government’s acts only before Parliament, 
who can dismiss him with a motion of no confidence. If the PoG is dismissed, the 
government ceases to be effective: it means that the confidence (or a censure motion) is 
voted by the Parliament directly with regard to the PoG and/or his Government, so that 
the PoG has absolute authority within the executive power. For these reasons, the PoG 
is the highest political office in Spain. The candidate firstly presents his program before 
Parliament and he becomes the PoG if Parliament gives him a vote of confidence with 
an absolute majority, or alternatively, a simple majority (once 48 hours has elapsed). 
Members of both the Congreso and the Senado are entitled to ask the Government 
questions.  
The judiciary power is constituted by the set of all judges and magistrates, 
tribunals and courts at the various levels that administer justice and interpret, enforce, 
sanction or invalidate laws. Tribunals and courts decide all the civil, penal, 
administrative, social and military trials. According to the Constitution and other 
fundamental laws, and based on the principle of justice and equality, Judiciary power is 
impartial and independent; judges are immovable except in those cases established by 
law, they are responsible for their acts and infractions, and are subject to the 
Constitution and other existing laws like all other citizens. There are many different 
levels and competencies for different courts (civil, administrative, penal, military, 
ordinary, Supreme, etc.), but here is not the place the place for an in-depth discussion of 
these complex questions.  
  
                                                          
35
 I use the masculine form for referring to the President, since so far only men have run the government. 
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2.2.2. Territorial and administrative organization 
Like many other European countries, Spain is organized at various subsidiary levels. 
The central administration is entitled to the State, and is established by some 
fundamental laws. According to article 137 of the Spanish Constitution, “el estado se 
organiza territorialmente (y administrativamente) en municipios, provincias y 
Comunidades Autónomas” (CE 1978).  
Regions are thus the second major level of administrative division. Regions are 
called Comunidades Autónomas (CCAA). The kingdom of Spain has 17 regions: 
Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, Basque Country, Navarra, Aragón, Catalonina, Castile & 
Leon, La Rioja, Madrid, Castile La Mancha, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, 
Andalusia, Murcia, Balearic Island, Canary Island, plus 2 Ciudades Autónomas, namely 
autonomous cities situated in Morocco: Ceuta and Melilla. All these territorial and 
administrative entities have a certain degree of autonomy. They have their own 
parliament, called Parlamentos Autonómicos, with their own MPs, their own regional 
government, called Juntas Autonómicas, and their own President, called Presidente de 
la Comunidad Autónoma or Presidente Autonómico. 
 
 




According to the various Estatutos de Autonomía, which are the laws defining the rights 
of each region within the frame of the Spanish Constitution (especially art. 143 et seq. 
CE), each region has a considerable degree of political and administrative autonomy 
and a number of specific competencies. These competencies must be aligned with the 
Spanish Constitution, often a cause of struggle and friction among peripheral and 
central governments due to conflicting interests. Unlike the extremely centralized 
Francoist administrative structure, the new Spanish Constitution recognizes and 
guarantees devolution to regions throughout the so-called Estado de las Autonomías, the 
legal politico-administrative frame for decentralization. 
The 1978 Spanish Constitution establishes the different competencies for the 
CCAA and for the State (art. 148, 149). In Spain there are two different kinds of CCAA, 
those that quickly became autonomous according to art. 151 or 152 CE (Basque 
Country and Catalonia in 1979, followed by Galicia and Andalusia in 1981) and the 
other that became autonomous through art. 143 CE, by means of a slower process and 
with a lesser degree of autonomy. At present, and following long and far from 
straightforward negotiations between the central government(s) and the CCAA, now all 
CCAA share practically the same degree of autonomy, as well as the same basic 
political administrative bodies: a parliament, elected by universal suffrage, a 
government with executive power, and a president, elected by the parliaments, the 
highest political authority in the CCAA. Nevertheless, the Basque Country, Catalonia, 
Galicia and Andalusia have a slighter greater degree of autonomy. 
At a third level of administration there are the provincias, a territorial division 
recognized in the 1978 Spanish Constitution (art. 141). In Spain there are 50 provinces, 
plus the two autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The CCAA are organized 
according to historic-cultural affinities between provinces: hence there are CCAA made 
up of a single province (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, and Navarra) or 
of multiple provinces. The province is considered a circumscription for the general 
election of MPs of the Congreso and Senado. Normally the administration of each 
province falls to its Diputacion Provincial [Provincial Council]. Provincial Council is 
the governing body of the province and is made up of a provincial assembly (a sort of 
parliament, which administers legislative power), a government (executive power), and 
a president. Their main aim is to manage local administrative and economic or territorial 
questions. The Provincial Council is present in all provinces, except in those CCAA 
made up of a single province and in those in the Basque Country, where they are called 
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Juntas Forales. Apart from the 38 Diputaciones, there are also the 3 assemblies of the 
Juntas Forales, the 7 Cabildos Insulares of the Canary Islands and the 4 Consells 
Insulars of the Balearic Islands. Members of the Diputaciones Provinciales are elected 
indirectly through a complex calculation based on the results of municipal elections. In 
contrast, representatives of the Juntas, Cabildos and Consells are elected directly. 
Finally, a fourth level of administration comprises the ayuntamientos [local 
authorities or councils] (art. 140 CE). This is the smallest administrative organ, and it is 
formed by a pleno [assembly or council], whose members are elected directly by 
universal suffrage, an alcalde [mayor], elected by the majority according to coalitions 
and agreements, and a council, which exerts executive power, and which is made up of 
the majority of the local councillors. Spain currently has 8,117 ayuntamientos.
36
 
Let’s see now the elective process at the different levels of the Spanish political 
and administrative structure. 
 
2.2.3. Elections at the different levels of the Spanish administrative structure
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Elective offices exist for all 4 levels of the legislative and executive power: 1) at State 
level: Congreso and Senado; 2) at a regional level: Parlamentos Autonómicos; 3) at a 
Province level: Diputaciones Provinciales; 4) at a municipal level: Ayuntamientos.  
Not always the representatives, that I will hereafter call MPs38, are elected directly by 
citizens, and sometimes they are elected indirectly by representatives who in turn are 
elected by citizens. The following sections provide a brief insight into the electoral 
system in Spain, from the highest to the lowest level. It starts with the State Parliament, 
then with the Regional Parliaments, then with Provincial Parliaments and ends with the 
Municipal Parliaments. 
 
2.2.3.1. State Parliament 
According to the Spanish Organic Law on the General Electoral Regime (hereafter 
LOREG), the 350 members of the State Parliament, the Congreso, are elected by 
universal suffrage with a proportional system of representation, called the D’Hondt 




 Except for Regional elections, all results of all elections throughout Spain’s democratic history are 
available on the official website of the Ministry of Interior, from where I took the data for drawing up the 
charts and tables: http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/. For the regional elections, the data come from the 
official website of the Spanish Parliament: http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/autonomicas/1997-
.htm. 
38
 I will use MPs or Senators, as well as regional MPs, provincial MPs, or city MPs. 
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system; the province is the electoral circumscription; parties with less than 3% of votes 
in the district have no representation and candidates are included in a blocked and 
closed list.  The following two charts show the distribution of MPs after the 2000 and 
2004 elections. Detailed data are provided under each chart. 
 
Figure 2. MPs in Congreso after the 2000 general elections 
 
 





Figure 3. MPs in Congreso after the 2004 general elections 
 
 
Table 2. Breakdown of MPs for each party after 2004 general elections 
 
As for the Senado, the LOREG establishes that 208 members are elected directly by 
universal suffrage with a majoritarian system of representation; the province is the 
electoral circumscription; citizens can vote for several candidates; the LOREG also 
establishes the number of senators eligible in each province. The other senators (58 at 
present, but their number can change according to the number of inhabitants) are elected 
by the Parlamentos Autonómicos of the respective Comunidades Autónomas. The 










Figure 5. Senators after the 2004 general elections 
 
The charts show that on a national level, Spanish institutions are monopolized by PP 
and PSOE. The next section addressed the various levels of regional and local 
administration: regional and provincial parliaments and city councils.  
 
2.2.3.2. Regional Parliaments 
Elections for regional parliaments are very similar in nature to the general elections and 
do not differ too much amongst regions. The main difference amongst the CCAA is the 
call for elections and the length of the legislature. Legislature length for all CCAA is 
fixed (4 years) and elections take place together with municipal elections, except for 
Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia, which have a different parliamentary 
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calendar. Provinces normally constitute the electoral circumscription and parties with 
less than 3% (or 5% in the case of some CCAA) have no representation.  
Each regional parliament is composed by a different number of MPs, based on the 
number of inhabitants of the region and range at the present from 129 in the case of 
Madrid (with 6.5 million inhabitants), to the 33 MPs of the region of La Rioja (320,000 
inhabitants). Members of regional parliaments are elected directly through universal 
suffrage every 4 years. Regional elections are normally held every 4 years on the third 
Sunday in May, together with municipal elections (city). In 2008 Spain had a total of 
1,216 Regional MPs. 
As an autonomous legislative body, regional parliaments pass autonomous laws 
(whose scope is limited to regions, and if they affect the state or other regions, they 
have to pass through the two Spanish State parliaments). Their competencies include 
setting the budget and appointing, together with other offices, senators for the Spanish 
State Senate, and they can also recur to the Constitutional Court laws of the State 
affecting a region’s competencies. The respective estatutos de autonomia [statutes of 
autonomy] establish which competencies a region is entitled to (devolution): budget, 
finance, health, education, urbanism, ecology, etc. In all cases the competencies of 
regions must be compatible with the Spanish constitutional framework. 
In order to give an idea of the figures and the general situation of Spanish politics 
at a regional level, below are four charts, two for 2003 and two for 2007. These charts 
illustrate the distribution of MPs and the parties they belong to. It is clear that PP and 
PSOE are the majority parties (between them they account for 77% of all MPs in 2003 
and 79% in 2007). The first two charts for each year present the data concerning the 
percentage of PP and PSOE MPs from the total (which is why the parties of the other 
MPs are not specified). The two remaining charts for each year show the total number 
of MPs for each party. The final section of this chapter provides a more detailed 
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 As throughout this work, the data concerning PP, PSOE and IU include all the various local 
denominations and coalitions, for instance, IU includes Ezker Batua, Esquerra Unida, Los Verdes, etc.; 
PSOE includes its main local groups such as PSdG (from Galicia) or PSC (from Catalonia) and PSE 




Figure 6. Regional MPs after the 2003 regional elections 
 
 





Figure 8. Regional MPs after the 2007 regional elections 
 
 
Figure 9. Breakdown of regional MPs after the 2007 regional elections 
 
In order to show the extreme bipolarization of the Spanish political field, the following 
charts show the distribution of the presidents of the regional parliaments. Together, PP 
and PSOE account for 82% of the total for both 2003 and 2007, albeit in varying 





Figure 10. Presidents of regional Parliaments after the 2003 regional elections 
 
 
Figure 11. Presidents of regional Parliaments after the 2007 regional elections 
 
The breakdown of the regional governments, as shown in the charts below, presents a 





Figure 12. Regional Governments, including coalitions, after the 2003 regional elections 
 
 
Figure 13. Regional Governments, including coalitions, after the 2007 regional elections 
 
Even though the situation is somewhat more fragmentized, PP and PSOE still have the 
most prominent roles in the regional politics, except in the Basque Country, Catalonia 
and the Canary Islands (further details are provided in the final section of this chapter).  
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2.2.3.3. Provincial Parliament 
Diputaciones Provinciales (hereafter DP) are not present in all Spanish regions. 
Properly speaking, a DP is an institution which only exists in 38 out of 50 provinces, 
since it does not exist in Basque Country, Balearic and Canary Islands. These three 
regions have similar institutions, called respectively Juntas Forales, Consells Insulars, 
and Cabildos Insulares, but whose MPs are elected directly by universal suffrage 
usually every 4 years and normally during municipal elections. DP do not exist either in 
those regions constituted by just one province (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, 
Murcia, Navarra); in these regions competencies otherwise held by DP are divided 
among municipalities or belong to Regional Parliaments. DP Representatives are 
elected indirectly according to a very complex system based on the representation in the 
municipal parliament of each party, and according to the D’Hondt system. Depending 
on the number of inhabitants of each province, the number of eligible candidates is 25, 
27, 31 or 51
40
. 
In order to make the data clearer and more significant, the following charts 
include data for DP as well as Juntas Forales, Consells Insulars and Cabildos Insulares. 
These charts provide an insight into those parties with political representation at a 
provincial level, and especially of the major role played by PP and PSOE in 
monopolizing politics. I will present only the MPs of PP, PSOE, IU and I will aggregate 
all those of other parties (in brackets the number of parties), in order to make the 
monopoly exerted by PP and PSOE in terms of representation and power visually 
clearer. In the table below I present the data for the elections of provincial MPs.  
 
Table 3. Provincial MPs elected in Diputaciones Provinciales, Juntas, Consells and Cabildos after the 
1999, 2003 and 2007 municipal elections 
 
As we can see from the graphs below, PP and PSOE hold the highest representation, 
with 76-78% of provincial MPs. 
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 Up to 500,000 inhabitants: 25 representatives; 500,000-1,000,000 inhabitants: 27 representatives; 




Figure 14. Provincial MPs after the 1999 municipal elections 
 
 





Figure 16. Provincial MPs after the 2007 municipal elections 
 
Generally speaking, and despite some very few exceptions, the respective presidents of 
the DP were elected in the most voted party. The chart below shows the proportional 
representation of the parties with at least one DP president. 
 
 





Figure 18. Presidents of provincial parliaments after the 2003 municipal elections 
 
 
Figure 19. Presidents of provincial parliaments after the 2007 municipal elections 
 
2.2.3.4. Municipal Parliaments 
As for the elections of the ayuntamientos, each municipality constitutes the electoral 
circumscription; the principle of representation is proportional; the electoral method is 
the D’Hondt system; candidatures are within blocked and closed lists; parties with less 
than 5% of votes have no representation. Municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants 
have a different administrative structure. Elections for ayuntamientos (city councils) are 
normally held every 4 years on the third Sunday in May, together with the regional 
elections. Citizens elect the members of the city councils directly by universal suffrage 
and the town and city councils then elect alcaldes (mayors). Municipal elections are 
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also fundamental in that, as we have seen, they contribute to the constitution of the DP. 
At present, Spain has more than 8,100 ayuntamientos and more than 56,000 councillors. 
Parties compete with their list of concejales. The elected concejales elect the leading 
candidate of each list as mayor. If there is no absolute majority, the election of the 
mayor is subject to agreements. The city council has competencies in security in public 
places; traffic; urbanism; environmental protection and historic heritage; cemeteries, 
markets; public water, lighting and cleaning; public transport, cultural and sporting 
activities and social services. The city government is run together with a collegial body 
(Junta de gobierno local) with a varying number of members. 
The following chart shows the number of city MPs in the period 1999-2003-2007. 
An initial analysis reveals the monopoly of PP and PSOE: as in other levels of 
administration, the figures are ten times higher than all other political parties.   
 
Figure 20. MPs in city councils for the main parties after the 1999, 2003 and 2007 municipal elections 
 
The previous charts clearly show the dominant position of PP and PSOE, who together 
account for 84% and 85% of the total number of MPs in the city councils. 
 
2.2.4. Observations 
This section has provided a brief outline of the structure of Spanish politics and 
administration at its various levels (national, regional, provincial, and municipal) and 
shown the composition of the different assemblies of the different elective bodies of the 
political and administrative structure. I focused on the period 1999-2007 in order to 
create a proper frame for understanding the Spanish political field at the time of the 
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communicative event I will deal with in detail here: the two presidential debates of 
2008. The data presented here shows that PP and PSOE monopolize Spanish politics 
and obviously from this condition they not only monopolize power, but also political 
discourse, topics, forms, etc. They monopolize the political public sphere, the 
(mainstream) public space where political struggles are conducted. From this 
perspective, television has sanctioned PP-PSOE duopoly. Indeed, they are the two only 
parties present in the presidential debates. It is true that they are the only ones capable 
of providing a real presidential candidate, but it is also true that television nurtures this 
duopoly. This duopoly emerged clearly in 1993 from a situation of greater 
fragmentation (more parties with more votes), which is exactly the year of the first two 
televised presidential debates. On that occasion, only PP and PSOE candidates were 




2.3. The Spanish political party system 
Although the three main parties will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter 
(2.3.2), I will here provide a brief overview of the Spanish political parties, giving some 
succinct indications on the main cleavages that distinguish them. The chapter ends with 
a number of observations on the Spanish party system. 
 
2.3.1. A brief overview of the system of Spanish political parties 
While during Franco’s dictatorship there was only one party, at present the many 
political parties are the main agents of Spanish democracy: they construct and manage 
public life and power (Fernández-Sarasola 2009a; 2009b). The Spanish Constitution 
(art. 6) recognizes their role in expressing political pluralism, and establishes the 
freedom for creating political parties within the framework of the Constitution
41
. 
Spanish institutional politics is characterized by the presence of two main parties 
in terms of votes and MPs: Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE). PP is a conservative party, founded by several of Franco’s principal ministers. 
It then absorbed Christian-Democrats and Liberals and moved toward the center of the 
political spectrum. PSOE is the most ancient Spanish party, founded in the 19th century 
on a Marxist basis, and is now a moderate social democratic party. Amongst other 
significant parties (in terms of votes) we must firstly mention Izquierda Unida (IU), a 
coalition of left-wing parties, such as Partido Comunista de España (PCE) and some 
ecologist groups. Then we have regionalist parties with representation at a national level 
(MPs in the Congreso and Senado) and strong support in their respective regions: for 
Catalonia: Convergència i Unió (CiU), a center-right, neoliberal and Catalanist party; 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a left-wing, republican Catalanist party. for 
the Basque Country: Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), a center-right, neoliberal, 
Basqueist party; for Galicia: Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG), a left wing, 
Galicianist party; for the Canary Islands: Coalición Canaria (CC), a center-right, 
neoliberal regionalist party.  
As we will see more in detail in chapter 6, parties construct, express and represent 
social interests, they channel the lines of conflict (cleavages) existing within a society, 
trying to manage them in institutional and pacific ways. According to Lipset & Rokkan 
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 Apart from the Constitution, Spanish political parties are also subject to the Spanish Law on Political 
Parties of 4
th
 December 1978, modified by the Organic Law on Political Parties 6/2002 of 27
th
 June 2002, 
also called the Party Law.   
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(1967) there are 4 main cleavages in Western societies: a) center-periphery; b) state-
church; c) land-industry; d) owner-worker (id: 47). Chapter 6 will deal more extensively 
with the issue of cleavages amongst the main Spanish parties, but a number of points 
will be briefly outlined here. After different phases in Spanish political history, the most 
significant cleavages of the Spanish party system are: a) socioeconomic (workers vs. 
owners, public-private
42
, Socialism-Neoliberalism, progressivism-conservatism, etc.), 
which distinguishes parties on a continuum from neoliberals to socialist; and b) the 
center vs. periphery cleavage, which distinguishes parties on a continuum from 
centralist to peripheralist (centralism-federalism, Unitarianism-separatism). Other 
classical cleavages in Spanish society, such as that concerning the nature of the State 
(monarchy vs. republic) or the role of religion within the State (laity vs. Catholic 
confessionality), are much more on the background and less prominent, even though 
they had and continue to have a certain importance in distinguishing Spanish parties. 
The two main cleavages referred to above outline a situation where parties can be 
distinguished according to their relative position on the left-right continuum and 
according to their position in the centralism-peripheralism continuum. This latter 
distinction operated on ideological basis is homological to the structural constitution of 
the Spanish political field, which allows a distinction to be drawn between parties of a 
national and regional scope.  
The following section provides an overview of the main parties (Solsten & Meditz 
1990; Magone 2005; UCM 1999), starting with the national ones and then moving on to 
the regional ones. In all cases I will indicate the main ideological features about the 
main cleavages (left-right, center-periphery, etc.). Section 2.3.2., offers a more detailed 
discussion of the three main Spanish parties. 
 
2.3.1.1. National parties  
Among the parties with a national scope, we can distinguish between left, center and 
right parties.  
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Partido Comunista Español (PCE)-Izquierda Unida (IU): founded in 1921 from a 
scission of the PSOE, after PSOE (founded in 1879) and PNV (founded in 1895) it is 
the oldest political party in Spain. From the late 1950s onwards, it was also the strongest 
anti-Francoist party. It was the last party to be legalized during the Transition, due to the 
opposition of the Spanish Army, convinced that Communists were the greatest threat to 
Spain. In order to achieve legal status, the leader Santiago Carrillo accepted the 
Monarchy and the Monarchic flag (Cercas 2009: 114). Progressively the PCE assumed 
moderate positions: from euro-communism to social democracy. Due to the constant 
loss of votes, in 1986 PCE integrated other left wing parties, such as Partido de Acción 
Socialista, Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España, Partido Humanistas, 
Federación Progresista, Partido de Izquierda Republicana and other independents under 
the name of Izquierda Unida. Due to a rightization of electors and to a prejudicial 
electoral system based on the D’Hont system, IU lost progressively votes and MPs. As 
for the center-periphery cleavage, it is open to a degree of federalism. 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE): Founded in 1879 it is the oldest political 
party in Spain. The current PSOE is an internal current of the historic PSOE that 
became predominant. Since the early years of democracy it became the most voted 
Spanish party. During the 28
th
 Congress (1979) the leader Felipe González convinced 
members to abandon Marxism and adopt social-democracy. PSOE ruled Spain with an 
absolute majority from 1982 to 1989. In 1993, it was returned with a relative majority 
and governed in coalition with a number of regionalist parties. In 1996, after the victory 
of PP, PSOE became the first party of the opposition. As for the center-periphery 
cleavage, it accepts more devolution (autonomy) for regions. 
Other far left parties (Partido del Trabajo de España; Organización Revolucionaria de 
Trabajadores, Liga Comunista Revolucionaria) since the beginning of the democracy 
they have obtained few votes and no MPs.  
 
Center 
Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD): This is a coalition of parties of moderate 
ideology founded in 1977 under the charismatic figure of Adolfo Suárez (then President 
of the Government) just at the end of the dictatorship. It became the first party in the 
country, but due to its heterogeneity (Francoists, liberals, social-democrats, Christian-
democrats and regionalists), the coalition quickly broke up, especially after Suarez 
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resigned in 1981. Suárez went on to found the Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), 
which had a good representation until 1989, when Adolfo Suárez resigned as General 
Secretary, and in 1993 the party eventually disappeared. 
 
Right 
Partido Popular (PP): Founded in 1977 as Alianza Popular (AP) to bring together the 
right wing forces during the transition. Its members included 7 early ministers of the 
Francois regime. AP’s leader, Manuel Fraga, was one of them. After a frustrating 
beginning, AP began to receive more votes following the disappearance of UCD, 
obtaining a 26% share in the 1982 elections, making it the second most voted party in 
Spain. After an internal crisis, and with the progressive moderation of its characteristics 
associated with Francoism, in 1989 the party was refounded as Partido Popular. PP 
quickly obtained a higher share of votes: it 1993 it was just 4 points behind PSOE; in 
1996 it obtained a relative majority and in 2000 an absolute majority. As for the center-
periphery cleavage, it leans towards centralism. 
Other far right parties: after the Transition all the most reactionary Francoist groups 
joined Fuerza Nueva and its leader Blas Piñar; but they have no MPs and play only a 
marginal role in political life.  
 
2.3.1.2. Regional parties 
In this section, the parties are classified according to the region they represent, briefly 
indicating their ideological stance in terms of left-center-right. As for the center-
periphery cleavage, all these parties lean towards peripheralism in varying degrees, 
ranging from devolution to secession. Moreover, both PP and PSOE have their regional 
representation for each region, and for the most peripheral regions the difference also 
lies in the actual names: PSdG is the Galician federation of PSOE; PSC is the 
Catalonian one, etc. 
 
The Basque Country 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV): Founded in 1895 by the racist and Catholic writer 
Sabino Arana, today it is a moderate right wing Basqueist party. It has governed in the 
Basque Country since the first regional elections (1980), albeit on occasions in coalition 
with other parties.  
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Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) emerged in 1986 following a scission with PNV and adopts a 
social democratic stance. PNV and EA often run in coalition in elections. It plays a 
major role in all the regional, provincial and municipal parliaments. 
Esuskadiko Ezquerra (EE): founded in 1977 following a scission with Partido 
Comunista de Euskadi, this Basqueist party merged in 1993 with the Basque PSOE 
group known as Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE). 
Herri Batasuna (HB): founded in the late 1970s, it is the coalition of the Marxist 
Basqueist parties. Considered as the political wing of ETA, and illegalized, in 1998 it 
changed its name to Euskal Herritarrok (EH), then again in 2001 when it became known 
as Batasuna, although a number of its members entered the Partido Comunista de las 
Tierras Vascas. In 2007 it stood with the party Acción Nacionalista Vasca (ANV), a 
traditional radical Basqueist party. Despite accusations of supporting terrorism, it plays 
a certain role in provincial and particularly municipal parliaments. 
 
Catalonia 
Convergència i Unió (CiU): founded in 1977, this coalition of moderate Catalanist 
right-wing neoliberal Catholic parties, whose leader was Jordi Pujol, has been in office 
in the Catalan government since the first regional elections (1980). On a national level, 
it played an increasingly important role from 1993 onwards, since, in the case of a 
relative majority, the two main parties (PP and PSOE) both need CiU’s support. In this 
sense CiU has become a key party for governance in Spain. At the same time, this 
position of strength and influence enables CiU to defend the interests of Catalonia on a 
national level. CiU also plays a major role in regional, provincial and municipal 
government. 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC): founded in 1931, this republican left-
wing Catalanist party played a major role during the II Republic. Apart from a short 
parenthesis (1986 and 1989 elections) without MPs in the Congreso, since 1977 it has 
been represented in Spain’s State Parliament. ERC plays a relevant role in all regional, 
provincial and municipal parliaments. 
 
Galicia 
Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG): founded in 1982, this left-wing Galicianist party, 
which questions the current territorial articulation of Spain, has MPs in the Galician 
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Partido Socialista Andaluz (PSA): founded in 1965, it has a left-wing ideology with a 




Coalición Canaria (CC): Founded in 1993 after the disappearance of UCD, it is 
formed by Canarianist parties, ex-communists, and Canarianist conservatives 
(Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (AIC), Partido Nacionalista Canario (PNC), 
Centro Canario Independiente (CCI), etc.). It has held a majority in the Canary Island 
Parliament uninterruptedly since 1993. Its aims are greater devolution and autonomy for 
the Canary Islands whilst remaining within the Spanish State. It is the governing party 
in many cabildos and ayuntamientos in the Canary Islands, and has MPs in the 
Congreso and Senado. 
 
Aragon 
Partido Aragonés Regionalista (PAR): founded in 1978, this center and regionalist 
party changed its name in 1993 to Partido Aragonés (PAR). Since 1993 it has had no 
representation in the Congreso or Senado, but it continues to play a major role in all the 
regional, provincial and municipal parliaments. 
Chunta Aragonesista (CHA): founded in 1986, this social-democrat, republican 
Aragonesist party has held a relevant representation in all the regional, provincial and 
municipal parliaments, and since 2000 has had MPs in the Congreso. 
 
Navarre 
Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN): founded in 1979 following a scission with UCD, 
between 1991 and 2008 this center-right, regionalist and Christian-democrat party stood 




Unión Valenciana (UV): founded in 1982, this right-wing regionalist party has often 
stood in coalition with PP. It had MPs in the Congreso, Senado and Valencian 
Parliament, but now only has representatives at a provincial and municipal level.  
 
2.3.2. The three main Spanish parties: PP, PSOE, IU 
In order to better understand the debate as a communicative event within the socio-
historical context within which it occurs, I will briefly recall the recent history of Spain 
and the three main Spanish parties, in terms of votes, discussing their ideology and their 
electoral results: PP (Partido Popular [Popular Party]), PSOE (Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]), and IU (Izquierda Unida [United 
Left]). 
 
2.3.2.1. The recent history of Spain 
Although it is one of the most ancient European nation-states, dating back to the 15th 
century
43
, Spain is one of the youngest Western European democracies. In November 
1975, the Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco died peacefully. He had ruled 
Spain for 39 years, after having won the Civil War (1
st
 April 1939) that followed his 
military coup d’état, also known as Alzamiento or Levantamiento [uprising] (18th July 
1936) against the democratically elected Second Spanish Republic
44
. The new Head of 
State, King Juan Carlos I, was named by the dictator himself to succeed him
45
.  
In 1976, King Juan Carlos I and the new Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, a young 
moderate conservative, led a peaceful but complex transition towards democracy, 
approving the democratic constitution in December 1978, after it was ratified in a 
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 The birth of the Spanish kingdom is conventionally situated between 1479, the year of the marriage of 
the so-called Catholic Monarch, Isabelle I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon, which meant the union 
of the two major kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula, and 1492, the year of the completion of the 
Reconquista, i.e. the conquest of the kingdom of Granada until then ruled by Muslims. 
44
 For an overview of recent Spanish history see Gunther et al. 1986: ch. 2. On the Spanish Second 
Republic see Payne (1993). 
45
 According to one of the 8 fundamental laws of Francoist regime, the Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del 
Estado (BOE 1947), the dictator himself should designate the successor; and he will be subsequently 
ratified by Spanish Francoist courts (art. 6). Interestingly, the Law stated that: (Art. 1) Spain was a 
Catholic kingdom; (Art. 2) the Head of State was the “the Commander of Spain and of the Crusade, 
Overlord of Armed Forces, Mr. Francisco Franco Bahamonde (my translation)”. Franco wanted his 
successor to be committed to Francoist principles: Spanishism, Catholicism, anticommunism and anti-
liberalism. On 23 July 1969, named by Franco as his successor with the title of “Prince of Spain”, Juan 
Carlos I swore “allegiance to the principles of the National Movement and other Fundamental Laws of 





. The monarchy is questioned by some Left groups
47
 for its relationship 
with the Francoist regime and for not having submitted to a democratic ratification by 
referendum
48. Furthermore, the King’s role in the military attempt of coup d’état leaded 





 remains unclear 
After Franco’s death, Adolfo Suárez, founder and President of UCD, held the 
office of President for two terms (1977-1979; 1979-1981)
50
, after winning the first 
general elections held without Francisco Franco (1977), as well as the first democratic 
elections (1979). 
The second democratic elections (1982) were won by PSOE. Felipe González, 
leader of the PSOE since 1974, was Prime Minister for four terms (1982-1986; 1986-
1989; 1989-1993; 1993-1996). 
In 1996 José María Aznar, president of PP since April 1990, won the elections 
held office as President for two terms (1996-2000; 2000-2004). 
Finally, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, elected the new leader of the PSOE in July 
2000, was President for a further two terms (2004-2008; 2008-2011). 
At the time of writing, Mariano Rajoy, leader of the PP since August 2003, is the 
country’s President with an absolute parliamentary majority, after winning the 2011 
general elections, which were brought forward 4 months, due to the economic and 
financial crisis. 
In the following sections I am going to deal with the history of these three parties, 
outlining their ideology, and giving some figures about the votes obtained and the MPs 
in the Congreso. 
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 On the Spanish transition and the recent years of Spanish democracy, see Morodo (1984), Colomer 
(1995; 1998), Balfour (2005a), Hopkins (2005). 
47
 Interestingly some far-right groups also question it, due to its alleged “betrayal” of Francoism and of its 
main principles of anticommunism and Spanishism: King Juan Carlos legalized PCE and approved 
decentralizing laws. 
48
 Note that on the official website for Juan Carlos I official (Casareal 2010) there is no reference to 
Francoism nor to the well-known fact that he was enthroned by Franco, who is euphemistically defined 
“Head of State”. On Juan Carlos see Preston (2005). 
49
 Again, see Colomer (1998: ch. 7). 
50
 Adolfo Suárez resigned on 29 January 1981; Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (UCD) acted as President for the 
remainder of the term. The 1981 attempt of coup d’état occurred exactly while MPs were voting Calvo 
Sotelo as President. 
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2.3.2.2. History, ideology and figures of PP, PSOE, and IU 
 
2.3.2.2.1. PP 
How party describes itself 
PP emerged directly from the ashes of the Francoist regime: its founder, Manuel Fraga 
Iribarne
51
, honorary president of the PP until his death (15
th
 January 2012), was 
Minister of Information and Tourism (1962-1969), and Minister of Government (1975-
1976). In 1976 Fraga founded Alianza Popular (AP), an agglomerate of right-wing 
groups and parties led by personalities directly proceeding from the Francoist regime. 
This heterogeneous group, led by Fraga, participated in general elections under different 
names. In 1977 it stood as AP and in 1979 as Coalición Democrática (CD), including 
parties as Acción Ciudadana Liberal, Partido Democrático Progresista, Renovación 
Española and Partido Popular de Cataluña. 
AP absorbed groups and movements previously integrated in UCD, such as 
Partido Demócrata Popular (PDP) and Partido Liberal (PL). In 1982 AP stood for the 
general elections under the name of Coalición Popular, including PDP, PL and various 
regionalist right-wing parties such as Unión Valenciana (UV), Unión del Pueblo 
Navarro (UPN) and Partido Aragonés Regionalista (PAR). Finally, in 1989 Fraga 
founded the PP that absorbed and merged all the previous existing right-wing groups. 
PP in Spain mainly represents continuity with the country’s conservative past; its 
main ideological axes are centralism, with the consequent opposition to peripheralist 
movements (Catalanism, Basqueism, and Galicianism); a rigid stance against the claims 
of the armed separatist and independentist organization ETA; patriarchalism and 
paternalism
52
 vis-à-vis of women rights and gender issues or in the field of individual 
freedoms and rights, mostly due to the influence of the Catholic establishment (refusal 
to accept homosexual marriage, legally regulated abortion and euthanasia, repressive 
policies for drug consumers, etc.); economic liberalism (deregulation, tax reduction, 
privatization, reduction of public services, etc.); and a nationalist (discriminating) 
position against immigrants.  
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 Colomer (1998: 62) defines him as “reformista y aperturista”. 
52
 On paternalism and patriarchalism see Kleinig (1983: 3-37). 
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To glean an idea of PP ideology we can refer to the way PP describes its history and its 
ideology as well as to its 2008 electoral program, as shown below. On its website
53
 PP 
describes itself as follows: 
 
A principios de los años 70, Manuel Fraga interesó a un grupo de personas en la idea de crear y 
articular una organización de talante reformista y con ideología de centro, con el fin de ofrecer una 
nueva alternativa política a la sociedad española (my emphasis). 
 
It defines itself as a center-wing, moderate and reformist party. As De Santiago-Guervós 
states (see also Morales-López & Prego-Vázquez 2002), since its foundation PP has 
attempted to occupy the center of the political space: 
 
Fraga intentó borrar de su partido la imagen de ‘derecha de toda la vida’, continuación del régimen 
de Franco, asumiendo la terminología centro en sus definiciones. […] Así presentará a su partido 
como centro-derecha. […] El partido popular sigue la misma línea política que AP hasta su 
desaparición; continuación de la política de conquista del centro, del espacio y de la palabra (De 
Santiago-Guervós 1996: 21-22). 
 
In defining itself as a center-wing and reformist party, PP strategically backdates this 
ideological feature to its very foundation, the early 1970s, playing down any 
connections with Francoism. Failing to mention its relationship with Francoism reveals 
PP’s will to hide it, in order to re-present itself as moderate as possible, and hence 
occupy the center. These observations can be corroborated by analyzing PP’s 2008 
manifesto. In the section entitled Nuestros Principios, it defines itself in the following 
way:    
 
Somos una formación política de centro. Defendemos los valores de la libertad, la igualdad, la 
concordia y la justicia que inspiran nuestra España democrática. Somos un partido joven que ha 
nacido y crecido con esta democracia, y que asume la tradición del liberalismo español surgida con 
la Constitución de Cádiz (PP 2008: 8). 
 
PP erases any connection with Francoism (“hemos nacido con esta democracia”). This 
shows how important it is for PP to present itself as a “center” party anchored in 
                                                          
53
 http://www.pp.es/conocenos/historia_2.html (12/July/2012). 
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Democracy. Note that in order to completely erase Francoism from its past, PP 
backdates its liberalism to the first Spanish Constitution (1812). 
Analyzing the PP manifesto allows us to corroborate its ideological principles and 
political priorities, as well as the main propositions of its electoral discourse. As for 
economic liberalism: the word liberty is frequently used, especially in the form of 
economic liberty, but we can also read statements such as “Las únicas diferencias justas 
serán las que nazcan del trabajo, del esfuerzo y del mérito” (2008: 20), together with 
references to individual initiative. As for Spanishism: we can find several references to 
nation, Spain, Spaniards, territorial cohesion, expressions aimed at glorifying the nation, 
such as “Spain is a very old nation”, “and we want to be proud of Spain” (PP 2008: 33, 
326), etc. Many references are made to terrorism and the Autonomous State i.e. the 
question of centralism/federalism, territorial cohesion, the defense of Castilian against 
other languages such as Catalan, Galician or Basque, regional devolution, etc. These 
issues feature strongly in the manifesto and considerable space is dedicated to 
consensus in issues such as terrorism or territorial cohesion.  
Considerable attention is also given to the question of equality, seen as the 
equality of Spaniards regardless of their place of residence, i.e. as a synonym of 
territorial and political unity. Equality intended as the people’s right to not to be 
discriminated against for reasons of gender, sexual orientation, political ideology, 
origin, race or religion, only occupies a few paragraphs (2008: 20). In the long chapter 
dedicated to equality, PP refers to equality policies for women, families, the elderly, the 
disabled and young people, yet there are no references to those discriminated against on 
the basis of their sexual orientation, race, or religion. In the 326 page document there is 
only one reference to sexual difference (2008: 164) and one to racial/religious 
difference and discrimination (2008: 214). The word homosexual is absent as well as 
the word race. 
In order to show how Catholicism is entrenched in PP ideology, it should be noted 
that there are no such words as cato* (católico/a/s) in the PP manifesto, whilst in the 
PSOE manifesto it appears once, stating that the party withdrew VAT exemption from 
the Catholic Church and favored the laicity of State. Furthermore, the words cato* has a 
strong presence in the IU manifesto, related to PP national-Catholicism and its claims 
for a more secular state. Interestingly, rather than expressing a lack of interest, the 
absence of a word implies the unproblematized acceptance of status quo: i.e. the 
acceptance of the current relationships between Spanish Reign and Catholic Church.  
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As for paternalism and patriarchalism, it should be stressed that the cover image of the 
chapter dedicated to equality does not portray a working woman (in reference to equal 
pay), a homosexual (in reference to sexual equality
54
), or a member of a minority 
racial/ethnic/cultural group (in reference to racial equality), but instead depicts a 
pregnant woman, related to the concept of motherhood and therefore to the (traditional) 
family. As for topics such as global poverty, climate change, equality and dependency, 
which traditionally did not form part of PP’s ideological background, their (marginal) 
presence responds to what I call convergence, and to an attempt not to leave these issues 
completely in PSOE hands. 
As we will see, during the debate, PP will make major efforts to present itself as a 
moderate party and its opponent in a radical light.   
 
Figures: votes and members of parliament 
We will now consider the electoral results of PP in the general elections. In the two 
figures below we can observe the number of MPs (fig. 1) and the votes obtained (fig. 2) 





Figure 21. PP MPs (1977-2008)  
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 This is a great difference, for instance with PSOE or IU, who to a certain degree flaunt the idea of 
homosexuality: in several of its television commercials, PSOE uses well-known homosexual Spanish 
actors, directors, singers, etc.; IU shows the rainbow flag, related to LGTB movements in many countries. 
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 The data come from the official PP website (http://www.pp.es/esp/congreso-diputados_184.html) and 





Figure 22. PP votes (1977-2008) 
 
These data are discussed briefly in the final section with those corresponding to PSOE 
and IU.   
 
2.3.2.2.2. PSOE 
How the party describes itself 
Reading what parties says about themselves is crucial, not only to obtain a solid 
discourse-historical basis (Wodak & Meyer 2001b), but also to observe their ideology, 
the way they wish to be seen and the type of electorate they target, etc.  
On its official website
56, PSOE describes itself as a party born “to express the 
eagerness of the new working classes”, and a party which has always worked to “realize 
the great emancipatory ideals of Socialism, with the obvious changes the historical 
moments have imposed in each situation, freely and democratically chosen by 
cardholders”. 
PSOE describes itself as a party with clandestine and republican origins
57
 that 
defends workers’ rights, targets social critics, and has always confronted the Right. 
PSOE reproaches the Spanish Right for being against the improvement of workers’ 
conditions, for instance in the agrarian reforms launched during the II Republic (1931-
36). It also blames the Spanish Right for encouraging Franco’s coup d’état, the 
                                                          
56
 http://web.psoe.es/ambito/historiapsoe/docs/index.do?action=View&id=460110  
57
 Interestingly PSOE has progressively weakened its Republican position; accepting the present 
Parliamentary Monarchy, as ratified by the Constitution of 1978, and erasing Republic from its discourse. 
This is one of the main differences vis-à-vis IU, which is clearly Republican. PSOE abandoned its former 
Republican ideas and it currently supports the Monarchy together with PP, even if this institution is a 
Francoist legacy that represents continuity with past. This gives IU a good foothold to attack PSOE as a 
false Left party too similar to PP. 
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consequent Civil War and the subsequent repression, where PSOE considers itself to be 
a “victim”. 
PSOE defines itself as a party that evolves with society, as a democratic and 
reformist party that has rejected Marxism since at least 1979
58
. 
In order to present itself as a supportive, progressive and liberal party, PSOE 
refers to some of its achievements such as decentralization, the depenalization of 
abortion, policies for the equality of women, increasing public universal healthcare, 
educational reform, the extension of unemployment benefits, the creation of a free 
public universal and compulsory education and the rise in the number of scholarships 
and grants. PSOE emphasizes public and social policies in order to guarantee the 
Welfare State, thereby granting the equal opportunities to everyone, in line with its main 
ideological axis of social solidarity. 
PSOE also describes the moment when it lost power (for the first time since it 
gained it, i.e., since 1982), defining the victory of PP in the election of 1996 as a 
“technical draw”, thereby minimizing its opponent’s positive results. At the same time 
PSOE states it made “una oposición fuerte y condicionante ante tentaciones 
reaccionarias [of PP]”, and in doing so PSOE presents itself as the party protecting 
democracy against a reactionary right
59
. 
PSOE places major importance on the election of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero as 
its Secretary General, claiming that he led the party through a “quiet change”. This 
description positively presents the candidate as a conciliating and dialoguing leader
60
. 
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 This is a very important point; in fact it constitutes the first and the main reason for being attacked by 
the Left, for betraying its Marxist past and by the Right, precisely for its Marxist past. On this point it is 
worth quoting De Santiago-Guervós observations on PSOE shift from Marxism to socialdemocracy and 
from it to the center (1996: 14 et seq.): “este corrimiento que inicia el PSOE a partir del 1975 hacia ideas 
más conservadoras ha continuado imparablemente, porque la realidad ha seguido cambiando, porque la 
sociología del elector es cada vez más conservadora. Y con el PSOE los demás partidos del arco 
parlamentario han tenido que ir ocupando o disputándose los huecos que han ido quedando. Así el PSOE 
abandona la socialdemocracia. […] IU intenta ocuparla” (De Santiago-Guervós 1996:15-16). Since the 
political field is relational, parties occupy the space let free by others. So the moving is the following: “de 
socialista a socialdemócrata y de ahí al centro para el PSOE. De comunista a eurocomunista y socialista y 
de ahí a socialdemócrata en el PCE. De derecha al centro-derecha y de ahí al centro en el PP” (De 
Santiago-Guervós 1996: 16). Interestingly, in the 1970s PCE reproached PSOE for abandoning Marxism 
in favor of Social-democracy, while in the 1980s, IU, accused PSOE for abandoning Social-Democracy, 
as it continues to do today. So historically IU political strategy is to accuse PSOE of not being far enough 
to the left,  not without reason, since in the 1980s Felipe González was convinced of PSOE’s need to 
“ampliar la base del PSOE hacia la derecha” (apud De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 16; see also Méndez-Lago 
2005). 
59
 These statements indicate a pattern of de/legitimation. 
60
 PSOE presents Zapatero more or less as a “protector father”, in terms of Lakoff (2004). Remember that 




The party is described as an organization fighting for freedom, equality and solidarity, 
oriented towards citizenship and the defense of individual freedoms. As for the 
economy, PSOE argues that State has to regulate the market adequately, and that it has 
to be supportive, provide opportunities and satisfy the basic needs of every citizen. Also 
PSOE presents itself as a party aimed at “guaranteeing progress in a free, equal and 
cohesive society”. 
PSOE also describes the recent years of its long history. This is a critical point, for 
PSOE takes into account the years of opposition and especially those of the return to 
power, and the way it happened (strongly contested by the Right). We must remember 
that PP did not accept the results of 2004 general elections, when PSOE won; PP 
accused PSOE of winning the elections thanks to the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004. 
In order to detract from these criticisms, PSOE claims that in the second half of Aznar’s 
term of office (PP) a certain desire for change was evident among the electorate, as 
shown by the positive PSOE results in the municipal elections and in regional Catalan 
elections of 2003. This desire is presented as precluding the electoral turnaround in 
2004. 
Interestingly enough, PSOE makes no reference to the 3 main reasons that seem to 
have definitely moved the electorate, namely the ecological disaster of the Prestige; the 
Iraq war fought with George W. Bush; and the Jihadist attack of 11M. This last point is 
especially important, since during the debates PP continues to consider it the real 
element that conditioned the 2004 elections. As we will see, it constitutes an element for 
de/legitimation (I will return to this issue). Yet, in order to change the shift among 
voters, PSOE refers mainly to its mature and conciliatory opposition and to poor PP 
administration between 2000 and 2004. PSOE blames PP for “its culture of imposition 
and lack of dialogue in its eight years in government”, compared to Zapatero’s 
determination for dialogue and negotiation. This description presents a very positive 
image of Zapatero and a negative image of PP. 
As for political ideology, PSOE presents equality, solidarity and justice as its 
main values and claims its policies target middle class, the young, women and 
immigrants. PSOE also refers to a (Francoist) past that caused economic 
underdevelopment and social tardiness. These references to the past will also feature in 
the debates as a means of de/legitimating. 
It should be noted that Socialism continues to be present only in the name PSOE: 
in fact, it has increasingly moved towards the center, through privatization or 
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deregulating the public sector. Nevertheless, to a certain extent it continues to encourage 
some types of public social policies and public investments, professes (at least) to 
defend the environment, and is somewhat critical of the Catholic establishment, having 
approved homosexual marriage and legalized abortion. A closer analysis of the 2008 
manifesto sheds greater light on its ideology and demands. I analyzed its assumptions in 
describing the current situation, and the perspectives expressed in the preamble, as well 
as the policies set out for the future. Examining the manifestos allows for the 
corroboration of the political cleavages, the topics chosen, their footing in relation to 
specific themes, the way parties deal with them, in order to better the way they 
legitimize themselves and delegitimize the opponent.  
For instance, the PSOE presents itself as a liberal party, the party that modernized 
Spain after dictatorship, represented as “backwardness”, an idea Zapatero also 
expressed in the televised debates. PSOE defines itself as a responsible and reliable 
party in government as well as in opposition; as a party looking for social harmony, 
consensus, and peace, in Spain as well as worldwide; a party that has tried to and will 
continue to redistribute wealth, maintaining public services such as education, health 
care, and pensions, sustaining the weakest (women, disabled, elderly, immigrants, 
young people); PSOE also defines itself as a secular party ma non troppo61, protecting 
individual freedoms such as abortion, homosexual marriage, euthanasia, etc. 
 
Figures: votes and members of parliament 
We will now consider the electoral results of PSOE in the general elections. In the two 
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 It is especially true if compared to the radical laicist position of IU, as we can see analyzing its left-
wing ideological assumptions, its manifesto and its discourse. 
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 Data come from the official PSOE website 
(http://www.psoe.es//ambito/resultadoselectorales/docs/index.do?action=View&id=99188) and have been 




Figure 23. PSOE MPs (1977-2008) 
 
 
Figure 24. PSOE votes (1977-2008) 
 
As the charts show, PSOE and PP have been the two main parties in terms of 
cardholders, of absolute votes and in terms of MPs since the early 1980s. The third most 
voted party is IU, which is discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3.2.2.3. IU 
How the party describes itself 
In terms of absolute votes IU is the third most voted Spanish party, but it has a very 
scarce parliamentary representation, due to the Spanish electoral system
63
 currently in 
force (art. 162 and 163 of the Ley de Regimen Electoral General in accordance with 
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 See for instance Bilbao-Arrese (1994). 
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article 6 of the Spanish Constitution) which uses the D’Hont system to distribute seats 
among the parties. This proportional electoral system favors larger or local parties, as 
occurs in Spain with PP and PSOE on the one hand
64
, and with the regionalist parties 
from Catalonia (ERC, CiU), Galicia (BNG) and Basque Country (PNV) on the other. In 
this sense, in the 2008 Spanish general elections, PSOE obtained 11,064,524 votes, PP 
10,169,973 and IU 963,040, but PSOE obtained 169 MPs, PP 153 and IU only 2. It 
means that PSOE got 1 MP for every 65,470 votes, PP one member for every 66,470 
votes and IU one for every 481,520 votes. 
As Urdanoz-Ganuza (2008) says, this electoral system hampers the birth of a third 
party as a moderator, or regulator, of the dynamics between PP and PSOE, who 
obviously defend status quo, since it favors their interests; moreover it “rewards” local 
parties for their democraticness. For this reason, if IU launches a strong attack on PP, it 
also attacks PSOE, since it considers both parties responsible for “an unjust electoral 
system” (IU: 72). This is important since it is an argument for the de/legitimation 
discourse of IU. 
As for its history and electoral program, the political association Izquierda Unida 
was officially founded on 27 April 1986, after the positive experience of the platform 
Izquierda Unida created in the campaign against the entry of Spain into NATO. For that 
referendum, left-wing groups except PSOE, then in the government, joined forces to 
support the NO-NATO vote. Among those groups there were: Partido Comunista de 
España (PCE), which would become the core of the future coalition, Partido de Acción 
Socialista (PASOC), Izquierda Republicana (IR), Federación Progresista (FP), Partido 
Humanista (PH) and Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España (PCPE).  
IU defines itself as a “socio-political movement, which hopes to embrace groups, 
persons, and parties, who claim for a human-emancipatory Left”. As we can read in the 
IU foundational document, IU arose as consequence of “the center-wing attitude of the 
PSOE Government (1982) vis-à-vis the economy and its right-wing attitude vis-à-vis 
the defense policy and foreign policies”. IU defines itself as “an alternative left-wing 
project” rooted in working-class movements, renewed according to the social and 
historical changes, in environmentalism, and in democratic socialism, aimed at 
“unifying a left-wing movement that wishes to drive contemporary progressive 
policies”.  
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 See for instance Colomer (1998: 141). 
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Coherently with its Socialist (social-democratic) assumptions, in its program IU 
presents itself as contrary to Capitalism and the current Neoliberal model of production-
consumption; against the increasing privatization of services, IU calls for a strong 
public sector; it is against the Catholic establishment, favoring a neat laicism. 
Furthermore, it is Republican and Federalist, albeit contrary to the particularistic view 
of peripheral nationalistic parties, especially right-wing groups, such as CiU or PNV; IU 
defends labor, workers and unions, ecology and a new way of life less subjected to 
market dictatorship, and more supportive and collective; IU defends social justice and 
peace worldwide. 
 
Figures: votes and members of parliament. 




Figure 25. IU MPs (1977-2008). For 1977, 1979, 1982 the data concern PCE. Eventual coalitions with 





Figure 26. IU votes (1977-2008). For 1977, 1979, 1982 data concern PCE. Eventual coalitions with other 
parties have not been counted 
 
The following section presents a summary of the discussion so far, as well as two charts 
and a number of observations.   
 
2.3.2.3. Observations 
As stated above, as occurs in many Western countries, political parties are the main 
agents of Spanish institutional politics. As in other countries, they have constructed, 
expressed and (institutionally) channeled the main cleavages of Spanish society: the 
socioeconomic conflict (owners-workers) as well as the center-periphery conflict. The 
present Spanish party system can be called multi-party, but in reality two parties, PP 
and PSOE, have increasingly assumed a predominant role. Consequently, even though 
this definition can be disputed, the Spanish party system is clearly two-party
65
. 
According to the figures and charts presented above, PP and PSOE account for 80% of 
the representatives of all legislative national or local assemblies. 
I would like to draw attention to the following charts: the first (fig. 27) represents 
the results (MPs) of the three main Spanish parties from 1977 to 2008 and the second 
one represents the evolution of the regionalist parties (MPs).  
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Considering the first chart (fig. 27) it can be noted that: 
1) Between 1977 and 1982 Spanish politics was dominated by UCD, the party 
built around the charismatic personality of Adolfo Suarez, who led Spain out of the long 
dictatorship through a rather pacific transition. UCD electoral success depended on the 
historic moment of the Transition itself, when electors considered an excessive 
polarization between Right and Left as dangerous, and political agents were convinced 
that it was necessary to find common ground, all making concessions in order to gain 
ground in other areas (De Santiago Guervós 1996: 19-20). In 1982 Suarez founded 
another party, Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), which after a difficult start (2 MPS 
in 1982) obtained very good results in 1986 (19 MPs) and in 1989 (14 MPs); both UCD 
and CDS declined once Suarez resigned as president, proving that it also was a 
personalistic party. CDS’ members moved to PP or PSOE.  
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 In drawing up this chart I have not considered the coalitions, but I have aggregated some data in order 
to simplify it. As for PSOE, I aggregated data of PSOE with those of PSC, the Catalan formation of 
PSOE. For 1979 I did not aggregate the seats of PSA-PA with those of PSOE. As for IU, in the chart I 
considered for the 1977, 1979 and 1982 elections the results of PCE. I did not aggregate the seats of IC, 
which sometimes stands in coalition with IU. In the three cases for PP, PSOE and IU I have not counted 
these associations in order to simplify. As for PP: in 1977 PP participated in the elections as AP, in 1979 
as Coalición Democrática, in 1982 as Alianza Popular-Partido Demócrata Popular and in 1986 as 
Coalición Popular, and has only been known as PP since 1989. In counting PP seats I always aggregated 
those of UPN that has always stood in coalition with PP since 1989. For 1989 I aggregated seats of PP 
with those of Partido Popular-Centristas de Galicia (CP-CG), which since then has merged with PP. For 
1996 I aggregated to PP the seats of Partido Popular-Partido Aragonés (PP-PAR). As for UCD, it 
participated in the 1977, 1979 and 1982 elections and then literally disappeared. 
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2) In addition to the UCD crisis, when votes went to PP and PSOE, PCE also 
experiences a period of crisis between 1982 and 1989, when it lost many votes to PSOE.   
3) The years between 1982 and 1989 were dominated by PSOE. This wide 
support in the years immediately following the end of the dictatorship is due to many 
factors: a reaction to Francoism, through a polarization on the opposite side of political 
field; the charismatic figure of PSOE’s leader, Felipe González; the conciliating profile 
of PSOE politics; a move towards the center and the delay of the Right in creating and 
offering a moderate (center) image, whereby AP was still perceived as too Francoist. As 
a result of this widespread support, PSOE obtained 3 absolute majorities between 1982 
and 1989. 
4) Equally in the same years we can observe a weak support for the Right, due on 
the one hand to a reaction to Francoism, as well as to the reorganization of the Right. 
From this perspective, PP’s rise and the fall of UCD are two faces of the same political 
movement, intended as a systemic electoral displacement: the electoral (rather than 
political) space of UCD is progressively occupied by PP. In a certain sense, the fact that 
UCD emerged from within Francoism and that its fall coincides with the rise of AP/PP, 
demonstrate the links between PP and Francoism, in terms of leaders and 
representatives, ideology, votes and voters. 
5) 1993 marks a turning point: PSOE obtains only a relative majority and PP 
definitively emerges as its antagonist. Since then PSOE and PP become the two 
majority parties and start to concentrate the highest number of votes in Spain. The party 
system clearly defines itself as two-party and the results of one party are mirrored by 
those of its principal opponent; since 1993 PP and PSOE alternated in government with 
absolute majorities (in 2000 and 2011) or relative majorities (PSOE in 1993, 2004 and 
2008; PP in 1996). Interestingly, this inflection point has been sanctioned by the first 
two televised presidential debates between PP and PSOE candidates that took place in 
1993
67
. As a consequence, more radical options, such as IU, started to lose traditional 
social support: one can therefore observe an increasing ideological convergence. By 
pursuing a chimerical centerness, PP and especially PSOE (who moved towards the 
right) increasingly assumed conservative Neoliberal positions and policies underwent an 
increasing uniformization.  
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6) We can observe that IU and PSOE results are related: a loss of votes for IU 
means an increase in votes for PSOE; this is particularly evident in the two peaks of 
1982 and 2004. Likewise, a loss of votes for PSOE often means an increase in votes for 
IU, as in 1996. Despite ideological differences (IU is more Socialist, more 
environmentalist, more Republican and more laic), the systematic relation between IU 
and PSOE results proves that PSOE and IU electors (or at least some of them) are 
somehow close, moving from one party to the other depending on contingent 
circumstances; we also may think that IU obtains most votes when electors are 
dissatisfied with PSOE policies, for instance due to an excessive PSOE move to the 
center. 
7) IU has consistently lost voters since 1996. 
8) Equally, since the early 1990s, the Right has increased its representation, 
probably due to the overall upward economic trend of Spain, and the increase in GDP 
(gross domestic product). It is well-known that richer electors tend to be more 
conservative, since they have something to conserve. Moreover, the Spanish population, 
like that of many other European countries, is becoming increasingly elderly and it is 
common for elderly electors tend to vote for conservative parties, mainly because they 
have more to conserve (materially and symbolically) vis-à-vis youngsters. 
The observation of the following chart (fig. 28) highlights several other factors: 
 
 
Figure 28. MPs of the peripheralist parties in the Congreso (1977-2004)  
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Peripheralist parties (regionalist, federalist or separatist) began emerging during the 
1979 elections. In the early 1980s the institution of CCAA as politico-administrative 
entities
68
 increased the role of parties such as CiU, PNV, ERC, HB, and CC in their 
respective regions as well as in the Congreso, as shown in the chart above. Even though 
they play minor roles in national assemblies, regional parties have featured strongly in 
the regional assemblies and governments of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and 
the Canary Islands. 
Although all 17 Spanish regions are autonomous, three regions are especially 
important for historical and ideological reasons: the Basque Country, Catalonia, and 
Galicia, and especially the first two. This is particularly relevant because during the 
2008 debates candidates broadly refer to the Estado de las Autonomías, the 
decentralized form of the Spanish State established by the Constitution. In particular 
they deal extensively with issues concerning the Basque Country and Catalonia. The 
Estado de las Autonomías changed the centralist vision of the Spanish State that, with 
the exception of a number of reforms carried out during the II Republic, had lasted since 
1714. Decentralization tried to provide an institutional solution to peripheralism 
necessary to disenable separatist movements, especially in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia. In this way centripetal forces were split among the moderates, who accessed 
institutions and were legitimized on the condition of accepting the new status quo, and 
the radicals, increasingly pushed towards the margins of the system. 
In order to understand the unique nature of the situation in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country, consider that in the regional parliaments of 11 regions PP and PSOE 
have more than 80% of votes, but in Catalonia and the Basque Country the situation is 
radically different. Since the first regional elections (1980), and apart from a short 
parenthesis (PSC-ICV-ERC), Catalonia has been governed by CiU, which has a solid 
representation in the Congreso (4.3% of MPs in 2000 and 3% in 2004), in the 
Catalonian Parliament (27-47%) and in provincial and municipal assemblies. In the 
Basque Country PNV has been in power since the first regional elections (1980), 
sometimes in coalition, apart from a short period (1987-1990), when PSE governed. 
PNV is also well represented in the Congreso (2% in 2000 and 2004), in the Basque 
parliament, and in provincial and municipal assemblies. The case of Galicia is 
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 1980 saw the creation of the Basque and Catalonian regional parliaments; the Galician Parliament was 
founded in 1981, followed a year later by the Andalusian Parliament. The first elections for the remaining 
13 regional parliaments were held in 1983.  
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considerably different: since the first regional elections (1981) AP/PP has been in 
power, apart from two parentheses of PSOE (1987-1990) and PSOE-BNG (2005-2011). 
In Galicia, peripheralism is not so entrenched as in the Basque Country and Catalonia 
and centralism has always been strong; indeed PP is traditionally well-established, due 
partly to the fact that Francisco Franco and Manuel Fraga were Galician. The second 
party in Galicia is PSdG, the Galician section of PSOE, and only in third place do we 
find the regional party, BNG, which, as we have seen above, is well represented in the 
regional, provincial and municipal assemblies, and since 1996 also in the Congreso. 
Generally speaking, 1993 also constitutes a turning point for peripheralist parties. Even 
though their role is reduced, they have MPs in the Congreso or Senado (CiU, PNV, CC, 
PAR, CHA, PA, BNG, and ERC), and play a particularly relevant role in the event of 
relative majorities of PP and PSOE: indeed, CiU, PNV and CC have all supported PP or 




Section one of this chapter provides an insight into the Spanish political and 
administrative structure, such as the division of power and administrative divisions into 
regions, provinces, and city and town councils. It also includes details of the main 
electoral processes at a national, regional, provincial and municipal level. For each level 
I have provided charts and figures to clearly show the relations of force between the 
mains actors of Spanish political field. In doing so, I have demonstrated the monopoly 
exerted by PP and PSOE in Spain’s political field.  
Section two of this chapter describes the Spanish party system, succinctly 
introducing the main Spanish national and regional parties. At the end of this second 
section, in order to provide more details about the structure and the dynamics of the 
Spanish political field, I have focused in particular on the three main Spanish parties: 
PP, PSOE and IU. I have briefly recalled the recent Spanish history, then I have 
provided an historical background for each of these three parties; I tried to point out the 
main ideological features, focusing in particular on the way the parties present 
themselves. Finally this chapter also outlines the main figures of their electoral results 
for the Congreso, the principal stage for institutional politics in Spain. This section ends 
with some general remarks on the three parties and their relative situation within the 
Spanish political field: in particular I have focused on the systemic, reciprocal and 
relational links between the results of the three parties (PP-PSOE; PP-UCD; PSOE-IU) 
and the duopoly of PP and PSOE, as it emerged in 1993; this duopoly was sanctioned 
by 1993 televised debates and the 2008 debates, thereby perpetuating this structural 
constitution of the Spanish field. 









This chapter deals with the data collection and organization methods. I will describe my 
data, explaining the reason for my choice of information, and pointing to a number of 
observations regarding representativity. Since I am dealing with audiovisual data, I will 
justify some methodological choices in favor of a simplified transcription. The chapter 
also includes an explanation of the way the materials are organized in the appendix and 
the reference system used. It ends with an introduction of the data treatment.   
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3.2. Selection of material 
The data were collected over a period of approximately one month, from early February 
to 11 March 2008. This period embraces the entire electoral campaign, which officially 
opened on 22 February 2008, and closed on 7 March, with the so-called día de reflexión 
just before the vote, that took place on 9 March. 
Although the focus is on the televised debates, I also have collected many other 
materials that can be considered secondary. However, some observations need to be 
made about this point. First of all I wish to highlight the fact that due to their nature, i.e. 
the fact of being part of electoral discourse aimed at popularizing and promoting 
candidates, all the materials were publicly and freely available within the public space, 
so no particular ethical issues were involved.   
Living in Spain during the electioneering allowed me to follow closely political 
news, broadcasts, etc. However, I have not systematically collected all the discourses 
produced over the period in question. Instead, I adopted a more impressionistic –not 
illogical– approach. My exposure to the discourse of the candidates and other political 
agents mirrored that of the average Spanish citizen with an interest in the elections and 
electioneering.   
In order to collect the data, each day I monitored the main websites of Spain’s 
three major parties
69
, using printscreen to record the main contents. I recorded the songs 
used by the parties for electoral propaganda, as well as the main electoral videos
70
. I 
also collected the main texts appearing on the websites, as well as statements, 
declarations, etc., all the campaign slogans, and the manifestos of the three parties. 
Finally I recorded the videos of the two debates, which are the main object of my 
analysis. 
I also transcribed all audiovisual materials: songs, electoral videos, and the 
televised debates
71
. The issue of transcription will be dealt with in greater detail at a 
later stage.  
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 Official websites, personal websites created specifically for campaign purposes, and the main web 
platforms linked from the main websites: For Zapatero: www.psoe.es; www.lamiradapositiva.es; 
www.plataformaapoyozapatero.es; for Rajoy: www.pp.es/marianorajoy; www.pp.es; www.hazteoir.org; 
for Llamazares: www.gasparllamazares.es; www.izquierda-unida.es. 
70
 I considered as main videos those produced by the parties or hosted on their official websites. 
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 On the Internet it is possible to find transcriptions of both debates, but they are normally incomplete or 
too approximate and inaccurate. 
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In short, the corpus consists of the following: 2 videos of the televised debates 
(approximately 190 minutes, the transcription of which totals more than 35,000 words); 
51 videos, including the official party political broadcasts (22 for IU, 14 for PP, and 15 
for PSOE, the transcription of which totals more than 6,200 words
72
); 2 songs (the 
transcription of which totals 550 words); the 3 electoral programs (more than 23,500 
words) and the slogans and various texts featured on the main websites. Apart from the 
main corpus, constituted by the transcription of the two debates, the other data (videos, 
songs, slogans, electoral programs, etc.) can be considered secondary data, but they are 
vital for triangulation: they allow for a comparison between my main object of analysis 
(debates) and other texts or other communicative events produced in the same period, 
within the same domain (electoral), by the same authors, with the same function 
(persuasion), in order to determine how they contribute to the construction of 
presidentiability. 
This point of triangulation is related to the issue of representativity in my corpus. 
The material collected is representative in the sense that it allowed me to observe the 
emergence of some kind of patterns, more or less constant, and therefore explicative of 
my quaestio. This issue of representativity is also related to that of coherence and 
cohesion. It is reasonable to assume that a party engaged in electioneering, and therefore 
aiming for re/election, will produce texts targeting a similar purpose; consequently, each 
part of its discourse is representative of the whole, as a metonymy. In terms of data 
collection this issue is methodologically significant in that, even though a corpus needs 
to be of a certain size (in order to check the discursive consistency), it does not have to 
cover the entire phenomenon under analysis, in this case the entire discursive 
manifestation of the electioneering; which is totally unattainable. This impossibility lies 
not only in physical limitations, but especially in the characteristic of text and discourse 
itself: each text is only a discretized part of a larger continuous macro-text or macro-
discourse
73
. Discourses are always part of the other discourses to which they refer: they 
are intrinsically hypertextual
74
. Therefore, regarding the relation between coherence and 
consistency and representativity, it is reasonable to assume that the texts constituting the 
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 I transcribed only the main ones: 7 for IU, 12 for PP and 13 for PSOE. 
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 This is particularly true if we assume dialogicity and intertextuality (and/or also poly-authoriality) as 
inherent features of every text and discourse (Bakhtin 1981; 1986; Kristeva 1980; 1986) or the fact that 
text and discourses are infinite in the sense that they are immerged in a continuous discursive flow 
(Foucault 1970), or in a semiotic whole (Lotman 1996a[1984], 1996b[1981], 1996c[1992]). 
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macro-text definable as “PSOE electoral discourse during 2008 general elections” are 
more or less coherent in strategies, purposes, even in the propositions used, and any 
deviation (incoherence or inconsistency) will prove highly remarkable and 
meaningful
75
. For instance, the propositions that ZP expresses in the debates will not 
differ from those expressed in the slogans; the lyrics of the song Defender la Alegría 
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 We can actually assume that coherence, consistency, and cohesion are normal features of any normal 
(i.e. not pathologic) discourse. Moreover, consistency becomes especially important for institutional 
discourses where the multiplicity of speakers require greater care to be taken over “unison”. 
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3.3. The reason for choosing the debates 
To avoid making the same mistakes as Borges’ cartographer, who, obsessed with being 
as precise as possible in his geographic description, drew a full scale and therefore 
useless map of the Earth (Borges 1974[1960]: 847), I selected materials based on 
criteria of representativity rather than mimesis. Moreover, my approach to electoral 
discourse was more that of normal citizens than a researcher; far from being exposed to 
every text, they are only exposed to a certain number of them, even though they display 
a high degree of coherence and consistency. This has is counterpart in the well-known 
way in which (persuasive) discourses circulate due to the organization of the mass 
media system: high redundancy, i.e. the same texts or the same propositions appear 
repeatedly in different texts. In short, although a fortiori partial, my corpus tried to be 




I therefore chose to analyze debates because they respond better than other texts to 
my research question: they are the key communicative event for analyzing the discursive 
construction of presidentiability; they epitomize electioneering as a stage for ritual 
confrontation; they show the mediatization and personalization of politics; they show 
the dialogicity and dialectic of facework, of the performance of self (Junod & Maillat 
2010) and of stance-taking; they occur at the height of the election campaign and are 
watched by millions of Spaniards, turning them into the party political broadcast with 
the largest audience for both main parties, who receive the positive sanction (or 
legitimation) of TV; they are the space from which the two main Spanish parties can 
spread out the (dominant) discourse they produce, their doxa, for instance allowing the 
exclusion of ideological alternatives, such IU. From this perspective, the lack of 
representation of Llamazares and IU and the fact that this party disappears at a certain 
point of my dissertation should not be seen as an incoherence of my analysis, but rather 
as a central feature of the Spanish political field.  
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 These clarifications are necessary to avoid criticism targeting (C)DA (Levinson 1983; Widdowson 
1998, 2004; Blommaert 2005). Note that, as Wodak & Meyer say, “there is no typical CDA way of 
collecting data” (2001a: 23); they continue to state that “there is little discussion about statistical or 
theoretical representativeness of the material collected. Although there are no explicit statement about this 
issue, one might assume that many CDA studies (perhaps with the exception of Teun van Dijk and Ruth 
Wodak) mostly deal with only small corpora which are usually regarded as being typical of certain 
discourses” (2001a: 25, but see also 31 footnote 7). 
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3.4. Multimodality and simplified transcription 
My chosen method of data analysis requires a number of observations. Since my aim is 
to analyze the discursive construction of presidentiability within the two debates, 
through interactive moves and discursive-argumentative devices, I focused on certain 
elements of discourse, playing down others. This leads to a number of observations on 
two points: 1) multimodality; 2) transcription. 
Regarding multimodality, I am aware that the choice of audiovisual materials 
requires a greater focus on multimodality. I recognize the importance of non-verbal 
aspects of discourse (Wodak & Meyer 2001a; Blommaert 2005; Fairclough 2001; Kress 
& van Leeuwen 1996; Kress et al. 1997; Kress & van Leeuwen 2001; Royce 2007; 
Ventola et al. 2004), but I preferred to deal only with textual features because they 
proved sufficient in order to answer the questions posed.  
This point had consequences in terms of the way I transcribed the audiovisual data of 
the debates, opting to use a simplified transcription of spoken data. This choice is due to 
the large amount of data, which would have complicated a detailed micro-linguistic 
transcription, as well as to the fact that the interaction produced in the debates is closer 
to “(spoken) written discourse”, which could justify a textual approach, and the desire to 
simplify the reading process. Yet furthermore, the particular objects of my interest were 
the patterns, leading me to carry out an extensive rather than an intensive analysis. 
Other, more precise and faithful kinds of transcription, would have been useful for 
responding other quaestiones, but would have not been forcefully more useful (more 
explicative) in order to answer my research question: from this perspective a more 
detailed transcription would not have added to my analysis.  
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3.5. Organization of materials 
All the transcribed materials are included in an appendix at the end of the dissertation, 
including the transcription of the two televised debates, the transcription of the main 
videos, the two songs and the main slogans and texts; the “primary” materials (a 
recording of the televised debates, videos, songs, manifestos, etc.) will be included on a 
DVD attached to this paper.  
As for the transcription of the two debates, which is the main object of analysis, 
the text reproduced in the appendix is numbered on each line, to guarantee easy access 
to every point. In-text references to corpus will have a specific form: for referring to the 
transcription of the debate I will use the following system: for instance I.128 refers to 
line 128 of the first debate; II.1155-1170 refers to lines 1155-1170 of the second debate, 
etc. Manifestos are referenced like books, with the author (PP, PSOE, IU), the year 
(2008) and the page (XX), whilst videos or songs will be referred to only by their title 
(in the appendix videos appear in alphabetic order for PP, PSOE and IU).  
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3.6. Data treatment 
A more detailed discussion of the data is given in the following chapter (4). Here I 
simply point out that the data analysis aims to establish patterns in the implementation 
of PP and PSOE moves and strategies of de/legitimation. My analysis is qualitative, 
descriptive and contrastive. It is a hermeneutic analysis of discourse that tries to 
compensate a textual approach with an interactive perspective. Following Wodak & 
Meyer (2001a), I have firstly sequentially analyzed my corpus, to pinpoint recurrent 
interactive moves of de/alignment or (verbal) discursive devices and patterns in their 
use, for instance, the recurrence of some uses of deixis, implicatures, metaphors, topoi, 
etc. I have then interpreted the results in order to determine how the candidates 
implemented their strategies of presidentiability construction. 
The analysis of the discourse produced and circulated during the 2008 election 
campaign, together with the observation of the Spanish political and administrative 
structure as well as of Spanish political party system, will give a general picture of the 





This chapter has addressed the collection, organization and treatment of data. I have 
explained why I chose my data and presented my idea of representativity. I also 
presented my reasons for opting not to focus on multimodality and for using a 
simplified transcription. The next chapter (4) describes the analytical framework and the 
analytical tools used in my analysis.  
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This section presents the analytical framework for the analysis of the discourse 
deployed during the two debates. This study can be situated in the strand of the 
Discourse Analysis or, better, in that of the Discourse Studies. Put simply, Discourse 
Analysis (also known as DA) studies discourse (Angermuller et al. 2014; Blommaert 
2005; Brown & Yule 1983; Gee 2005; Harris 1952; Jaworski & Coupland 1999; 
Johnstone 2002; Renkema 2004; Schiffrin et al 2001; Stubbs 1983; van Dijk 1997b). 
The problem is that the term “discourse”, used for the very first time by Harris (1952), 
and since then widely employed in the humanities and the social sciences, is a fuzzy 
word. Discourse can be considered, as in the words of Harris himself, as “language 
above the sentence”. However, as Cameron shows (2001; see also Widdowson 2004), 
this definition is somehow insufficient. Discourse can be conceived as coherent units of 
varying length of spoken or written language used by speakers and hearers for a variety 
of purposes
78
. It is also possible to conceive discourse as a social practice determined by 
social structures as well as determining social structures and social practices. As Gee & 
Handford say: 
 
Discourse analysis is the study of language in use. It is the study of the meaning we give language 
and the actions we carry out when we use language in specific contexts. Discourse analysis is also 
sometimes defined as the study of language above the level of sentence, of the way sentences 
combine to create meaning, coherence and accomplish purposes (Gee & Handford 2012: 1).  
 
These authors go on to state that the term “discourse analysis” applies both to texts and 
talks. In order to refer to the different approaches for analyzing any “naturally 
occurring” significant semiotic event, the term Discourse Studies is therefore probably 
more appropriate that Discourse Analysis. Discourse Studies deal with communicative 
events. As in “pure” DA, my analysis addresses various levels or dimensions of 
interaction: genres, words selection, rhetoric, meanings, speech acts, moves, strategies, 
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 The term discourse could also apply to other forms of human communication, such as images, but 
language is the preeminent semiotic mode analyzed. 
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turns, the relation between discourse and context, the relation between discourse and 
power, etc. The field of the DA is very broad, dealing with an enormous variety of 
objects of analysis and of perspectives: among the main theoretical and analytical 
approaches relevant for the present work, mention should be made of at least the 
following: Conversation Analysis; Ethnography of Communication; Pragmatics; 
Rhetoric and Argumentation; Critical Discourse Analysis. It is important to bear in 
mind that different as these approaches may seem, and even though they address 
different facets of language-in-use, they are all based on the idea that language is social 
interaction, and deal with the discourse as well as the social contexts in which discourse 
is entrenched. 
Conversation Analysis (also known as CA) studies talk-in-interaction, i.e. verbal 
and non-verbal conduct, in situations of everyday life (Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1983; 
Schegloff 1995; Sacks et al. 1974; Sacks 1995; Cameron 2001; Hutchby & Wooffitt 
2008; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Psathas 1995; Schegloff 2007; Sidnell 2010; Sidnell 
& Stivers 2012; Ten Have 2007; Wooffitt 2005)
79
. Herein this case, I follow CA by 
working on a transcription of recorded data (the debates), even though my transcription 
is not as detailed as usual in CA. As in CA, my analysis is driven by data and attempts 
to find recurring patterns of interaction. It is important to mention that one of the main 
concerns of CA, turn-taking, is strictly defined in the debate, and this influences the 
debaters’ interaction. Another key factor for consideration is that CA differs from 
Interactional Sociolinguistics (Gumperz 1982; see Cameron 2001) in that it does not 
consider it necessary to interview the protagonists of the interaction for the analysis of 
talk-in-interaction. In this sense, I have not consulted or interviewed participants 
(candidates or others involved in the event) about their interaction. My approach also 
differs from ‘pure’ CA in that in my work I have included an analysis of larger 
sociocultural phenomena. 
Ethnography of Communication, combining the study of culture with that of 
linguistic codes, deals primarily with “the description and understanding of 
communicative behavior in specific cultural settings” (Saville-Troike 2003: 13-14); it 
studies how members of particular speech communities use language in context and in 
relation to their social and cultural practices and beliefs (Hymes 1962; 1964; 1972; 
1974; Cameron 2001). However, as Cameron says, the study of a text’s context is so 
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 Note that even if DA is the general term used for indicating the analysis of spoken interactions or 
spoken discourse (Cameron 2001), some scholars oppose CA and DA (see for instance Wooffitt 2005). 
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important that an analyst will spend more time describing context than analyzing text
80
. 
In this sense, Blommaert blurred the boundaries between text and context (2001; 2005). 
The Ethnography of Communication not only studies the communicative event in all its 
components, but also the functions it has within a given culture. In this work I have 
analyzed the presidential debates as communicative events, with all their structural 
features, but I have also analyzed them within the socio-historical context and the 
culture they are embedded in. 
Pragmatics analyzes the contribution of context to the construction of 
meaning(s): i.e. the fact that speaker and listener do not construct meaning based 
exclusively on their shared knowledge of the structural features of language, but also on 
the context of the interaction, previous knowledge of the interlocutors, their inferred 
aims, and other factors. Since Pragmatics covers such issues as speech act theory, 
conversational implicatures, inferences, etc. (Austin 1962; Searle 1965; 1969; 1975; 
1979; Grice 1989; Levinson 1983; 2000; Brown & Levinson 1978; Mey 1993; Sperber 
& Wilson 2005; Verschueren et al. 1995; Yule 1996), in my analysis I will use some of 
the tools offered by this discipline in order to understand how candidates manage their 
presidentiability. 
Rhetoric is the study of the ability to persuade. It is very difficult to separate it 
from Argumentation, which is the study of how conclusions result from logical 
reasoning, i.e. claims based on premises, either soundly or not (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004; van Eemeren 2001; van Eemeren et al. 1993; 1996; van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958). As van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst define it: 
 
Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of 
the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or 
refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint (2004: 1). 
 
Since debate is a form of taking a position and defending it, I have referred to some of 
the tools of Argumentation, such as arguments and loci or topoi. 
As for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), it analyzes discourse as language-in-
use as well as “a form of social practice that constructs the objects of which it purports 
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 According to Cameron, a difference between CA and EC lies in the balance between the importance 
given to text and context (2001: 51). 
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to speak” (Cameron 2001: 123; see also Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000; Caldas-Coulthard 
& Coulthard 1996; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1992; 1995; 2001; 
2003a; Fowler et al. 1979; Jaworski & Coupland 1999; van Dijk 1993c; 1993d; Weiss 
& Wodak 2003; Wodak & Meyer 2001c)
81
. Since it is concerned with the enactment of 
power and the unveiling of social inequalities, it focuses mainly on the analysis of 
institutional discourses, and in particular on mediated discourses. CDA has been 
criticized for its open commitment, for its lack of clear analytical methods, for its 
hermeneutic nature, for the fact of being mainly a textual approach –strictly linked to 
literary criticism– and for focusing on non-ordinary discourses (Cameron 2001; 
Widdowson 2004)
82
. Under this premise my decision to analyze the televised debates 
can be seen as an adherence to this discipline. However, in order to overcome the 
limitations of CDA, I have tried to combine some points of this approach with others 
from the disciplines referred to above, in particular interactional approaches. 
I will now discuss the analytical tools employed to study the debate in 
interactional terms, mainly as a (ritual) practice of stance taking, de/alignment, footing 
and as facework. Part two of this section focuses on the discursive devices employed by 
candidates for (re)presenting and categorizing events and actors in terms of de-
legitimation moves: metaphors, presuppositions, narratives, reported speech and 
quotations, deixis, argumenta, fallacia, and loci (or topoi). A reflection on these devices 
is then necessary in order to analyze the candidates’ discourse. Obviously these two 
plans of analysis, the interactional and the discourse approach, are intertwined rather 
than disarticulated.  
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 Cf. also the dispute on CDA between Widdowson and Fairclough (Widdowson 1995; 1996; 1998; 
Fairclough 1996b; see also Widdowson 2004, where some of these contributions contra CDA have been 
collected). 
82
 One could disagree with Cameron’s criticism of the lack of ordinariness of the object of analysis of 
CDA, as in our Western society, institutional talks seem to be as ordinary as other “ordinary” talks. 
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4.2. Interactional approaches 
In order to gain a proper insight into debates, and to analyze the de-legitimation moves, 
the discursive strategies as well as the discursive mechanisms used to implement them, 
we have to bear in mind that the main feature of this discursive practice is interactivity. 
 
4.2.1. The interactional construction of stances 
Debates are a stage for politicians to publicly perform stance taking. Even if the turns 
are so strictly defined and organized that they make a debate look like two parallel 
monologues
83
, debates are clearly interactions due to the polyphonic and intertextual 
nature of discourse as well as to the intrinsic interactional and dialogic feature of stance 
taking. During the debates, candidates are engaged in a specific type of discursive 
action, stance taking
84
. A stance can be defined as follows:  
 
as a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means 
(language, gesture, and other symbolic forms), through which social actors simultaneously 
evaluate objects, position subjects (themselves and others), and align with other subjects, with 
respect to any salient dimension of value in the sociocultural field. I have argued for a particular 
configuration of actors and actions as the defining feature of stance. Key to this configuration is a 
set of three entities (first subject, second subject, stance object) and a set of three actions 
(evaluation, positioning, alignment) (Du Bois 2007: 169). 
 
In this definition there are some points that need closer definition: dialogicity and the 
polyphony are widely intended as a means of responding to the discourse or subjectivity 
of others, as for instance in (textual or paraphrased) reported speech, but also in terms of 
constitutive intertextuality or interdiscursivity
85
. Du Bois is extremely clear about the 
importance of prior discourse in the construction of a stance and of a convergent or 
divergent alignment as well as the multimodal nature of communicative means 
(language, gestures, etc.). The evaluative nature of the process of stance taking relates it 
with the formation and expression of ideology (Voloshinov, [1929]1973; Bourdieu 
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 This feature seems to be favorable to candidates that can perform their speech easily, i.e. they can 
easily manage their presidentiability (enhancing their image and detracting from that of their opponent), 
without incurring in open, hence unpredictable, conversation that can threaten their face and which is 
therefore risky for both competitors. 
84
 In this sense, stance taking is similar to argumentation: as van Eemeren says,“argumentation always 
pertains to a specific point of view with regard to a certain issue” (2001: 11). For a discussion on the 
relationship between the terms footing, alignment and stance, see Hale (2011). 
85
 For an overview of the concept from a clear sociolingusitc perspective, see Jaffe (2009). 
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2000). Finally, alignment is the relative stance of each subject about one object and it 
counts as a process and product of the negotiation. 
In the case of these debates we will see that candidates take a stance on various 
issues. For our purposes here the issues are the topics discussed by the candidates (the 
economy, immigration, terrorism, nationalism, etc.). In taking their stances, candidates 
produce ideological-evaluative discourses mobilizing many semiotic resources. 
Although I recognize the multimodal nature of the stance taking, in this analysis I will 
focus primarily on linguistic structures and mechanisms. Since stance taking is never an 
isolated process, occurring instead in a discursive flow, a proper analysis of the 
discourse deployed in the debates by the candidates should at least take into account the 
main intertextual and interdiscursive references. By the same token, since each 
candidate utterance is linked to those of the other candidate, it will be crucial to show 
the interactional enchainment of the moves that each candidate makes to manage his 
own and the other’s presidentiability. In this sense, considerable attention will be given 
to the reaction to other’s stance taking, especially in terms of reported speech. In terms 
of presidentiability management, reported speech is important in that it relates to the 
“public” owning and the responsibility of a stance (Du Bois, 2007: 173). 
 
4.2.2. Participation frame: Turn taking, Participants, Interactional space 
Finally, I will take into account the fact that the candidates share the same participation 
frame about “what is it that’s going on here” (Goffman 1974: 8), i.e. about the debates 
(polarization, rules, confrontation, etc.), and the way they engage in their stance taking: 
for instance it will be evident that, due to the ritual nature of the communicative event 
and the polarization it entails, the candidates will exaggerate and over-perform their 
opposition through constant dealignment. This point is obviously linked to my 
conceptions of debates as performed rituals of confrontation (see section 5.3). 
In this sense, in the debates in question the turn taking, which is a crucial object 
of analysis for interactional approaches (Sacks et al. 1974; see also Bachmann et al. 
1991), is previously organized and established: turns are fixed and candidates are not 
allowed to interrupt the speaker or to exceed the allotted time. The participants know 
the rules and breaking them will have a negative impact on their self-image. However, 
in some cases the candidates do overlap their speech in order to contrast their own 
stance with that of their opponent: in those cases the candidate that interrupts attempts 
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to reduce the persuasive force of speaker’s argument or move; the interrupter tries to 
discredit the other’s statements or refute the accusations. 
As for the Interactional space (see Mondada 2005), in the debates, the space 
where interaction occurs is constructed in order to give the impression of confrontation 
between the candidates, who are positioned face-to-face, and of the neutrality of the 
moderator, situated equidistantly between the candidates. Conveying neutrality is also 
the reason for the color of the stage, which is neither red nor blue (the corporate colors 
of the two parties) or in any other color with political significance (black, orange, 
green), but rather a “neutral” beige. These issues will be further considered in chapter 5. 
 
4.2.3. Faces, faces in interaction and facework 
The concept of face, like those of political capital and ethos (see chapter 1), is crucial 
for understanding politicians’ behavior86. In my introduction to presidentiability 
management I referred to the issue of attributes: even in the classical conception 
provided by Goffman, the notion of face is related to the issue of approved attributes: 
“Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (Goffman 
1972[1967]: 5). I also have often referred to the rituality of political interaction during 
the debate, and Goffman himself deals extensively with ritual roles of the self in 
facework (1972[1967]: 31-32). 
In his analysis of facework (see Goffman 1972[1967]: 12 for a definition), 
Goffman also defines a situation that perfectly matches that of political debates (id: 24-
26): an interaction whereby the interlocutors attack each other, or, in Goffman’s terms, 
threaten each other’s face, in order to increase own face and decrease that of the other 
interactant. It is clear that this is the situation here: each candidate attacks the other in 
order to increase his own presidentiability and decrease that of his opponent.   
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 On face, see among others, Haug (2013); Arundale (2013); and Hernández-Flores (2013). 
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4.3. Discourse analytical approaches 
This section describes the principal tools used to analyze the political discourse of the 
two presidential debates of the 2008 election campaign. It includes a discussion of the 
way candidates (re)present events, actions and actors: the way they categorize agents, 
the narratives employed, the arguments deployed or the loci referred to, the way they 
use metaphors and exploit presuppositions as devices for implementing wider de-
legitimation moves, the way they use deixis for managing (their own or the opponent’s) 
agency, or for creating desalignment, the way they use reported speech or quotations 
and more in general interdiscursivity to present a description of reality favorable to their 
socio-discursive strategies. 
Since there are many relevant variables and many different closely intertwined 
levels of analysis, it is impossible to use them all, and, as van Dijk states, “we must 
make choices, and select those structures for closes analysis that are relevant for the 
study of a social issue” (2001a: 99). 
It goes without saying that also many other features of the discourse deployed by 
both candidates –which I have not taken into account here– could have shed light on the 
ways the candidates manage presidentiability: for example, intonation, voice, mimic, 
proxemic features, etc. This selection is naturally open to criticism, but I am convinced 
that the analytical tools used are sufficiently relevant in order to shed light on the 
strategies deployed by the two candidates in order to manage presidentiabilityIn 
analyzing the positive self-presentation the negative presentation I will try to take into 
account the fact that meaning is constructed at different levels: lexico-semantic + 
morpho-syntactic + logico-pragmatic. In keeping with the nature of this work, I will 
draw from different disciplines including Pragmatics, Semantics, Argumentation and 
Rhetoric. I will consider the usefulness of implicitness and indirectness, 
presupposition, inferences, implicatures, entailments, etc. in strengthening persuasion as 
well as the strategic use of personal deixis to present a polarized division of the world, 
where “we” are good and “they” are bad; I will analyze how the candidates use 
narratives for the strategic (re)presentation of social actors and actions; I will 
investigate the way politicians use arguments, topoi and fallacies, metaphors, as well as 
reported speech for positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of the other. 
All these categories are rather classic features in political discourse analysis (see, for 
instance, van Dijk 2000e).  
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I wish to clarify that these tools do not work as closed sets, independent from each 
other, but rather as intertwined levels of analysis. For instance, metaphors are a lexical 
choice with semantic implications; they could appear in a certain narrative and 
constitute a fallacy or form part of reported speech, etc. 
The following section provides a number of examples of these. Chapters 7-10 
provide a deeper analysis of presidentiability management during the debates in relation 
to the four main topics of the 2008 campaign; in this way I will show how interactional 




As the seminal work of Lakoff & Johnson (1980; 1981; see also Underhill 2011: chs. 2 
and 3) has proven, metaphors play a relevant role in everyday language, since they have 
crucial cognitive functions: metaphors make is possible to understand unfamiliar ideas 
in terms of something that is already familiar; they shape human experience, as well as 
the way people act, according to certain metaphors. 
Since antiquity scholars have investigated the role played by metaphors in 
discourse, in literary texts as well as in political discourse, and, in more recent years 
also in ordinary language (Black 1981[1955]; Davidson 1981[1978]; Searle 
1981[1979]; Lakoff 1993; Underhill 2011)
87
. Due to the power of metaphors for 
constructing meanings and behavior, it is not surprising that metaphors are of such 
particular relevance in political discourse, where they are very frequent (see, among 
others, Wilson 1990; Musolff 2000; Lakoff 1995; 2002[1996]; Mio 1997; Ghafele 
2004; Chilton 2004: 51-52). Lakoff & Johnson are very clear on the importance of 
metaphors in political discourse:  
 
No political ideology addresses the main issue head-on. [...] Political and economic ideologies are 
framed in metaphorical terms. Like all other metaphors, political and economic metaphors can 
hide aspects of reality. But in the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, because 
they constrain our lives. A metaphor in a political or economic system, by what it hides, can lead 
to human degradation (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 236). 
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 For a general introduction to metaphor from Discourse Analysis, see Calsamiglia-Blancafort & Tusón-
Valls (1999: 345-350); for an approach to metaphor from Pragmatics, see Escandell-Vidal (1993: chap. 
11); for a revisitation of Lakoff & Johnson’s “experientialist” approach (1981: 286), see Musolff (2012). 
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Metaphors can take many forms: they can be local, global or archetypical. A local 
metaphor only acts at sentence level, while a global metaphor acts at the level of the 
entire text, as a feature conditioning the discourse. As I have shown (Screti 2013), 
during the 2008 PSOE electoral campaign, the whole idea of defending joy, where joy 
represents the PSOE, its policies, and its electors, is an example of a global metaphor: it 
underlies not only the entire text of the song Defender la Alegría, but also several other 
videos and was the concept underpinning the entire (electoral) discourse of Zapatero the 
candidate. Archetypical metaphors (Gill & Whedbee 1997; Osborn 1967) act across 
many discourses or texts, across generations, always construing the same meanings.  
Both Zapatero and Rajoy use metaphors for the purpose of positive self-
presentation and the negative presentation of their opponent. An example is when ZP 
refers to PP as an obstacle, framing PP as an impediment to PSOE’s government. 
Through this metaphor, ZP describes PSOE as actively trying to do something, while PP 
as the passive element that impedes PSOE’s action. This description obviously frames 
PSOE in positive terms and PP in negative ones. Another example is when RJ describes 
immigration as an avalanche. This widespread metaphor, where immigrants represent a 
threat for Spaniards, allows RJ to present himself as a defender of the Spanish against 
Zapatero’s passivity: the description allows for the positive framing of PP and the 
negative framing of PSOE.   
 
4.3.2. Inferential meanings: presuppositions, entailments, implicatures 
The balance between the speaker’s duties and hearer’s needs in terms of amount of 
information has been investigated by Grice (1975). In general people say less than they 
mean (and mean much more than they say), because speaker and hearer share some 
information about context, (more or less) the same language, a certain amount of 
background, as well as an encyclopedic knowledge of the world. So, many of the blanks 
left by speakers are filled in by hearers. 
In political discourse, implicit aspects of discourse normally create ideological 
meanings (Wilson 1990). According to van Dijk (2000e), it is frequent that in polarized 
ideological speeches, such as those that are the object of this work, implicitness is used 
for a positive self presentation and a negative presentation of the other, for instance to 
emphasize our good points and deemphasizing our bad ones as well as for emphasizing 
their bad points and deemphasizing their good ones (van Dijk 1995a; 2006a; 2006b). 
Since most of the information conveyed by discourse is not expressed, but is only 
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implied or presupposed, and the fact that an active role of the hearer in co-constructing 
the meaning strengthens persuasion (Eco 1979), candidates use presuppositions in their 
discourse: for instance candidates exploit semantic entailments, which establish a 
common ground among interlocutors and allow a construction agreement on the basis of 
common assumptions, despite actual disagreement on arguments (this will be discussed 
further at a later stage). 
There are different kinds of implicitness: on the one hand allusions, ambiguity, 
vagueness, etc., and on the other, pragmatic presuppositions, also called conversational 
implicatures. Grice’s seminal work (1975) has amply investigated these forms of 
implicitness and the role of implicatures depending on context (Strawson 1950; 
Levinson 1983: ch. 3; Mey 2001[1993]: 45-52). 
Finally, there is a third kind of presupposition, more strictly “linguistic”, that does 
not depend on the common knowledge of the context widely intended (which can be 
defined as pragmatic inferences), but on logic inferences based on the literal meaning of 
the words, i.e. semantic inferences. These inferences are often triggered by verbs such 
as to manage (it implies ‘to try’), to stop, to begin, to return, adverbs such as again, 
anymore, etc. but also a noun such as defender triggers inferences, since it presupposes 
a threat, etc. These words are in fact termed presupposition triggers (Levinson 1983: 
ch. 4; Mey 2001[1993]: 27-29; in particular for the study of inexplicit meanings in 
political discourse, see Chilton (2004: 61-65); on the power of implicit discourse see 
also Amossy (2010a[2000]: 142-148) among others). For instance, when RJ says during 
the debate 
 
RJ: Corregir el rumbo [correct the course] 
 
he is activating a semantic presupposition, based on the literal meaning of the 
presupposition trigger corregir [to correct], which logically implies that the actual 
course is not correct. By the same token, when ZP says: 
 
ZP: Continuar creciendo económicamente [keep growing]  
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He is logically implying that Spain’s economy has previously experienced a period of 
growth. Obviously these inferences are ideologically determined. Interestingly enough, 
there is an important conversational presupposition that implies that only PP will be 
able to correct the course or PSOE to make Spain’s economy grow. 
It is evident that presuppositions play a role in strengthening persuasion regarding 
de-legitimation. But what is especially interesting is the importance of presupposition 
triggers in spreading the doxa, the dominant discourse: they establish as presupposed 
(than shared) contents that in reality are not, contents that are disputed (Santulli 2005: 
81-84; Sbisá 1999). Through semantic or pragmatic presuppositions, the speaker 
subtracts premises to discussion; establishes them as a common ground for discussion 
and in doing so strengthens his own premises. In the examples shown above, such as 
corregir el rumbo, the verb corregir triggers a semantic presupposition that “the 
present course is wrong”, establishing a negative situation – attributable to PSOE 
government – as common ground, which only PP can change. In doing so, the speaker 
has presented the opponent negatively and himself in a positive light.  
There is also an important contextual feature that provides implicitness all its 
strength: inference. Given the contextual information (the election campaign, the highly 
polarized nature of the elections, etc.), receivers infer that PSOE lacks what PP has and 
vice versa. Inferences are a constant in human communication: if we always say less 
than we effectively mean to convey, the addressee has to actively reconstruct the 
meaning. This is very important in electoral discourse, whose end is persuasion. As 
Campany clearly puts it: 
 
What people deduce is more important than what you tell them. So, if you just limit yourself to 
providing some suggestions or some elements of reflection, you could better motivate their support 
(2005: 151, my translation). 
 
Inferences contribute to implementing the de-legitimation strategy and presidentiability 
management. This is evident in both debates. By listing some positive features as 
typical of themselves, RJ or ZP imply conversationally (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983; 
Wilson 1990; see also the “invited inferences” of Lycan (1986) apud Wilson 1990) that 
the opponent lacks these characteristics. Thanks to their knowledge of context 
(electioneering, polarization, etc.), receivers know that in electioneering the 
construction of identity is differential, so they infer that such positive features only 
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belong to speaker. By associating these positive features to himself and dissociating 
them from his opponent, the speaker legitimizes himself and delegitimizes the 
opponent. 
 
4.3.3. Narratives  
In general terms, a narrative is any account of connected events presented by an 
addresser in a sequence. Narratives are a fundamental part of social life with key socio-
cognitive functions such as organizing and giving sense to experience (Labov 2010; 
White 1980; Bruner 1987; 1990; 1991; Goffman 1974; 1981[1976]; Hoffmann 2010). 
They are a fundamental way of describing social actors and actions, which in turn is a 
basic tool for framing the other(s) and otherness (van Leeuven 2003[1996]). 
Due to its polarized nature, narratives are crucial in political discourse (Santulli 
2005: 70 et seq.) and are used strategically (Shenav 2005; 2006; Hsu 2001; Duranti 
2006; Larat 2005; Bennett & Edelman 1985). Indeed, politicians can use narratives to 
associate positive values with themselves and negative values with others whilst 
describing themselves and the others. 
According to Edelman (1988), citizens mainly have experience of politics through 
its linguistic description, so politics is political language. In this sense, political 
narratives play a key role in the ideological and hence polarized descriptions of actors 
and (past) actions. Politicians use narratives for positive self-presentation and the 
negative presentation of the other in order to win votes
88
. In political narratives, 
(Santulli 2005: 72 et seq.) the narrators are always homodiegetic, i.e. internal to the 
story, and often autodiegetic, since they are the protagonists of the story; the protagonist 
is often the listener, either the politician on the stage or the citizen watching the political 
broadcast on television. Normally the speaker and the listener play different actantial 
roles (Greimas 1966; 1987[1973]; 1990) –the agonist and the antagonist respectively– 
and are characterized as the classic hero and villain explored in narratology (Propp 
2000[1928]). 
For instance, Schubert says that politicians carefully chose a selection of past 
events with “the function of presenting the speaker in a favorable light or making 
derogatory remarks about the political opponent” (2010: 144). In his work, Schubert 
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 Labov & Waletsky (1997[1967]) distinguish two main functions of narratives: referential and 
evaluative, which is the most relevant for this work (see also Hoffmann 2010: 3). 
119 
 
also provides a classification of the functions fulfilled by narratives in political 
discourse: 
 
Personalization I have done... 
Integration we have done... 
Exemplification he has done... 
Polarization we did (good)/you did (bad); we did not (bad)/ you did (bad)… 
 
As we will see, the narratives presented by Zapatero and Rajoy fulfill these 4 
fundamental functions: they serve to focus attention on the candidate, as when RJ says 
(1); to create a group (see also the section on deixis) as when ZP says (2); to present 
clear and vivid exempla of what is going on through hypotyposis
89
; to polarize the 
world between we and them (see also deixis), where we did things well and you did 
things badly, as in (2).  
 
(1) yo formé parte de un gobierno en el año 1996, que tuvo que 
pedir un crédito en el mes de diciembre para pagar las pensiones 
 
(2) Hemos desbloqueado lo que ustedes frenaron que es la 
investigación con células madre, […] ustedes nunca han apoyado las 
leyes que han supuesto avances de derechos, no apoyaron la ley del 
divorcio, […] no han apoyado ningún avance de derechos de los 
ciudadanos en este periodo democrático […] desde hace 30 años no 
han movido un dedo para que los españoles tengan más derechos 
 
All four functions are employed for a positive self-presentation and a negative 
presentation of the opponent. According to Fetzer: 
 
in the context of political discourse, small stories are used strategically to support the politician’s 
argumentation, to reconstruct her/his credibility, to express alignment with the audience and to 
reconstruct common ground and group coherence, thus presenting the political self as a 
multifaceted identity who knows how to perform appropriately in different spheres of life (2010: 
181). 
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Narratives also allow candidates to present themselves as coherent (Fetzer 2010: 180; 
Duranti 2006: 486), which helps to construct their credibility. As seen in the discussion 
on the key attributes of presidentiability (chapter 1), coherence is related to credibility: 
people tend to trust coherent rather than incoherent persons. So ZP and RJ constantly try 
to present themselves as coherent (and therefore trustworthy) and their opponent as 
incoherent (and by extension untrustworthy), as, for instance, when ZP reproaches RJ 
for criticizing PSOE’s immigration policy whilst the PP government, with RJ as 
Minister of the Interior, did even worse. 
 
ZP: de las cinco regularizaciones, señor Rajoy, que hizo el PP, 
tres pertenecen a su etapa de ministro. Requisitos: bastaba una 
factura de una noche de hotel o un bono-bus. Señor Rajoy, ¿con qué 
cara habla usted de regularizaciones, usted que como ministro 
regularizó inmigrantes con un bono-bus?  
 
Narratives also work as a polarized presentation of the actors: both debates contain 
frequent references to the opposition between good and evil constructed over time 
(before/now) and persons (we/you, if candidates speak to each other or we/them if 
candidate speak to the audience): 
 
before – we – good  vs.  now – they – bad  
before – they – bad  vs. now – we – good  
 
As will be seen in the analysis of the debates (chapters 7-10), these kinds of narratives 
and common, as they are highly effective devices for improving polarization, and 
enacting the positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other. 
Apart from narratives, there are also many other devices used by politicians to 
demonstrate that their opponents are incoherent, in contrast to their own coherence. One 
such example is reported speech or the quotation.  
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4.3.4. Reported speech and quotations 
References to the discourse of others as (direct or indirect) quotations or as reported 
speech are to be understood under the more general idea of dialogism
90
 and 
intertextuality (Bakhtin 1981; 1986; Kristeva 1980; 1986; Voloshinov 1973[1929]; 
Fairclough 1992; see also Barthes’ reflections (1977: 159) on text as fabric) and 
interdiscursivity (Blommaert 2005: 253; Fairclough 1992). Fairclough (1992: 117) 
distinguishes between “constitutive intertextuality”, the structural polyphony of 
discourses, also referred to as interdiscursivity, i.e. the fact that all discourses are made 
of other (piece of, reference to) discourses, and that there are no isolated discourses (see 
also Foucault 1970) and “manifest intertextuality” –which is of greater relevance here– 
which refers to a discourse that openly presupposes or recalls other discourses. 
According to Voloshinov, every discourse is a situated social practice with evaluative 
meanings and directed at certain social aims that take place between interlocutors. Each 
discourse is therefore a piece of dialogue: hence dialogicity and dialecticalness are 
common features of discourse. Moreover discourse is not an autonomous event: it does 
not arise ex abrupto and ex nihilo, for it is necessarily connected with what was uttered 
before and is a premise for what will be uttered after (this is related to Foucault’s 
reflections (1970) on discourse). From this perspective, no discourse is independent 
from other discourses, but in a way or another it more or less overtly and consciously 
quotes them or some parts of them: it echoes, presupposes, refutes, denies, comments, 
recasts and entextualizes (Bauman & Briggs 1990; Silverstein & Urban 1996; 
Blommaert 2005: 47-48) them. As Blommaert clearly defines it: 
 
Entextualisation refers to the process by means of which discourses are successively or 
simultaneously decontextualised and metadiscursively recontextualised, so that they become a new 
discourse associated to a new context and accompanied by a particular metadiscourse which 
provides a sort of ‘preferred reading’ for the discourse. This new discourse has become a ‘text’ 
(2005: 47). 
 
This idea, whereby someone’s words are ‘used’ by other speakers with other socio-
discursive ends, is very useful in the analysis of political electoral discourse, since, due 
to its polarization, the discourse of one candidate presupposes the opponents’ 
discourses, if only to deny them or take an opposite stance. The cases where the 
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discourse of one candidate refers to previous turns or even discourses before or outside 
the communicative event of the debate are numerous and require a deeper analysis 
(chapters 7-10). Here I will deal with the open reference made by candidates to their 
own or others’ previous turns or discourses. We will see how candidates quote each 
other, how they use pieces of the discourses of others –either opponents or allies– to 
construct their own discourse, putting their opponent in a negative light by using their 
discourse, re-footing opponents’ discourse or re-reading it in a preferred reading which 
is favorable to them and strategically functional to achieving their own discursive aims 
(managing presidentiability to obtain votes). 
Thus I will deal with the special kind of polyphony that is reported speech
91
. 
According to Voloshinov (1973[1929]: 115-123), “reported speech is speech within 
speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also speech about speech, 
utterance about utterance” (id.: 115) so that the reported utterance becomes a theme of 
one’s utterance92. Voloshinov says that:  
 
Reported speech is regarded by the speaker as an utterance belonging to someone else, an 
utterance that was originally totally independent, complete in its construction, and lying outside 
the given context (id.: 116).  
 
According to Santulli (2005: 159 et seq.), reported speech can be seen as a form of 
narrative that becomes more dramatized through the use of direct discourse, bringing 
the (quoted) protagonist to the foreground (id.: 163-164). 
Quoting the opponent through direct or indirect discourse is a frequent resource of 
political discourse, as reflected in the debates analyzed in this work. In presidentiability 
management, the opponent’s words are cited for reducing his ethos, threatening his face, 
contrasting his positive self-representation, decreasing the opponent’s credibility, 
presenting him as a liar, as incoherent, as untrustworthy or more generally blaming him 
for all behavior improper of a good candidate or a good president. The importance of 
one’s own or another’s speech –hence the frequent references that politicians make to 
their or to other’s dictum and the wide use of verba dicendi– can be understood only 
under the perspective, theoretically outlined above, of the importance of political 
discourse as a political action, and (in obvious relation to the latter) the concept of ethos 
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 On this see also Calasmiglia-Blancafort & Tusón-Valls (1999: 148-153). 
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 On themes see, again, Voloshinov (1973[1929]: 99), who defines them as “the general meaning of an 
utterance” or van Dijk (2003: 68) for whom themes are the most important information of a discourse. 
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as being discursively constructed (see chapter 1). As we have seen, ethos is something 
candidates construct discursively, not (only) or only slightly through their open 
statements about themselves, but rather more through general statements about other 
issues; ethos then has to be inferred from the candidate’s discourse. As Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca claim (1958: 426), discourse is the manifestation par excellence of the 
person, of the speaker, so that speakers are judged by their actual discourse, in relation 
to other discourses, and according to the relation between their persona and their 
discourse(s), as well as according to the relation between their discourse and their 
actions. Therefore, and in relation to the implicitness I referred to above, even if 
candidates sometimes directly accuse the opponent of not being credible, they very 
seldom lay claim to their own credibility; rather they invite the addressee to infer it. A 
number of examples illustrate this point.  
 
RJ: usted en su programa electoral decía que iba a subir las 
pensiones de las viudas, la base reguladora del 52 al 70. ¿Por qué 
ha mentido a las viudas y no cumplió su programa electoral? 
 
RJ: quisiera decir que usted ha dicho dos mentiras 
 
ZP: su credibilidad sobre lo que ha dicho en materia de política 
social, […] es exactamente igual que la credibilidad que ha tenido 
con las preguntas de la economía y su interés por la economía en 
estos 4 años 
 
All the examples are taken from the block on immigration included in the two debates, 
although the other blocks provide many more examples. They show that the two 
candidates try to negatively present their opponent, stressing that what he said was false 
(denoting some foul play or some dirty intentions or aims) or, especially, that what he 
said is in contrast with what he said before or later or what he did before or later: in 
doing so candidates accuse each other of being unfair, untruthful or incoherent, thus 
each candidate decreases the other’s credibility and increases his own; not only by 
denying the accusation of being incoherent or inconsistent, but in a more subtle way: 
Since accusing presupposes the right of accusing, the accusing candidate increases his 
own presidentiability and decreases the presidentiability of the accused candidate. 
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There are also two more interesting cases of (quasi) reported speech, concerning 
the use of other’s word. In the first case RJ uses the word talante (I.115) to attack ZP 
as incoherent and consequently untrustworthy. As Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca say 
(1958: 144-145):  
 
Lorsque quelqu’un observe une règle, et particulièrement lorsqu’il proclame qu’il l’observe, il 
manifeste qu’elle est bonne à suivre. Cette prise de position est assimilable à un aveu, qu’on 
pourrait, le cas échéant, rappeler. […] Il est efficace de reprendre, pour l’utiliser contre lui, tout ce 
que l’on peut considérer, à cause de l’adhésion qui s’y manifeste, comme un aveu de l’adversaire. 
 
Beside the clarification of the discursive value of ethos and its performativity (claiming 
that to follow a norm equates to following it), it is interesting that what an opponent 
says can be used against him. And this is exactly what Rajoy does when, during his first 
intervention in the first debate, says of ZP that:  
 
RJ: Ningún gobernante ha sembrado en la historia de la Transición 
Moderna tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez que hablaba de 
entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia. 
 
Note that talante was one of the keywords of ZP’s self-presentation in the 2004 
election
93
. In quoting ZP’s keywords in order to twist them, presenting a gap between 
what he said and what he did, RJ delegitimizes ZP, presenting him as incoherent and a 
liar and thus untrustworthy. Indeed, in order to delegitimize his opponent through what 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca call aveu, RJ uses the very words employed by his 
opponent. ZP employs the same device when he uses RJ’s word orden to talk about 
government immigration politics. RJ accuses ZP of letting too many immigrants into 
Spain and at the same time insistently asks for more order
94
. But ZP takes up RJ’s 
words and uses them against him. 
 
ZP: Y me habla usted de rigor, de orden… y de seriedad… 
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 Entendimiento, convivencia and especially talante were so frequent in ZP’s discoursethat they were 
used in imitations or caricatures (see Screti 2012: 38). 
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 RJ uses the word orden 5 times and makes one reference to desorden in relation to inmigration and one 
to inmigracion desordenada. 
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ZP: tengo aquí (enseña un dossier) todas las regularizaciones de 
casos concretos con lo que he dicho, con una rueda de bicicleta 
[…] Eso es la falta de seriedad, de rigor. ¡Como para hablar 
ustedes de orden! 
 
Beside these cases of indirect reported speech there are other examples where the 
opponent’s speech is literally reported word for word, obviously for the purpose of 
twisting them and using them against the speaker.   
 
RJ: "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está pasando ya en 
muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de integración de 
los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan derechos sociales 
porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel de renta más bajo, 
que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas sociales". Esto lo 
dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces menos grave, el señor 
Rodríguez Zapatero 
 
ZP provides a further example 
 
ZP: antes de que hable usted de inmigración necesita credibilidad. 
Credibilidad. Esta declaración es suya: "Los inmigrantes vinieron 
a España cuando gobernaba el PP". Y es verdad: con su gobierno, 
con usted de ministro del interior 
 
As we have seen in the examples above, the candidates use direct and indirect 
references to their opponent’s words as a means of attack.   
 
4.3.5. Deixis 
Deixis, a term stemming from the Greek verb δείικνυμι [deiknumi] ‘to indicate’, is one 
of the main concepts in Pragmatics and “the single most obvious ways in which the 
relationship between language and context is reflected in the structures of languages 
themselves” (Levinson 1983: 54). As Levinson states:   
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Deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the context of 
utterance or speech event, and thus also concerns ways in which the interpretation of utterances 
depends on the analysis of that context of utterance (ibid.). 
 
As we will see, this reference to context is far from being unproblematic. Deixis is 
generally distinguished in personal, time, place, discourse, and social (Levinson, 1983: 
68-94). What matters most to me here is personal deixis, as a way not only for referring 
to persons of discourse, but especially as a way for polarizing the social world in an 
opposition between we vs. them. 
I will begin with a number of general observations about the first plural person or 
4
th
 person pronoun, before considering the political use of this pronoun (we/us). As 
Bossong (2014) showed, in all European languages the 4
th
 person pronoun is 
ambiguous; in many languages including Chinese, Malayo, Tagalog, Tok Pisin, 
Quechua, etc., the 4
th
 person pronoun clearly expresses the inclusion or exclusion of the 
receiver, so that we(+you) is grammatically or morphologically different from we(–
you). In contrast, in European languages (as for many others around the world) the 4
th
 
person pronoun (we) and more generally all the 4
th
 person deictics (we and our, ours, 
us) can include or exclude receivers. According to Wodak et al. (1999: 164) the pronoun 
we comprises all other personal pronouns (see table 1): 
 
 
Table 1. The pronoun “we” 
 
“We” can also flexibly adjust to include or exclude one of the other persons. In this 
sense, the semantic reference of we/us/our is always ambiguous (Blas-Arroyo 2000: 6; 
Atkinson 2011: 142; Gelabert 2000). The speaker decides (or imagines) who is included 
or excluded
95
. This ambiguity is strategically can be used to create social sets or 
discursively constructed groups. This problem was clearly individuated by Benveniste 
(1966[1946]: 233-236). As he says:  
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«nous» n’est pas un «je» quantifié ou multiplié, c’est un «je» dilaté au-delà de la personne stricte, 
à la fois accru et de contours vagues. De là viennent en dehors du pluriel ordinaire deux emplois 
opposés, non contradictoires. D’une part, le «je» s’amplifie par «nous» en une personne plus 
massive, plus solennelle et moins définie; c’est le «nous» de majesté. D’autre part, l’emploi de 
«nous» estompe l’affirmation trop tranchée de «je» dans une expression plus large et diffuse: c’est 
le «nous» d’auteur ou d’orateur. […] D’une manière générale, la personne verbale au pluriel 
exprime une personne amplifiée et diffuse. Le «nous» annexe au «je» une globalité indistincte 
d’autres personnes (id. : 235). 
 
Therefore, given the semantic impossibility of having many “I”, “we” is either an “I” to 
which somebody else is added (“you” for inclusive “we” or “s/he” for exclusive “we”) 
or an enhanced (pluralis maiestatis) or diminished “I” (pluralis modestiae) (against this 
position, see Almela-Pérez 2000). As Manetti shows (2014) regarding the first option 
(“we” as “I + somebody else”) it must be remembered that “we” is an improper deictic, 
since in order to understand the utterance reference, it is not enough simply to know the 
person of the speaker (as is the case for the proper deictic “I”). Indeed, according to 
Recanati (2001), “we” is an expression half-way between deictic (whose meaning 
depends on the context of utterance), and intentional (whose meaning depends on 
speaker’s intentions): it is the speaker’s intention that defines who “we” refers to, or, in 
other words, who is included within or excluded from “we” (see also Íñigo-Mora 2004: 
35). “Therefore, and by virtue of its ambiguous nature, “we” allows for the strategic 
manipulation of inclusion/exclusion. Apart from maiestatis and modestiae, “we” ranges 
from a minimum meaning as “I + someone else” to a maximum meaning as “I + all 
human beings”. This idea has been brilliantly illustrated by Wilson in his extended 
treatment of deixis in political discourse (1990: 45-76). Drawing from Urban (1986), 
Wilson provides the image of the concentric circles (see figure 1, adapted from Wilson 
1990: 49): “we” works like a circle that can be expanded to include more or less 





Figure 1. The pronoun“we”. 
 
Within this elasticity of “we”, which is crucial for the construction of groups, lies all its 
rhetorical value (Atkinson 2011: 142), since its ambiguity allows for the strategic 
discursive construction of groups, based on the principle of inclusion and exclusion. 
This latter observation leads us to the role played by deixis in political discourse. Many 
studies have been conducted on the role played by deixis in the construction and 
transmission of ideology, and especially by the 4
th
 person (Maitland & Wilson 1987; 
Wilson 1990; see also Fairclough 1989: 127-128 on the “we” in political editorials in 
newspapers); many of them analyze Spanish parliamentary discourse (Gelabert 2006; 
Atkinson 2011) or Spanish presidential debates (Blas-Arroyo (2000 in a study of the 
1993 Spanish presidential debates, Fernández-García (2008), and Hernández-Flores 
(2013) who analyzed the 2008 Spanish presidential debates). For politicians, “we” is 
fundamental (Santulli 2005: 109 et seq.; Santulli 2004), since it is part of “speaker’s 
electoral, political and ideological strategies, that is, as an aspect of political rhetoric 
that is used for persuasive purposes” (Hernandez-Flores 2013: 178-179). Through “we” 
the speaker constructs a group, identifying himself with the hearers; through 
contraposition we/them speaker involves (privileged) addressees and excludes 
opponents negatively polarizing them (Santulli 2005: 98). Since groups do not exist 
beyond discourse but are constructed and maintained discursively, and thanks to the 
intrinsic ambiguity in relation to inclusion-exclusion, 4
th
 person deixis is typical of 
ideological discourse, because it allows for the strategic construction of groups, 
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entailing a “them”, against which it creates an opposition and ideology which emerges 
from situations of polarization
96
. 
When politicians use we/us/our they build a group and place themselves within it, 
speaking from and to a group. This group may be the party (excluding the electorate), 
the group of politicians, the faction (the party including electors), the entire nation, etc. 
As Santulli says:  
 
non sempre è facile individuare […] la natura exclusiva o inclusiva: accanto a casi molto evidente 
nell’uno o nell’altro senso, ve ne sono molti che restano (forse volutamente, e spesso comunque 
effiaccemente) ambigui (2005: 121). 
 
This is precisely what happens in the discourse of the two candidates, RJ and ZP. In 
both debates we can see an opposition between we vs. them or between we vs. you. 
Normally the opposition is between nosotros vs. ustedes (which is the Spanish formal 
pronoun for you and is usual in political debates). Sometimes the nosotros refers to 
Spain, sometimes to Spaniards, sometimes to politicians, but more often to their own 
party or government (PP or PSOE). Differences have emerged in the use of deictic 
pronouns by the two candidates in the debates (Hernandez-Flores 2013: 178; 
Fernandez-Garcia 2008, Fuentes-Rodríguez 2009). Hernandez-Flores shows that ZP had 
a slight preference for nosotros to refer to the in-group and ustedes for the out-group, 
while RJ used preferably usted for addressing the opponent and yo for referring to 
himself (2013: 176). In this sense, RJ personalized references to the other and self-
references more than ZP did. Both candidates used nosotros to refer to Spain as a 
nation, but Zapatero’s preference for nosotros has to be seen as an effort to present 
himself as member of a group (PSOE) linked to the history of democratization of Spain. 
On the other hand, Rajoy’s preference for personalization (yo/usted) is designed to 
increase his own visibility and strengthen his own leadership, which was questioned 
within his own party, and to detract from ZP’s image through personal attacks (basing it 
on his strong leadership and visibility). It was also a means of isolating ZP, separating 
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 This use of “we” is clear in the nationalistic discourse. It should be noted that institutional political 
discourse is always a nationalistic discourse, since institutional politics is enacted in nation-states or 
presupposes nation (Billig 1995; Duchêne 2008). The nation, like other groups, is produced and 
reproduced by discourse, especially when mediated by media, which permits physical constraints such as 
closeness (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1997; Wodak et al. 1999) to be overcome, thanks to its ambiguity in 
relation to inclusion/exclusion and to its ability for entailing a “they”, 4th person deixis is typical of 
nationalistic discourse (Billig 1995; Wodak et al. 1999; Íñigo Mora 2004; Petersoo 2007). 
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him from his collaborators and electors, to whom RJ’s discourse is partially directed. It 
serves RJ’s argumenta ad personam and argumenta ad hominem. At the same time 
ZP’s preference for the plural nosotros/ustedes, is due to his stable leadership within 
PSOE, and is aimed at creating a wider group and especially at generalizing the 
opponent’s flaws to the collective story of PP as heir to Franco’s dictatorship and fascist 
ideology. 
A number of examples illustrate this point: In his opening statement, where, as in 
the closing statements, the candidates directly address citizens, RJ addresses citizens as 
ustedes, he uses an ambiguous nosotros, and finally he uses an inclusive nosotros that 
situates him within Spaniards.  
 
RJ: A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que hace cuatro años? 
Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si se la hacemos al 
señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el mejor de los mundos, 
pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a ustedes, algunos nos dirán que 
hay cosas que están bien, otras regular, y que en los últimos 
tiempos hay cosas que están mal y otras que están muy mal. […] En 
Inmigración, toda Europa ha protestado por el desorden que provoca 
este gobierno y nosotros los sufrimos 
 
In this second example, RJ uses the opposition between you/me. 
 
RJ: Somos el segundo país del mundo, sólo superado por EEUU, a la 
hora de entrar ciudadanos extranjeros. […]. Usted no ha hecho nada 
más que complicar las cosas […] se limita a decir lo bien que va 
todo y a ignorar la realidad. Y, además, cuando alguien hace 
propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y las tilda de 
ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he propuesto 
prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he propuesto el 
contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad de derechos, 
oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones. He propuesto que se expulse 
a los extranjeros que cometan delitos, y para usted eso no tiene 
ninguna importancia 
 
In his opening statements, ZP firstly uses a nosotros that could refer to the entire group 
of Spaniards, and then he uses a nosotros that refers more specifically to the 
government or, more largely to PSOE. This latter nosotros clashes with ustedes (PP).  
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ZP: […] España es un país que se ha convertido en la octava 
potencia económica del mundo. Hemos superado en renta per cápita a 
Italia […] Un país que ha trabajado con diálogo social, hemos 
tenido el periodo de menos huelgas de la historia de la Democracia 
[…]. Esta es la tarea que hemos hecho. Hemos trabajado con 
firmeza, con convicción y con humildad […]. La disyuntiva en las 
próximas elecciones es: diálogo o confrontación, aquellos que 
buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican problemas, aquellos que 
desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y aquellos que han 
intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar al poder.  
 
It is therefore clear that the speakers play with the ductile nature of the pronoun 
nosotros to create different groups in accordance with their discursive strategies. 
I wish to conclude this section by highlighting a paradox intrinsic in the use of 
“we”. Every time a speaker says “we” s/he is usurping somebody else’s voice, since 
speakers can legitimately speak only in their own name, i.e. as “I”. Even when expressly 
delegated by others to speak in their name as a spokesperson, speakers steal others’ 
voices in order to give them a voice and it is never clear to what extent they are actually 
speaking on their behalf. Nevertheless, if this paradox is structural of representative 
democracies, due to the logic of representation and the need to concentrate social capital 
(Bourdieu 1981), it is equally true that the intrinsic ambiguity and ductility of “we” 





4.3.6. Argumenta, falacia, loci (or topoi) 
Electoral discourse is aimed at inducing certain behavioral response in addressees, after 
having convinced or persuaded them (on the distinction between convincing and 
persuading see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 34-40). For this analysis I have 
chosen to use Rhetoric, because, since its beginnings, it has been closely linked with the 
performance as well as the study of political discourse (consider Aristotle, Cicero or 
Quintilian)
98
. Rhetoric has historically dealt with the analysis of effective persuasion. 
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 See also Brown & Gilman’s (1960: 255) observations about the plural as a form of power, since 
powerful speakers represent others so that they can speak as if plural. On the other hand there are other 
cases where “we” can be seen as a pronoun of solidarity. 
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 For a historic survey of Argumentation theory see van Eemeren et al. (1997: 210-219). 
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The founders of New Rhetoric, Charles Perleman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, defined 
the discipline as follow:  
 
L’étude des techniques discursives permettant de provoquer ou d’accroître l’adhésion des esprits 
aux thèses qu’on présente à leur assentiment : une argumentation efficace est celle qui réussit à 
accroître cette intensité d'adhésion de façon à déclencher chez les auditeurs l'action envisagée 
(action positive ou abstention), ou du moins à créer, chez eux, une disposition à l'action, qui se 
manifestera au moment opportun (1958: 5). 
 
They highlight the perlocutive (in pragmatic terms) effect of a successful persuasive 
discourse. 
As Gill & Whedbee state, despite the difficulties in defining the meaning of the 
word rhetoric, two things are clear: 1) the aim of rhetoric is to “influence an audience 
towards some end”; and 2) “the essential activities of rhetoric are located on political 
stage” (1997: 158; see also Santulli 2005: 59). 
 (New) Rhetoric is the study of the discursive means that lead to (effective) 
persuasion
99
. There are several devices, but I will focus on topoi or loci (of quantity and 
quality), and arguments, in particular the argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad 
personam, the example, the metaphor as particular case of analogy
100
, discussed earlier, 
and the argumentum ad verecundiam, both ab auctoritate or ad populum. 
As described previously, ideological discourse is discourse with evaluative 
meanings. The expression of partial (partisan) stances takes place through word 
selection: some adjectives, names
101
, verbs, adverbs, etc. are chosen instead of others 
that are equally plausible and grammatically correct to positively present “us” and 
negatively present “them”. In terms of lexical choice, in my analysis, apart from the 
observations on metaphors or deixis, I will offer some brief reflections on quantifiers 
(all, always, never, many, some, few, often, only, etc.), which are fundamental 
implementing strategies of de-legitimation, especially absolute quantifiers (none, 
always, never). They are used to fix positive or negative features described by speakers 
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 Van Eemeren et al. say that “classical rhetoric has to do with effective persuasion: with principles that 
lead to assent or consensus” (1997: 213, my italics), but, as the words of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 
show, New Rhetoric is also interested in the same object. 
100
 On the persuasive effectiveness of metaphor in rhetoric, see Gill & Whedbee (1997: 172-173). 
101
 See for instance the use of words such as revolución, revuelta, proyecto, apuesta in the PP electoral 
song Revolución Popular (Screti 2013; on this lexical transformation of a normal peaceful election in a 
“revolution”, see also Santulli 2005: 89). 
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beyond the contextual contingence and to emphasize negative aspects of “them” and 
positive aspects of “us”. 
As van Eemeren et al. define it, “argumentation uses language to justify or refute 
a standpoint, with the aim of securing agreement in views” (1997: 208). This definition 
entails disagreement about a standpoint. Nevertheless, this definition only partially fits 
in with electoral discourse. Ideally, argumentation takes place through syllogisms, 
complete arguments with true premises that demonstrate the truth or conclusion, but in 
most cases, and in electoral discourse in particular, speakers use enthymemes to 
persuade receivers (Gill & Whedbee 1997: 171-172; see also van Eemeren et al. 1997: 
213; Amossy 2010a[2000]: 110-114), a sort of abbreviated or incomplete syllogisms, 
or, instead of complete logic arguments, pseudo-arguments (Perelman & Olbrecths-
Tyteca 1958: 149), or fallacious arguments, also called actually fallacies (van Eemeren 
2001; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: ch. 7; Amossy (2010a[2000]: 127-129) 
defines them paralogismes in opposition to the term syllogisme). According to van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, the English philosopher John Locke, first defined the three 
main types of fallacies: ad verecundiam, ad ignorantiam, ad hominem (2004: 159). 
However, there are many others, such as ad baculum, ad populum, ad nauseam, ad 
misericordiam, etc. Each one is used by politicians, and would require an individual 
treatise in itself, but here I will focus on argumentum ad verecundiam and ad populum 
(that is a particular case of the former) and especially on argumentum ad hominem, that 
for Bourdieu –due to the logic of the political champ and political capital– is the most 
used in political discourse (1981: 18). 
The term argumentum ad hominem
102
 originally made reference to the use of 
opponent’s concessions, and it was also defined as argumentum ex concessis; although 
it currently indicates a direct or indirect attack on the opponent (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004: 159-160; see also Amossy 2010a[2000]: 131-134). The 
argumentum ad
 
hominem can appear under three variants: a) the abusive variant: direct 
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 Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca, who speak of the fallacious nature of arguments ad hominem, defining 
them pseudo-arguments (1958: 148-150), neatly distinguish them from arguments ad personam (which is 
the term they use for those arguments now generically called ad hominem); this is a very common 
confusion, and, as noted above, Bourdieu also confused the two terms (1981: 18). On this shift of the term 
ad hominem, van Eemeren says: “Originally the ad hominem made use of the other party’s concessions in 
one’s argument, but now it is a general term for the fallacy of attacking the other party’s person either 
directly by depicting them as stupid, bad or unreliable (abusive variant) or indirectly by casting suspicion 
on the opponent’s motives (circumstantial variant) or pointing out a contradiction in the other party’s 
words or deeds (tu quoque –you too! –variant)” (2001: 143; see also Walton 2001; van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004: ch. 7). In the present text, whilst acknowledging this shift I will consider ad hominem 
as the fallacious argument of attacking the opponent. 
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personal attacks in which the opponent is represented as stupid, dishonest, unreliable, 
etc. (lack of intelligence or integrity); b) the circumstantial variant: the suggestion that 
the opponent is self-interested, hence his arguments are invalid (lack of impartiality); c) 
the tu quoque variant: highlighting contradictions between current statements and 
previous ones (or principles) or between current statements and past or future behavior 
(lack of coherence and consistency) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 177-178). 
In the two presidential debates, ZP and RJ use the argumentum ad verecundiam, 
ad populum and especially the three variants of argumentum ad hominen to discredit 
their opponent and construct credit for themselves. These examples will be discussed in 
greater depth in the analytical chapters (7-10).  
As for arguments, two things should be born in mind: the presence of spectators 
and indirectness. The reciprocal attacks that ZP and RJ launch on each other would 
probably not take place in private discussions, and are amplified by the presence of 
(mediated) audience. Due to the constitutive polarization of the electoral context (and 
contest) and to the presence of spectators, the candidates enact struggle and opposition, 
but this struggle is probably less real and more symbolic and ritual (in Edelman’s terms; 
see also Martín-Rojo 2000a). This issue will be discussed in the next chapter (in 
particular in section 5.3), where I explore the extensive mediatization of politics and its 
rituality. As for indirectness or implicitness, as van Eemeren & Grootendorst say, 
“personal attacks are often more effective if they are made in veiled terms or indirectly” 
(2004: 180). As we will see, many attacks are implicit. 
I will now move onto another key resource in persuasive discourses, and 
particularly in electoral discourse: τόποι or loci communes. According to Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, who refer to Cicero, Quintilian and Aristotle, they can be considered 
as “stocks of information” to obtain arguments (1958: 112). Of the two kinds of loci, 
loci communes and loci specifici, the former are more general so they can be used in any 
circumstances. In an operative way, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 114) classify 
all the possible loci in 6 main categories: “lieux de la quantité, de la qualité, de l’ordre, 
de l’existant, de l’essence, de la personne”. 
This work focuses only on the two main categories, since they are the most used 
by the two candidates. As for the loci of quantity, some have more value than others for 
quantitative reasons, so that more (good) is better than less (good); but since this also 
applies in the negative, less (bad) is better than more (bad). So for instance, in the 
debates, ZP tries to demonstrate that his government had more social policies: according 
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to the (accepted) presumption that increased public spending on social policies is 
positive, this movement legitimizes ZP
103
. RJ and ZP use the issue of quantity in a 
negative sense, each accusing the other of allowing large numbers of immigrants to 
enter Spain. According to the (accepted or unchallenged) premise that the lesser 
immigration the better, the arguments based on this locus work as follows: through his 
claims, RJ delegitimizes ZP and legitimizes himself, simply by making it an issue; in 
turn, when ZP accuses RJ of having done the same during the previous PP government, 
by using the same argument, the same locus, and the same premises, he delegitimizes 
RJ on two counts: firstly for having let immigrants in, and secondly for being incoherent 
and self-interested (circumstantial and tu quoque variants of argumentum ad hominem). 
Another example of the use of the locus of quantity is the discursive desire to be 
the “President for all (Spaniards)”, a claim that is common amongst political candidates 
(Santulli 2005: 129 et seq.); as will be seen in the analytical chapter, candidates 
extensively use this resource.   
Another clear example of locus of quantity is that of the habitual, normal: usual is 
better than unusual
104
, and interestingly, there is a fairly natural shift from normal to 
normative (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 118), so that abnormal or unusual is 
bad. Examples of this use include RJ’s reproach that ZP was the first President to break 
the consensus of the Transition in matters of terrorism or of the Catalonian issue. Since 
the normal (how it has been done) is normative (how it has to be done), and since ZP 
has interrupted this norm, RJ’s criticisms delegitimize ZP.  
As for the loci of quality, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 118-120) indicates 
that of uniqueness (id.: 120)
105
. Novelty and change are also recurrent locus of quality: 
as the old is valorized as indicating tradition, the news valorized as original (Perelman 
& Olbrecths-Tyteca 1958: 130). As for other loci, they can be used either positively or 
negatively. An example of the use of the topic of uniqueness in negative terms is RJ’s 
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 Indeed this is not so straightforward, since for PP public spending to support social policies is not 
good. 
104
 As Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca say (1958: 128-132) Romanticism has changed this locus 
considerably, so that also originality and anormality can be seen as a positive argument, and especially 
novelty as opposed to tradition (id.: 130). In any case, the claim that arguments can be constructed 
according to the quantitative value of something is still valid: what changes is only the sign (positive or 
negative) related to the quantity (more or less). The relativity of values is not a problem for the theory. 
Indeed, every locus can receive a positive or a negative value, as for the locus of quality of uniqueness 
(uniqueness can be negative or positive), but this does not undermine the validity of the theory that 
speakers use loci to construct their (positive or negative) arguments. 
105
 Uniqueness is still a quantity locus (one). As for this locus, Perelman & Olbrecths- Tyteca say (ibid.) 
that “La valeur de l’unique peut s’exprimer par son opposition au commun, au banal, au vulgaire. […]. 
L’unique est original, il se distingue […]”. 
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description of ZP as the worst President in Spanish history (1); another example is the 
presentation of the situation of the Spanish education as the worst in the countries of 
references (2): 
 
(1) RJ: ningún gobernante […] ninguno 
(2) RJ: somos los que estamos más abajo 
 
Through this locus, RJ presents ZP as the worst, thereby detracting from his 
presidentiability. However, ZP also uses loci of quality, such as that of uniqueness, by 
claiming that his government has spent more on social policies than any other 
government.  
 
ZP: Mi Gobierno ha sido el primero en la historia de nuestro país 
que ha dedicado al gasto social más de la mitad de todo el 
Presupuesto 
 
In doing so he legitimizes himself as the best option for governing Spain (given the 




This chapter presents the principal discursive devices used by both presidential 
candidates to construct presidentiability during the two 2008 presidential debates. These 
devices constitute the main analytical tools used to analyze candidates’ discourse. An 
intertwined framework has enabled me to employ tools based on interactional analytical 
and discursive analytical approaches. This choice proves the multidisciplinarity of my 
analysis, since the tools I selected are situated at the crossroads of many disciplines, 
namely Sociolinguistics, Pragmatics, Semantics, Semiotics, Argumentation, Rhetoric, 
etc. In particular I have tried to combine interactional tools and discourse analytical 
tools in order to correct the limitations of an overly textual approach. This section also 
contains a brief introduction to the concepts used and several examples. These tools 
proved useful in understanding the functioning of the two candidates’ presidentiability 
management (construction and destruction) through moves of de/legitimation. 
The following chapter begins with an introduction to presidential debates as 
communicative events in which presidentiability management occurs (chapter 5).  
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5.1. Introducing the debates 
During the election campaign, the two candidates present themselves in a positive 
manner and their opponent in a negative light for the purpose of self-legitimation and 
delegitimation of the other respectively. In doing so, they employ all types of media and 
channels: speeches, interviews, slogans, institutional websites, personal websites 
expressly created for the elections, videos, songs, television shows, broadcasts, etc. 
These texts constitute a hyper-text of the positive self-presentation and negative 
presentation of the other. Within this flow of electoral discourse aimed at 
constructing/destructing presidentiability, the two televised presidential debates played 
a crucial role: they took place at the height of the campaign; they epitomize and embody 
the struggle for power, and attract the highest audiences (for what are essentially party 
political broadcasts) of the campaign. 
This chapter presents the two 2008 presidential debates between José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero (PSOE) and Mariano Rajoy (PP). I will first frame Spanish 
presidential debates within the history of presidential debates in the main Western 
democracies, highlighting debate analysis trends. I will then focus on the debate as a 
mediatized communicative (pseudo)event, insisting on the issue of mediatization, 
personalization and ritualization. Subsequently, I will describe the structure and the 
main features of the 2008 Spanish presidential debates, concluding the chapter with 
some observations on their contribution to constructing the candidates’ presidentiability.  
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5.2. Presidential debates in Western democracies and as a field of inquiry 
The tradition of political TV broadcast debates dates back to September 1960 in the 
USA, with the first of the four encounters between Richard Nixon and John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy. The personalization and spectacularization of politics has been traditionally 
greater in the USA, where mediatization took place earlier in comparison with other 
countries, and where presidentialism and a two party electoral and political system 
favored the representation of Politics as a face-to-face encounter between two persons 
(Santulli 2005: 41) that embody two opposing (?) political stances. This explains why 
the USA has a long-standing tradition of such debates, as the following list of 
presidential elections where presidential debates were held show (the list is limited to 
debates between presidential candidates): 
 
1960: 4 debates between Richard Nixon and John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
1976: 3 debates between Jimmy Carter and Jerald Ford 
1980: 1 debate between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter 
1984: 2 debates between Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale  
1988: 2 debates between Gorge H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis 
1992: 3 debates between Gorge H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Ross Perot 
1996: 2 debates between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole 
2000: 3 debates between Gorge W. Bush and Al Gore 
2004: 3 debates between George W. Bush and John Kerry 
2008: 3 debates between Barack Obama and John McCain 
2012: 3 debates between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney 
 
Presidential debates have been analyzed from many perspectives and there is a vast 
amount of literature on US presidential debates especially in the field of 
Communication Studies, Political Studies, or Social Psychology, for the study of the 
effects of debates on voters (Abramowitz 1978; Chaffeea 1978; Miller & Mackuen 
1979; Vancila & Pendellb 1984; Lanoue & Schrott 1989; Schrott 1990; Zhu et al. 1994; 
Kraus 1996; Benoit et al. 2002; Benoit et al. 2003).  
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In European democracies electoral debates are much less common
106
. For instance, in 
UK the first televised debate between candidates for the post of Prime Minister was 
held in 2010. Three candidates took part: Nick Clegg, David Cameron and Gordon 
Brown (three debates in April 2010). 
In Germany there is little tradition of face-to-face televised debates between 
candidates. The tendency is instead for a debate between all the candidates of the major 
parties represented in the German Parliament (from 1972 to 1987). Due to the German 
federal structure and political system (based on coalitions) and for avoiding over- 
personalization in politics after the Second World War, face-to-face debates have been 
rare until very recently. Indeed, the first real televised duel between two presidential 
candidates was held in 2002 between Gerard Schroeder and Edmund Stoiber (two 
debates in August and September). Since then televised presidential debates have 
become slightly more common: in September 2005 a unique duel took place between 
Gerard Schroeder and Angela Merkel; in September 2009 a duel took place between 
Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier; and finally the last one was held in 
September 2013, again between Merkel and Peer Steinbrück. 
In Italy, despite the “videocracy” inaugurated by Silvio Berlusconi after his arrival 
on the political stage
107
, debates are rare. Indeed, only three have been held: in March 
1994 between Silvio Berlusconi and Achille Occhetto; two debates in April 1996 
between Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi; and finally two debates in March and 
April 2006, again with the same protagonists. This is probably due to the Italian 
political system, which is not presidential, the proportional electoral system, which does 
not favor polarization, and the traditional social fragmentation of the electorate. Still it 
is possible to notice a clear trend within European democracies toward personalization, 
polarization and mediatization. 
In contrast, France is the European country with the longest-standing tradition and 
the greatest number of presidential debates, attributable to its presidential political 
system
108
. The first debate took place in May 1974 between Valéry Giscard D’Estaing 
and François Mitterrand, who were also the protagonists of the one held in May 1981
109
. 
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 I refer here only to presidential debates between the two main candidates and not to the very numerous 
debates that take place on the TV between politicians and journalists or between many candidates. 
107
 See Mazzoleni (1995); see also Erik Gandini’s documentary Videocracy (2009). 
108
 In their edited volume, Kaid et al. (1991) deal with similarities between France and USA in terms of 
presidentialism and of mediation of political discourse. 
109
 See Verón (1989). 
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Another debate took place in April 1988, between François Mitterrand and Jacques 
Chirac. Chirac also engaged in a debate in May 1995 with Lionel Jospin. In May 2007 a 
presidential debate took place between Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, who took 
part in a second presidential debate in May 2012 with François Hollande
110
. 
As for Spain, the first time that two candidates engaged in a presidential face-to-
face debate was in May 1993, and the protagonists were Felipe González and José 
María Aznar: they had two debates on 23 and 31 May 1993. During the 2008 election 
campaign two debates took place, between José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Mariano 
Rajoy, on 25 February and on 3 March. Finally in November 2011 Mariano Rajoy and 
Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba engaged in a new debate. 
The Spanish debates have been the object of extensive study, not only in terms of 
their impact on voters from the perspectives of Sociology or Political Studies (Barreiro 
& Sánchez-Cuenca 1998; Callejón-Lledó 2001) but also from the field of 
Communication Studies (Canel 1998; Herrero & Benoit 2009; Quintas-Froufe & 
Quintas-Froufe 2010); they have also been studied from the perspective of Discourse 
Analysis (Cortés-Rodríguez & Bañón-Hernández 1997; Bañón-Hernández 2005; 
2010a), Rhetoric (Fuentes-Rodríguez 2009; 2010), and especially, within Discourse 
Studies, from the perspective of the analysis of the (im)politeness (Fernández-García 
2009; Mapelli 2010; Ridao-Rodrigo 2010; Bañón-Hernández 2010b). More generally, 
within the field of Discourse Studies Blas-Arroyo has been the major scholar to analyze 
Spanish presidential debates (1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2009; 2010), 
and his studies on the dramatization of discursive political conflict have been included 
in a recent book (2011).  
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 Literature on French presidential debates is vast, but in more recent years Kerbrat-Orecchioni has 
analyzed it from a rhetorical and interactional perspective (Doury & Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2011; Constantin 
de Chanay et al. 2011; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d; 2013e; forthcoming). 
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5.3. Mediatization, personalization and polarization: debates as rituals of 
confrontation 
Election campaigns have been often defined as a ritual connected to myth (Rey-Fuentes 
et al. 1999: 31; Del Rey-Moratò 1989: 171, highlighting the ritual character of 
confrontation; Gerstlé 1989; Huici-Módenes 1996: 145; Abèlés 1989; but also Edelman 
1964; 1971 links politics, myths and rituals): they are ritual in that they are regularly 
repeated in accordance with pre-defined patterns, they have symbolic value, are based 
on certain often mythical beliefs (mythical in the sense that they determine, explain, and 
justify the current social structure, but they also reassure who believe in them); in our 
case some myths are the belief of vote as free choice, the election as highest expression 
of democracy, the opposition between right and left, etc. In his paper, Abèlés 
distinguishes rituals of confrontation and rituals of consensus (1989: 130-132): among 
the former the author includes meetings, rallies, etc. where (ritual) antagonism is the 
main feature; whilst the latter includes anniversaries, inaugurations, etc. I will also 
include (televised) presidential debates in the first group. More generally, and I will 
come back to this issue, what all these rituals have in common is the fact that they are 
pseudo-events (Boorstin 1961; 1989[1987]; Del Rey-Moratò 1989: 172; Edelman 
1988): by this term I mean that they are organized and carried out for the purpose of 
being reproduced, commented, contested, evaluated, reported or quoted (see Wilson 
1990) by newspapers, websites, television channels, etc. This is linked to the fact that 
politicians take advantage of what I have defined the permeability of media system, i.e., 
the fact that contents pass through different media (Screti 2011). This is also related to 
the fact that politicians are in constant need of attention (Wodak 2009a; Atkinson 1984), 
as shown by the etymology of the word candidate: in ancient Rome it indicated those 
persons covered with a shining white tunic, called candida; the persons aspiring to 
elective public offices used to wear white candida, in order to be noticed by voters. The 
need for attention is obviously at its height during the election campaign when media 
space and time –especially on television– is crucial for victory (Santulli 2005: 31; 
Campmany 2005: 241). This point is not only coherent with what has been defined as 
the mediatization of Politics (among others, Wodak 2009a
111
; 2009b; Forchtner et al. 
2013), but especially with the idea of what has alternatively been defined as the 
                                                          
111
 This term must be distinguished from what Wodak (ibid.) defines the “fictionalization of politics” and 




“eventization”, “theatralization” or “spectacularization” of Politics (as studied in Spain, 
for instance, by Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999: 35-6; Del Rey-Moratò 1989: 136, 172, 174; 
Muñoz-Alonso 1989: 71, 136, 139, among others; see also Bourdieu 1981: 11). This 
idea is also aligned with the interdependency of the political and media fields, i.e. the 
symbiotic relationship between journalists and politicians, as well as the idea that 
politicians perform like media celebrities. This issue leads us to some further 
considerations. 
1) As Rey-Fuentes et al. say (1999: 34) the advent of (new) mass media such as 
radio and television in particular, dramatically increased the number of addressees 
beyond direct (immediate or face to face) interaction, thereby mediatizing the political 
space (Santulli 2005: 22-23; see also Thompson 1995; Livolsi & Volli 1999). As a 
consequence, political interaction today increasingly targets TV audiences rather than 
the direct participants of the interaction (not only, but especially on the frontstage)
112
. 
This increase has had many more consequences: political discourse has changed in 
terms of its nature, contents and functions (Atkinson 1984: xiii and ch. 6). 
2) Given the emergence of a media system, the main actors of this system, 
journalists and reporters, have become increasingly central to the political spectacle. 
Despite their efforts to present themselves as neutral (contra see Tuchman 1972), 
journalists are not mere spectators of what happens on the frontstage, even though they 
may be ratified participants (Goffman 1981[1976]: 9-10); they are rather actual actors of 
the political field (Bourdieu 2000). 
3) Given the emergence of the media system, the political field has been 
increasingly mediatized and spectacularized, so that politicians have become dramatis 
personae (Santulli 2005: 37 et seq.; Thompson 1995; Sampedro-Blanco & Vizcaíno-
Laorga 2008) and act and are treated like celebrities (Rieffel 1989; Charaudeau 2008; 
Wodak 2009a). Inherent to the structure of the media system (in capitalist societies) is 
the consideration of the monetary value of Politics as a spectacle: in this sense, due to 
their huge audiences, debates have to be seen as very profitable programs, generating 
money through advertising placement.  
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 Wodak (2009a) and Okulska & Cap (2010) distinguish performances on the frontstage from those on 
the backstage. As for the audience, Albaladejo-Mayordomo calls poliacroasis (1998, 1998-1999, 2000) 
the existence of many audiences; according to Mazzoleni (1998: 66) the politician’s interlocutor is less 
the other politician than the audience watching the debate on TV (see also De Santiago-Guervós 1996:3). 
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If it is true that the logic of representation favors the concentration of capital in one 
representative, in one leader (but on leadership see Edelman 1964: ch. 4), it is also true 
that the media and especially television favor the simplification of politics and focus 
attention on one or few personae. Indeed, paraphrasing Edelman, Politics is a parade of 
personae, of leaders (note, for instance, that Atkinson’s book (1984) is entirely focused 
on leaders’ discourses). Television has also favored the spectacularization of politics, 
transforming citizens into spectators of a political show (Santulli 2005: 42; Thompson 
1995; Mazzoleni 1995; 1998: 116-119; Edelman 1988) and assimilated political 
communication to marketing (on this see Screti 2012: 40-41). Election campaigns 
intensify spectacularization and personalization, with spectators that, according to the 
logic of the media system, are pushed to follow incidents and stories of actual personae 
rather than complex and faceless collective entities with their intricate historic, cultural 
and ideological references (Santulli 2005: 43, although it should be noted that the author 
lacks the Bourdieuian reflections on social and political capitals). 
4) This spectacularization of politics has been and continues to be favored by the 
structure of the media system, in the sense that for instance television with its narrations 
favors figures on the ground, thereby favoring personae, i.e. protagonists, rather than 
complex chains of abstract historical events. On the other hand, growing audiences –as 
well as the enlargement of the census (Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999)– and the new way of 
communicating through television lead to a simplification of forms and contents of 
discourse (Popper & Condry 1996; Bourdieu 1996); one of these simplifications is 
precisely the personalization of politics (see, among others, Langer 2007; Volli 1997), 
another is the extreme polarization that erases continua and complexities
113
; another 
example is the extreme simplification of the discussion to an enchainment of slogans, 
catchphrases and fallacies (cf. the overuse of ad hominem arguments). 
5) As a result, politicians became actors of narrations played out in the media, and 
especially on television, where Politics is simplified as a fight between agonist and 
antagonist
114
. Politicians are party to this game, employing easily understandable 
slogans and easily understandable but often fallacious arguments.  
                                                          
113
 Del Rey-Moratò says that the distinction itself between right and left, two definitions “arbitrary and far 
from undisputable”, is a simplification ad usum delphini, for electors (1989: 128; on this simplification in 
the form of polarization, see also Bourdieu 1981: 10; Edelman 1988: ch. 4). 
114
 On Politics as narratives with a plot featuring heroes vs. villains, see Volli (2000). 
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The epitome of this mise en scène, of the political spectacle, is the presidential debate, 
where personalization, polarization, and simplification reach their acme: with two 
candidates face-to-face, one for each party, dealing over a two-hour period with the 
most complex problems in a way that is comprehensible to everyone on the other side of 
the screen.  
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5.4. Spanish televised debates as a means of sanction for the two-party system 
Despite their rarity compared to countries as France, televised debates in Spain can also 
be considered a ritual. One of the main features of Spanish televised presidential debates 
(called debates cara a cara) is that since the first debates held in 1993 they have acted 
as a means of sanctioning the two-party system; the debates held in 2008 and 2011 
confirmed this trend. As we have seen in the previous chapters, in Spain there are 
clearly two majority parties (PP) and (PSOE) and a third national party (with a national 
scope and electors throughout Spain),IU. It is true that there is a huge difference in the 
number of votes (PSOE and PP around 10 million, and IU 1 million), but these three are 
the three most voted national parties. Yet despite this, the debates only took place 
between the candidates of PP and PSOE, respectively Aznar and González (1993), 
Rajoy and Zapatero (2008) and Rajoy and Rubalcaba (2011). As for the two 2008 
debates, even though Llamazares (IU) pushed to take part in the debate, Zapatero and 
Rajoy (actually their respective communication managers) refused to do so, legitimizing 




From the point of view of this work, the fact that the third candidate (Llamazares) 
is absent from the debates should not be seen as a limitation, since it is a consequence of 
the structure of the electoral system and of the workings of the political field. By 
“electoral system” I refer not only to the system of laws which regulate electioneering in 
Spain, but also the way the agents of the political field, the politicians and journalists, 
implement these laws: for instance only inviting the candidates from the two main 
parties, PP and PSOE, to take part in the debates. This behavior, does not respond to 
any law about the presence of politicians in electoral debates (there are no laws stating 
that presidential debates should take place only between the candidates of the two main 
parties), but in itself shapes political confrontation, silencing all other minority options, 
such as IU. 
This issue of the presence of only two candidates is very important. A debate with 
three candidates would present and represent the existence of an alternative to PP and 
PSOE political thinking. These two parties, despite ritual formal confrontation, are 
actually very similar (I have called this ideological convergence or centerization). In 
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 This is obviously a circular argument, since if nobody else receives the same public visibility as PP 
and PSOE candidates, nobody else will ever have the chance to become President.   
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inviting only candidates from PP and PSOE, the media system shapes the political field 
and sets the agenda, eliminating alternative options from the mainstream
116
. 
The current structure of the Spanish political field is perfectly represented by the 
two presidential debates: a ritual confrontation between the two main parties that 
excludes the only national party which is especially critical of Neoliberalism, and hence 
against the two parties that since 1982 have alternately been in power in Spain. This 
issue of playing down or under-representing a party was one of IU’s principal claims 
during the election campaign, and one of the most repeated propositions, under the form 
of multiple slogans such as debate plural, ley electoral injusta, debate fraude, etc. 
This organization of the political field and the subsequent claims of an inequitable 
representation within media (mediatization) have lead also to the preparation of two 
more debates between the main Spanish parties. This is of particular relevance in 
understanding the Spanish political field. The two presidential debates took place on 
Monday 25 February 2008 and on Monday 3 March 2008 both at 10 p.m., which is 
prime time in Spain, i.e. the time of maximum audience. But according to a decision of 
the Junta Electoral Central
117
, the two debates between Zaptero and Rajoy could only 
take place if two more debates with all the parties represented in the Congreso took 
place. In application of this condition, two debates were organized on Spain’s principal 
public television channel (RTVE1). These debates were defined as “debate a siete”, due 
to the number of politicians present. The first one was broadcast on Thursday 28 
February 2008 and the second one on Wednesday 5 March 2008. The politicians that 
took part in the first debate, moderated by the journalist Ana Blanco, were Ramón 
Jáuregui (PSOE); Esteban González Pons (PP); Montserrat Muñoz (IU); Jordi Jané 
(CiU); Josu Erkoreka (PNV); Joan Ridao (ERC); Fernando Bañolas (CC). To the 
second one, moderated by Ana Pastor, took part Ramón Jáuregui (PSOE); Esteban 
González Pons (PP); Joaquin Nieto (IU); Jordi Xuclá (CiU); Josu Erkoreka (PNV); 
Agustí Cerdà (ERC); and Ana Oramas (CC). 
Some observations need to be made about these issues. All four 2008 debates 
were televised by the state television channel RTVE1 and in all cases the moderator was 
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  This is actually a free choice between limited options (Preve 2002). 
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 Based in Madrid, the Junta Electoral Central is the highest organ for electoral administration in Spain. 
According to the Spanish law on Electioneering, its main mission is to “guarantee […] the transparency 




a journalist well-known in Spain and often engaged in political broadcasts
118
. However, 
there are major differences between the cara a cara debates and these debate a siete. the 
cara a cara debates were also televised by two of the major private (open access) 
national television channels, LaSexta and Cuatro, together with other digital or 
analogical media. This was not the case with the debate a siete, which was only shown 
on RTVE1. The time of the broadcast also constituted major difference. Indeed, it 
became a cause of dispute. Interestingly enough, due to the low audience numbers of the 
first debate a siete (see below), originally RTVE set the broadcast of second debate a 
siete at midnight, in a secondary time; but the Supreme Court, after a complaint 
presented by the interested parties (IU, CiU, PNV), forced RTVE1 to bring the debate 
forward to a prime time slot, 10 p.m. This is so also because of the lower profile (given 
by the media system, in accordance with its interest) of the candidates taking part in the 
debate a siete, compared to the importance in terms of a media event of the two 
presidential debates, for which there was no doubt about the time, and which took place 
at prime time. So the cara a cara debates were major events in the media system and 
were treated as such: there were numerous commercials before and after the debates
119
, 
they were commented on other programs or media (TV, radios, internet, etc.), they were 
enthusiastically presented by moderators as unique and crucial television and political 
events. In contrast, the debate a siete did not receive so much media attention. There is 
also a difference in audience numbers; as Gallego-Reguera & Martínez-Martínez (2013: 
149) show, the two 2008 cara a cara debates were extremely successful, with 13 and 12 
million viewers respectively (62% and 58% share). However, the first debate a siete 
attracted just 1.75 million viewers (11% share). And figures for the second debate a 
siete were no better. Actually on Wednesday 5 March, Spain’s most popular football 
team, Real Madrid, played the return leg of the round of 16 in the Champions League, 
Europe’s most popular football tournament: matches start at 8.45 p.m. and end at 10.30 
p.m., unless they go into extra time, when they can end as late as midnight. Wednesday 
5 March 2008 was a “Champions League night”, with many of the most famous 
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 Ana Pastor, Ana Blanco, Olga Viza and Manuel Campo Vidal (also president of the Academia de las 
Ciencias y las Artes de Televisión), who also moderated the first of the two 1993 presidential debates. 
119
 As Gallego-Reguera & Martínez-Martínez (2013: 148-154) show the Academia de las Ciencias y las 
Artes de Televisión (no-profit entity, founded in 1997, and uniting the professionals of audiovisual 
media), responsible for the organization of the two events, started its “publicity” of the debates, 
throughout press releases, on 13 December 2007 (more than two months before the first debate) and 
finished on 26 March 2008 (almost one month after). 
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European teams playing for a place in the quarter finals and as it is widely-known, 
football is Spain’s most popular sport.   
Some other considerations need to be made regarding these debates: the debates a 
siete were conceived to appear to give space and media visibility to secondary parties, 
actually to all parties with their own group in the Congreso (PSOE, PP, CiU, ERC, IU, 
CC, and PNV). The structure was very similar to the cara a cara debates between 
Zapatero and Rajoy: in the two hour show, each candidate had 3 turns of one minute for 
each topic discussed; turns were ordered according to the size of parliamentary group 
from the smallest to largest: CC, IU, PNV, ERC, CiU, PP, and PSOE. Yet in doing so, 
the two debate a siete diluted attention on many personae. Compare, for instance the 





Figure 1. The “undistinguishable” 7 politicians participating in the debate a siete (left); compared to the 
two recognizable candidates (right) of the cara a cara debate (photographs: El Pais, RTVE). 
 
In the debate a siete photographs it is impossible to distinguish the actors; whilst in the 
others it is very easy, since the cara a cara debates focused attention only on two 
personae. In addition, the amount of speech time allotted to every candidate varied 
radically between the two kinds of debates: in the cara a cara debates each candidate 
talked for 41 minutes, whilst in the debate a siete programs this time was reduced to 17 
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minutes. Moreover, Zapatero and Rajoy talked twice, whilst not all candidates in the 
first debate a siete took part in the second debate. 
Finally, PP and PSOE had a double representation: an exclusive representation in 
the two cara a cara debates and a further representation in the debate a siete programs.  
It is probably due to this evident inequality that the participants in these two 
debate a siete programs were all politicians holding minor positions in their respective 
parties: the main figures being Llamazares (IU); Durán i Lleida (CiU); Íñigo Urkullu 
(PNV); Josep Lluis Carod Rovira (ERC); Paulino Rivero (CC).  
The conclusion that can be drawn by the elements presented above is that the two cara 
a cara debates sanction (legitimize) the current two-party system, but the system is also 
reinforced through the use of the debate a siete format: they are shown on days with 
other major programs (football); they fail to receive the same publicity; politicians 
receive little visibility,; and PP and PSOE have a double representation.  
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5.5. Norms, organization and structure of 2008 Spanish debates 
Probably the only constant of all the debates held in Western democracies and referred 
to earlier is the fact that they are highly regulated by the candidates’ communication 
assistants. In the case of the two 2008 debates between Zapatero and Rajoy, strict rules 
were set, the result of long and complex negotiations between the candidates’ 
communication teams. Indeed, the debates were straightjacketed: everything was pre-
established. The timing, the position of the two candidates, presenters, order of speech, 
turn taking, etc. were all determined beforehand. The candidates sat on either side of the 
presenter. A different journalist presented the second debate, and the candidates 
swapped sides (see figure below). Some observations must be made in relation to the 
position of the two candidates: the fact that they sit facing each other symbolizes their 
opposition, as the medium-shot of the camera frame highlights
120
. In addition, the 
position of the moderator at the center of the scene, between the two candidates, is 
meaningful and is aimed at representing journalistic neutrality. This neutrality was 
enacted by presenters through a minimum amount of intervention: in fact, they merely 
opened and closed the debates and introduced the topics, and most of the time their 




Figure 2. In a medium-shot, the two candidates and the presenter in the first (left) and the second (right) 
debate. Same set, different presenters, candidates’ place inverted 
 
Everything was set to appear neutral: the presenters were considered neutral in the sense 
that they could not be associated to PP or PSOE; they were physically situated as 
equidistant from PP and PSOE; the set colors were neutral (grey and beige), but also 
                                                          
120
 The two debaters talk directly to the TV viewers only in the opening and the closing statements, whilst 




frames and shots were as objective as possible
121
. As the image below shows, only two 
planes were possible for the three-shot (which framed the two candidates and the 
presenter): a medium-shot, as shown above, or a long-shot, as shown below:  
 
  
Figure 3. Long-shot of the two candidates and the presenter in the first (left) and the second (right) debate 
 
As for the presenter, in order to give the sensation of neutrality, they could be framed 
only from in front and in a bust-shot, as shown in the images below: 
 
 
Figure 4. In-front bust-shot of the two respective presenters in the first (left) and the second (right) debate 
 
As for the candidates: only two frames were allowed: a quasi-frontal bust-shot, as in the 
figure below (the two on the left from the first debate, and the two on the right from the 
second one): 
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Figure 5. Quasi-frontal bust-shot of the two candidates in the first (left) and the second (right) debate: 
candidates’ places are inverted. 
 
Or alternatively, a quasi-frontal close-up of face, as in the figure below (the two on the 
left from the first debate, and the two on the right from the second one): 
 
 
Figure 6. Quasi-frontal close-up of the two candidates in the first (left) and the second (right) debate: 
candidates’ places are inverted. 
 
Apart from the opening and closing and the transitional frames (when the moderator 
takes and gives the floor), where the moderator is framed alone or with the candidates, 
only one of the two candidates appears in the frame: the one speaking, with some takes 
of the other candidate. During the opening and the closing statements only the speaker 
is framed. In the other blocks the candidate who is not speaking is framed briefly (few 
seconds) 2-5 times whilst the other candidate is speaking. From the shots shown above 
it can be seen that the candidates’ positions are inverted: in the first debate, Zapatero 
was on the viewers’ left, and Rajoy on the right, whilst in the second debate, Rajoy was 
on the left and Zapatero on the right. Moreover, the candidates looked at camera when 
directly addressing audience, i.e. in opening and closing statements, and were framed as 
looking at the opponent during the turns (as one can see in the figures above). It goes 
without saying that order and time of speech were measured precisely, as was the turn 
taking. The order of interventions was inverted in the second debate: in the first one 
Rajoy was the first to speak, whilst in the second debate Zapatero opened the debate. 
The only role for the presenter was to ensure that speakers complied with the times 
allotted to them
122
, and except for the welcoming and closing statements and the 
interventions to close one topic and introduce the next one, the moderators only 
employed ‘transitional questions’ or utterances (Agha 1997: 471, footnote 10).   
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 Soengas-Pérez is somewhat critical of the passive role of the moderator (2009: 998) 
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5.6. The structure and the themes of the debates 
As discussed earlier, the structure was previously agreed between the candidates. The 
debate, opened and closed by the moderator, was divided into 7 parts: 1) candidates’ 
opening statements (OS), 2) economic policies and employment (EP), 3) social policies 
(SP), 4) foreign policy and security (FP), 5) on institutional policies (IP), 6) challenges 
for the future (CFF), 7) candidates’ closing statements (CS). The first and last parts 
were organized as single monologic interventions of three minutes per candidate. The 
other five parts were organized as follows: 3 interventions of 2 minutes for the first 
candidate, with 3 responses of 2 minutes for the other one, with a final minute for each 
candidate per block. 
 
 
Figure 7. Structure of the first debate: each colored square indicates a minute; the black square indicates 
the moderator’s turn (often lasting less than a minute, except for the welcoming intervention; other very 
short turns used just for giving the speech to candidates are not considered), the blue one indicates 
Rajoy’s turn, and the red one Zapatero’s turn. In the second debate the order of the two candidates was 
inverted, but the structure was the same. 
 
More generally the structure was typical of any political-electoral debate
123
. The 
moderator’s interventions served to open the frame of the debate as mediated event, a 
televised program, and close it, i.e. welcoming viewers and politicians, introducing and 
concluding each one of the 5 blocks, distributing the candidates’ turns, as well as calling 
                                                          
123
 According to Cortés-Rodríguez & Bañón-Hernández the face-to-face Spanish electoral-political debate 
has a five-step structure: 1) short presentation of moderator, 2) short exposition of the problem by each 
candidate, 3) development of argumentation and debate, 4) last message for each candidate, 5) closure by 
the moderator (1997: 16). 
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The debate is a communicative event, but not a spontaneous interaction: 
everything was meticulously prepared, organized and expected; candidates knew the 
themes, the questions, etc., they prepared their speeches and they performed them
125
. At 
some points, such as the opening and closing statements and to a lesser extent the first 
turns of each block, they took the form of two parallel monologues. This further 
contributed to the impression of the debate as a ritual. Indeed, except in rare cases, 
suddenly interrupted by the presenter, turns were clearly defined, as previously agreed, 
and open dialogue was impossible. This format makes the debates look like other rituals 
and highly formal(ized) discursive practices such as parliamentary debates (Alcaide-
Lara 1999), albeit with a lesser degree of formality. The aim was to allow each 
candidate to present himself and his stance –and if possible to introduce slogans or 
arguments prepared by communication consultants– preserving them from 
unpredictable interaction. This observation obviously does not mean that the debate did 
not constitute an interaction with statements and responses, reformulations, criticisms, 
quotations, etc. In fact, it is through interaction that the two candidates can dynamically 
negotiate, manage and construct/deconstruct their presidentiability. 
The first block, which includes the opening statements, is a general one, in which 
each candidate presents himself and the current situation. It goes without saying that 
these opening statements are crucial in framing the debate right from the beginning. The 
final block containing the closing statements is also of vital importance, as it represents 
the candidates’ last chance to address the electorate.   
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 It would be of interest to consider in greater depth the passive role of the journalist from the 
Bourdieuian perspective of the journalist as an agent of the political field: both journalists in their opening 
and closing addresses contribute to the mise en scène and sanction the debate as a political and mediated 
pseudo-event; they contribute to its publicity with all the rhetoric of uniqueness (Este es en España 
el primer debate del siglo XXI de esta envergadura), of the historic value of debates (En 
la historia electoral española quedará la fecha de hoy), of the worldwide interest on 
this debate; they also evidence the connivance with politicians (Nuestro agradecimiento, desde 
la Academia, a los dos partidos políticos, que nos han honrado con su 
confianza […] y a los dos candidatos). The journalists present the debate as crucial (estamos 
en la fase decisiva y ante el debate definitivo) and as an event in which the future of the 
country is at stake; at the same time they increase expectation (Lo cierto es que la expectación 
es indudable) and, interested in the mediatic value of the event, they urge a repetition (esto ha 
sido un verdadero honor. Y creo interpretar un deseo general si digo que no 
tengan que pasar otros quince años para que esto se repita). 
125
 See, for instance, Soengas-Pérez (2009). 
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I will now consider the principal topics dealt with in each block: in the five blocks, 
candidates addressed the main themes of the campaign. These issues are naturally 
strategically established by parties themselves in accordance with their aims, in the 
sense that the agenda is set by the parties themselves; the topics were chosen before the 
debate was set up by the communication managers of each candidate. The themes were 
as follows: 
 
 Economic policies: Macroeconomics, prices, salaries, unemployment, productivity, etc. 
 Social policies: pensions, health care, education, immigration, dependency, equality, family, etc. 
 Foreign policy and Security: diplomacy, international cooperation, development, defense, 
terrorism, city safety, road safety, etc. 
 Institutional policies: autonomous regions, devolution, constitutional reforms, justice, etc. 
 Challenges for the future: research, technology, climate change, sustainable development, 
housing, infrastructures, etc. 
 
It can be seen (see also chapter 6 on themes and cleavages) that many issues were 
discussed, but I have chosen the most important ones, in accordance with my personal 
observation, Pujol’s study (2008), and Gabriel Elorriaga’s declarations (Crawford 
2008): I will thus focus on 4 issues that can be considered as the main terrains of 
struggle: the economy, immigration, terrorism, and the unity of Spain.  
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5.7. Debates as a stage for managing presidentiability 
According to the observations above, the two major pseudo-events of the 2008 electoral 
campaign were the two televised debates between ZP and RJ. This is due to at least 
three reasons: 1) because they were magnified by the main agents of the political field 
and the media system (journalists), for instance, presenting them as a historical event 
and insisting on the fact that in 30 years of democracy it was only the second time that 
two candidates had confronted each other in a televised debate; 2) because, due to the 
fact that they took place at the height of the election campaign, they concentrated in 
little space and time the discourses of the electoral campaign; the electoral campaign 
lasted from 9 February to 8 March 2008, while the two debates, that took place on 25 
February and 3 March, were (and were presented as) the very center of electioneering; 
3) due to the visibility they received, and to the permeability of the media system, they 
were reported, commented, discussed, etc. in other media, with the effect of increasing 
their dissemination. 
But in particular, the debates constitute a crucial space for the implementation of 
the strategies of construction and deconstruction of presidentiability. Not only due to the 
absolute visibility of the event, but especially for the opportunity of showing off and 
enacting the self and self-image on television. They play out the widespread metaphor 
of Politics as a performance of actors on a stage. Indeed, the debates allow the 
candidates to present themselves in a unique event, which epitomizes the representation 
of Politics; it allows politicians to portray themselves as they wish to be seen by electors 
(Sampedro-Blanco & Seoane-Pérez 2008; Sampedro-Blanco & Roncero 1999). Debates 
are the stage or better the frontstage for performing opposition and confrontation; for 
increasing one’s own presidentiability by enacting positive self-presentation, and for 
decreasing other’s presidentiability through the negative presentation of the other. 
Politicians aim to win citizens’ votes. Vote is a form of legitimation: it legitimates 
politicians to exert their authority (on this type of legitimacy and on a discussion on the 
issue see Weber 1958[1922]; Peter 2014; Bensman 2014). The fact that politicians 
receive the social sanction they need to govern legitimately trough votes is so important 
that even totalitarian regimes periodically submit themselves to citizens’ consensus. In 
order to obtain votes, candidates first need to be visible and recognizable and therefore 
need to show themselves off, presenting themselves as presidentiable through a positive 
self-presentation: at the same time they need to present negatively their opponents.  
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The televised debate is an ideal space for constructing one’s own presidentiability and 
destroying that of an opponent. It allows politicians enormous visibility, enabling them 
to perform the fight for power in a ritual confrontation to define the most presidentiable 
(the legitimate president): the winner of the debate. This confrontation takes place in 
verbal terms and discourse is by far the principal means by which candidates can 
manage their own image or ethos or face. During the debate politicians present 
themselves as good –good politicians, good citizens, good men, good husbands, good 
fathers, good debaters, etc.– in order to appeal to citizens’ for their vote, the logic 
assumption being that voters will not vote for a reprehensible person (they will not vote 
for a person that they believe is shameful). 
 
The basic claim of this work, as discussed in chapter 4, is that the construction of 
presidentiability is mainly discursive
126
, so to this end, politicians on the stage of the 
debate put their face to citizens’ judgment. However, their image is constructed through 
what they say and the way it is expressed, i.e. through discourse. Debate, which is the 
main place where candidates interact face-to-face and where discursive interaction is the 
main way of managing self and the image of the other, is thus the prime stage for 
managing presidentiability. 
The perlocutive object (end) of discourse produced during the debate is for 
addressees to give their vote to the addressers (see also Santulli 2005: 31). Addressers’ 
main communicative intentions are to make know and make do (Greimas & Courtés, 
1979), hence speech acts constituting the interaction constructed during the debate are 
of two main types: assertive or directive (Searle 1965; 1975): 
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 This point requires deeper discussion in relation to the Bourdieuian concept of habitus (Bourdieu 
1980: chs. 3 and 4; 2000[1972a]; 2000[1972b]). 
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Whether assertive or directive, the perlocutive object of the speech-act is the same: to 
obtain votes. On the other hand, as we will see, assertions and requests are rarely 
formulated directly, but rather indirectly. Candidates very rarely say “I am good” or 
“you are bad”, but through the tools discussed above in chapter 4 (narratives, deixis, 
arguments, reported speech, etc.) they constantly try to legitimize themselves through a 
positive self-presentation and to delegitimize their competitor through a negative 
presentation. 
A communicative event such as the presidential debate has a dialectic structure 
and is highly polarized, for the purpose of mettre en scène (staging) in an embodied 
manner (i.e. by two candidates physically present) the competition for power and for 
limited social and symbolic resources. At a discursive level, many devices contribute to 
representing this polarization through a divergence between “I/us” and “you” or “us” 
and “them”. Each candidate tries to align himself with electors and to disalign himself 




Since the victory of a candidate means the defeat of the other, each candidate 
increases his own image, by generalizing and emphasizing his positive aspects and 
limiting or omitting his negative aspects, and adds to the negative image of the other, by 
omitting his positive aspects and by generalizing and emphasizing his negative ones 
(van Dijk 1998; 2001a: 107-108; 2003: 57; see also Wodak et al. 1999: 33-45; Wodak 
2009a: 40-45). I refer to this basic strategy, whereby candidates only attack the 
opponent perceived as the real competitor in the struggle for power (Morales-López & 
Prego-Vázquez 2002: 211), as legitimation and delegitimation (Chilton & Schaffner 
1997; see also van Dijk 1998: ch. 26; 2003): each candidate’s self-legitimization means 
that he justifies his election because he is better than others, or, in other words, he is 
more presidentiable than the opponent. And the debate is the place where the candidates 
show their presidentiability. 
In managing their presidentiability both ZP and RJ follow the same socio-
discursive strategy: self-legitimation (through positive self-presentation) and 
delegitimation of the other (by framing him in a pejorative manner). Presidentiability 
management is verbally implemented by different devices, such as the choice of certain 
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 This kind of discourse is obviously ideological (van Dijk 1998; 2001b; 2003; 2006b), since ideology 
arises when opposition for resources exists; the construction of identity and the diversity (sameness and 
otherness) are constructed through an ideological discourse (Wodak et al. 1999: 10-18; Wodak 2009a: 12-
13; see also Atkinson 1984: 37-45). 
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lexical items, morpho-syntactical features, pragmatic elections (such as deixis or 
implicatures), or rhetorical features (such as metaphors, hyperboles, arguments, etc.) 




This chapter provides a more detailed insight into the two 2008 presidential debates 
between ZP and RJ. I firstly introduced the story of presidential debates in the main 
Western democracies, in particular in the USA, UK, Germany, France, Italy and then in 
Spain. I also very briefly outlined the main trends in debate analysis. I then went on to 
frame the debate as a mediatized communicative (pseudo)event, i.e. as an event created 
only to generate notoriety. In this section I insisted on the mediatization of politics and 
of the symbolic and ritual feature of Politics and on personalization. The debate is a 
ritual of confrontation based on some myths such as the existence of opposing parties 
and the myth of the free choice of citizens that allows society to keep its structure. 
Subsequently I analyzed the Spanish debates and their role in sanctioning the two-party 
political system. Finally I described and analyzed in detail the structure and the main 
features of the 2008 Spanish presidential debates. I concluded the chapter with some 
observations about how debates work as a stage on which candidates enact their 
identities and thus construct their presidentiability. 
The next section addresses in greater depth the themes according to which 
candidates constructed their presidentiability within the debates, and their relation with 
traditional cleavages of Spanish society.  
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6.1. Introduction: Cleavages and Themes 
This chapter takes a closer look at the themes around which the candidates have 
managed their presidentiability. I will discuss this issue against the general background 
of the traditional political cleavages of the Spanish political field, in order to clearly 
define the position of the three main Spanish parties. The chapter starts with an 
introduction of the concept of cleavage. It then moves from the general to the particular 
in the main cleavages of Spanish politics. Finally, there is a discussion of the topics that 





6.2.1. Definition of cleavages 
Cleavages
128
 are generic and general ideological divisions about wide-ranging 
questions, and are few in number, tending to be the same for all Western democracies. 
They can be considered, as Bornschier (2009) points out, as “a deep and lasting division 
between groups based on some kind of conflict”. Bornschier also points out that this is 
far from being an easy concept, but I am going to use it here in an operative way, very 
close to this intuitive definition. 
According to Lipset & Rokkan (1967), cleavages can be reduced to 3 or 4 main 
questions on which people (individuals or groups) normally assume two different and 
opposite positions, among which there are nonetheless possible intermediate positions: 
religion (clericalism vs. laity; Judaism vs. Islamism; Catholicism vs. Protestantism; 
etc.), the economy (Capitalism vs. Socialism; owners vs. workers; etc.), administration 
(center vs. periphery; centralism vs. federalism; unionism vs. separatism; etc.). Take, for 
instance, religion and the opposition laicity/clericalism: themes concerning such a 
cleavage can be the degree of religiosity/laicity of public education. In the case of the 
economy, the cleavage concerns the opposition owners/workers, i.e. between classes 
(whatever this word means today), but also ideas about the public/private, i.e. how 
public or private certain sectors such as healthcare, transport and education should be, 
but also ideas about taxes, such as tax rises or cuts, etc. As for administration, also 
referred to as center/periphery, the cleavage concerns the opposition 
centralism/federalism, but it could also define different positions on the 
monarchy/republic or the union/split of a region from a country, etc. 
I voluntarily omit to deal with a fourth classic cleavage that is urban/rural 
opposition. Despite its historical importance, in our days its role in Western 
democracies seems to be reduced. This does not mean that it did not leave some traces 
throughout the history in the construction of social and political allegiances and 
divisions within Spain. 
In Bornschier’s definition, the term cleavages:  
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Denotes a specific type of conflict in democratic politics that is rooted in the social structural 
transformations that have been triggered by large-scale processes such as nation building, 
industrialization, and possibly also by the consequences of post-industrialization. One of the great 
appeals of the concept thus lies in its ability to link individual political behavior to macro-
historical processes, and to make sense of the way “critical junctures” may shape politics in path-
dependent ways for decades. In a perspective of comparative methodology, the cleavage approach 
helps us to understand the origins of similarities and differences between party systems and 
countries (2009). 
 
As noted above, cleavages are generic and stable ideological divisions (the results of 
long historical processes) on general issues. Many of these distinctions on an individual 
scale could be transversal or cross-cutting, but for simplicity here I consider socio-
political clusters –electors as well as parties– as mainly homogeneous entities. 
 
6.2.2. Old and new political cleavages and the 2008 election campaign 
Generally speaking, we can say that PSOE is a center-left party (even though it was 
formerly clearly left wing), PP is a center-right party (even though it tries to present 
itself as center and was formerly right), IU is a left wing party (even though it was far-
left). These labels are obviously oversimplifications, but can be used operationally. 
Nevertheless, a number of observations must be made regarding the positioning of these 
three parties.  
It must be remembered that political positioning is relational and diachronically 
and synchronically dynamic (Bourdieu 1981: 6, 9, 11 indicated it as a crucial feature of 
champs, and especially of the political field). This means that the positioning of every 
party is related to that of others, and that any change in one element of the field leads to 
changes in other elements: if a party changes its stance, this change affects the stance of 
other parties: or, in other words, any move of a party causes a move in other parties. For 
instance, PP PSOE and IU did the following moves: “de socialista a socialdemócrata y 
de ahí al centro para el PSOE. De comunista a eurocomunista y socialista y de ahí a 
socialdemócrata en el PCE [=IU]. De derecha al centro-derecha y de ahí al centro en el 
PP” (De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 16). 
In these general moves towards less radical positions, hence to less distant stances 
(more central), it can clearly be seen that PP and PSOE have been trying to occupy the 





La lucha por el centro es otra larga historia. Definido en la transición como la propia moderación, 
equilibrio entre los extremos, interclasista frente a la lucha de clases, se personifica en UCD 
[Unión de Centro Democrático, n.d.r.], que se encarga de colocar la palabra en el centro de sus 
siglas. En aquellos momentos centro suponía para el electorado cierta ausencia de compromiso 
ante la insidiosa pregunta: ¿derecha o izquierda? (1996: 19-20). 
 
In this fight to occupy the center the two main actors are PP and PSOE, who fight to 
gain floating electors, the less ideologically stable ones. As for PP, De Santiago 
Guervós stated that since its beginnings PP has been trying to erase its links with 
Francoism, and is doing so by using the word center in its self-definitions (1996: 21-
22). As for PSOE, as we have already seen above, “el PSOE modera sus posturas para 
llegar a un más amplio espectro del electorado con el fin de acceder al poder” (De 
Santiago-Guervós 1996: 22). 
This is a very important point: it is coherent with Bourdieu’s vision, namely that 
the political field is organized around two major poles such as left/right, progressivism 
(liberalism for US readers)/conservatism, in this case PP/PSOE. Yet it also clearly 
shows that political parties, especially the large national ones, are becoming 
increasingly similar. Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between them on 
the ideological grounds, the result of their ideological convergence. At the same time 
and partially as consequence of the previous phenomenon, parties need to exteriorly 
differentiate themselves on the surface (see also Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999), as the 
importance of branding and marketing operation
129
 can show. In this sense, it is no 
coincidence that Bourdieu and De Santiago-Guervós refer to electors as clientele or 
clients as if they were going to buy something, for instance, candidates or parties. It is 
therefore not surprising that politicians use marketing to sell themselves and that 
advertisers or analysts consider politicians as products or brands (Campmany 2005). 
Interestingly enough, parties not only describe and situate themselves in different 
ways (for instance PP situates itself at the center –with Fraga as well as with Rajoy–, 
displacing PSOE to the left, and IU to the extreme left), but also dynamically change 
these self-descriptions and positioning along the political space during the election 
campaign: for instance PP accuses PSOE of being radically left wing, while PSOE 
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 On this see also Bourdieu (2000: 35). See De Santiago-Guervós 1996 about the similarity between 
political and commercial language; this is to some extent obvious, since both are rhetorical and persuasive 
discourses, but it is true that they increasingly base their argumentation on emotive arguments (pathos) 
rather than logical reasoning (logos). 
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accuses PP of being far Right; in turn, IU accuses PSOE of being too far center or 
insufficiently left wing and PP of not being center at all, but instead positioned on the 
far right
130
, etc. These issues are crucial in the implementation of de/legitimation 
strategy. 
In short, the definitions of PP as center-right, PSOE as center-left and IU as left 
differ from parties’ self-definition –the way each party defines itself and other parties– 
and will help us to understand the de/legitimation strategies. 
Coming back to the issue of cleavages, we can represent, simplifying, the general 
ideological positioning of PP, PSOE and IU, depending on how parties position 
themselves in terms of these three axes: religion, economy, type of state. The claims 
each party makes about key issues in the election campaign will corroborate this 
positioning. We can represent each cleavage as a polarized line along which each party 
situates itself in terms of more/less radical position or in terms of 
agreement/disagreement. 
According to Colomer, traditional cleavages in Spanish society, for instance 
around the 1930s, are socioeconomic, religious, linguistic-cultural (center/periphery), 
and political: on the one hand conservative, Catholic, centralist, monarchist; and on the 
other, progressive, laic, federalist, republican (1998: 11)
131
. After the agreements 
between Suárez and the Communists, that led the latter to accept the monarchy (vs. 
republic), this cleavage (monarchy vs. republic) became less relevant (Colomer 1998: 
15). In contrast, the center vs. periphery cleavage continued to be important, although 
the Communists, like other anti-Francoist groups, sacrificed the idea of a federalist 
state. Based on my personal observations, and assuming the classic definition of 
cleavage and the taxonomy given above, the main elements of the 2008 electoral 
campaign were: 
 
1) Religion: relations with the Catholic Church (laity vs. confessionality); individual 
freedoms regarding divorce, homosexual marriages, abortion, euthanasia (yes vs. no); 
education with the school subject of religion (teaching vs. not; evaluating vs. not), and 
Civic Education (yes vs. no), strictly related to the prior subject of the relationship with 
Catholic establishment due to its nature; 
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Zapatero was Marxist, and Zapatero links Rajoy to Alianza Popular, implying it was Francoist. 
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2) Type of State: (federalism vs. centralism) under this cleavage falls the question of 
terrorism and the Government’s relationship with the Basque independence movement 
ETA (dialogue vs. non-dialogue), as well as the relationship between Spain and 
Catalonia or all issues concerning Castilian and other languages such as Catalan, 
Basque and Galician; 
 
3) The economy: all kinds of economic policies (tax decrease vs. increase, growth, 
inflation, housing, etc.), and also the question of immigration (permissive vs. restrictive 
policies), which, far from being seen as a humanitarian issue, is seen and dealt with as 
an economic problem. It should be noted that the economic crisis of 2008 and the 
negative economic results of PSOE (also due to the negative global economic 
conjuncture), compared to the successful economic results of the last two PP 
governments (also thanks to the positive global economic conjuncture) made this key 
theme of macroeconomics even more relevant, giving PP (but also IU, albeit from 
different perspectives) a firmer foothold to attack PSOE on issues related to growth, 
unemployment, etc. This will be seen in greater detail in the following chapters. 
 
The aforementioned cleavages (religion, economy, type of state) are enough to draw a 
general ideological distinction between the three parties: in accordance with my 
observations (see also Gallagher, Laver & Mair 2011b: 220-222), we can represent PP, 
PSOE and IU in relation to these three cleavages. 
 
 CLEAVAGES 
 ECONOMY TYPE OF STATE RELIGION 
PARTY    
PP Liberalism Monarchism 
Centralism 
(Catholic) Confessionality 
PSOE less Liberalism than PP 
less Socialdemocracy than IU 
Monarchism 
less Federalist than IU  
less Confessionalism than PP 
less Laity than IU 
IU Socialdemocracy Republicanism 
Federalism 
Laity 
Table 1. The three parties’ ideological stance about the main cleavages of Spanish society  
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This table provides a picture of the three parties’ political position. We could add a 
fourth column concerning a new cleavage such as individual freedoms, which 
concerns, for instance, abortion, homosexual marriage, divorce, euthanasia, etc. This 
could give us a clearer image of parties in terms of their conservativeness or 
progressiveness. Nevertheless, despite its obvious importance, I preferred not to include 
this cleavage for two reasons: firstly because it can be easily subsumed under the 
cleavage of religion, since choices in issues concerning individual are strictly 
intertwined with Catholic moral(ism) and the position of CEE, Conferencia Episcopal 
Española [Spanish Bishops’ Council], the highest official institution of Spanish 
orthodox Catholic establishment. Secondly, because there is no agreement amongst 
scholars regarding rifts concerning individual freedoms as a cleavage
132
. Nonetheless, it 
would be possible to consider individual freedom as a fourth cleavage without incurring 
in any serious conceptual error.  
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In this section I will present the main topics used by the candidates to construct their 
presidentiability
133
. I define here themes simply as ‘what discussion is about’: they are 
the terrains on which the two candidates struggle to positively present themselves and 
negatively present the other. 
Electoral discourse is always about something, addressing certain topics. 
Normally these themes are significant, and can be considered as symbols in the sense of 
Edelman (1964). Themes polarize electors in terms of choosing one party or another, 
according to the way each party (throughout the spokesperson of its candidate) foots 
itself about each theme. It should be noted that themes and cleavages are related but 
different things and it is important not to confuse them: cleavages are general and stable 
divisions about themes, themes are particular and contingent local problems where 
cleavages become visible. For instance, the issue of education (public/private) or 
healthcare (public/private) is related to the socioeconomic cleavage; but the issue of 
education (religious or laic education) is also related to the religious cleavage; the theme 
of Spanish minority languages (Catalan, Basque, Galician) is related to the center-
periphery cleavage (federalism/centralism), etc. 
In the following pages I will list the main themes for the 2008 election campaign. 
Yet before listing these topics, it is necessary to make a series of observations regarding 
the difficulties involved in selecting topics from electoral discourse. 
 
6.3.1. Difficulty of selecting themes from electoral discourses 
Trying to outline a scheme, even summary, of themes and questions dealt with during 
the election campaign is a complex task for at least three reasons.  
1) First because within the theoretical framework used here, institutional political 
activity is entirely understandable as an uninterrupted electoral campaign, since all 
politicians’ activity (performances and discourses) is geared towards (re)election. 
Politicians are constantly engaged in an electoral campaign, and the terms pre-campaign 
and campaign are fictitious: although the duration of electoral campaign is legally fixed 
by law (BOE 1985: 19.116), parties are always occupied in preserving their political 
capital, their image, positively presenting themselves and negatively presenting the 
other. Hence establishing those topics that can be considered the object of stance taking 
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 I consider theme and topic as synonym, but other scholars distinguish between these two terms (see, 
among others, Brown & Yule 1983: ch. 3 and p. 126). 
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during the election campaign is difficult: on the one hand any decision to include or 
exclude a topic could be considered arbitrary, and on the other hand there could be a 
tendency to include them all, which analytically is of little or no use.   
2) Secondly, because in electioneering absolutely all topics emerging from current 
events is susceptible to becoming an element for polarization, and therefore a relevant 
theme in the political (and media) agenda, according to its ideological meaningfulness, 
contextual pertinence, and relationship with other issues. This is exacerbated by the 
situation being highly polarized. 
3) Thirdly because in electoral discourse implicit or explicit intertextuality and 
entextualizations, under the form of reformulations, critics, (pre)suppositions, 
inferences, quotes, parodies, premises, citations, denials, etc., are very evident and 
especially important, probably much more open and evident or explicit than in other 
discourses
134
. As a result, themes discussed during an election campaign are inevitably 
linked to others that are relatively close in time and space, which can be referred to or 




6.3.2. Treatment of themes by politicians 
I argue that not all topics receive the same treatment: some of them are extensively 
treated while others appear as topoi, as just names or short phrases, as synthetic 
symbols, which stand for something else, referring to other elements of polarization
136
.  
I wish to stress that the amount of space/time dedicated to a theme is not always 
directly proportional to the importance the topic could have for presidentiability 
management. Sometimes the relationship is direct and very important themes are treated 
extensively, with ample space, time, and words, yet this is not always the case. In many 
cases we face topoi with great symbolical meaning and a strong polarization capacity; in 
these cases the theme is reduced to one word that –like a synecdoche– implies and sums 
up all the discourses generated on it in the past. Therefore, in the case of topoi the 
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 This point strengthens the Foucaultian conception of discourse as an uninterrupted flow and 
Bakhtinian observation that every text is polyphonic. 
135
 This observation is coherent with the need of historical inquiries for understanding political elections, 
and the fact that political and ideological oppositions are historically built up (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 2-
3). 
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 Note the difference between themes and topoi. Here I use the term theme for indicating “the general 
meaning of an utterance” (Voloshinov 1973[1929]: 99). Themes are the most important information of a 
discourse. Sometimes themes are so generalized that they become information which does not need to be 
dealt with: they become topoi. Topoi are merely cited under the form of only one general word, such as 
justice or freedom. As van Dijk puts it, “topoi are used as ready-made arguments that do not need to be 
discussed or defended: they are basic criteria of argumentation” (2003: 68, my translation). 
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relationship between the amount of space employed and strategic importance seems to 
be indirect, but because of their intrinsic quality of synthesis they resume in one word or 
in a short phrase all the time past “talking” about it, disputing about it, positioning 
pro/con about it, all the space and time dedicated to it in news, videos, songs, films, 
schoolbooks, informal conversations, etc. 
 
6.3.3. How to select (relevant) themes 
This section deals with some methodological questions related to the way I selected the 
topics discussed by politicians during the elections and in particular during the debates.  
For reasons of economy, I have opted to focus on those topics that most clearly 
allow me to show how candidates have managed their presidentiability. As I focus on 
the two televised debates, the height of the election campaign, I will make a brief 
reference to the division of the debates by topics. Particular attention will be given to 
the economy, immigration, terrorism and the unity of Spain (which will include the 
Catalan question). The two debates constitute privileged material to determine the key 
themes of the election campaign: indeed, since they occurred in the middle of the 
campaign, on 29 February and on 3 March, they concentrate all the topics dealt with in 
the campaign and even previously within a short space and time, even though 
candidates may only refer to them with a single word which acts as a topos, or through 
an indirect reference, a citation or an allusion. 
Nevertheless, I have triangulated this choice with: a) my personal observations; b) 
an analysis of other materials collected; c) the declarations of PP communication 
manager, Gabriel Elorriaga (see below); d) Pujol’s report on the media coverage of 
2008 Spanish general elections (2008). 
As for the debates, after long negotiations between the communication managers 
of the two candidates, they were structured around 5 main blocks: Economic policy; 
Social policies; Foreign policy and Security; Institutional policies; Challenges for the 
future. Each block allows for the discussion of multiple topics (the following is just a 
short list, based on the introductory statements of the two presenters): 
 
1. Economic policy: macroeconomics, prices, salaries, unemployment, 
productivity, etc. 
2. Social policies: pensions, health care, education, immigration, dependency, 
equality, family, etc. 
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3. Foreign policy and Security: diplomacy, international cooperation, development, 
defense, terrorism, city safety, road safety, etc. 
4. Institutional policies: autonomous regions, constitutional reforms, justice, etc. 
5. Challenges for the future: research, technology, climate change, sustainable 
development, housing, infrastructures, etc. 
 
It is clear that the four issues I selected are the crucial themes addressed in the first four 
sections of both debates.  
I have chosen these themes also contrasting with my personal observation. I 
lived in Spain between 1999 and 2006 for discontinuous but extended periods in 
different cities. During this time, personally witnessing current Spanish life, interacting 
with people living in Spain, reading newspapers or books, watching TV, etc., in short 
being immersed in Spanish culture enabled me to build up a strong cultural and political 
background about Spanish history and politics. Moreover I was settled in Spain from 
2006 to 2011, actively observing and following Spanish politics. Living in Spain 
allowed me to absorb the discourses (institutional or not, formal or not) circulating in 
that period within Spanish society: within the media, in in/formal discussions, broadcast 
debates, news, (instant) books, newspapers, etc. Thanks to my observation, I can 
corroborate that the four themes I selected were really central to the Spanish political 
space, also thankto the agenda-setting role of the media. 
On the other hand, I have carefully triangulated the debates with the other 
materials collected for this work: websites, videos, debates, and manifestos. Reading on 
Rajoy’s website the phrase “Zapatero ha conseguido que los precios suban incluso en 
las rebajas”, allows us to reasonably suppose that one of the topics dealt with by Rajoy 
is rising prices; actually the same topic appears in the two televised debates between 
Zapatero and Rajoy, as well as in several of PP’s election videos (Precios; Castillo de 
naipes; Rajoy: Precios), or in its manifesto (2008: 111-115, 153, 157, 235, 268, 272, 
275, 302). 
Finally, I referred to Pujol’s quantitative study (Pujol 2008: 21). It allowed me to 
corroborate my empirical observations, as well as my own analysis of the corpus. 
Calculating the number of news items that appeared in the main Spanish and Latin-
American media dealing with each subject matter, Pujol found that the most relevant 
subject matters were, in this order, terrorism, the economy, employment, immigration, 
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foreign policy, education, housing, tax, inflation, climate change, digital canon
137
, 
abortion, family. Pujol also traced a comparison between the two parties in relation to 
the time/space dedicated by each party to the issues reported above. According to Pujol 
(2008: 23), the most relevant issues for PSOE were: terrorism, the economy, 





Figure 1. PSOE’s most relevant campaign issues 
 
The most relevant issues for PP (id.: 25) were: housing, tax, inflation, climate change, 
digital canon, abortion, family (see figure below).  
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 In 2007, PSOE government extended the existing tax for personal copying to all digital devices (CDs, 
DVDs, USBs, memories, HardDiscs, MP3s, PDAs, Tablets, Cells, etc.). The tax was created to 
compensate the economic losses of the record and cultural companies as a consequences of digital file 
sharing programs and technologies; actually the tax was paid to the SGAE (Sociedad General Autores y 
Editores [Spanish General Society for Authors and Publishers]). Since this compensation was paid to 
SGAE there was no distinction between using a CD player to copy music or personal data. PP exploited 
the opposition to this tax (especially from young people) to attack PSOE. 
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Figure 2. PP’s most relevant campaign issues 
 
According to Pujol, “el discurso [del partido] socialista ha estado mas asociado a la 
política con respecto al terrorismo, así como el empleo y la vivienda. Por su parte el 
partido popular se ha asociado mas a los temas de inmigración, al cambio climático y al 
canon digital” (2008: 25). 
The following chart shows a comparison between the relative importance of the 




Figure 3. Comparison between the PSOE and PP’s key campaign issues 
 
It is evident from these graphs that terrorism, the economy and immigration attracted 
considerable attention from both parties, but they also indicate that no space seems to 
have been dedicated to the unity of Spain (contra see Ruiz-Jiménez 2010). I am unable 
to explain the reason for this difference. On the other hand, the space and time dedicated 
by PP to immigration
139
 should be noted, indicative of its strategic importance for PP, in 
line with other research addressing racism among the Spanish Right (Martín-Rojo & 
van Dijk 1997; Rubio-Carbonero 2011; Ruiz-Jiménez 2010). Still on the question of 
immigration, another significant fact is the way issues received varying degrees of 
attention before and during the (official campaign). For instance, in the figure below 
(from Pujol 2008) we can see how the agenda changed from pre-campaign to the 
campaign. Issues such as terrorism, immigration and education received far more 
attention, while issues as economy and employment received less attention. As Pujol 
(2008: 26) puts it:  
 
El tema que mayor crecimiento ha experimentado es el de la inmigración, seguido por la 
educación, la política exterior y el terrorismo, [...] la campaña se ha desplazado por lo tanto hacia 
la inmigración, uno de los temas que más asociados están al PP.   
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Figure 4. Key election issues: the difference between pre-campaign and campaign 
 
The fact that immigration has become so important is due to PP’s election strategy, as 
reported by Gabriel Elorriaga, PP communication strategist and in charge of Rajoy’s 
campaign. Since PP was unable to mobilize more of its own voters, it needed PSOE 
voters –considered by Elorriaga as less disciplined than PP voters– not to vote for 
PSOE; PP needs a high abstention rate to win, so PP’s message targets PSOE voters:  
 
Our whole strategy is centred on wavering Socialist voters […]. We know they will never vote for 
us. But if we can sow enough doubts about the economy, about immigration and nationalist issues, 
then perhaps they will stay at home […]. It will be difficult to increase our vote […], but [PSOE] 
voters are less disciplined than ours […] That is why we are directing our message at them. We are 
saying, ‘your government has not taken care of your problems’. The election result will depend on 
the impact of that message (apud Crawford 2008). 
 
These statements, together with the place given to them in the two debates, my personal 
observations, Pujol’s report and Ruiz-Jiménez study, confirm the importance of the 
themes I have selected: the economy, immigration, terrorism and the unity of Spain (the 
last two themes can go under the term used by Elorriaga of “nationalist issues”). 
Another issue deserves some attention: the considerable relevance given by PP to the 
topic of climate change, which could seem contradictory in a party which has not 
demonstrated a great sensitivity towards environmental matters. This attention is due 
not to a change in ideology, i.e. not to a new and greater interest of PP in environmental 
and ecologic questions, but as a defense strategy in the light of previous attacks by 
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PSOE about PP’s (supposed) lack of interest in environmental issues. It is a way for PP 
to detract this issue from the Left, or at least to contend the Left’s (quasi) monopoly of 
the defense of the environment and sustainability. This usage of environmental issues is 
also a form of what I have defined ideological convergence, which will be discussed in 
greater depth at a later stage.  
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6.4. Themes and the construction of presidentiability 
It is obvious that topic selection is crucial for presidentiability management. Elorriaga’s 
statements quoted above have shown the importance of using the economy, immigration 
and nationalist issues in persuading electors not to vote PSOE.  
Topics can therefore be considered the terrains in which the struggle to impose 
one’s own principle of vision and division of the world, as well as the positive self-
presentation and negative presentation of the other take place.  
As the following sections show in greater detail, PP chooses the economy to paint 
a gloomy picture of the current situation, and by extension projecting a negative image 
of PSOE. It bases its arguments on the idea that unlike PP in 1996 and 2000, PSOE 
failed to address the real problems. Moreover PP tries to present itself as more “lefty”, 
including in its agenda topics normally associated with PSOE, such as environmental 
issues, but especially by presenting itself as interested in the problem of Spanish laymen 
as mortgages, price raising, etc. Furthermore PP uses immigration to present PSOE as 
disordered and insensitive to “poor” Spaniards threatened by the “avalanche of 
immigrants”. Also PP uses terrorism to present PSOE as a party that is threatening the 
State, because of its agreements with ETA terrorists. In addition PP uses the Estatut de 
Catalunya and the reforms conducted by PSOE to give Catalonia greater autonomy, to 
present PSOE as the party that is breaking up Spain. In doing so PP tries to separate 
PSOE from electors. This negative presentation of the other is always accompanied by a 
positive self presentation: PSOE did it badly, we did it right; PSOE is disorder PP is 
order, etc. 
In this sense, all the topics used by PP to attack PSOE and erode its positive 
image (and therefore to reduce its electoral support), are used by PSOE to defend itself 
from attacks and positively present itself. So PSOE uses the economy to present itself as 
a supportive party caring of the weakest segments of society (the elderly, women, 
immigrants, youngsters, precarious, students, etc.); Immigration is used to present an 
image of a tolerant party opposed to the xenophobic PP; the Estatut de Catalunya is 
used to present PP as centralist and intolerant, unlike PSOE, which is a progressive 




This chapter considered the main cleavages that define and differentiate the three main 
Spanish parties and discussed the main topics of the 2008 electoral campaign that 
express these cleavages. The aim was to show the main terrains of struggle within 
which PP and PSOE during the election campaign. This is of particular importance in 
showing that the themes discussed during the debates were deeply entrenched in the 
discourse circulating in Spain at the time of the election campaign. They match the 
thematic division of the debates. On this point something else needs to be said: they 
were chosen by candidates and their teams, because they were considered as the most 
relevant for Spaniards, but at the same time their use as the central topics for debate also 
converted them into the most relevant for Spaniards. 
Moving from the general to the particular, the next 4 chapters focus on how the 
two candidates manage presidentiability within the terrain of the 4 main themes (the 
economy, immigration, terrorism, the Catalan question). After providing some historical 
information in an introductory section, I will proceed to analyzing the main moves and 
discursive devices employed for managing the presidentiability.  
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7.1. Introduction: the economy in Spanish politics 
As stated by senior PP member Gabriel Elorriaga, the economy is, together with 
immigration and nationalist issues (i.e. terrorism and the Catalan question), one of the 4 
main issues of the political agenda strategically set by PP in order to win votes from 
PSOE: for this reason the economy was one of the main terrains of struggle in the 2008 
election campaign.  
During the campaign PP framed the political debate depicting an unprecedented 
crisis under the indifference, the passivity and the incapacity of ZP, who they accused of 
failing to realize the importance of the situation and an inability to adopt the right 
decisions. PP launched videos such as Embargo and Castillo de naipes. In the first, an 
average Spanish family is shown in their room, watching ZP on the TV saying that 
everything is going fine and that Spain is among the best economies in the world, while 
two people are taking away all the family’s goods, executing a repossession order. In 
the second video, two hands build a castle of playing cards; the playing cards feature 
ZP’s posters with his optimistic election slogans. The speaker declares that ZP is 
indifferent and does nothing to solve the Spaniards’ problems. At the end of the video, 
the castle falls down. PP’s strategy for subtracting electors to ZP is to worsen the 
situation and stating that ZP did not care about their problems, especially economic 
ones, while PP will do.  
This populist position is not only typical of PP. During elections populism
140
 is 
common among both left and right wing parties, with politicians trying to present 
themselves as defenders of people, even though they specifically favor the interests of 
the same groups in power (Edelman 1964; 1971; 1977; 1988). This issue of the 
proximity to or distance from the people is especially interesting, since, as Enzensberger 
shows (1992), in reality politicians are far removed from citizens: materially, through 
bodyguards, armored cars, preferential seats and locations, opaque and impenetrable 
spaces, etc.; and also symbolically, through representations that show the politicians’ 
exceptionality (Edelman 1988). Politicians move closer to citizens during election 
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 Populism is a disputed term: some attach negative values to it (demagogy) and others positive ones 
(the defense of people’s interests); here I will use it in its first sense. 
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campaigns because they need electors’ legitimacy, i.e. their votes (Santulli 2005). Both 
ZP and RJ fight to present themselves as the defenders of citizens’ interests. 
Consequently, there are frequent references in the two debates to laymen and moves to 
position themselves next to them.   
This fight for proximity to citizens must be linked to two episodes of the 
campaign preceding the debates. On the one hand, what happened during the TV show 
Tengo una Pregunta para Vd., where ZP, asked by a citizen, was unable to answer 
properly about the price of a coffee, showing the distance between him and citizens’ 
everyday life (Arroyo-Martínez & Yus de La-Fuente 2011: 66); and on the other hand, 
PSOE’s response to RJ’s efforts to present himself as the spokesperson and defender of 
the working class: this requires a short digression, since it is crucial in the electoral 
strategy of 2008 elections. On 4 October 2007, responding to a previous video of 
Juventudes Socialistas (PSOE’s youth organization) that defined members of PP as 
ultra-Catholic nationalists and intolerant snobs, RJ declared to the media that “PP is a 
party of workers [currantes] […], I am the president of this party and I am a worker 
[currante]”. During the campaign RJ insisted on this idea of his being as a worker and 
of PP as the worker’s party, showing that this was one of the main campaign strategies 
to win over traditional PSOE votes. On 17 February 2008, during a meeting in Logroño, 
RJ asked workers and wage-earners “abandoned” by ZP to vote for him. Some days 
before, he defined the PP election program as one of “socialistas clásicos [classic 
Socialists]”, trying to mobilize PSOE’s former electors who felt betrayed by ZP’s 
politics. At that meeting RJ mentioned all the topics he would later use in the debates: 
ZP’s lack of interest and incapacity vs. PP interest and capacity, as proven by Aznar’s 
governments; he defined ZP as a trickster [embustero], accused him of dealing with 
things nobody cares of. He attempted to target middle-class voters, those waking up 
early in the morning to go to work (an image he would use repeatedly in the debates). 
He also accused the government of having neglected Spaniards’ everyday problems, 
promising that PP would deal with them. He accused ZP of taking no interest in 
economic policy and recalled the positive economic results of former PP governments. 
This self-presentation was aimed at attracting wavering PSOE voters, as RJ said 
himself in the CS of the second debate, where he clearly indicates that his discourse 
targets discontented former PSOE voters (II.1652-1656). Obviously, RJ’s attempt to 
present himself as the defender of workers’ interests was refuted and contested by 
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PSOE during the campaign (for instance, in a video of a meeting embedded in PSOE 
web, ZP makes fun of RJ’s self presentation as a worker) as well as during the debate. 
The issue of the “legitimate” representative of working class voters is not secondary, in 
that it is related to the most common self-representations that parties give of themselves 
and that voters have (or are supposed to have) of parties. During the debates, ZP uses 
multiple resources to present PSOE as the only party that defended the working class. In 
doing so, ZP lays claim to the votes of working-class electors. This negotiation is 
interesting in terms of strategic face-work, since on the one hand it shows PSOE’s 
interest in maintaining its image as the party traditionally committed to working-class 
struggles, independently from current politics (which can be seen as manipulation), and 
also PP’s interest in constructing a self-image different from the classic one as a 
traditional conservative party committed to owners’ interests, with the aim of getting 
votes (which, again is manipulation). But it is also linked to the ideological convergence 
and the discursive hybridation (see below).  
183 
 
7.2. The economy in the debates: Strategies, moves, devices 
According to the structure of debates, the economy is the first theme addressed, which 
is indicative of its importance. However, it is also a topic that cuts across at least 3 
blocks within the debate, that of Economic policy (EP), Social policies (SP) and 
Challenges for the future (CFF). In this sense I have adopted an integral approach to the 
issue of the economy, as it features in all the debate blocks.  
The analysis will show that candidates manage their presidentiability according to 
the general and local attributes of the presidentiable as discussed in chapter 1 and 
which are briefly recalled here: 
 
General attributes: Unity; Sincerity; Strength; Realism; Loyalty; Coherence and 
Consistency; Defending people’s interests; Supportiveness; Activity, capacity, 
efficacy; Centerness and moderation;  
Particular attributes: being a nurturing father (talkativeness, optimism, 
supportiveness); Being a strict father (authority, realism). 
 
What follows is a discussion of the main moves employed by both candidates to 
manage their presidentiability. 
 
7.2.1. RJ’s moves to manage presidentiability 
 
7.2.1.1. Ability: PP as an effective administrator and PSOE as incapable 
PP’s strategy to reduce the number of electors willing to vote for ZP is to distance him 
from them employing two main moves: a) to present him as incapable and indifferent to 
his voters’ needs; and b) to present RJ as the defender of the Spaniards’ interests. Since 
RJ’s aim is to get votes from wavering PSOE electors dissatisfied with the PSOE 
government, he has to paint a darker picture. He therefore describes the situation as 
unprecedentedly dramatic. This representation of situation and actors is extensively 
employed throughout both debates (I.82-128). RJ’s narratives are aimed at presenting 
the situation as worse than 4 years before (under PP government), due to rising prices, 
mortgages and unemployment rates in a frame of a serious economic crisis. The outline 
of these narratives, that can be found also for other terrains of struggle
141
, is always the 
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 We can find the same narrative structure for the economy (II.190), terrorism (I.711, II.734), and the 
Catalan question (II.111). 
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same: “before (under PP) we were fine; now (under PSOE) we are in a difficult 
situation” or “PP management was good; PSOE was bad” or “when ZP came to power 
things were fine, now (after his government) things are bad”. Through this strategic 
description of the situation, RJ presents ZP as unable to cope with this negative 
situation, and himself as the real defender of workers: in doing so RJ aims at obtain the 
favor of former PSOE electors. For this reason RJ’s discourse is aimed at presenting ZP 
as far away from people and himself as responsible, realistic, close to laymen and able 
to corregir el rumbo [put things back on an even keel]. In short, RJ’s discourse 
constructs the following propositions: 
 
RJ→ZP: distant from laymen, did not deal with their problems; removed from 
reality, incapable 
RJ→RJ: close to laymen, interested in their problems, realistic, capable. 
 
To win the favor of laymen, RJ often refers to gente, ciudadanos or españoles de 
a pie, talks of laymen issues (prices, job, housing, mortgage, etc.
142
) with terms that 
are easily understandable, through expressions such as apretarse el cinturón 
[tighten the belt], and references to the prices of typical foods of laymen’s diet, 
including milk, eggs, chicken, bread, anchovies and potatoes, or about the difficulties of 
people waking up early to go to work or with difficulties in finding a place in 
kindergartens for their children, etc. Through these hypotyposis and with references to 
specific examples, RJ tries to get closer to classes traditionally inclined to vote for 
PSOE, presumably dissatisfied with the economic situation and therefore probably 
ready to punish PSOE. 
RJ also uses narratives of the negative economic situation left by previous PSOE 
governments (1982-1996). These narratives are based on the agreement existing on the 
implicit assumption that some favorable macroeconomic indicators are desirable. 
Through this device, RJ decreases ZP’s presidentiability, focusing on the traditional 
PSOE incapacity to manage the economy and increases his presidentiability by 
framing PP as able to solve problems.  
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 As Edelman says (1971; 1988), these are the problems of laymen, but the fact that politicians talk 
about these issues does not implies that they solve them once elected. 
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nos dejaron la Seguridad Social quebrada, una tasa de paro del 
22%, un déficit público y una deuda pública y unos tipos de 
interés que no nos permitían en ningún caso cumplir los requisitos 
del Euro y entrar en Maastricht (I.337-343) 
 
sabemos hacerlo, lo hemos hecho en su momento y volveremos a 
hacerlo (II.390-391) 
 
RJ’s attacks are aimed at showing PSOE’s incapacity for managing the economy in 
contrast with PP’s capacity, as recent history proves (I.413-417; I.1602-1603). It is 
important to note that RJ’s presentation of PP as able and with proven expertise in 
solving the problems left by previous (PSOE) governments goes in hand with the 
presentation of PSOE as an irresponsible party leaving black holes in the state 
balance. According to these narratives, the occasional achievements of the PSOE 
government are the consequence of previous PP governments (I.202-208): when 
referring to this point, RJ uses the expression herencia e inercia [inheritance and 
inertia]
143
. But see also the following excerpt:  
 
hicimos una ley reconociendo las pensiones por ley, hicimos una 
ley donde se decía que las pensiones subirían al menos como el 
IPC, cuando ahora han cobrado los pensionistas una paga a final de 
enero fue por la ley que hizo el Partido Popular. Le dejamos un 
fondo de reserva, subimos las pensiones y mire, ahora vamos a 
volver a subirlas (I.601-606) 
 
This kind of narratives of the past whereby PP solved Spaniards’ economic problems 
inherited by PSOE as in 1996 are very frequent in both debates (II.242-283; II.336-342; 
II.389-391). Through these narratives RJ represents PSOE as the party who is unable to 
manage Spanish economy and ZP as passive, whilst PP is the party of efficiency: 
 
Lo que hay que hacer es una política económica, que es lo que 
ustedes no hicieron. Ustedes se quedaron sentados tranquilamente, 
dijeron "qué bien se vive de la herencia y de la inercia, qué bien 
                                                          
143
 The issue of herencia e inercia will be repeatedly used by RJ throughout the two debates (I.204; 
II.200, II.321, II.323, II.266, II.370, II.389), as a key-word for negatively presenting ZP (“you/he did it 
badly”) and positively present PP (“we did it fine”). 
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nos lo han dejado estos señores del Partido Popular y ahora vamos 
a no hacer nada. A dedicarnos a la Alianza de Civilizaciones, a 
enter… a entretenernos con la memoria histórica, vamos a negociar 
con ETA y otras cosas". […] Hagan reformas económicas y una 
auténtica política económica, que es lo que no han hecho a lo 
largo de estos 4 años (II.263-274) 
  
The effective management of the economy is linked to the importance PP places on 
economic issues: in the CS, for instance, RJ insists on the importance of the economy 
and the necessity of not becoming entangled in debates on other secondary issues. 
 
Me ocuparé de la economía. La economía es capital. La economía lo 
es todo y de la economía, de una buena política económica depende 
todo […] Por eso, debemos prestarle toda la atención y no 
enredarnos con debates sobre Naciones o alianzas de civilizaciones 
como ha ocurrido en esta legislatura. La economía por encima de 
cualquier otra consideración (II.1667-1680) 
 
The insistence on the importance of the economy clearly reflects a Neoliberal ideology. 
RJ presents himself as an efficient and pragmatic leader, as when he refers to 
realismo, trabajo y humildad, able to solve Spaniards’ problems with Neoliberal 
formulas favoring growth and competitiveness, such as tax reduction and cuts in public 
spending (as he said to ZP during the debate). RJ’s presentation of the economy as the 
main problem on the political agenda is based on the macroeconomic success of former 
PP governments (1996-2004). Moreover, when referring to this, RJ presents himself as 
the pragmatic leader of all Spaniards, oriented to relaunching economy and growth, far 
from “entangling” debates in secondary issues. Obviously this self-representation is 
aimed at increasing his own presidentiability and at decreasing that of ZP, whom he 
presents as indifferent or incapable (cf. PP slogan “con Z de incapaz” that transforms 
PSOE one “con Z de Zapatero”), as having confused priorities and having dealt with 
secondary issues nobody cares about, such as the Alianza de Civilizaciones, Ley de 
Memoria Histórica, Ley de Educación para la Ciudadanía (I.678; II.385) or that only 
divided and confronted Spaniards such as discussing the idea of nation and 
negotiations with ETA.  
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Some observations need to be made about the deixis used in these narratives: even if RJ 
mainly uses usted-yo, every time he refers to the success story of PP in 1996, he uses 
the opposition ustedes-nosotros. He does so to refer to situations where actually neither 
RJ nor ZP were present, as José María Aznar and Felipe González were at the forefront 
of Spanish political life at the time. The use of the plural therefore refers to PP and 
PSOE and serves to frame PP as a party in positive terms and PSOE in negative ones. 
Finally I wish to draw attention on the metaphor used by RJ in his representation 
as being able to solve Spaniards’ problems: 
 
Quiero que esta noche se vayan a dormir con la tranquilidad de que 
podemos encarrilar las cosas. 
 
The power of this metaphor of a State as a means of transportation goes in hand with the 
implicit meanings that it activates: it implicitly refers to ZP, through the semantic 
presupposition triggered by the verb encarrilar [put back on track], which, logically 
implying a derailment, sets out the common (undisputed) presupposition that the present 
situation is off track, and furthermore that ZP is responsible for Spain’s derailment. 
Consequently, RJ implicitly decreases ZP’s presidentiability (descarrilar) and explicitly 
increases his own (encarrilar). 
 
7.2.1.2. Ability: ZP as passive 
Connected to the previous move of PP as an able manager of the economy, there is 
the presentation of ZP as inactive, unrealistic or a liar, as someone talking positively 
instead of realizing the seriousness of the situation. These moves are aimed at 
implementing the strategy of connecting with laymen and distancing ZP from them. 
So, for instance, in the OS of the first debate, RJ accuses ZP of failing to face up to 
reality (1); of having confused priorities (2); of having forgotten the essential issue, 
i.e. economy (3); of not having coped with Spaniards’ real problems, such as the 
economy, immigration, education, focusing instead on secondary issues, such as the 
state model and agreement with ETA, where he failed (4). 
 
(1) no se puede negar la realidad porque quien niega la realidad, 




(2) ¿Qué ha pasado en los cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de 
España ha equivocado las prioridades 
 
(3) se ha olvidado lo esencial, que es la economía, que son los 
precios, que es la vida de las personas, que es su forma de 
sentir, de vivir, son sus preocupaciones 
 
(4) el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las prioridades. Ha tenido 
dos grandes proyectos: el primero, cambiar España y el segundo, 
negociar con ETA. Ambos han sido un fracaso 
 
These negative representations of ZP as being removed from reality, as having confused 
priorities and neglecting the economy, are implemented in many points of both debates, 
representing ZP as an inactive player (I.209-215; II.450 among others): 
 
Ustedes en materia de política económica no han hecho nada (I.413) 
esta es la consecuencia de no haber hecho ninguna política 
económica […] vamos a hacer una política económica ordenada y 
seria, lo que ustedes no hicieron (II.326-327) 
 
[…] al que no le ha importado la economía es a usted, que además 
era el presidente del Gobierno, que ha preferido dedicarse a otras 
cosas como le he dicho antes: a negociar con ETA, o a hacer 
cábalas sobre España eh… que al final han terminado como han 
terminado, o a entretenerse con cosas y cuestiones que no le 
importaban a nadie. Usted es el que no le ha dedicado ni un sólo 
minuto a la economía (II.379-386) 
 
In this move, as in others, quantifiers such as ninguna, ni una sola, nada play an 
important role in absolutizing and stabilizing the negative image of the opponent 
beyond specific and particular behavior. 
In terms of the dialogic and interdiscursive construction of stance taking it is 
interesting to note that to respond to the accusation of inactivity that he received one 
week earlier, in the second debate ZP explicitly presents himself as active, as 
implementing concrete measures, and takes advantage of any opportunity to present RJ 
as a pessimist:  
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Estas son medidas inmediatas, efectivas y constructivas, no como 
su habitual catastrofismo señor Rajoy, sólo se dedican a sembrar 
dudas cada día, a meter miedo sobre la economía, a describir una 
situación catastrófica. La verdad es la que se le ha escapado a 
uno de sus dirigentes, al señor Elorriaga, en un prestigioso 
periódico extranjero, cuando ha declarado "toda nuestra estrategia 
es desalentar a los votantes socialistas para que no voten, si 
sembramos dudas sobre la economía, sobre la inmigración y sobre 
las cuestiones nacionalistas, quizás se queden en casa". Esa es la 
razón por la que siembran tantas dudas, y meten tanto miedo, 
intentar ganar votos.  
 
I will return to this strategy of depicting the opponent as pessimistic through the use of 
abusive and circumstantial arguments. 
 
7.2.1.3. Defense of people’s interests: Proximity to or distance from people 
As mentioned above, as RJ is attempting to win votes from former PSOE voters, one of 
the main moves in his discursive strategy is to get closer to laymen and to distance ZP 
from them. RJ implements this move through various discursive devices and 
propositions. One such way is to accuse ZP of “hiding himself behind macroeconomic 
data that nobody understands” (I.251-281). This point is linked to the presentation of the 
other as insincere and a bad debater. Obviously, getting closer to laymen implies 
mitigating the image of being a Capitalist party and constructing an image of a center 
party concerned with the Spaniards’ welfare. In his attempt to connect with laymen and 
reverse the image of an (excessively) right-wing party, RJ accuses ZP of having 
contributed to increasing social inequality: 
 
[…] Pero lo más grave, lo más grave de lo que ha dicho usted es lo 
de la igualdad de las rentas. Yo tengo aquí los datos de Eurostat 
es que hemos perdido en igualdad el 20% más rico gana hoy bastante 
más que el 20% más pobre (I.343-347)  
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In this way, and in line with PP’s overarching strategy of winning over doubtful PSOE 
voters, RJ presents himself as the defender of the poorest segments of society. This 
theme of social in/equality and distribution of wealth has traditionally been exploited by 
the Left, and ZP himself said el crecimiento para nosotros supone distribuir 
la riqueza (I.230). This is the reason why RJ’s appropriation of the issue is so 
significant. This move goes in hand with that of separating ZP from citizens, for 
instance through accusations of failing to talk about what matters, which allows RJ to 
present ZP as a bad debater, and therefore a bad president (I.349-353). RJ insists on the 
topic of the laymen with expressions like personas de carne y hueso (I.407
144
), to 
present himself as the defender of people and for reduce ZP’s traditional support; in 
doing so RJ says that ZP does not even know the laymen (parece que usted no los 
conoce). 
In constructing his self-image of a candidate close to laymen, RJ introduces the 
theme of housing (I.1311-1338). It is a delicate issue in Spain, especially for working-
class, and particularly during the beginning of the credit crunch and the burst of real 
estate speculative bubble. As he did for prices, salaries, pensions, talking about housing 
is used by RJ to win over former PSOE voters by demonstrating that ZP has been 
insensitive to their problems, while RJ is concerned about them. This is based on the 
performativity and discursivity of ethos: the fact of talking about something makes RJ 
concerned with it. Obviously RJ uses the issue of housing to present ZP as incapable 
(his action was insufficient and wrong). In order to strengthen his connection with 
laymen RJ deploys hypotyposis, i.e. a realistic picture of people suffering and presents 
ZP as insensitive or unrealistic and as an obstacle to the solution of the problem 
(II.83-96; cf. also II.195: no hay peor médico que el que no quiere ver la 
enfermedad); hypotyposis widens the gap with regard to ZP’s indifference or 
ignorance: 
 
Yo voy a hablar de lo que afecta fundamentalmente a los españoles, 
y voy a hablar de cómo viven los españoles, que no viven como 
usted cree que viven los españoles (II.175-178).   
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 RJ uses here the same definition used by ZP in the previous intervention (I.357), when he tried to 
regain his connection with citizens. 
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According to RJ’s description, ZP is unable to solve people’s problems, because he is 
simply unaware of them. RJ constructs his alignment with laymen through references to 
the rise in the price of basic foods such as leche, huevos, pollo, pan, etc. showing 
that RJ talks about what citizens talk about, that he deals with citizens’ problems, 
especially of those of asalariados [wage-earners] (II.255). This last point is crucial 
because –albeit simplifying somewhat– wage-earners are traditionally PSOE voters. 
This also shows that in order to achieve his electoral ends RJ adjusts his discourse in a 
clear example of discourse hybridation: a right wing party talks about wage-earners, 
although it is a traditional theme of Left discourse, and uses ‘lefty’ arguments to 
dismantle ZP’s workface aimed at presenting himself as a defender of laymen: 
 
cuidaremos a las personas que tienen menos ingresos, que han sido 
las grandes atacadas por su política porque hoy la desigualdad de 
renta entre españoles es mucho mayor (II.392-395; see also I.343-347) 
 
las personas más pobres son las que más sufren las subidas de los 
precios y las consecuencias de su política (II.345-347) 
 
RJ exploits the increased differences between rich and poor (a constant in 
contemporary Neoliberal societies) to dismantle ZP’s positive self-presentation and 
represent ZP as unsupportive and incapable. In line with PP’s global strategy of 
representing ZP as neglecting Spaniards’ problems and especially those of his former 
electors, RJ presents ZP as betraying his voters, as betraying the Left, and presents 
himself as the new defender of workers, with a discourse that includes lefty words and 
themes. 
In the fight for proximity to laymen, ZP contests RJ’s facework, deconstructing 
RJ’s image of defender of Spaniards’ interests through a narrative that recalls 
economic measures taken by the previous PP government such as the freezing of civil 
servants’ wages. The agreement is on the negativity of this measure. So ZP 
delegitimizes RJ as a pretender and, repositioning PSOE as the “legitimate” defender 
of working class interests, reconstructs the image of PSOE as standing beside workers 
and of PP aligning itself with Capital. ZP does so through explicit abusive arguments 
such as Usted no es creíble para representar a la gente de la calle 
(I.310-311) or through polarized narratives, where RJ made Spaniards poorer (bad) and 
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ZP made them wealthier (good). Aware of PP’s strategy and the electoral difficulties 
that he could face if he permits RJ to distance him from laymen, ZP tries to regain the 
connection with people. For this reason, in both debates he employs expressions like 
vamos a hablar de la vida real, de salarios y de la economía familiar 
(I.283). This attempt to keep the connection with laymen is more visible in the second 
debate, maybe on the recommendation of his advisors, in which, like his opponent, he 
refers to basic popular foods and goods such as pan, leche, pollo, frutas, 
patatas, vestidos o electrodomésticos (II.227-233). ZP tries to keep the 
connection with people, also through performative statements showing his 
commitment to them: 
 
Pero yo quiero hablar de los problemas de los ciudadanos. Y el 
primero para el bienestar de una economía es el empleo (II.298-299) 
 
Quiero hablar de política sociales, porque tienen mucho interés 
los ciudadanos en conocer nuestras propuestas (II.408-410) 
 
In order to refute RJ’s argument of having betrayed his former electors, neglecting 
wage-earners, the poor, etc. ZP presents himself as a supportive leader and RJ as 
unsupportive through expressions like Creo en la creación de riqueza y en la 
distribución la riqueza, ustedes no (I.304). In doing so ZP repositions PSOE 
on the Left and RJ in his “natural” ideological space: beside Capital. By exposing this 
left idea, ZP increases his presidentiability and decreases his opponent’s, the local 
agreement –i.e. on the Left– whereby wealth should be equally distributed. For the same 
reason he uses an argumentum ab auctoritate, quoting a UN document on the Human 
Development Index:  
 
Cuando ustedes llegaron al Gobierno, España estaba en el puesto 
número 11; con su Gobierno perdimos diez puestos y llegamos al 
número 21 en 2003; ahora […] llegamos al puesto 13 (II.308-317) 
 
ZP tries to stay connected to citizens with (positive) facework, through which he 
presents himself as the defender of weakest (II.410-435; II.483-515). The need for ZP 
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to present himself as a supportive leader is so important in deactivating RJ’s attacks, 
that, in both debates he dedicates the final part of his CS to it (I.1673-1677): 
 
Gobernaré con sensibilidad, y estaré muy cerca de los que no 
tienen de todo. Buenas noches y buena suerte (II.1639-1640) 
 
Again, ZP refers to a lefty theme, that of social protection and presents himself as 
supportive and PP as unsupportive. I will return to this issue in the next section. 
 
7.2.2. ZP’s moves to manage presidentiability 
 
7.2.2.1. Un/supportiveness: PSOE supportive vs. PP unsupportive 
This move is strictly connected with the previous one. Since there is a general and 
particular (within the Left) agreement on the fact that solidarity is positive, PSOE’s 
overarching strategy for de/constructing presidentiability is to use narratives that refer to 
a past where PP is represented as an unsupportive party that did not defend the 
weakest and the present where PSOE is depicted as a supportive party. This move is 
coherent with the electoral strategies suggested for Liberals by Lakoff (2002[1996]; 
2004): in order to win elections the Left should offer values like, as in this case, 
solidarity. ZP increases his presidentiability, presenting himself as committed to the 
weakest taking care of young people, women, the elderly, and the disabled, promoting 
social dialogue, and promoting public healthcare and public education (I.145-159; 
I.419-431; I.472-506). The description of the situation is always polarized on the 
opposition we/you for presenting PP as bad (56,000 public houses vs. €0 per person for 
young people in housing benefits; 3 billion € for research vs. freezing spending on 
education and scholarships) and PSOE as good or better (100,000 public houses; €200 
per person in housing benefits; 7 billion € for research; etc.) (I.1339-1374). ZP presents 
RJ as a conservative that cuts public spending on housing, education, research, 
cooperation and development or immigration and himself as a liberal and supportive 
leader committed to the weakest segments of society (I.620-653; I.1419-1433). 




No puedo prometer que todas las personas tengan éxito en su vida, 
pero sí me puedo comprometer a trabajar para que todas las 
personas tengan las mismas oportunidades para tener éxito, y 
aquellas que no lo alcancen tendrán siempre el amparo de nuestro 
país. Buenas noches y buena suerte (I.1673-1678) 
 
Here ZP expresses a social-democratic ideology where life is conceived as a quest for 
success, whose result depends on the participants’ ability and starting conditions and 
where the politicians’ role is to guarantee equal opportunities (social justice) and the 
protection for those who do not achieve this success (welfare state). 
ZP continues to construct the image of a supportive leader concerned by gender 
equality, work precariousness, safety at work, etc. right from the start of the second 
debate (OS), claiming that his aim is traducir ese crecimiento económico en 
crecimiento social (II.51). Throughout the debate he presents himself as the 
defender of the weak (the disabled, those at risk of exclusion, women, young people, 
children, etc.) (II.140-173; II.410-435; II.483-515). At the same time he presents PP 
(and by extension RJ) as an unsupportive party. The following passage is a good 





Obviously in this kind of representation of reality deixis plays a crucial role in 
constructing the opposition and in associating positive or negative values to the 
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opposing sides. This insistence on lefty values is so important that it also features in the 
CS of the second debate, where ZP again presents himself as a supportive and 
sensitive leader, concerned with the weakest members of society (II.1617-1627): 
 
Porque estoy convencido que un país es fuerte si da las mismas 
oportunidades a todos los ciudadanos y apoya a los más débiles, 
porque estoy comprometido con terminar con todas las 
discriminaciones, empezando por las que afectan a las mujeres, 
porque estoy convencido que el crecimiento económico nos debe 
llevar al pleno empleo. Porque estoy comprometido con que la 
mayoría de los recursos públicos se dediquen a la educación, a la 
sanidad, a subir las pensiones, a apoyar a los jóvenes para que 
encuentren empleo, a apoyar a los trabajadores y a sus familias. 
 
Through this performative profession of social-democratic faith ZP tries to reconnect 
with people, in response to RJ’s attempts to distance him from them, and he also 
presents himself as lefty, contesting RJ’s attempts to present him as having betrayed the 
Left. 
 
7.2.2.1. Fair play: PSOE fair player PP unfair player 
One of the main moves enacted by ZP for de/constructing presidentiability is the usage 
of narratives of the past where PP/RJ are represented as unfair players that failed to 
abide by the rules of the political game, and PSOE/ZP as fair player
145
. This strategy 
is again based on the idea of proposing general values –as widely agreed on as possible– 
upon which to construct the self- and the other’s image, rather than directly attacking 
the opponent on particular issues that can be reversed. ZP implements this strategy from 
the OS of the first debate: 
 
Buenas noches, me alegro que por fin tengamos este debate. Mi 
satisfacción no es por mí mismo, si no por los ciudadanos que van 
a poder comparar esta noche dos proyectos políticos bien definidos 
y diferentes (I.133-136)  
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 ZP’s efforts to present himself as sincere, loyal, and democratic sustained the entire campaign: 
throughout the two debates as well as in other texts, such as the videos of the series Vota con todas tus 
fuerzas, where PSOE invited citizens to vote for whatever party, or other statements appeared on his 
website as “la abstención es perder todos”, etc. 
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He presents the debate as an occasion for citizens’ to compare two different political 
projects. After this legitimization based on selflessness, ZP delegitimizes PP in 
reference to its disloyal opposition, defining it as the main hurdle [el principal 
obstáculo] of the legislature. RJ describes PP as undemocratic, since, it did not accept 
an unfavorable election result, insulted the opponent, tensed the environment, divided 
citizens, lied and exaggerated, failed to support the government on key national issues 
and used terrorism and the victims’ pain for its own electoral ends (I.161-175). This 
argument works since it is commonly assumed that a president has to be a sincere 
democrat, i.e. that democraticness is one of the main attributes of a president, and hence 
presidentiability depends on it. The following passage of the OS shows how the 
management of presidentiability is two-folded: 
 
La disyuntiva en las próximas elecciones es: diálogo o 
confrontación, aquellos que buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican 
problemas, aquellos que desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y 
aquellos que han intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar 
al poder (I.171-175) 
 
Through a Manichean representation of reality, ZP presents the vote as a choice 
between what is generally considered as good (dialogue, solutions, serving citizens) and 
bad (confrontation, problems, using citizens). Highlighting PSOE’s selflessness and 
PP’s opportunism, ZP defines PSOE (us) as a fair player and PP (them) as unfair 
player. 
By presenting the opponent as unfair player ZP deactivates all criticism coming 
from RJ, as coming from a disloyal –hence untrustworthy– subject, i.e. he reduces the 
credibility of his opponent’s criticisms. Most importantly, ZP does not criticize RJ for 
some contingent elements of his behavior and does not respond to criticisms about 
concrete deeds; instead, he employs argumentum ad hominem, to criticize his opponent 
for (allegedly) stable features of his personality such as disloyalty to democracy or, as 
elsewhere, pessimism, intolerance, backwardness, etc. One of the ways of stabilizing 
negativity in the opponent is to base the argument on the topic of uniqueness, as in the 
following example:  
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Ustedes nunca han apoyado en nada al Gobierno, no tienen parangón 
con ninguna oposición democrática de los países que conocemos 
(I.388-391) 
 
Quantifiers (ninguna) make the case of PP unique, stabilizing and generalizing (nunca) 
the negative feature of PP as permanent and not contingent. But quantifiers are also 
crucial for self-legitimation, as shown in the following examples:  
 
En toda mi vida política, tanto en la oposición como en el 
gobierno, he servido a España con lealtad, he colaborado en los 
asuntos de Estado (I.1643-1645) 
 
En toda mi trayectoria política he intentado que el insulto, que 
la descalificación, no contamine el debate público (II.67-69) 
 
Here toda stabilizes and generalizes the attribute of loyalty and selflessness beyond 
contingency. This move works thanks to the fact that voters reasonably agree that 
selflessness and loyalty are necessary presidential attributes. RJ also employs a variant 
of this argument, presenting himself in his CS as a disinterested patriot (I.1606-1608). 
The last point where ZP presents himself as a loyal democrat is the first part of 
ZP’s CS: 
 
Quiero aprovechar esta ocasión para expresar mi profundo 
agradecimiento a los que me dieron la confianza en aquella 
ocasión. Mi agradecimiento también a los que en estos años, han 
expresado el apoyo a las acciones de Gobierno y también mi 
agradecimiento a los que han discrepado con respeto. Quiero que 
todos los españoles sepan que tanto el apoyo como la crítica me 
han servido de estímulo para esforzarme y trabajar por mis 
compatriotas (II.1606-1614) 
  
This is not only a captatio benevolentiae towards his electors and especially those who 
did not vote for him, which is undeniably useful for winning their votes; instead, 
thanking also who criticized him, ZP presents himself as a fair player, as a self-critic, 
a moderate and mature leader, and particularly as a president for everybody (see below). 
It is obvious that all these features (maturity, moderation, self-critic, unity) are agreed 
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upon as essential attribute of the president. In order to boost their presidentiability 
candidates therefore have to construct their image in relation to them, which shows how 
performative discourse is in constructing ethos. I will insist on this, albeit from another 
perspective, in the next section. 
 
7.2.2.3. Sincerity and Ability: Good debater vs. bad debater 
In many points of the two debates we can see the equation “good/bad debater = 
good/bad president”, i.e. the fact that good –sincere as well as effective– oratory is 
linked to presidentiability. This idea is based on the features of ethos discussed in 
chapter 1. Since ethos is created discursively, bad oratory, i.e. insincere or ineffective, is 
considered as a flaw for a president. The second point is less common than the first; we 
can see an example in ZP’s criticism of RJ when discussing Spain’s participation in the 
Iraq war. That war was harshly criticized by Spain’s civil society, people and parties 
except PP, and was one of the main problems of PP faced in government; so ZP 
considers that RJ makes a faux pas by raising the issue. 
 
no sé quién le ha aconsejado que venga ahora a discutir… (II.854-
856)  
 
In highlighting RJ’s faux pas, ZP shows that he is not a good debater and therefore 
presidentiable.  
Nevertheless, criticism tends to focus on the debater as insincere, rather than 
ineffective. For instance, RJ tries to dealign the audience from ZP, accusing him (I.251; 
I.276-277; I.326-327; I.351-352) of hiding himself, of trying to disorient interlocutors 
and audiences with figures that nobody understands, of shirking his responsibilities and 
by extension of being insincere. On the other hand, and to present himself as a good 
debater, ZP uses performative speech acts in which he states that he wants to talk about 
what people are interested in:  
 
yo sí quiero hablar de los precios que afectan a los ciudadanos 
(II.218-219; see also II.297-298; II.408-410) 
 
This is part of a positive facework that responds to RJ’s attempts to present ZP as a bad 
debater, as well as an attempt to remain close to the people (see above). The issue of 
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sincerity is obviously linked to the open accusation of lying, even though they are 
different cases of the same discursive construction of ethos, the open attack of lying is 
simpler, but also very effective and very common. 
To boost the construction of his image as a sincere politician, in the second 
debate, and as a consequence of RJ’s accusation of lying in the first on, ZP added an 
effective theatrical move: he said he brought a white paper with all the data referred to 
throughout the debates (II.71-78). This fact of presenting himself as an honest debater, 
whose statements and data can be checked in a supposed white paper he offers in his 
intervention, and explicitly referring to the truth (La verdad por delante y por 
escrito, para que no haya ninguna duda), is highly relevant in increasing his 
presidentiability. ZP presents himself as sincere and he guarantees it with a theatrical 
and performative gesture: nobody could really check his data, but it is enough for him to 
enact sincerity and honesty. This indicates the importance of discursive ethos: being a 
sincere speaker and telling the truth gives the orator his credibility and increases his 
presidentiability. Obviously, sincerity is recognized as a fundamental attribute for a 
president. 
These last points are especially interesting in that they demonstrate the 
candidates’ meta-communicative and meta-pragmatic intentions; the performative 
power of discourse in constructing the self-image and the discursive character of the 
construction of ethos. 
 
7.2.2.4. PSOE dialogue PP authoritarian 
Another of the moves used by ZP to de/construct presidentiability is the usage of 
narratives of the past where PP is represented as an authoritarian party that 
unilaterally took decisions and of PSOE as open to discussion, as shown by the 
numerous references to agreements with owners and unions (I.376; I.633; II.498; II.515; 
II.657; II.48-49; II.147-152.). 
This move also has to be seen within the global PSOE electoral strategy as 
defined in the suggestions given to the Liberals by Lakoff (2002[1996]; 2004): in order 
to win elections the Left should offer values, as, in this case, dialogue. ZP presents 
himself and PSOE as open to discussion and PP as authoritarian. 
If ZP does so it is because there is a general and particular agreement on dialogue 
as a crucial attribute for a president.  
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7.2.2.5. Selflessness: PP opportunistic vs. PSOE selfless 
Indubitably one of the main moves used by ZP to detract from RJ’s presidentiability is 
to suggest that RJ is interested in the economy solely out of electoral interests:   
 
Pero, ¿ahora a qué viene usted si no se ha preocupado por la 
economía en cuatro años? Si hemos tenido tres debates sobre el 
Estado de la Nación, y en sus discursos, que son largos, sólo ha 
dedicado una media de tres minutos a la parte de la economía… Si 
usted no se ha dedicado en nada a la economía (I.242-249) 
 
This clear example of the circumstantial variant of argumentum ad hominem is 
fundamental because it allows ZP to deactivate all RJ’s attacks as coming from 
someone not really interested in citizens’ problems, but interested only in his own 
electoral objectives. As we will see below, this issue will also play a central role in the 
second debate, where the issue of RJ’s first question to ZP in the Congreso will 
receive great attention from both candidates. More generally, ZP’s strategy is based on 
presenting PP as lying and opportunistically manipulating the interpretation of 
economic figures only for electoral ends, and he does so through a tu quoque argument: 
 
Mire, los precios en sus últimos cuatro años de Gobierno crecieron 
al 3,4 de media anual, ahora han crecido al 3,2, prácticamente 
igual. Lo que entonces era un milagro hombre, ahora es desolador 
(I.295-298)  
 
The presentation of RJ as an opportunist goes in hand with the presentation of the 
opponent as pessimistic:  
 
Estas son medidas inmediatas, efectivas y constructivas, no como 
su habitual catastrofismo señor Rajoy, sólo se dedican a sembrar 
dudas cada día, a meter miedo sobre la economía, a describir una 
situación catastrófica. La verdad es la que se le ha escapado a 
uno de sus dirigentes, al señor Elorriaga, en un prestigioso 
periódico extranjero, cuando ha declarado "toda nuestra estrategia 
es desalentar a los votantes socialistas para que no voten, si 
sembramos dudas sobre la economía, sobre la inmigración y sobre 
las cuestiones nacionalistas, quizás se queden en casa". Esa es la 
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razón por la que siembran tantas dudas, y meten tanto miedo, 
intentar ganar votos (II.162-173) 
 
In this way pessimism (see the section below), which is already a negative feature, is 
worsened by opportunism. RJ’s pessimism is opportunistic: he sows doubt in order to 
win elections (circumstantial argument). In this representation the role of reported 
speech and argumentum ab auctoritate are crucial. RJ cannot deny these statements. 
Through this representation, ZP deactivates RJ’s criticism as proceeding from an 
interested –hence not objective and therefore untrustworthy– person. Describing the 
opponent as a strategic pessimist, who criticizes only to win elections, gives a negative 
image of the opponent as an unfair player and contrasts with the image ZP offers of 
himself as selfless (I.1643-1645; II.68). 
 
7.2.2.5. Optimism vs. pessimism: PSOE optimistic and PP pessimistic 
The opposition between optimism and pessimism was also one of the main moves in 
PSOE’s strategy to increase ZP’s presidentiability and decrease that of RJ. It is crucial 
in the PSOE de/legitimation strategy, and indeed informed the entire campaign: the 
opening act of its election campaign, its main pseudo-event, was the presentation to 
media of the song Defender la alegría (on this see Screti 2013); in that event, the 
presenter talked of “defender la alegría contra los cenizos [defending the joy against 
jinx]”, implicitly referring to PP. Moreover, one of the videos of the PSOE campaign, 
No seas él [don’t be him] featured a jinx always expecting or foreseeing the most 
negative side of things. The idea is that existing agreement on the fact that optimism is a 
positive attribute, associating it with ZP will increase his presidentiability and at the 
same time, associating RJ with pessimism will decrease his presidentiability. 
As a result, in both debates ZP tries to present himself as an optimist and PP as a 
pessimist. One way of expressing optimism is by minimizing the gravity of the present 
situation referring to it through a euphemism such as desaceleración
146
 instead of 
crisis, which is the word used by RJ, or by blaming the global crisis, which reduces his 
responsibility. Another way of enacting optimism, and at the same time minimizing his 
mistakes and maximizing his achievements, is to present the upside of the situation:   
                                                          
146




A pesar de la desaceleración, seguiremos creciendo […] La 
desaceleración no va a ser ni profunda, ni prolongada. Va a ser 
una desaceleración, para la cual nuestro país está mejor preparado 
que nadie, por la fortaleza de su Sistema Financiero, por la 
fortaleza de sus Cuentas Públicas (I.369-376; see also II.140-173) 
 
Esta noche, me propongo explicar cuál es mi proyecto para los 
próximos cuatro años, para un país que debe continuar creciendo 
económicamente, que juntos empresarios, sindicatos y Gobierno-, 
podemos superar un momento de desaceleración económica que vive 
España en un contexto mundial, para traducir ese crecimiento 
económico en crecimiento social (II.46-52) 
 
Another way of expressing optimism is to explicitly refer to it, something ZP does in 
the CS of the first and second debates.  
 
Tengo plena confianza en las enormes posibilidades de la España 
libre y unida. Creo que nuestro país puede continuar avanzando, 
incrementar su prosperidad (I.1640-1642) 
 
llegaremos mejor al futuro si tenemos confianza y no pesimismo 
(II.1634) 
 
Worthy of note is the role of expressions such as seguiremos creciendo, continuar 
avanzando, and continuar creciendo: the verbs continuar and seguir semantically 
imply that Spain is already progressing and growing. The persuasiveness of these 
expressions is based on the power of implicit meanings triggered by the verbs, which 
state as common ground something that was disputable and in fact disputed by PP, 
namely economic growth. These expressions convey optimism by establishing 
economic growth as being taken for granted. 
As we have seen, ZP’s self-presentation as an optimist goes in hand with his 
presentation of RJ as a pessimist. If we refer to passage (II.162-173) quoted above, we 
will see that ZP presents himself as active (also in response to the accusation of 
inactivity received one week earlier in the first debate) and positive, whilst presenting 
RJ as a pessimist. Through this representation, ZP deactivates RJ’s criticism as 
proceeding from a person who is naturally pessimistic –and therefore not objective– (su 
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habitual catastrofismo; abusive argument), and especially from an opportunist 
sowing doubts only to win elections (circumstantial argument). In this delegitimation of 
the opponent the role of his reported speech is crucial in realistically representing his 
pessimism and opportunism. 
These accusations of pessimism are obviously disputed by RJ, who starts his CS 
of the first debate using words such as tranquility, optimism, hope. 
 
Quiero que esta noche se vayan a dormir con la tranquilidad de que 
podemos encarrilar las cosas […] Podemos mirar al mañana con 
optimismo y con esperanza (I.1598-1602)  
 
It is obviously an attempt to mitigate or avoid accusations of pessimism in response to 
those formerly received from ZP and PSOE during the campaign. Note that the 
metaphor encarrilar las cosas [put things back on track] is crucial, for what it says 
and for what it implies. It refers to the widespread metaphor of the State as a collective 
means of transport (train, boat, bus, plane), and as such activates references to the need 
for a captain, control, driving straight, etc. But the very verb encarrilar semantically 
implies important meanings logically established as common ground and hence 




7.2.3. A particular case: the first question RJ asked ZP in the Congreso 
I already briefly referred above to the first question RJ asked ZP in the Congreso. I 
will now consider in greater depth this seemingly minor issue, but which is actually a 
key issue that appears in both debates (see also Fuentes-Rodríguez 2010: 35-38).  
It arose during the first debate, when ZP rhetorically asked RJ about his sudden 
interest in the economy, after 4 years without talking about it in his long discourses 
(I.242-249). On that occasion, ZP used circumstantial argument to deactivate all RJ’s 
attacks in the field of economy as coming from an opportunistic person, not really 
interested in citizens’ economic problems, but only in his own electoral ends.  
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In the second debate, it is RJ who first brings up this issue. Both candidates refer to it 
extensively throughout the block on the economy (II.197-378) as well as across many 
other sections: ZP refers to it in the section of SP (II.406-407), and RJ in the section of 
IP (II.1028-1034), and again ZP in the same section (II.1079-1086). This is due to the 
intrinsic importance of this issue in the de/construction of presidentiability. ZP uses it to 
delegitimize RJ, presenting him as an opportunist and liar; while RJ uses it for self-
legitimation purposes, presenting himself as a responsible leader concerned with 
citizens’ economic problems since the very beginning of ZP’s legislature.  
From the point of view of the strategic production and circulation of discourses it 
is interesting to note that RJ takes up the theme in the second debate, probably on the 
advice of his communication consults who saw it as an effective attack by ZP that 
required a response, albeit a week later. The way this issue is treated also shows 
intertextuality and interdiscursivity, i.e. the interconnection of the discourse produced 
within the debates with other earlier discourses as well as the interactional nature of 
the debate, where turns for stance taking, even if constructed as to seem as monologic, 
are intrinsically dialogic: candidates always respond to previous stance taking and 
moves, and even their lack of response is in itself a form of reacting to opponent’s 
stance through dealignment. 
RJ brings up the issue in the middle of his first intervention on the economy 
(II.175-211). This point is a response to ZP’s moves in the first debate of presenting PP 
as pessimistic and opportunistic. 
 
[…] Usted lleva mucho tiempo hablando de catastrofismo, de que 
nosotros somos unos exagerados, pero yo ya la primera pregunta que 
le hice en el Congreso de los Diputados en el año 2004 era que 
debería hacer usted reformas económicas porque si no, la herencia 
y la inercia se iban a terminar como así ocurrió y así nos 
encontramos en la situación en la que estamos […] (II.195-201) 
 
So in response to ZP’s innuendos about his late interest in Spanish economy (I.242-
249), RJ backdates it to the first question he asked ZP in the Congreso, in 2004
148
, well 
before the crisis or the elections (2008). By presenting a different and opposed 
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narrative, according to which in the first question he asked ZP he talked about the 
economy, RJ deactivates ZP’s accusation of being an opportunist and a pessimist and 
attempts to present himself as sincerely interested in the Spaniards’ problems, as a 
responsible and provident politician that advised ZP, who as an irresponsible or 
incapable president, ignored RJ’s advice and did not react. 
This issue is crucial in the respective strategies of presidentiability management: 
for presenting the opponent as opportunistic (ZP→RJ) or as incapable (RJ→ZP), and 
for presenting the self as loyal (ZP→ZP) or concerned with Spaniards’ economic 
problems (RJ→RJ). The decision of both candidates to tackle this therefore comes as no 
surprise. For instance, ZP responds by insisting on saying that RJ did not talk about the 
economy in his first question: 
 
debería de tener un poco más de memoria sobre la primera pregunta 
que me hizo en el Parlamento siendo usted líder de la oposición y 
yo presidente del Gobierno porque no fue ni de economía ni de 
precios (II.214-218) 
 
In the next turn, RJ again opens his intervention by claiming that he did indeed talk 
about economy: 
 
Bien, eh… la primera pregunta que yo le hice al señor Zapatero en 
el Congreso de los Diputados fue de economía la primera y por 
tanto le ruego que no falte a la verdad, esto se podrá comprobar 
en el día de mañana (II.242-245) 
 
In the following turn, ZP again insists that RJ did not talk about economy: 
 
Sí, señor Rajoy, me sorprende la poca memoria o el intento que 
usted tiene de manipular. Yo tengo aquí su primera pregunta 
realizada como líder la oposición (enseña un folio del que lee) y 
dice así: "¿Cómo valora usted los primeros días de su Gobierno?". 
Y en esa pregunta habla de la coordinación del Gobierno, de los 
hechos que han sucedido, de los anuncios. No hay nada de precios 
[RJ: Y de las reformas económicas… que es lo que le pido…] ni de 
la economía [RJ: la reformas económicas es lo que le pido] No, no, 
déjeme. La primera pregunta que usted hace de precios, de la 
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subida de los precios ha sido hace pocas semanas. No ha tenido 
usted ninguna pregunta sobre subida precios, hace pocas semanas, 
prácticamente cuando ya estaban las elecciones. No le ha importado 
este tema (II.285-297) 
 
This final passage reveals ZP’s strategy of accusing RJ of dealing with economy only 
once since the start of the election campaign. To support his own position, ZP quotes 
RJ’s speech as evidence, concluding that RJ was not interested in the economy. 
RJ opens his turn trying to turn ZP’s innuendos in his favor through the reference 
to herencia e inercia of previous successful PP governments: 
 
En la primera pregunta que hice en el Congreso de los Diputados 
hablé de la necesidad de hacer reformas económicas y no de vivir 
de la herencia y de la inercia. Y si no hablé de precios hasta 
hace pocos meses es que, como ustedes vivieron de la inercia y de 
la herencia, durante un cierto tiempo las cosas fueron bien 
(II.319-324) 
 
So RJ concedes that he did not talk about price rising until few weeks earlier, but he did 
so because of the long-lasting positive results of PP’s previous legislatures, which is a 
way of presenting a positive self-image as an effective manager. 
The strategic value of this issue is evident in the fact that it is the sole topic in 
ZP’s next turn, accusing RJ of tricking citizens with his false and sudden interest in the 
economy and prices, motivated only out of electoral interests: 
 
Sí señor Rajoy, me sorprende y le acabo de referir (ensena un 
folio) y tengo aquí la pregunta parlamentaria, la primera que 
hizo, que no habló de economía ni era de economía ni de precios, 
habló de los primeros días de la valoración del Gobierno y de la 
coordinación de anuncios que habían hecho los distintos 
Ministerios. Usted ha estado engañando a los ciudadanos. A usted 
los precios sólo le han preocupado hace unas semanas, porque la 
primera pregunta que hizo sobre precios fue el 19 de diciembre de 
2007, prácticamente ya [R: Se lo acabo de explicar….] estábamos en 
las elecciones. [RJ: Se lo acabo de explicar… al terminar la 
inercia y la herencia], no, no, usted, usted ha dicho que la 
primera pregunta fue de economía [RJ: y hablé de economía], y la 
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tengo aquí y no habló de economía. Preguntó sobre la acción del 
Gobierno. Está engañando, engañando, no se ha preocupado de la 
economía. Los precios no le han interesado hasta hace unas 
semanas. ¿Sabe lo que le ha importado a usted la subida de los 
precios a los ciudadanos y la economía de las familias? Un bledo, 
eso es lo que le ha importado señor Rajoy (II.360-378) 
 
It should be noted that both candidates attack each other in relation to sincerity, 
especially ZP who through a climax goes from poca memoria through intento de 
manipular to usted ha estado engañando. 
On the other hand, RJ insists on the herencia e inercia as a strategy for 
delegitimizing any PSOE achievements and legitimizing PP, and on the tu quoque 
argument for accusing ZP of not failing to deal with the economy, focusing instead of 
issues that nobody cares about:    
 
Bueno, Ha estado usted muy brillante, señor… al que no le ha 
importado la economía es a usted, que además era el presidente del 
Gobierno, que ha preferido dedicarse a otras cosas como le he 
dicho antes: a negociar con ETA, o a hacer cábalas sobre España 
eh… que al final han terminado como han terminado, o a 
entretenerse con cosas y cuestiones que no le importaban a nadie. 
Usted es el que no le ha dedicado ni un sólo minuto a la economía. 
Ya le he dicho antes por qué no le he hablado de precios, porque 
las cosas los primeros años fueron bien, porque vivían ustedes de 
la herencia y de la inercia, se lo dije absolutamente hasta la 
saciedad (II.379-289) 
 
This issue of the first question is so important that ZP returns to it again in the SP block:   
 
Sí muchas gracias, señor Rajoy, ha quedado claro la credibilidad 
de sus palabras y lo que ha pasado durante todos estos meses con 
su engaño a los ciudadanos (II.406-408) 
 
As this passage shows, the candidates insist on this issue because it is a way for them to 
increase or decrease their credibility not only on the topic of the economy, but more 
generally in relation to the attribute of sincerity. Following RJ’s response, when he 
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addresses immigration, ZP again returns to it to make further inroads into RJ’s 
credibility:   
 
Sí, señor Rajoy, su credibilidad sobre lo que ha dicho en materia 
de política social […] es exactamente igual que la credibilidad 
que ha tenido con las preguntas de la economía y su interés por la 
economía en estos 4 años, la misma (II.478-482) 
 
Recalling the first question ZP aims to demonstrate that RJ is an opportunist, and 
therefore not credible, and that he tricks citizens and thus not presidentiable. 
The debate moved onto other topics, and following a pause, probably on the 
advice of his communication strategists, RJ again returned to his first question in the 
Congreso. This again shows its importance for the construction of credibility, which is 
the main objective of the debate in order to win votes. RJ opens his turn in the IP block 
with a reference to it: 
 
sí, quisiera comenzar, para dejar claro alguna cosa, que en la 
primera pregunta que hice en el Parlamento, esto es para que 
veamos la credibilidad del señor Zapatero, hablé del IVA, la 
financiación autonómica, los cien euros, del cálculo de las 
pensiones… Esto es fútbol ¿no? para usted, señor Zapatero, es 
decir, esta es la muestra de que usted no le dice la verdad a los 
españoles e incluso con un papel delante (II.1028-1034) 
 
J’s intention is to present ZP as a liar. But again ZP insists on his presentation of RJ as 
an opportunist interested only in the election results:  
 
Sí, muchas Gracias, señor Rajoy. Eso que se refiere de la primera 
pregunta del IVA y de los cien euros, no era de economía sino 
sobre comentarios que hacía sobre lo que decían los ministros, 
sobre si se iba a aplicar o no. Aquí está la pregunta [RJ: IVA, 
financiación autonómica, cien euros y cálculo de pensiones… eso no 
es economía?] No, no. [RJ: ¿Ah, no es economía?] No, no, no, aquí 
está la pregunta. Era de lo que decían. [RJ: El IVA es fomento… ¿y 
la financiación económica? ¿Y el cálculo de pensiones?…] Ni era de 
economía ni de los precios, ni de la economía ni de nada. [RJ: Así 
se explica la situación de la economía española a fecha de hoy 
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conociendo su…] Era de lo que decían los ministros, porque usted 
intentaba denunciar en la pregunta que había descoordinación. No, 
no, que había descoordinación, si luego lo van a ver todos los 
ciudadanos lo que ha preguntado… (II.1079-1086) 
 
In reality, what matters is the fact that a seemingly insignificant issue that arose during 
the first debate is introduced transversally into the second debate due to its strategic 
importance in the de/construction of speakers’ ethos and therefore their 
presidentiability. As we have seen above, through a certain narrative (in this first 
question RJ did not talk about the economy) and circumstantial argument, this issue 
allowed ZP to present RJ as an opportunist only interested in the economy for his own 
personal electoral interests, i.e. to obtain votes. It also allowed ZP to deactivate RJ’s 
criticisms, as coming from an interested –and hence unobjective– person, and a liar (he 
is lying in the first question); through this move ZP reduces RJ credibility, and he also 
explicitly refers twice to RJ’s (lack of) credibility. Through another opposed narrative 
(in this first question he did talk about the economy), RJ deactivates ZP’s accusation of 
being an opportunist and a pessimist; he can demonstrate that he has long been 
concerned about Spain’s economic situation, as responsible and provident, and that ZP 
is irresponsible or incapable. The propositions constructed by candidates can be 
summarized as shown below: 
 
ZP→RJ: opportunist, liar  
RJ→ZP: passive and incapable, liar  
ZP→ZP: sincere 
RJ→RJ: sincere, concerned with Spaniards’ economic problems 
 
It is clear that the importance of the issue is only marginally related to capability, while 
it is mainly linked to sincerity, both as politicians, in relation to opportunism, and as 
debaters, in relation to telling the truth about the question itself, which is one of the 




In this subsection I have presented the way candidates have managed their 
presidentiability in the debate in relation to the issue of the economy according to the 
attributes of the presidentiable: general attributes (unity, sincerity, loyalty, coherence, 
consistency, defending people’s interests, activity, capacity, efficacy) and particular 
attributes like being a nurturing father (open to dialogue, optimistic, supportive) or a 
strict father (strict, realistic, strong). 
I have also presented the main moves employed by candidates to manage their 
presidentiability. They can be summed up as follows:   
 
RJ→ZP: inactive, incapable, indifferent, unrealistic, a liar, confusing priorities, 
distant from laymen, a divider; 
RJ→RJ: an effective manager of economic issues, close to laymen, realistic, 
capable, sincere, a unifier. 
 
ZP→RJ: unsupportive, does not defend people, a pretender, unfair player 
(opportunist, disloyal, divider), liar, authoritarian, pessimist; 
ZP→ZP: supportive, defends people, fair player (selfless, loyal, unifier), sincere, 
open to dialogue, optimistic. 
 
As we can see, these moves concerned the main general and particular attributes of a 
president. 
As for the main discursive-argumentative devices employed, we can see that 
candidates have extensively used the tu quoque or circumstantial argument to 
demonstrate the opponent’s incoherence or inconsistence. They also used the abusive 
argument, for accusing the opponent of lying. A particular case of this is the accusation 
of failing to keep a promise (I.607-610), since it detracts from the other’s credibility, 
especially during an election campaign, when politicians promise many things and try to 
present themselves as credible
149
. In order to increase/decrease credibility we can also 
see the widespread use of argumentum ab auctoritate through references to other 
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 The proposition you failed to keep your promise is very important for decreasing the opponent’s 
presidentiability and this explains its recurrence in the debates, since it is directly linked to 
un/trustworthiness: it should be noted that a promise is a source of potential danger for the image and 
with great costs for speaker; moreover, not keeping one’s own promise is a violation of hearers’ logic 
expectations, since promise is based on the condition of sincerity (see Austin 1962; 1979[1961]; Searle 
1965; 1975; Grice 1975). 
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politicians or organisms such as the EU, UN, Banco de España, etc. (RJ.II.1417; 
ZP.II.309) or the use of reported speech (ZP.II.1465-1467). ZP’s quoting of 
Elorriaga’s statements that unveil PP’s election strategy shows the importance of the 
discursive construction of ethos: candidates are what they say. 
A central role is played by narratives such as “when we X(+), now you Y(–)” (as 
RJ in II.1417-1421 or ZP in II.1404-1408); the lexical choice is also crucial: as when RJ 
tries to get close to laymen by using simple terminology and popular expressions, or 
when, in order to delegitimize his opponent says that he entertained (a verb that denotes 
the lack of the sense of duty) himself with issues nobody cares about. In this sense, 
presumptive meanings triggered by particular verbs like continuar, or by the metaphor 
of encarrilar, etc. are also crucial in de/legitimizing. In the polarized representation of 
the situation deixis is also important in aligning the audience to the speaker or 
dealigning it from the opponent. In the strategic description of actors, quantifiers 
(todo, ningún) and the topic of uniqueness contributed to absolutizing positive or 
negative dispositions. 
The ideological convergence and the hybridation of the discourse produced by 
candidates deserve further observations. Since PP’s overarching strategy is to separate 
ZP from citizens, especially from previous PSOE voters, PP tries to present itself 
asclose to people as possible; and it does so by speaking the language of people and the 
language of the Left. To achieve his electoral ends RJ adjusts his discourse: using 
themes and words of the Left, as the excerpts above have shown (I.343-347; II.327-329; 
II.345-347; II.392-395). RJ’s decision to talk about prices, housing, mortgages, social 
inequality, etc. is strategic in getting closer to laymen. In particular the issue of social 
in/equality and distribution of wealth is historically the domain of the Left, and ZP 
himself referred to them at the beginning of the first debate (I.230); this is the reason 
why RJ’s attempt to appropriate them is so significant.  
These statements apparently in favor of the poor have to be understood in terms 
of the global strategy of presidentiability management, according to which RJ presents 
ZP as someone who failed to address the Spaniards’ problems and especially his former 
electors’ problems. Coherently with Elorriaga’s statements on PP electoral strategy, to 
win over ZP’s voters, PP has to show that ZP betrayed his voters, and that he betrayed 
the Left; in addition RJ must present himself as the new defender of former left wing 
voters, with a discourse that includes lefty words and topics. Yet even though RJ’s 
discourse exemplifies a discursive hybridation, it is nothing but a simple manipulation 
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and not a real ideological convergence. Ideological convergence is rather a movement 
towards the Right, and seldom towards the Left. The widening gap between the rich 
and the poor is a constant trend in contemporary Neoliberal societies, but RJ only 
exploits it for dismantling ZP’s arguments or ZP’s positive self-presentation. He did not 
solve it and will never do so, since given his right wing ideological assumptions he 
could never eliminate social inequality. And evidence of this lies in the debate itself: the 
war of figures between ZP and RJ about rising prices unfortunately reveals how prices 
constantly rose under PP as well as PSOE; the fact that both candidates accuse each 
other of having impoverished Spaniards (I.327-330) and of being demagogues (I.221; 
I.343; but also I.479, I.1563-1564, II.224, II.1276), not only shows the use of the same 
arguments, but leads to conclude that maybe both are demagogues that made the 
Spanish poorer. 
Moreover, the fact of dealing with the economy and SP (public scholarships, 
integration of immigrants, pensions, salaries, public housing, etc.) as two separate 
issues, in two different blocks, demonstrates the undisputed ideological assumptions 
that both candidates share: the way they conceive the economy and social politics as 
two separate issues. Despite their attempts to present themselves as close to people as 
possible, social policies, that mean the wellbeing of citizens, especially of the weakest, 
are considered as separable from the economy (growth). This clearly indicates 
candidates’ priorities: macroeconomic indicators are more important than the Spaniards’ 
wellbeing; indeed the economy, or rather, the condition of some macroeconomic 
indicators, is considered as the main concern, and actually it is the main block after the 
opening statements. This formal organization of the debate reveals the Neoliberal stance 
of both candidates. This is actually the point indicating ideological convergence, as the 
underlying idea that growth, competitiveness, balance, etc. are absolute positive values 
per se: this is the place of agreement
150
 in the argumentative discourse deployed by both 
candidates, since both embrace a Neoliberal ideology. This attempt to present the 
Neoliberal choice as undisputed is also reinforced by the exclusion from the debate of 
Gaspar Llamazares. His exclusion erased and silenced any alternative to the single 
Neoliberal thinking, according to which PP and PSOE only vary in terms of degrees.  
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 On agreement (accord) see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: ch. 1). For a study on agreement in 








8.1. Immigration and Spain 
Intranational and international socio-economic inequalities, together with the 
development of transport and the media, the end of decolonization processes, and the 
trans-nationalization of capital and labor, led to growing movements of population (van 
Dijk 1989: 199-200). The direction of these movements is often from poor(er) countries 
towards rich(er) ones. Immigration has become a crucial issue on the political agenda 
only over the last twenty years, at least in the actual terms the issue is framed (van Dijk 
1992a: 108; 1993b: 186-187), even in those countries, such as the UK or France which 
have a long-standing tradition of immigration.   
As for Spain, which until the end of Francoism was a country of emigration, 
immigration is an even more recent phenomenon. If we observe the chart below
151
, the 
number of immigrants arriving in Spain dramatically increased since the early 1990s, 
peaking in the 2000s. According to these official data, over a twenty-year period, the 
number of immigrants in Spain rose from 400,000 in 1992 to 5.4 million in 2012. In 
2008, the year of the general election, the number of immigrants stood at 4.4 million, 
11% of the population. The chart shows that the immigration rate rose dramatically 
since the 2000s, due to the spectacular economic development of the Spanish economy; 
immigration income began to stabilize around 2010, registering lower rises than in 
previous years. This changing trend coincided with the years immediately following to 
the global economic crisis of 2008, which had a particularly harsh impact on Spain.  
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Figure 1. Evolution in the number of immigrants included on the municipal registers since the early 1990s 
(source: INE) 
 





Figure 2. Origin of immigrants included on the municipal registers in Spain (source: INE 2006) 
 
As Martín-Rojo says (2000a; 2000b), at the beginning of the 21st century, immigration 
was still a recent and relatively small phenomenon for Spain, which explained the 
infrequence of parliamentary debates on this issue
153
. The fact that immigration was not 
an issue on the political agenda is proven by its absolute absence in the two televised 
debates of 1993 between Felipe González (PSOE) and José María Aznar (PP)
154
. 
Further evidence of its irrelevance is that the Permanent Observatory on Immigration, a 
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 Drawn up by the author using the data from the Spanish governmental institutions cited above. I took 
the year 2006, which for the average of the figures, can be considered representative of the real situation. 
153
 Interestingly enough, Martín-Rojo shows that the first shift in the Spanish legislation about 
immigrants, with the definition of the case of the illegal immigrant, occurred in 1985, and that this change 
coincided with an economic crisis. 
154
 I wish to thank Professor José Luis Blas-Arroyo for kindly providing me with his transcriptions of the 
two 1993 presidential debates. 
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government institution, was not set up until 2001. However, the situation changed, and 
during the 2008 election campaign immigration became a core issue.   
The situation of 2008 is characterized by a “traditional” xenophobia, by a more 
recent fear of the other, especially Muslims
155
, and particularly by a harsh crisis, with 
high unemployment rate and reduced access to social services, due to cuts in public 
spending on social policies. In this new scenario, it was obvious that the right wing 
party would exploit immigration as a terrain for managing presidentiability. 
Immigration was actually one of the main themes of PP’s campaign, together with 
the economy, terrorism and the Catalonian question (Elorriaga apud Crawford 2008; 
Ruiz-Jiménez 2010). As Pujol’s report cited in chapter 6 (Pujol 2008) proves, PP was 
the party that devoted the greatest attention to this issue. In a certain sense PP set the 
political agenda on this issue, for evident strategic reasons that will be discussed later. 
The chart below shows the relative importance of the issue in the electoral campaign for 
PP and PSOE. 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison between the PSOE and PP’s most relevant issues during the campaign (Pujol 2008)  
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 Although it increased after the 9/11 and other jihadist attacks as 11M, this fear of Muslims is 
historically entrenched in Europe for historical reasons such as the wars for the control of the 
Mediterranean Sea and in the case of Spain the Reconquista (see Wodak & Forcthner 2014; van Dijk 
2005b: 21 and 22). 
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It is clear that PP dedicated far more time to immigration, because this topic was 
strategically more important to them
156
. This situation is coherent with other research 
into racism in Spanish right wing parties (Martín-Rojo & van Dijk 1997; Rubio-
Carbonero 2011, etc.). Moreover as the chart below shows, PP stepped up its attention 
to immigration between the pre-campaign period and the actual campaign.   
 
 
Figure 3. The most relevant electoral issues: difference between the pre-campaign and campaign periods 
(Pujol 2008) 
 
As Pujol puts it “El tema que mayor crecimiento ha experimentado es el de la 
inmigración, [...] la campaña se ha desplazado por lo tanto hacia la inmigración, uno de 
los temas que más asociados están al PP” (2008: 26). This relevance of immigration for 
PP must be understood in relation with its election strategy, as reported by Gabriel 
Elorriaga, PP’s communication strategist. Since PP cannot mobilize more of its own 
voters, it needs PSOE voters (that Elorriaga considers less disciplined than PP ones) not 
to vote for PSOE, i.e. PP needs a high abstention rate to win, so PP’s message targets 
PSOE voters:  
 
Our whole strategy is centred on wavering Socialist voters […]. We know they will never vote for 
us. But if we can sow enough doubts about the economy, about immigration and nationalist issues, 
then perhaps they will stay at home […]. It will be difficult to increase our vote […], but [PSOE] 
voters are less disciplined than ours […]. That is why we are directing our message at them. We 
are saying, ‘your government has not taken care of your problems’. The election result will depend 
on the impact of that message (apud Crawford 2008). 
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8.2. Immigration in the debates: Strategies, moves, and devices 
The debates do not occur in isolation in the discursive space; instead they are immersed 
in a continuous flow of discourse produced by the political actors and circulating within 
society. In this sense, debates are merely the epitome of electoral discourse. As during 
the entire campaign, immigration is one of the topics that received the most extensive 
treatment during the debates, and both candidates use it to implement their electoral 
strategies and according to their needs. However, a number of differences are visible in 
the treatment of immigration by both candidates: for instance, during the first debate 
within the block of SP, RJ dedicated 62% of his time to talking about immigration, 
compared with 43% in the case of ZP. This indicates the importance of this issue for PP. 
In the second debate both candidates increased the total amount of time dedicated to 
immigration, but even though the difference between the two candidates narrowed 
(from 19% to 15%), RJ still talked more about this issue: 74% of his time, compared 
with 59% in the case of ZP
157
. As will be seen final section, this shift between the first 
and second debate and ZP’s alignment with RJ’s agenda (dedicating to this issue almost 
the same time that RJ dedicated to it in the first debate) interestingly shows the 
dynamics and the interactivity of the debates, and the ideological convergence of the 
discourse produced by both candidates: this last point will be supported by a deeper 
analysis on the representations of immigrants that emerged from the debate. 
RJ’s main strategy, as for other terrains of struggle, is to separate ZP from his 
electors, from laymen. One of the ways he does this is to present ZP as incapable and 
as not having dealt with Spaniards’ interests. This last point is particularly important 
in the block on immigration, since it allows for the representation of ZP as a non-
patriot, the premise being that favoring immigrants is antipatriotic. This discourse 
presupposes that immigrants are not Spaniards; hence they have fewer rights than 
Spaniards. Other moves include constructing the opposition between talks and deeds; 
constructing the image of a bad debater who avoids some topics, which is linked to the 
attribute of sincerity; the presentation of ZP as inactive, as unaware, unserious, lax, 
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 The figures are based on the percentage of words dedicated to immigration out of the total of each 
candidate’s words on the block of SP: in the first debate, out of a total amount of 1399 words, RJ 
dedicated 864 to immigration; ZP instead, out of a total of 1169 words dedicated 507 to immigration; in 
the second debate, out of a total of 1300 words, ZP dedicated 765 to immigration, whilst RJ, out of a total 
of 1535 words, dedicated 1129 to immigration. I have not counted the space RJ dedicated to immigration 
in his OS of both debates; in this case, obviously the total amount of time dedicated to immigration would 
have resulted even higher for RJ and lower for ZP. 
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irresponsible, incapable, inconsistent, incoherent, and liar; as being feeble and isolated 
in Europe. 




 defense of Spaniards’ interests 
 activity, capacity and efficacy 
 strictness vs. laxity 
 strength vs. weakness  
 supportiveness 
 realism vs. unrealism 
 coherence and consistency 
 patriotism 
 
As we have seen in the introduction, ZP dedicates less space to immigration than RJ. 
Indeed, while RJ addresses it from the OS of both debates, ZP postpones it until late in 
the 3
rd
 turn of the SP block; RJ uses this to attack him (I.508-510; I.575-577; II.459-
460; II.488). In order not to disrupt the interaction, in his first turn, ZP makes a brief 
reference to immigration, but only to attack RJ on the number of illegal immigrants 
under PP government (I.472-476). He then uses a metapragmatic statement to postpone 
the issue in order not to overly align himself with RJ’s agenda. Furthermore, he uses 
RJ’s insistence on immigration to accuse him of not having social policies (I.544-546). 
In doing so ZP “responds” to RJ, by dismantling prior accusations of not being aware of 
Spaniards’ needs by explicitly referring to citizens (I.475-476). This move is obviously 
strategic in getting close to people. In addition, ZP’s disalignment continues through 
his widening of the discussion to include other SP issues such as education, 
scholarships, equality, dependency, pensions, housing and the family. Interestingly 
enough, ZP begins to address the issue of immigration just when RJ turns to other SP 
issues, brought up by ZP. Through this strategic de/alignment ZP tries to present 
himself as setting the debate agenda. Nevertheless, in the second debate, maybe at the 
suggestion of his advisors, ZP makes extensive references to immigration, to prevent 
any indication that he is avoiding the issue (see also II.460).  
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The main moves adopted by ZP for self-legitimizing and delegitimizing the opponent 
concerns the general attributes of capability, coherence, selflessness and sincerity, and 
the particular attributes that can be summarized in the frame of the nurturing father 
(dialog, progressiveness, solidarity with the disadvantaged and weak, including the 
elderly, women, the disabled and young people).   
In short, the attributes referred to by ZP in this turn for managing presidentiability 




 progressiveness  
 activity, capacity and efficacy 




 strength and strictness 
 
8.2.1. RJ’s moves for managing presidentiability  
 
8.2.1.1. ZP as incapable 
RJ implements his strategy of separating ZP from people through moves aimed at 
disqualifying the opponent as incapable
158
, inactive, indifferent, and insensitive. To 
achieve this he begins by offering a very negative description of the present situation in 
Spain, with references to economic problems (price, mortgage and unemployment 
rising) and to immigration, framed as a problem between economic uncertainty and a 
lack of safety in cities. 
 
Buenas noches. A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que hace 
cuatro años? Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si se la 
hacemos al señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el mejor de los 
mundos, pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a ustedes, algunos nos 
dirán que hay cosas que están bien, otras regular, y que en los 
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 Think to PP slogan “Con Z de incapaZ” that responds to PSOE slogan “Con Z de Zapatero”. 
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últimos tiempos hay cosas que están mal y otras que están muy mal. 
Y eso se comprende, porque en los últimos tiempos han subido los 
precios, las hipotecas, vuelve el desempleo y hay muchos españoles 
que tienen muchas dificultades para llegar a fin de mes, y tienen 
que apretarse y muy mucho el cinturón. ¿Cómo se puede decir que 
España está muy bien?, ¿en qué otras materias de las 
verdaderamente importantes estamos bien, en Vivienda, en 
Educación? Estamos a la cola de Europa, según dicen los organismos 
internacionales. En Inmigración, toda Europa ha protestado por el 
desorden que provoca este gobierno y nosotros los sufrimos. En 
Seguridad, la inseguridad ciudadana crece de una manera alarmante 
e importamos delincuentes organizados en bandas muy violentas. 
¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4 años 
además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la Alianza de 
Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras cuestiones? Ha hecho 
dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y las dos las ha hecho mal: 
la estructura de España y los tratos con ETA. Ha querido modificar 
por su cuenta el modelo de Estado y ha querido negociar con los 
terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas operaciones le han salido mal. 
[…] Sr. Zapatero, no estará de acuerdo conmigo. Espero que él 
exponga sus razones y no me critique a mí, que es lo que está 
haciendo normalmente. Él es el que estado gobernando en España. 
(I.82-123) 
 
In his narratives, RJ presents the situation as worse than 4 years earlier (i.e. under a 
PP government), the result of ZP’s indifference and incapacity. According to RJ’s 
narrative, ZP has not dealt with the issues that matter, but has instead entertained 
himself with “issues nobody cares about” (I.678; II.385) such as the Alianza de 
Civilizaciones, Memoria Histórica, and Educación para la Ciudadanía, or with two 
issues that ended badly: modifying the structure of the State and negotiating with 
terrorists. RJ does the same in the second debate, where he will show ZP as lacking 
some attributes considered fundamental for a president, namely as the capacity to 
prioritize, efficacy, and sensitivity to people’s problems: 
 
¿Qué ha pasado en los cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de España 
ha equivocado las prioridades […] se ha olvidado lo esencial, que 
es la economía, que son los precios, que es la vida de las 
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personas, que es su forma de sentir, de vivir, son sus 
preocupaciones (II.124-131) 
 
In order to distance ZP from citizens, RJ represents ZP as neglecting what really 
matters. People reasonably want a president capable of addressing and solving their 
problems; presenting ZP as passive, distracted by accessory issues, unable to solve 
problems due to his incapacity, as a liar, saying that things are fine when they 
clearly are not, enables RJ to detract from ZP’s presidentiability.  
Since the disqualification of the opponent is based on emphasizing his 
mistakes, RJ highlights ZP’s agency, presenting him as holding direct responsibility 
for the problems (Él es el que estado gobernando en España, I.123; no lo 
pued[e] remediar quien lo ha causado, I.126; esa es su gestión, I.526; aquí 
hay que poner orden y control que es lo que usted no quiere hacer, 
I.539). Obviously, in this move to draw attention to ZP’s incapacity, deixis plays a 
crucial role in personalizing attacks. 
Since RJ has to convince wavering supposedly middle or working class PSOE 
voters, he constructs a discourse by appealing to laymen: for this reason he refers to 
their specific problems, such as prices, mortgage, unemployment, etc. (Edelman 1988; 
1971)
159
, and uses a popular expression as apretarse el cinturón [tighten the belt]. 
In order to align with the viewers at home, RJ also uses an inclusive personal deixis as 
nosotros en nosotros lo sufrimos, situating himself alongside lay Spaniards, who 
are supposedly suffering due to uncontrolled immigration. RJ tries to get the audience’s 
favor and dealign ZP from the audience as he did with the construction of his self-image 
as a currante [worker]. 
The description of ZP as incapable recurs in many points of both debates. In the 
following excerpt which presents ZP as incapable, RJ constructs his arguments by 
stating that immigrants affect the feasibility of Spain’s social policies, and it is therefore 
necessary to order and control immigration. He provides a number for the immigrants 
that entered in Spain under ZP’s government to prove that Spain is under an avalanche 
of immigrants:  
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[…] Es evidente que esto no está controlado, es evidente que esto 
es una avalancha. Usted no ha hecho nada más que complicar las 
cosas, provocando hace tres años un efecto llamada que se oyó en 
todo el mundo. Y en lo demás, pues, se limita a decir lo bien que 
va todo y a ignorar la realidad. Y, además, cuando alguien hace 
propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y las tilda de 
ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he propuesto 
prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he propuesto el 
contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad de derechos, 
oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones. He propuesto que se expulse 
a los extranjeros que cometan delitos, y para usted eso no tiene 
ninguna importancia […]. ¿Mantiene usted que no pasa nada, que es 
lo que le ocurre a usted habitualmente y que no hay nada más que 
hacer en esta materia, salvo seguir como estamos? (I.457-471) 
 
RJ presents ZP as passive or as taking decisions that make the situation worse (I.457-
461). By referring to the metaphor of the avalancha, which suggests that Spaniards are 
facing an enormous risk, and presenting ZP as unaware, inactive and a liar (he lies 
about the reality by saying that everything is alright), RJ reduces the opponent’s 
presidentiability, exploiting the assumption that a good president should save the 
citizens from the risks they face and should not lie. By describing ZP as being unaware, 
ignoring reality and lying about it, RJ presents ZP as irrational, distancing him from 
real people. 
In order to portray ZP as incapable or as inactive, RJ emphasizes his opponent’s 
mistakes. In the following excerpt, for example, RJ says that despite ZP’s efforts, the 
results of his action are pitiful: 
 
Su política de inmigración: usted puede decir lo que quiere, pero 
le he dado unos datos que son demoledores. Es que hay más del 
doble de personas con permiso de residencia desde 2004 hasta hoy. 
Es que esto ha sido un auténtico coladero. Es que a usted lo han 
puesto de vuelta y media en la UE y luego me critica a mí por unas 
regularizaciones que hice pactadas con la UE. Dice usted que ha 
hecho un gran esfuerzo. Ha hecho un gran esfuerzo, pero el 




To delegitimize him, RJ also often uses the ab auctoritate argument, as in other points 
of the debate, referring to the EU’s criticisms of ZP’s policies or even reporting the 
speeches of some EU ministers criticizing ZP’s immigration policies, in order to prove 
that ZP’s incapability is also recognized by the EU. 
RJ also represents ZP as inactive. Given the premise that a president should do 
things to improve citizens’ conditions, ZP’s inactivity towards something that worsens 
Spaniards’ conditions, like immigration, indicates that ZP makes the Spanish people’s 
situation worse. There are numerous references to ZP’s inactivity (I.671-674; I.941-945; 
II.453-454; II.470-471; II.517-524; II.641-643), as shown by the following excerpts: 
 
¿y sabe por qué pasa esto? Pues porque no hay control, señor 
Rodríguez Zapatero entonces aquí hay que poner orden y control que 
es lo que usted no quiere hacer (I.536-539) 
 
Hay que luchar contra la inmigración ilegal y hay que trabajar por 
la integración, que es exactamente lo que usted no ha hecho a lo 
largo de estos años (II.611-614) 
 
ZP’s inactivity is constructed in the reference to people interests (II.523: le ha 
generado muchísimos problemas a los españoles), to that ZP does not act on 
behalf of the people. 
 
8.2.1.2. RJ as capable 
Parallel to the moves aimed at disqualifying the opponent, RJ also makes moves aimed 
at self-legitimation. These moves are often implicit, since, as Pereleman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca say, self-praise can be counterproductive. After disqualifying ZP for the lack of 
some attributes, RJ, without explicitly referring to himself, talks about what is needed 
for the future of Spain: 
 
Creo que se necesita un Gobierno que dé certidumbre, un Gobierno 
que dé seguridad, que se ocupe de los problemas reales de los 
españoles, que busque acuerdos, que sea un Gobierno para todos y 
que no divida a los españoles.  
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This final part of the statement refers to such attributes as security and defense of 
Spaniards’ interests. Obviously RJ lets the audience infer that he has these attributes, 
while the person who has run the government so far lacks them. It should be noted that 
this self-legitimation works thanks to the performativity of language and the discursive 
construction of ethos: for the mere fact of saying what he says, RJ constructs a self-
image as defender of citizens’ interest. 
RJ also openly self-legitimizes through a polarized description where he presents 
himself as serious and committed with order and control, and the opponent as only 
speaking without acting: 
 
Este es un asunto que hay que tomárselo en serio y yo desde luego 
me lo voy a tomar en serio, porque esto requiere orden y requiere 
control y no palabras, que es lo que usted hace (II.530-533). 
 
As in other points of the debates the opposition between words and deeds is crucial in 
presenting the opponent as incoherent, inconsistent, and insincere or even as a 
manipulator (cf. an open reference to propaganda, a word that occurs 3 times in the 
second debate). Together with the delegitimation of the opponent, RJ legitimizes 
himself through an argumentation based on the explicit premise that immigration is an 
issue that ought to be taken seriously and on the promise that he will take it seriously. 
 
8.2.1.3. Distancing ZP from citizens: ZP as indifferent, insensitive, unaware 
One of the main moves employed by RJ to implement the strategy of distancing ZP 
from the people is to represent him as indifferent and insensitive to his electors’ needs, 
as the two excerpts below show: 
 
En junio de 2004 había en España 1.776.000 personas con permiso de 
residencia. En diciembre de 2007 hay tres millones 900, es decir, 
mucho más del doble, ésa es su gestión. Esto para usted no plantea 
ningún problema pero hay gente a la cual sí que se lo plantea los 
que quieren una plaza escolar, los que quieren becas comedor, los 
que van a la sanidad, los que buscan el acceso a la vivienda 
pública y hay que trabajar para que los derechos de uno porque 
todos tienen derecho evidentemente no perjudiquen a los otros. Eso 
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a usted no le importa pero a mucha gente sí (I.520-532; see also II.458-
469) 
 
In order to distance ZP from the people RJ presents ZP as indifferent in the face of the 
huge number of (legalized) immigrants in Spain, supposedly sapping the resources of 
the social services. This move of presenting ZP as being unconcerned about 
Spaniards’ problems, constructs the image of ZP as a non-patriot and of RJ as a 
patriot because of his defense of Spaniards’ interests. This move is obviously aimed 
at aligning with the audience and dealigning ZP from them. In doing so RJ uses 
hipotiposis, i.e. realistic exempla of actual problems of real persons lacking access to 
public services such as kindergartens, hospital beds, etc. This device gains RJ laymen’s 
consensus and distance ZP from them, causing him to lose people’s favor. 
Another move carried out by RJ in order to discredit his opponent is to say that 
ZP is not aware of the problem: 
 
usted no es consciente de los grandes problemas que le está 
generando a muchos ciudadanos españoles (II.528-530) 
 
Through this move, RJ demonizes his opponent as unpresidentiable, the agreed 
premise being that being aware of and solving citizens’ problems is one of the main 
attributes of a president. 
 
8.2.1.4. ZP far removed from reality 
Another move carried out by RJ to discursively distance ZP from people and 
connected with the previous one, is to present him as removed from reality. This move 
is implemented by two related descriptions of the opponent: a) ZP as describing a 
reality that does not exist; and b) ZP as denying reality or in a different reality. The first 
move is introduced at the start of the OS in the first debate: 
 
A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que hace cuatro años? 
Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si se la hacemos al 
señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el mejor de los mundos, 
pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a ustedes (I.82-86)  
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Presenting ZP’s perception of reality as different from that of people dealigns ZP from 
audience, and aligns RJ with them. RJ hints that ZP is a liar, saying that situation is 
good, when it is bad (¿cómo se puede decir que España está muy bien? […] as 
in I.92) or at least a fool or naive. This has very important consequences for the 
construction of presidentiability, since there is obviously agreement on the fact that only 
a realistic person should be in charge of a country’s government. Representing ZP as 
saying the contrary of the reality, thereby portraying him as a liar or a manipulator is 
crucial, as, due to the discursive construction of ethos, describing the opponent as 
insincere detracts considerably from his presidentiability. The following excerpt clearly 
shows the construction of the difference between what ZP says and reality: with a 
metapragmatic utterance RJ represents ZP as taking a stance on immigration 
(“immigration is under control”160) and denies it; he aligns with the audience thanks to 
the inclusive deixis nos dice, disaligning from ZP through an opposite description of 
the situation (immigration is not under control): 
 
El señor Zapatero también nos dice que la inmigración está 
controlada. Yo no estoy de acuerdo. La inmigración no está 
controlada y hay que poner orden y control (II.96-99) 
 
The second description used by RJ represents ZP as ignoring or negating reality. This 
device appears at many points in the debates: 
 
Usted […] se limita a decir lo bien que va todo y a ignorar la 
realidad (I.457-461; see also I.469) 
 
no se puede negar la realidad porque quien niega la realidad, como 
hace el señor Zapatero, pues es imposible que pueda afrontarla 
(II.94-96; see also II.118-119) 
 
no está usted en la realidad (II.1335; see also II.1456) 
 
By presenting ZP as denying reality RJ not only decreases his presidentiability in 
relation to the attributes of realism (a president should be realistic), but in particular 
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 Actually ZP never stated it in the debate. 
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demonizes the opponent as mad (denying reality is a typical feature of madness) with 




8.2.1.5. Strength and strictness vs. weakness and laxity 
Presidentiability management not only occurs in relation to a number of generally 
agreed attributes, but also to certain particular attributes. One such attribute is that of 
strength and strictness, which can be subsumed under the label of the frame of the strict 
father. This frame is accepted by PP electors, but not by PSOE ones. Within this frame 
and according to the set of attributes associated with strict leaders, RJ increases his own 
presidentiability by presenting himself as a tough leader that controls and orders, whilst 
at the same time detracting from ZP’s by portraying him as messy, weak and 
unserious. In the negative representation of the opponent, RJ highlights ZP’s agency 
with personalization at a level of deixis and at a lexical level with the verb querer: 
 
aquí hay que poner orden y control que es lo que usted no quiere 
hacer (I.538) 
 
Insisting on ZP’s agency, RJ increases ZP’s responsibility in a negative issue, thereby 
detracting from ZP’s presidentiability. 
On the other hand, RJ tries to increase his presidentiability by presenting himself 
as a strict leader (strong, exerting authority, being severe)
162
. RJ’s self-presentation as a 
strict father is based on references to seriousness and the use of the expression order 
and control. Opposing disordered immigration to order and control instills fear in the 
audience and also allows RJ to act as a strict father, traditional in right wing Rhetoric. 
The opposition between disorder/control and strictness/laxity is evident in the following 
passage: 
 
Este es un asunto que hay que tomárselo en serio y yo desde luego 
me lo voy a tomar en serio, porque esto requiere orden y requiere 
control y no palabras, que es lo que usted hace (II.530-533)  
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 On its website PP also demonized ZP by presenting him as mad: cf. the expression “va como un 
poseso”. 
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The de/legitimation is implemented in sentences that contrast the deontic modality of 
what ought to be done, with what ZP does or has done (I.450; I.538; II.99; II.103). They 
delegitimize the opponent, working as premise to show what the opponent did not do 
and legitimize the speaker, who performatively, merely by stating them, presents 
himself as legitimated for stating what has to be done (discursive ethos), and lets 
audience infer that once elected he will do it. 
De/legitimation can be explicit or implicit. In the excerpt above, it is explicit, 
unlike in the following example, where it is implicit. Without explicitly referring to 
himself, RJ presents himself as the solution to Spaniards’ problems: 
 
Creo que se necesita un Gobierno que dé certidumbre, un Gobierno 
que dé seguridad, que se ocupe de los problemas reales de los 
españoles (II.131-133) 
 
Merely by talking about the ability to offer certainty and security and due to the 
polarized situation of electioneering, RJ lets the audience infer that the current President 
lacks these attributes, whilst he has them (performativity of language).  
Yet at other stages of the debate RJ makes explicit references to ZP’s weakness 
and lack of firmness: 
 
su política de inmigración ha sido débil, sin firmeza (II.684-686) 
 
Presenting the opponent as feeble naturally reduces his presidentiability, since there is 
an agreement on the fact that president should be strong. 
 
8.2.1.6. Sincerity and coherence: words and deeds 
As at many other points of the debate, reference to attributes such as sincerity and 
coherence are crucial in de/constructing presidentiability. An effective way of referring 
to such attributes used by RJ in this block is to create an opposition between words and 
deeds. See the following excerpt: 
 
Su política de inmigración: usted puede decir lo que quiere, pero 
le he dado unos datos que son demoledores. Es que hay más del 
doble de personas con permiso de residencia desde 2004 hasta hoy. 
Es que esto ha sido un auténtico coladero. […] Usted en esta 
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política, como en la económica, se ha limitado a no hacer nada, a 
decir: “Oiga, esto va muy bien. Qué listos somos, qué bien hacemos 
las cosas” (I.663-675) 
 
By this move RJ also highlights ZP’s incapacity and inactivity: he talks but does not act 
(cf. II.531-533). However, it is mostly used to present the opponent as incoherent, 
inconsistent, and insincere or even as a manipulator (as occurs later on through the 
reference to propaganda). Consider the following example: 
 
Vamos a ver eh… Señor… Zapatero. Lo que usted dice no tiene 
absolutamente nada que ver con lo que ha hecho a lo largo de estos 
años. Claro me dice que la inmigración tiene que ser una política 
europea y yo recuerdo a los ministros del Interior de Francia, del 
Reino Unido, de Italia, de Alemania y de Polonia, poniendo de 
vuelta y media, y perdón que utilice esta expresión, al Gobierno 
de España por su actuación en esta materia (II.599-606) 
 
RJ’s metapragmatic utterance (Lo que usted dice […]) rejects ZP’s discourse, the 
stance ZP took on immigration in the previous turn and his positive self-presentation. In 
order to discredit him, RJ presents ZP as incoherent, as someone who does the 
opposite of what says. As we know, one of the principal devices for representing the 
opponent as incoherent is to quote his speech and contrast it with other speeches or his 
actions. The previous excerpt show RJ’s move to present ZP as incoherent. The 
following is a further example: 
 
pero mire [ZP: está aquí], escúcheme, escúcheme, sí ya sé que está 
ahí, escúcheme... "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está 
pasando ya en muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de 
integración de los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan 
derechos sociales porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel de 
renta más bajo, que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas 
sociales". Esto lo dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces menos 
grave, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero en el Congreso de los Diputados 
en un debate del Estado de la Nación, por eso nos han llamado a 
nosotros xenófobos y otras lindezas. Si es que usted cambia de 
criterio cada cuarto de hora [ZP: No, no, no, no, yo estoy de 
acuerdo con eso, lo que no estoy de acuerdo es exigir un contrato 
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para que sean presuntos delincuentes los inmigrantes, eso es lo 
que no estoy de acuerdo] [OV: ahora tendrá su turno] dice una cosa 
y la contraria, no tiene ninguna propuesta. En materia de 
integración de inmigrantes, ninguna propuesta. Que la Comunidad de 
Madrid dedica el 2,5 por ciento, y la comunidad el 97,5, son los 
datos, y en Valencia igual. Yo también tengo datos, y también son 
ciertos (II.627-645) 
 
RJ reports some ZP’s previous declarations (Cortes Generales 2002), where ZP 
deplored that some Spaniards had lost access to certain social services due to the 
immigrant integration policies implemented by the Government of José María Aznar. 
RJ twists these declarations in order to present ZP as a xenophobe who criticizes 
immigrants
163
. RJ uses circumstantial argument to hint that ZP used the same arguments 
against PP that RJ is now using against PSOE, but when the problem was 4 times less 
serious. This move has three aims: a) to discredit the opponent as incoherent and 
opportunistic; b) to demonize him as psychologically instable through an abusive 
argument: usted cambia de criterio cada cuarto de hora; dice una cosa y 
la contraria; and c) to reverse previous accusations of xenophobia received by PSOE 
and suggest that PSOE is also xenophobic through a tu quoque argument or PSOE is 
lying in accusing PP of xenophobia. In both cases ZP is negatively represented. There is 
actually agreement on the need for coherence and stability, as well as the fact that a 
president should not be xenophobic. This point shows at once the interdiscursivity and 
dialogicity of stance taking and the construction of presidentiability, but in more general 
terms it is linked with the dominant discourse circulating on immigration and the hiding 
of (open) racism. I will return to this issue at a later stage. 
 
8.2.1.7. Re-Constructing supportiveness and defending Spaniards’ interests 
Since ZP tries to increase his presidentiability by constructing a self-image of a 
supportive candidate and decrease RJ’s presidentiability by presenting him as 
uninterested in social politics (II.486-489: Ya veo que usted no tiene política 
social, ni de educación, ni de pensiones, ni de familia, ni 
dependencia…), or even as responsible for cutting or obstructing public spending on 
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 In a certain sense ZP, at the time in opposition, was doing what RJ is doing: criticizing the government 
to show that it does not care about citizens’ problems. The difference is that, according to his ideological 
background, ZP asks Aznar for more public spending “Eso no se puede consentir por su falta de política 
social” (Cortes Generales 2002: 8981). 
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welfare (II.431-433), RJ needs to balance this negative representation. He does so by 
accusing ZP of lying about public spending cuts and contesting figures on state funding 
for the Ley de Dependencia, compared to what regions spend on it claiming that the 
autonomous regions spend more than State (I.510-520). With these statements, RJ 
reconstructs his own image as a supportive leader, rejecting ZP’s accusations and 
instead accusing him of being a liar (ha dicho dos mentiras; mentido usted); 
then providing figures on how much Madrid region spends on Dependencia: choosing 
Madrid, traditionally run by PP, is a means of indirect self-legitimation. RJ tries in this 
way to contrast the monopoly on social politics discursively constructed by ZP. In order 
to respond to ZP’s accusations and reconstruct his own legitimacy, RJ firstly states that 
he supports Ley de Dependencia; then in order to discredit the opponent decrying the 
importance of his achievements, states that regions assume the spending of the law and 
that Madrid (ruled by PP) spends more than other regions ruled by PSOE.  
 
Usted habla de la dependencia […]. Yo voté a favor de la ley de 
dependencia y estoy a favor de la ley de dependencia. [ZP: pues 
diga a sus comunidades que no la boicoteen] ¿Pero cómo la vamos a 
boicotear? [ZP: mire Andalucía, mire Asturias] Si son las 
Comunidades Autónomas las que se están gastando el dinero en 
dependencia. ¿Sabe usted cuántos centros hay de dependencia y 
cuántas personas se atienden en Madrid? 45.000. En Cataluña 38.000 
y en Andalucía 17.500. ¿Qué se están gastando? [ZP: Pues dígales 
que no la boicoteen] Ustedes hablan mucho, no se gastan nada y no 
tienen ninguna política social sobre ningún asunto. Lo suyo es 
puramente propaganda. Yo desde luego voy a dotar la ley de 
dependencia, creo que es capital, de los más importantes, es 
fundamental para que la gente pueda también conciliar la vida 
laboral y familiar, para que se dé un gran salto en el empleo y 
para que logremos que puedan trabajar, como le he dicho antes, 
tantas mujeres fuera de casa como hombres en España. Ese es uno de 
los objetivos que tengo más importantes a lo largo de los próximos 
4 años (II.533-553)  
 
This move also is based on the opposition words vs. deeds: PSOE talks but fails to act, 
turning its words into mere propaganda. This representation, together with the use of 
absolutizing quantifiers as nada, ningún, ninguna allows RJ to present PSOE as 
absolutely unreliable, and to delegitimize PSOE’s discourse as manipulation. In terms 
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of re-constructing supportiveness, particular note should be taken of the reference to 
gender equality at the end of the turn. 
Two more moves deserve some brief comments: the representation of ZP as a bad 
debater, linked to the attributes of sincerity and ability and the presentation of ZP as 
being isolated in Europe. 
 
8.2.1.8. Good debater bad debater: RJ as the Spaniards’ spokesperson 
One important move carried out by RJ to manage presidentiability is to accuse ZP of 
avoiding the issue of immigration for his own interests with a meta-stance utterance that 
works as a circumstantial argument: 
 
Bien, ya veo que usted no tiene el más mínimo interés en hablar de 
inmigración pero yo sí. Y los españoles también y por lo tanto yo 
voy a hablar de inmigración (I.508-510) 
 
RJ uses this move in response to ZP’s previous speech to dealign himself from ZP’s 
topics and hint that ZP wishes to conceal his own failures. This is agreed as unfair and 
reduces presidentiability in relation to the attributes of sincerity. Moreover he presents 
ZP as a bad debater, and being a bad debater implies being a bad president (Kerbrat-
Orecchioni 2013e; Agha 1997). In contrast, by presenting himself as the candidate who 
talks about what matters to Spaniards, RJ increases his own presidentiability, presenting 
himself as the Spaniards’ spokesperson, related to the construction of an image as a 
defender of Spaniards. This opposition between the candidate that does not talk about 
what matters to Spaniards (ZP) and the candidate that does (RJ), is implemented 
through a polarized deixis (yo vs. usted). RJ will insist on this move also in his next 
turn, which again opens with a meta-stance narrative according to which ZP avoids 
talking about immigration: 
 
Bien, es evidente que el señor Zapatero no quiere hablar de 
inmigración después de las críticas que ha producido su política 
[ZP: no hablaré cuando… cuando yo crea conveniente, Sr Rajoy]. Uno 




Bien, a usted esto le puede parecer bien o le puede parecer mal, 
ya sé que no le parece ningún problema y por eso no quiere hablar 
de este asunto (II.459-460; see also II.488) 
 
This discursively constructed difference regarding the treatment of topics not only 
increases dealignment, and therefore differentiation from the opponent, in terms of 
interaction, but also in relation to image, since, due to the performativity of discourse 
and the discursive nature of the construction of ethos, speakers are what they say. By 
this move, RJ represents ZP as unpresidentiable in that he is a bad debater and an 
opportunist. There are many reasons why RJ uses this move. Immigration is one of the 
main topics used by right wing parties in Western societies. It is an easy symbol, linked 
to another myth of political discourse such as the idea of nation, and is an easy way of 
winning votes from discontented electors. Yet it constitutes an ideological dilemma for 
Left, and ZP’s strategy of avoiding the issue somehow shows this. RJ then takes 
advantage of this ideological dilemma. I will return to this issue later on.  
Moreover, this opposition between the candidate that talks about what matters to 
people, such as immigration (regardless of whether he has actually set the agenda 
himself in order to bring this topic to the fore) and the one that avoids the issue, allows 
RJ to distance ZP from electors by depicting him as being out of touch with people’s 
interests, in line with PP’s overarching strategy. Equally, it allows RJ to present 
himself as sincerely interested in laymen’s problems and as a defender of people 
from immigrants for the mere fact of performatively talking about it. 
 
8.2.1.9. The EU as authority: ZP as being isolated in Europe 
Given the freedom of mobility within the EU and interconnection between member 
states, immigration is a European issue. Moreover the supranational organism works as 
a justification of policies and as legitimating authority in judging Prime Ministers of 
member countries. RJ repeatedly refers to EU for two ends: 1) to increase his own 
presidentiability through narratives according to which EU agreed with his policies in 
immigration (when he was Ministry of the Interior); and 2) to detract from ZP’s 
presidentiability through narratives according to which the EU criticized ZP’s policies. 
RJ applies this move on many occasions in both debates:  
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Es que hay más del doble de personas con permiso de residencia 
desde 2004 hasta hoy. Es que esto ha sido un auténtico coladero. 
Es que a usted lo han puesto de vuelta y media en la UE y luego me 
critica a mí por unas regularizaciones que hice pactadas con la UE 
(I.664-669; see also II.520-524; II.602-606) 
 
Pero fíjese usted cómo lo juzgaron a usted en Europa. Ministro de 
Interior francés: la regularización española crea un efecto 
llamada y provoca nuevas llegadas. Ministro el alemán, otro sí, 
socialista: "La regularización en España afecta a otros Estados, 
porque los inmigrantes regularizados podrán desplazarse 
libremente". El alemán fue muy rotundo: "Pedir dinero a otra 
persona, porque usted fue a pedirlo a Europa, es siempre la manera 
más fácil de resolver el problema". Y fíjese lo que dijo la de 
inmigración de Holanda: "España es en parte el responsable del 
problema por haber legalizado a los inmigrantes. Las mafias vieron 
en ello una señal positiva" (II.672-683) 
 
RJ personalizes his attacks in order to ZP as being isolated in Europe. The attacks are 
based on the ab auctoritate argument and at some points RJ even reports speeches from 
ministers of several EU countries that have criticized ZP’s immigration politics. RJ tries 
to demonize ZP by presenting him as being isolated in Europe and as begging the EU 
for money. This abusive argument is important in terms of interdiscursivity in that it 
recalls the famous incident during the 1993 debates, when Aznar calling González a 
“pedigüeño [beggar]” in reference to the negotiations on the EU funds during the 




8.2.2. ZP’s moves to manage presidentiability 
 
8.2.2.1. Supportiveness 
While RJ refers to immigration right at the start of the debates, in order to attack ZP for 
his incapacity and distance him from the people, ZP does not apply this tactic. Instead, 
and in an attempt to legitimize himself right from the onset, ZP presents narratives that 
highlight his achievements (capacity) and minimize his mistakes, by blaming the 
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opponent’s unfairness and implements PSOE’s global strategy for managing 
presidentiability: the opposition between good (us) and evil (them) in relation with 
abstract values such as fairness and supportiveness. This is a particular attribute 
(nurturingness) but there is a growing general consensus (accord) on the fact that 
defense of the weak is one of the main attributes of a president. Consequently, right 
from the initial phases of both debates, ZP increases his presidentiability by presenting 
himself as belonging to a supportive party committed to helping the weak (I.145-
159; II.44-78), taking care of young people, women, the elderly and the disabled, 
promoting social dialogue, promoting public healthcare and public education, as a 
sincere, loyal and responsible democratic and dialoguing leader, associating himself 
with positive attributes such as solidarity, dialogue, ecology, etc. Interestingly, in the 
OS of the second debate, ZP also refers to unity and patriotism, praising the virtues of 
Spain as a world power (una gran potencia como es España). Through this 
reference to nation, ZP realigns himself with the audience and redresses RJ’s attempts 
to monopolize the defense of the idea of nation and professions of patriotism. 
Patriotism is particularly salient in the issue of immigration, since it has to do with 
(national) identity and otherness: we are Spaniards; they are not.  
This description of the leader is coherent with Lakoff’s theory (2003; 2004; see 
also Bassets 2008) that liberals represent the model of the nurturing father, in contrast 
to the conservatives’ ideal of the strict father. It is also coherent with Edelman’s 
critical ideas (1964; 1988) that the political spectacle is crucial in order to reassure 
electors –either from a frame of nurturing or strictness - and protect them from threats 
(often created artificially by the politicians themselves for the purpose of the electoral 
game). 
This move is more evident in the SP blocks, where ZP clearly represents PSOE as 
caring for all citizens, especially the weakest ones and PP as uncaring or 
obstructing social policies or cutting public spending. This move is essential in 
increasing his own presidentiability as there is a general consensus that a (good) 
president should take care of citizens, and there is a particular agreement on the fact that 
a left wing president should take care of the weakest ones. Nevertheless, this move is 
also a response to RJ’s previous accusations (early in the debate or in the campaign) of 
not caring about citizens. 
The following excerpt is of particular interest in this sense:  
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Señor Rajoy, usted como ministro de Educación redujo las becas. 
Hoy hay 250.000 estudiantes que disponen de becas después de la 
política de este gobierno. Hay que comparar los hechos y la 
demagogia, con las palabras que ustedes pronuncian. Política de 
igualdad. Hemos hecho una ley de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres, 
sin su apoyo. […] Hemos aprobado la Ley de la Dependencia, ustedes 
no hicieron nada por apoyar a las personas que no se pueden valer 
por sí mismas y ahora tenemos como un derecho el apoyo a más de un 
millón de dependientes que va a ser un cambio histórico en nuestro 
modelo social. Hemos subido un 30% las pensiones mínimas más en 
cuatro años que ustedes en ocho cuando la economía según ustedes 
iba muy bien y hemos subido el salario mínimo al 30%, eso es 
política social. Hemos apoyado a los jóvenes para la vivienda en 
alquiler con una renta de emancipación [RJ: Sí eheheh…] que va a 
ayudar a 350.000 jóvenes, ustedes ni un euro para los jóvenes en 
alquiler, hemos establecido una prestación de 2.500 euros por 
nacimiento y ustedes que tanto hablan de la familia no hicieron 
ninguna prestación, ningún apoyo por nacimiento a las familias en 
este país (I.476-501; see also I.620-623) 
 
ZP’s employs polarized narratives (nosotros vs. ustedes), generally based on group 
deixis; but in some points ZP also directly attacks RJ through the use of personalization 
as in the first line (usted como Ministro de Educación redujo las becas). 
Another key point in dealigning from the opponent in interactive terms 
(un/following the agenda) and in terms of representation is presenting the self as being 
concerned with all social policies, not just immigration:   
 
Señor Rajoy no tiene ninguna política social corresponde a la 
trayectoria del gobierno del Partido Popular, ni ninguna 
propuesta, solo habla de inmigración, luego me referiré a ella 
(I.544-546) 
 
Ya veo que usted no tiene política social, [RJ: sí, sí… el que no 
quiere hablar es usted de inmigración] ni de educación, ni de 
pensiones, ni de familia, ni dependencia… (II.486-489) 
 
To contest RJ’s appropriation of defense of citizens and recover the connection with 
laymen (those presumably most interested in public spending for social policies, 
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traditionally lefty electors), ZP firstly disenables RJ’s attacks, accusing him of having 
implemented no social policies and of having no proposals at all (ninguna), suggesting 
through the use of circumstantial argument that RJ’s interest in talking about 
immigration is opportunistic due to this lack of proposals. 
As for the decrease in presidentiability, two more points are worthy of note here: 
the use of absolutizing quantifiers (ninguna) to consolidate an image of PP as not being 
concerned with laymen’s needs; and ZP’s metapragmatic statement (luego me 
referiré a ella) aimed at denying RJ’s previous accusations of avoiding the issue of 
immigration, defending his own face from RJ’s threatening and presenting himself as 
managing the agenda of the debate
165
. 
At many stages throughout the debate ZP insists on representing PSOE as the 
party of supportiveness and PP as that of unsupportiveness (II.410-413). See the 
following excerpt:  
 
Los ciudadanos saben que nosotros impulsamos las políticas 
sociales y que con Ustedes se frenan. Su Gobierno no dedicó ni un 
euro a la dependencia y además, ahora obstaculizan la aplicación 
de la Ley (II.430-433) 
 
Discrediting the opponent through the use of polarized description, where we 
increase public spending (impulsamos las políticas sociales) and you not (con 
Ustedes se frenan), is based on the particular agreement that increasing public 
spending for social policies is positive. Two further points should be noted: the ad 
populum variant of argumentum ad verencundiam (Los ciudadanos saben), aimed at 
increasing alignment with the audience; and absolutizing quantifiers such as ni un 
euro [not even a euro] in order to draw maximum attention to the opponent’s 
mistakes. However, the same move is also visible at many other stages of the debate. 
(II.483-493). ZP modulates the deixis and although he mainly tends to flatten the 
agency of the two candidates within a group (nosotros vs. ustedes), he also 
personalizes his attacks against RJ, in order to portray him as the agent of social cuts 
(villain)
166
.   
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 Cf. for instance, ZP’s statement during RJ’s next turn, responding to the same accusation: no, 
hablaré cuando… cuando yo crea conveniente, Sr Rajoy (I.577-578). 
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 It should be noted that in an increasingly personalized political field, flattening RJ within the PP group 
instead of making his figure standing out also is a form of detracting from the opponent’s image. 
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Obviously ZP’s efforts to monopolize the terrain of social policies will be contested by 
RJ, who attempts to recover legitimacy on public policies:  
 
diera la sensación de que las políticas sociales en España 
empezaron con el señor Zapatero; antes no había educación pública, 
ni sanidad pública, ni había dependencia (II.437-439). 
 
8.2.2.2. Capability and Coherence 
One of the main moves carried out by ZP to dismantle RJ’s facework and his attempts 
to present himself as the patriot that defends order and control is to attack him on the 
number of illegal immigrants that entered in Spain under the PP’s government and the 
legalization processes. Numerous examples of this can be found in both debates (I.623-
634; I.637-653; I.681-684; II.565-588). The following excerpt is particularly 
representative: 
 
Pero mire, antes de que hable usted de inmigración necesita 
credibilidad. Credibilidad. Esta declaración es suya: "Los 
inmigrantes vinieron a España cuando gobernaba el PP". Y es 
verdad: con su gobierno, con usted de ministro del interior se 
colaron más de un millón de inmigrantes sin papeles. Hicieron 5 
regularizaciones. Nuestra única regularización se hizo a 
trabajadores con contrato de trabajo en vigor, sin antecedentes 
penales y se hizo con el acuerdo de empresarios y sindicatos. 
Ustedes dieron papeles sin exigir contrato de trabajo, sin 
examinar los antecedentes penales de los países de origen en 
algunas regularizaciones. Bastaba presentar un bono para el 
autobús, un recibo de un televisor o la factura de una sola noche 
de hotel. No sé si fue por su conocida afición al ciclismo, Sr. 
Rajoy, pero se regularizaron inmigrantes con el recibo de compra 
de una rueda de bicicleta. Y me habla usted de rigor, de orden… y 
de seriedad… está aquí (II.649-665) 
 
ZP employs polarized narratives, where PSOE (nosotros) legalized (illegal) 
immigrants under strict conditions, and PP (ustedes) did not. This move is based on 
the assumption that controlling illegal immigrants and repatriating them is positive. The 





These narrative of past can be used to discredit the opponent dismantling with a tu 
quoque argument the image that RJ offers of himself and of PP as engaged with ordered 
and legal immigration (you are not as ordered as you say). ZP attacks PP as group but 
he also personalizes attacks against RJ –at that time Minister of the Interior – 
suggesting that he was responsible for the failure of PP border control policies 
(I.624; I.650-652). By insisting on his agency, ZP can decrease RJ’s presidentiability in 
relation to the attributes of capability by emphasizing his mistakes. Yet ZP also 
decreases RJ’s presidentiability in relation to two main attributes: sincerity (RJ 
pretends to be ordered but he is not), and coherence (RJ is incoherent). Likewise, 
he increases his own presidentiability in reference to capacity, in relation to the efficacy 
of his policies and his strictness towards illegal immigrants. Showing PP’s incoherence 
as not as ordered as it seems, detracts from RJ’s right to criticize ZP for his laxity, 
precisely because of his own failings in this sense (tu quoque). ZP’s narratives on strict 
immigration policies and repatriations also allow for the self-legitimation of ZP as being 
ordered and strict (PSOE combats illegal immigration) within the frame of the strict 
father. 
In order to occupy the ideological terrain contended with and so far monopolized 
by RJ, ZP tries to recover the image of a strong leader, describing the PSOE 
government as concerned with firmly and tenaciously fighting illegal immigration 
(I.637; II.569). This move, which completes the description of RJ as being not as strict 
as he pretends to be, answers RJ’s accusation of lack of order and control, building a 
positive image of PSOE as committed to legality. The obvious premise is the 
agreement on legality as a value, as well as on the existence of the distinction between 
legal and illegal immigrants. Through this move ZP detracts from RJ’s monopoly on 
order and control; he can talk to electors whose opinions of immigration lie within this 
frame of strictness. 
One more observation must be made on the metapragmatic construction of 
credibility. Through a metapragmatic utterance, ZP decreases RJ’s credibility (II.649-
652) quoting RJ’s own previous declarations, apparently aligning with him (this 
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declaration is yours […] and it is truthful). But this alignment only preludes the 
following dealignment, expressed in the distinction between “us vs. you”.  
Using a discursive device like reported speech is highly effective, since RJ cannot 
deny his own declarations, unless he wishes to appear incoherent. With this move ZP 
effectively disables the image RJ tries to offer of himself as a leader able to maintain 
“order and control”. By using tu quoque and circumstantial arguments ZP presents RJ 
as unserious (he legalizes immigrants too easily) and incoherent (he now claims 
control, when he failed to control immigration). A particular inconsistency between 
words and deeds is highlighted as the evidence for untrustworthiness and incoherence: 
ZP in fact metapragmatically refers to RJ’s speech to portray his presidentiability as 
incoherent (y me habla usted de rigor; cf. also II.691-698). The opposition 
deeds/talks is crucial in dismantling the discursively constructed ethos: Hay que 
comparar los hechos y la demagogia, con las palabras que ustedes 
pronuncian (I479-480). Interestingly, ZP also uses a meta stance narrative on what PP 
says also at another point of the debate on SP discredit his opponent through a 
circumstantial argument aimed at showing PP’s incoherence: ustedes que tanto 
hablan de la familia no hicieron ninguna prestación, ningún apoyo por 
nacimiento a las familias en este país (I.499-501).  
 
8.2.2.3. Progressiveness 
One of the moves ZP employs to manage presidentiability is to avoid dealing with 
immigration, opting instead to raise social policy that allow him to increase his 
presidentiability in relation to one particular attribute: progressiveness, thereby 
implementing the overarching strategy of presenting PSOE as the defender of individual 
freedoms and PP as an obstacle to the progress. This move was used mainly in the first 
debate, where ZP dealigns himself from RJ’s agenda, referring to issues such as stem 
cell research, divorce, abortion, the universality of free public healthcare and education, 
homosexual marriage, etc.
167
 So through a polarized narrative, ZP self-legitimizes by 
emphasizing his own achievements (PSOE promoted policies improving individual 
freedoms) and presenting PSOE as the party of progress, freedom and civil rights and 
delegitimizes the opponent, emphasizing his faults (PP opposed them), and 
presenting PP as the party of conservatism and regression.  
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 This also shows the ideological shift from class to subjectivity that left wing parties have taken in 
recent years (cf. Fairclough 2003). 
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En esta legislatura se han producido importantísimos avances para 
los derechos sociales y ciudadanos de nuestro país. Hemos 
desbloqueado lo que ustedes frenaron que es la investigación con 
células madre, […] Quizá los jóvenes necesiten o sería bueno que 
los jóvenes les dijéramos lo que ha pasado en el periodo 
democrático, ustedes nunca han apoyado las leyes que han supuesto 
avances de derechos, […] no han apoyado ningún avance de derechos 
de los ciudadanos en este periodo democrático […] Si ustedes 
hubieran gobernado durante 30 años seguidos lo que es evidente es 
que en España hubiera habido menos Educación, menos Sanidad, menos 
derechos, peores pensiones… Desde luego seríamos un país menos 
libre y más intransigente (I.547-573) 
 
This move is based on the existence of a particular agreement that defending personal 
freedoms is positive and attacking them is negative. ZP increases his presidentiability 
by associating PSOE with progress and freedom, and PP with a (Francoist) past and 
intransigence, which is also visible in other texts such as Defender la Alegría
168
. 
In the second debate ZP also opts not to start with immigration, addressing instead 
other social policy issues that fit in with the Left’s self-image and its topos of solidarity. 
This move is also aimed at proving that ZP’s vision of social policy extends to a broad 
spectrum, setting him apart from RJ who appears concerned solely with immigration.   
 
8.2.2.4. Dialogue 
In the second debate, immediately after RJ’s first accusation of avoiding the issue of 
immigration (II.487-488), ZP instantly addresses it. However, he avoids moving within 
the terrain of immigration in relation to the attributes established by RJ (strictness, 
activity and efficacy); instead he uses the topic to delegitimize RJ in other attributes 
(authoritarianism). As a result the interactive dealignment on the theme is followed by 
a dealignment on the attributes with which these topics are dealt with. However, as we 
have seen, in both debates ZP also ends up using strictness, activity and efficacy in 
order to delegitimize RJ through the tu quoque argument. In doing so, ZP tries to handle 
the debate agenda and to manage presidentiability according to general attributes as well 
as according to particular attributes belonging to both the frames of nurturing and 
strict father.  
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 This topic has been employed also by Felipe González in the two 1993 presidential debates against 
José María Aznar. 
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In order to dealign himself from RJ, ZP tries to increase his presidentiability and 
decrease that of RJ by depicting PSOE as being open to dialogue and PP as 
authoritarian for its inability to debate and negotiate. ZP constructs a polarized 
narrative “PP=bad” and “PSOE=good”, based on the local agreement that 
authoritarianism is negative and dialogue and debate positive: 
 
Ustedes cuando hablan de inmigración se olvidan de una, de una 
cosa fundamental que es el acuerdo, el diálogo social... Ya sé que 
esto del diálogo les produce cierta alergia, pero no se puede 
hacer una política de inmigración eficaz de si no hay acuerdo con 
empresarios y sindicatos. Mire, toda la política de inmigración 
que hemos hecho en estos 4 años ha tenido el acuerdo de 
empresarios y de sindicatos. El diálogo social es verdad que nunca 
ha sido su punto fuerte, ni siquiera hablaron de él para hablar de 
inmigración. […] Y esa es también una diferencia entre dos 
proyectos, usted es el proyecto del ordeno y mando, de hacer una 
política impositiva, en materia de inmigración, lo que quieran sin 
hablar con nadie, sin dialogar con nadie y lo nuestro es una 
política de diálogo con empresarios y sindicatos en materia de 
inmigración (II.494-515) 
 
This positive self representation (dialogue) and negative representation of the other 
(authoritarian) shows PSOE’s general electoral strategy of constructing frames based on 
abstract positive values rather than discussing concrete elements
169
.  
Of particular importance here is the metaphor of allergy in order to describe PP’s 
difficulty in establishing debate and dialogue. Furthermore, quantifiers (toda, nunca) 
stabilize this negative PP feature beyond the contingent situation, portraying it as a 
physical attribute, as an incurable sickness. 
 
8.2.2.5. Immigrant integration 
Another crucial point is for self-legitimation according to a frame of solidarity and 
supportiveness is ZP’s reference to PSOE spending on immigrant integration:   
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 Even though, for avoiding criticism of abstractness, ZP in many points repeats that he put in practice 
concrete measures (II.162; II.220). 
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Ustedes no dedicaron un duro a la integración de inmigrantes, 
nosotros 200 millones a los ayuntamientos para la integración de 
inmigrantes (I.645-647) 
 
Hemos invertido hasta ahora 800 millones en esta legislatura en 
integración, en dinero que va a las comunidades autónomas y a los 
ayuntamientos. Y vamos a llegar a 2.000 millones hasta 2010 para 
la integración de trabajadores en los municipios donde más 
inmigración hay, para que haya más ayudas sociales, más becas y, 
por supuesto, ningún ciudadano se vea perjudicado por ello (II.592-
598; see also II.647-649) 
 
In particular, this final statement is ZP’s response to RJ’s accusation of not caring about 
Spaniards’ problems, but in doing so he accepts the assumption that immigrants be 
detrimental for citizens. ZP’s insistence on integration is functional to the self-
representation in accordance with the left wing values of solidarity and opposed to the 
representation of the Right as xenophobic and rejecting immigrants within the frame of 
strictness. The issue of xenophobia will be considered in greater depth in the final 
section. 
 
8.2.2.6. Selflessness and sincerity 
As we have seen, RJ’s main strategy is to connect with citizens and distance ZP from 
them. Precisely in order to maintain this connection, ZP insists on the citizens’ interests 
at many points throughout the debates. In order to separate RJ from the audience, ZP 
establishes a contrast between selflessness and opportunism. In ZP’s argument, RJ deals 
with immigration because he is opportunistic (he has no social policies) (I.544-546; 
II.486-489), whilst ZP deals with what matters to people. This move responds to RJ’s 
accusations of his being removed from the people and avoiding certain issues for 
opportunistic purposes.   
 
Quiero hablar de política sociales, porque tienen mucho interés 
los ciudadanos en conocer nuestras propuestas (II.408-409) 
 
Through this reference to citizens’ interests, ZP legitimizes himself as a defender of 
Spaniards’ interests and their spokesperson.  
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Another move adopted by ZP to maintain the connection with citizens is, besides 
referring to them and their interests, to present himself as selfless: 
 
Espero que el debate esta noche sea útil para todos los 
ciudadanos. En toda mi trayectoria política he intentado que el 
insulto, que la descalificación, no contamine el debate público. 
Deseo que esta noche tengamos un debate de ideas, de propuestas y 
de soluciones; es lo que nos exigen los ciudadanos, con limpieza, 
con limpieza y con veracidad (II.66-71) 
 
This move also allows ZP to portray himself as a fair player; and there is agreement 
that sincerity, as respect for the rule of the political game is essential for a president. In 
his narrative the quantifier toda plays a crucial role in absolutizing fair play as a stable 
quality of his personality. As for sincerity, ZP also employs a coup de théâtre: he shows 
off a white paper containing data and figures used by ZP during the debates. This 
enactment of sincerity, related to fair play and selflessness, creates the image of a good 
debater (which is frequently challenged by RJ). As we know, and given the discursive 
nature of the construction of ethos, the ability to debate is homologically related with 
presidentiability: being a good debater increases presidentiability. The decrease in RJ’s 
presidentiability is implicit: due to the polarization of the communicative event, the 
audience infers that is ZP’s opponent who pollutes the public debate with insults, the 
unfair player. 
 
8.2.3. A particular case: disputing xenophobia 
An important point in the debate is the dispute surrounding xenophobia, since it shows 
the relevance of intertextual connections of what is said in the debates with other texts 
and discourses (polyphony). As in many other Western societies, a dominant discourse 
circulates in Spain that mainly reproves open xenophobic stances. A month before the 
elections, at the beginning of the campaign, in a pseudo-event aimed at setting the 
agenda regarding immigration (Jornadas sobre inmigración, Barcelona), RJ presented 
the contrato de integración [integration agreement]: an agreement that immigrants 
should sign in order to enter in Spain
170
. It is a populist measure that highlights the 
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difference between us-here (Spaniards) and them-there (others)
171
. PSOE responded to 
this by accusing PP of xenophobia
172
. Since this accusation is extremely harmful for a 
party trying to present itself as moderate right wing, RJ needs since the very beginning 
to refute it by presenting some disclaimers (I.444-446) or by openly denying it: 
 
cuando alguien hace propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y 
las tilda de ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he 
propuesto prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he propuesto 
el contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad de derechos, 
oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones (I.461-466) 
 
In this instance RJ increases his presidentiability and decreases ZP’s in accordance with 
the idea of activity: I am not xenophobic, I do things; you do nothing; you just talk; 
you accuse those who do things of being xenophobic. Nevertheless, one of the most 
effective moves for self-legitimizing and delegitimizing the opponent is for ZP to retake 
RJ’s reference to contrato de integración in his own favor, presenting himself as the 
defender of immigrants: 
 
Ahora usted propone un papel para evitar que los inmigrantes aquí 
cometan delitos como la ablación, la poligamia o las ablaciones. 
¿Sabe las penas que tienen en el Código Penal? La poligamia hasta 
un año. La ablación del clítoris hasta 12 años. Y lo que 
representa la lapidación hasta 20 años. Está en el Código Penal. 
Es un papel inútil [RJ: que lo tiene toda Europa]. Señor Rajoy, 
señor Rajoy junto a los españoles hay inmigrantes en este país 
como voluntarios en las ONGs, como donantes de órganos… [RJ: Si ya 
lo sé] y también entre los fallecidos en las misiones de paz del 
Ejército español. Y en los atentados terroristas del 11 de marzo y 
de la T-4. ¿Deberíamos pedirles que firmen su papel de delincuente 
potencial a todos los inmigrantes que nacen, viven y mueren con 
nosotros y a veces por nosotros, señor Rajoy? (I.685-698)  
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 This agreement is based on the fear of diversity, especially towards Islam and some of its practices 
such as the veil, ablation, polygamy, lapidating, etc. The supposed defense of human rights under which it 
is veiled turns out to be especially contradictory for a Catholic and conservative party unconcerned with 
gender equality or freedom, except in terms of the freedom of economic activity. On the difference of 
freedom (preferred by liberals) and liberty (preferred by conservatives), see Edelman (1964: 121-122). 
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 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_7234000/7234027.stm  
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ZP presents immigrants positively, contributing to Spaniards’ well-being in health 
(voluntarios en las ONGs, donantes de órganos) or as soldiers (fallecidos en 
las misiones de paz del Ejército español), and in particular as one of us, whilst 
at the same time portrays RJ as framing them as potential criminals, thereby suggesting 
that he is xenophobic
173
. ZP places the blame directly on RJ through the use of deixis 
(usted; su papel).  
ZP can increase his own presidentiability and detract from RJ’s thanks to the 
generalized rejection in contemporary Western societies of overt displays of 
xenophobia, which means that presidents cannot be xenophobic. RJ not only repeatedly 
denies being xenophobic, in the second debate he will reverse this accusation and 
instead accuse ZP of being xenophobic. The excerpt is very significant: 
 
Escúcheme… "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está pasando 
ya en muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de integración 
de los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan derechos sociales 
porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel de renta más bajo, 
que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas sociales". Esto lo 
dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces menos grave, el señor 
Rodríguez Zapatero en el Congreso de los Diputados en un debate 
del Estado de la Nación, por eso nos han llamado a nosotros 
xenófobos y otras lindezas. Si es que usted cambia de criterio 
cada cuarto de hora [ZP: No, no, no, no, yo estoy de acuerdo con 
eso, lo que no estoy de acuerdo es exigir un contrato para que 
sean presuntos delincuentes los inmigrantes, eso es lo que no 
estoy de acuerdo] [OV: ahora tendrá su turno] dice una cosa y la 
contraria, no tiene ninguna propuesta (II.628-642) 
 
RJ reports ZP’s speech and twists his declarations in order to represent ZP as 
xenophobic through a tu quoque and circumstantial argument: RJ implies that ZP used 
the same arguments against PP that RJ is now using against PSOE, but when the 
problem was 4 times less serious
174
. RJ therefore discredits the opponent by reversing 
previous accusations of xenophobia and suggesting that ZP is also xenophobic, 
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 This representation of immigrants and this self-presentation as being humanitarian is consistent with 
the traditional self-representation of the Left.   
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 In a certain sense ZP, who at that time was in the opposition, was actually doing what RJ is doing in 
this campaign. The strategy is the same: criticizing the government for showing that it does not about 
citizens’ problems. What changes is that, according to his ideology, ZP asks Aznar for more public 
spending “Eso no se puede consentir por su falta de política social”. 
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incoherent and voluble (Si es que usted cambia de criterio cada cuarto de 
hora dice una cosa y la contraria).  
The importance of reported speech for the construction of ethos is linked to the nature 
of political interaction and mainly dialogic and interdiscursive stance taking, as well as 
the construction of ethos, which is mainly discursive: candidates are what they say and 
the way they say it. Reporting speech thus means representing the opponent realistically 
in his actions and his being. Furthermore, this device obliges the opponent to align with 
what he said before in order not to seem incoherent. For this reason, twisting the 
opponent’s previous utterances and using them in the speaker’s own favor is an 




This chapter has dealt with how ZP and RJ manage their presidentiability within the 
terrain of struggle of immigration; i.e. how they use immigration for positive self-
presentation and negative presentation of the other. The representations of the opponent 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
RJ→ZP: inactive, unaware, lax, incoherent, inconsistent, a liar, feeble, a bad 
debater, non- defender of Spaniards’ interests, non-patriot; 
RJ→RJ: active, capable, strict, a defender of Spaniards’ interests, patriot, good-
debater. 
 
ZP→RJ: unsupportive, a liar, incoherent, incapable, authoritarian, xenophobic, 
opportunistic, not a defender of Spaniards’ interests; 
ZP→ZP: supportive, tolerant, talkative, sincere (also a good-debater), capable.  
 
Both debates follow mainly the same patterns, with the same strategies, and almost the 
same moves and devices, nevertheless some differences can be observed between the 
first and the second: a week has elapsed between the two and candidates have read news 
and comments on the debates; they have received suggestions from their 
communication managers on what to say, correct, or change; they have received 
feedback on the issues viewers wish to hear about, etc. Furthermore, and as seen above, 
in the second debate RJ deals with immigration even more extensively than in the first 
debate, as does ZP, who dramatically increases the time dedicated to this issue. It is 
reasonable to think that ZP’s advisors recommended that he should not give the 
impression of avoiding the topic, in order not to detract from his presidentiability in 
accordance with the attribute of the good debater and to attract electors by framing 
immigration as a Police issue. 
The main discursive devices used to implement the discursive strategies and 
moves are the circumstantial and tu quoque variant of argumentum ad hominem and the 
ab auctoritate and ad populum variant of argumentum ad verecundiam; reported 
speech; narratives; disclaimers; metaphors (threat, danger, allergy); the strategic use of 
deixis (such as RJ’s our to create a community and aligning with Spaniards; and you for 
personalizing attacks against the opponent); hipotiposis; and quantifiers. In the 
representation of actors and actions, quantifiers (nada, ningún*, las únicas, tod*, 
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siempre, etc.) served to permanently stabilize the negative or positive features implied. 
As for the ab auctoritate argument RJ repeatedly appeals to the EU, as does ZP, albeit 
less frequently. I will return to this issue and the EU role in Spanish immigration 
policies. As for deixis, as in other points of the debate, even though RJ sometimes 
widens his criticisms to PSOE, he mainly personalizes his attacks against ZP in order to 
highlight ZP’s agency in the negative situation. Personalization is not only a way for 
reducing the disputes between parties in government and opposition to an easily 
understandable “fight between you and me”, which is the result of the personalization of 
politics. Personalization is also aimed at blaming ZP without threatening the face of 
PSOE voters, to whom RJ also addresses his discourse. 
The following lines address the main representation of immigration produced 
on the stage of debates; this is capital because debates are a privileged place from 
which powerful speakers build and spread their hegemonic discourses. In this sense, 
candidates’ discourse on immigration allows us to see the dominant representations of 
immigrants spread by both candidates during the debates. 
RJ mainly represents immigration as a problem amongst other serious issues 
such as the economy (prices rising, mortgages, unemployment) and lack of safety; these 
problems are particularly relevant for working-class and middle-class Spaniards (see 
both RJ’s OSs). By juxtaposing immigration with references to the crisis and insecurity, 
RJ creates a logical relationship (cause-effect or before-after) between these issues. RJ 
refers to immigration as a threat for the feasibility of social policies: pensions, health 
and education are basic pillars of social policies and immigration can damage (afectar) 
these pillars (I.439-451). RJ hints that immigration could determine the fall of the 
Spanish system, as evoked by the architectural metaphor of pillars. This frightening 
metaphor, reinforced by expressions such as an emerging new (then unknown) and 
growing (then unstoppable) phenomenon is not the only one; RJ also represents 
immigration through the classic metaphor of the avalanche (I.457-458; II.672) to create 
a sensation of insecurity among the audience that can be reassured by the strict father. It 
is under this category that RJ’s representation of immigrants as criminals should be 
interpreted, through a reference to the foreign criminals entering Spain or to the number 
of immigrants among the prison population (I.941-945; II.533-536). This representation 
of immigrants as a problem or as a threat to public order or the social system, which 
needs to be faced by a police solution, is typical in right wing discourse (Martín-Rojo 
2000a; 2000b, who points out that immigration has traditionally been an issue dealt with 
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by the Ministry of Interior) and especially in PP discourse on immigration (Rubio-
Carbonero 2011). Note that framing immigration as an issue in need of strict order and 
control serves to construct the frame of a strict father that has proved highly 
successful for the Right (Lakoff 2003). All these representations, together with the 
victimization of Spaniards, are crucial in obtaining audience support (II.101; II.523) 
and in presenting himself as the defender of the Spanish
175
. The populist defense of 
Spaniards is strategic because in debates such as these, utterances are directed more at 
the electorate watching the program than the opponent.   
This representation of immigrants as a threat for social policies is especially 
successful during economic crises, such as that affecting Spain since 2008. These 
arguments allow politicians to shift their burden and unload citizens’ frustrations by 
blaming the weakest and unprotected segments of the population, easily identifiable as 
alien. Blaming immigrants excuses politicians for cutting social services; the 
responsibility lies not with the government for its constant welfare cuts in response to 
the dominant Neoliberal ideology, but rather with the immigrants who demand more 
and more services. Presenting immigration as the greatest threat (II.447) or a danger 
(II.451) for our social politics, allows RJ to save current Neoliberal policies. Coherently 
with his ideology, the threat for “our social politics” is not Neoliberalism, an ideology 
predicating the weakening of the State’s role in balancing market-determined 
inequalities, the reduction of social solidarity, compulsive privatization, the 
marketization of social services (not as a means for satisfying basic rights but 
marketable wares), but immigration. So if Spaniards experience greater difficulties in 
accessing social services it is not because in obeying the Neoliberal credo the two main 
Spanish parties (PP and PSOE) increasingly reduced or privatized public services, but 
because of the immigrants. Obviously by shifting the burden and blaming immigrants 
RJ increases his presidentiability. 
Nevertheless these very negative presentations of immigrants could earn RJ the 
accusation of being xenophobic, which would wound his face. So RJ needs to deny 
racism: he does so by providing positive representation (immigrants as workers), 
although it is always followed by a but.  
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Son personas que vienen a España, que trabajan y que, en su 
mayoría, contribuyen. Pero también son los más necesitados y, por 
tanto, demandan muchos servicios sociales (I.444-447) 
 
Hay mucha gente que viene aquí a trabajar, se gana la vida 
dignamente, tiene derechos y debe tener los mismos derechos que 
los españoles, pero hay muchos derechos de españoles que se ven 
perjudicados (II.99-102) 
 
Like many other moderate right wing parties, RJ expresses a moderate racism that is 
often disguised or mitigated through well-known disclaimers always introduced by 
adversative conjunctions such as pero (Hewitt & Stokes 1975; van Dijk 2000a; 2000d: 
92; Wodak & Reisigl 1999: 185-186). Disclaimers are fundamental in the construction 
of presidentiability, since they allow RJ to produce a racist discourse whilst at the same 
time avoiding accusations of xenophobia. 
As is widely recognized, racism is not only typical of marginal violent radicals, 
even though mainstream politicians try to persuade citizens otherwise (van Dijk 1992a: 
95-96; 1992b: 22; 1992e). Indeed, despite the existence of a mainstream politically 
correct(ed) and antiracist discourse (van Dijk 1993a: 97), racism is common within 
political and administrative elites (1992a; 1992b; 1992d: 201-207; 1992e; 1993a; 
1993b; 2000b; 2002: 148-149; 2004; 2005b) and is spread through the media mainly by 
them (van Dijk 1987; 1989; 1992c; 2000a; 2002). As van Dijk demonstrated, political 
debates are a key space in which to frame immigration and immigrants in racist terms, 
as a problem or as a threat (1992e: 56; 1997: 61; 2004a), and Spain is no exception (van 
Dijk 2005b: 22 and 23; 2006b)
176
. This is especially true in the case of right wing 
parties, but this discourse is also contaminating the left wing, because of the relative 
lack of interest shown towards immigrants by trade unions (Wodak, personal 
conversation, but contra see van Dijk 2005b: 22). 
Consequently, given the stigmatization of open racism, before he takes a stance on 
immigration as noxious to Spaniards, RJ firstly denies accusations of xenophobia or 
racism (I.461-463; I.530-531)
177
, as shown in the following excerpt:  
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Yo estoy a favor de la inmigración, pero la inmigración debe ser 
legal y con contrato (II.610-611) 
  
This move is crucial in order to increase his presidentiability; he presents himself not as 
a racist but as a pragmatic leader, based on the agreement that a (good) president 
cannot be racist, but should be realistic.  
As for realism and the rightization of left wing discourse on immigration it is 
worth analyzing the fact that ZP frames immigration in the terms of both the nurturing 
father (selfless, supportive and open to dialogue) and strict father (legality, fight against 
illegal immigrants). As we can see in the excerpts below, ZP’s construction of the 
image of a strict leader (1) is balanced by framing immigrants in positive terms (2): 
 
(1) Sí, gracias Señor Rajoy… Voy a hablar de inmigración y de la 
política que hemos realizado. Nuestra política de inmigración 
tiene un principio: sólo pueden venir y quedarse los que puedan 
trabajar de acuerdo con la ley. Es decir, lucha con firmeza contra 
la inmigración ilegal […] 
 
(2) Pero hemos de recordar una cosa: la mitad del crecimiento 
económico que hemos tenido en los últimos años es como 
consecuencia de la inmigración. Lo que cotizan a la Seguridad 
Social los inmigrantes equivale al pago de casi un millón de 
pensionistas españoles.  
 
This balancing of the frames of the nurturing father (referring to values such as 
solidarity and tolerance) and strict father (referring to values such as authority and 
inflexibility) is aimed at obtaining maximum support even from electors belonging to 
different groups: it is an example of how to widen the electoral base with a hybrid 
discourse but it also shows the surface of ideological convergence. Again as for 
realism and ideological convergence, we should consider the main representations of 
immigrants produced by ZP. In general, ZP frames immigrants in more positive terms 
than RJ, trying to express some kind of empathy, as shown in the following excerpts: 
 
¿Deberíamos pedirles que firmen su papel de delincuente potencial 
a todos los inmigrantes que nacen, viven y mueren con nosotros y a 
veces por nosotros, señor Rajoy? (I.696-698)  
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hemos incrementado tres veces la ayuda al desarrollo para la 
cooperación con los países de origen, donde hay hambre, donde hay 
miseria, para dar más oportunidades a los jóvenes que son los que 
escapan de allí, lamentablemente, en busca de una esperanza. (I.641-
645) 
 
ZP prefers to represent immigrants as workers (I.971-977; I.472-473). Apart from 
expressing empathy and tolerance, this move enables ZP to draw attention to his fight 
against illegal immigration, as a work contract is a requisite for entering Spain (I.632; 
II.572-574; II.596; II.654-656). By framing immigration in positive terms, as a resource, 
ZP deactivates RJ’s arguments: if immigration is positive, RJ’s accusations are not 
grounded. But the reference to immigrants as workers, despite displaying a positive 
attitude towards immigration, actually hides the assumption of Neoliberal ideological 
perspectives, as shown in the following example:  
 
Pero hemos de recordar una cosa: la mitad del crecimiento 
económico que hemos tenido en los últimos años es como 
consecuencia de la inmigración. Lo que cotizan a la Seguridad 
Social los inmigrantes equivale al pago de casi un millón de 
pensionistas españoles (II.588-592) 
 
It should be noted how evident the ideological dilemma is: ZP acknowledges that 
persons entering Spain illegally are desperate (expressing humanitarianism and 
empathy), but works to prevent them from leaving their countries or takes them back 
(expressing pragmatism and legalism). So for coherence with PSOE self-image (and its 
electors’ expectations) of a social-democratic party committed with solidarity, ZP 
presents himself as open to immigrants (solidarity). However –and it is here that the 
ideological dilemma comes to the surface– this openness is not based on 
humanitarianism, but on economicism: it is due only to the fact that they contribute to 
our social security, and therefore to Spaniards’ well-being (economic rationalism). ZP 
considers immigrants as a resource: in terms of costs-benefits they must be rejected, 
even if they are hopeless, unless they contribute to our economy, as labor, to pay for our 
pensions. This is a crucial issue in left wing discourse on immigration and the apparent 
solution to this ideological dilemma is an example of manipulation. ZP’s goody-goody 
discourse is aimed at obtaining more votes from “supportive” voters as well as from 
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immigrants, whilst ideological assumptions of social policy converge toward Neoliberal 
conceptions of human beings as a resource and human relationships as being based on 
economicism. So the positive representation of immigrants only constitutes a superficial 
dealignment from RJ’s stance, useful in performing diversity and disagreement, but in 
no way challenging ideological assumptions or proposing new ones. 
Two more points can be seen as examples of ideological convergence. This lack 
of ideological dealignment concerns the way RJ conceives aid for developing 
countries: it is not a way of reducing global inequality, but a means of solving the 
problems of developed countries such as the increasing number of immigrants. Funds 
for poor countries are represented as the logical counterpart for repatriations of persons 
coming to Spain from those countries. Obviously RJ does not talk about creating 
together a fairer world where people are free to move but not obliged to do so to escape 
terrible conditions; he is only interested in mechanisms that will keep immigrants away 
from the richer parts of the world. If this is coherent with RJ’s right wing ideology, it 
nevertheless constitutes an incoherent solution of the ideological dilemma for left wing 
parties. Interestingly enough, ZP never challenges this view, openly declared by RJ. 
When in the first debate ZP referred to development aid, accusing RJ of having frozen it 
during his government, he did so closely to the issue of repatriation, even though he 
tearfully talked of famine, poverty, and penury (I.640-645).  
The ideological convergence is also visible in the role that candidates assign to the 
EU as last instance of Spanish immigration policies. Both candidates try to present 
their policies in line with EU ones: RJ when he refers to integration agreement in 
answer to ZP’s criticism (ZP: es un papel inutil, RJ: lo tiene toda Europa 
I.690-691) or again when he repeatedly depicts ZP as being criticized by EU (I.96; 
I.688; II.601-606; II.673-683; II.522-523). In response to this, in the second debate ZP 
refers to his immigration policies as in line with the EU (II.585-588; II.606-608). These 
references to EU are not simple ab auctoritate arguments. They have a long history in 
Spanish political discourse on immigration, since the EU is somehow considered as the 
ultimate instance of the immigration policies,; the instance that obliges parties to take 
their decisions: this provides both the Right and the Left with a means for self-
legitimation and allows the former to avoid accusations of xenophobia, and the latter of 




In conclusion, both candidates try to exploit immigration for their own electoral 
interests: RJ to present himself as an authoritarian father, and ZP to present himself as 
a nurturing father. These two different self-representations are well known in political 
discourse (Lakoff 1995; 2002; 2004; for Spain see Molpeceres-Arnáiz 2008). The issue 
of paternal figures threatening and/or reassuring electors is linked to the deep 




Beside this convergence in strategies, the analysis has shown the degree of 
convergence of the dominant discourse produced on the stage of presidential debates: 
although it presents immigrants in more positive terms, ZP never challenges RJ’s frame 
of immigrants as an element of public order, to be treated as a police issue (as in RJ’s 
terms). ZP does not challenge the dichotomy legal/illegal immigrants; he does not even 
challenge the reification of persons (immigrants as economic resource), as posited by 
RJ. With his discourse, ZP accepts this conception and, despite the effort for performing 
opposition, the ideological assumptions underlying the discourse are widely shared. 
Moreover, the policies implemented by PSOE and PP are very similar, demonstrating 
the ideological convergence highlighted here and in other points of this work. 
ZP turns out to be unable to produce an emergent discourse, limiting his 
production to an oppositional discourse (Raiter & Muñoz 1995; Raiter 1999; Giménez-
Montiel 1983). Oppositional discourse does not challenge the ideological assumptions 
of the discourse it disputes; in contrast, emergent discourse completely rejects them, 
tracing a totally new terrain of political struggle, based on new categories. As the 
analysis carried out here has shown, ZP’s discourse shares the ideological assumptions 
of PP’s discourse. Sharing the same ideological assumptions, both candidates use same 
categories, such as legal-illegal, the same arguments and reproaches on who let in or 
legalized more illegal immigrants; and quite the same expressions: ZP uses the verb 
colarse [‘to strain’ or ‘to gate-crash’] and RJ the noun coladero [‘strain’, or figuratively 
‘place where is easy to enter’]. This is because the two candidates’ arguments follow the 
same pattern of mutual attack on the number of illegal immigrants legalized. This 
commonality of arguments shows ideological convergence. The war of figures about 
how many illegal immigrants have been legalized indicates the existence of undisputed 
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assumptions on immigrants such as the fact that letting in and legalizing immigrants 
in Spain is an error, hence an index of incapacity. 
This inability to produce a new discourse on migration is a defeat for the Left: despite 
references to integration and expressions of solidarity or empathy, embracing the same 
Right ideological assumptions, ZP (immigration as a police issue and the distinction 
between legal/illegal immigrants) stresses that he also fought illegal immigration; that 
he also prevents desperate persons from leaving their country and entering Spain; that 
he also sends back those who managed to enter. This shows that the Left has followed 
the Right in its agenda, discourse and ideology. It is possible that left wing parties are 
more open to solidarity and humanitarianism (van Dijk 1997c, 2000b), whilst right wing 
parties present themselves as rationalist and pragmatist
179
. Yet the Left seems unable to 
frame the debate on immigration in terms other than those established by the Right. In 
fact, the most positive representation of immigrants produced by ZP is that of 
immigrants as a resource: he is unable to frame immigration in other terms than 
economicistic ones, whereby immigration is positive only if it pays our pensions or 
sustains our economy. In embracing this perspective, where immigrants have to be 
treated according to cost-benefit ideology, the Left contributes to the dehumanization of 
persons and to the economization of the debate, reinforcing Neoliberal market ideology 
(Fairclough 2003b: 20). 
One can witness an ideological convergence and a centerization (move toward the 
center) of political positions. It is not only an attempt to avoid overly radical positions 
in order to gain the majority of electors by catching the wavering (less ideologized, 
hence ‘moderate’) electors, supposedly at the center of the political spectrum; it is rather 
a real shift in the institutional parties, whose ideologies converge towards a form of 
undisputed centerism. In their constant race to catch all electors, which involves 
occupying the center space, parties are increasingly leaning towards similar positions, 
positions that display a growing conservatism: preserving status quo, erasing alternative 
                                                          
179
 Van Dijk shows that there is a constant tension in elite political discourses about immigration between 
these two tendencies of humanitarianism-solidarity on the one hand and rationalism-pragmatism on the 
other. This tension seems partially to reflect the political distinction between Left and Right, but is also 
largely present in political discourse on racism, especially in right wing discourse (in order to avoid 
accusations of xenophobia). In general terms, politicians say “we are a supportive country 
(humanitarianism), but we cannot help all immigrants (pragmatism)”. In his analysis of the denial of 
racism by the elites, van Dijk (1992a, 1993b) shows that to deny racism many Right MPs use in their 
parliamentary discourses the declaration of principle of solidarity and humanitarianism. But actually we 
can witness that right wing (anti-immigrant) discourses include keywords of left wing discourse 
(solidarity) and vice versa. 
258 
 
visions, and never disputing the basic pillars of the current capitalist world order. This 
centerization is especially evident within the Left, since the Right seems more able to 
conceal its radical positions, mitigating them under the veil of (economic) rationality 
and pragmatism or the defense of (actual) order. Moreover, for the Left, centerization 
means moving towards the Right. It is for these reasons that I consider that immigration 
constitutes an ideological dilemma for the Left, since it does not match with left wing 








9.1. The role of ETA in Spanish politics 
The military and political activities of some Basque radical organizations, often simply 
referred to as terrorismo Vasco, has traditionally been one of the main topics of Spanish 
political discourse, and one of the most hotly debated within Spanish society. It is 
especially important for PP, since, as we have seen, according to De Santiago-Guervós 
(1996), Terrorism, Marxism and Separatism epitomized the deepest threats to society 
for Francoism: the disappearance of private property, chaos and the disaggregation of 
Spain. Since PP emerged from the Francoist ideology, it is not surprising that terrorism 
dominates its political agenda, together with the economy and the unity of Spain. 
Indeed, PP works to cut public spending and fight against separatism to preserve the 
country’s unity.   
Nevertheless, terrorism is a transversal cleavage, since it interests the whole of 
Spanish society, and the entire political spectrum from Right to Left, with different 
stances: PP electors are mostly convinced that it is necessary to repress terrorism 
militarily, as well as reduce the claims of independence of (some segments of) Basque 
society, since they defend the unity of Spain. Among PSOE electors there are some that 
strongly oppose the use of violence to achieve autonomy or independence, and also 
some contrary to the claims of independence of some Basques. Although in the past part 
of PSOE silently approved the role ETA played in fighting Francoism (Cercas 2012: 68, 
257-258), PSOE electors are almost unanimously against ETA, but prefer to solve 
issues of Terrorism through dialogue than military repression (Ruiz-Jiménez 2010). 
Terrorism is one of the main terrains of struggle of the 2008 electoral campaign. 
Crossing my personal observation of the discourses produced and circulated in Spain in 
the early 2000s, with Elorriaga’s statements that appeared in The Financial Times 
(Crawford 2008), and with the analysis of other texts (Cortes Generales 2005), I can 
state that it is one of the key themes used by PP to secure its own traditional voters and 
win indecisive voters from PSOE. For the purpose of this work I use the word terrorism 
in reference to the armed activities carried on by the Basque independentist armed 
organization called Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [Basque Country and Liberty], founded in 




Figure 1. ETA flag and logo 
 
Trying to even loosely sketch the intricate history and situation of ETA is a very 
complicated task
180
; I will here limit myself to presenting some summary information, 
dates and ideological references. ETA emerged in the early 1950s as a group of young 
Basqueist university students from PNV
181
, aimed at defending and reinforcing the 
historical, cultural and linguistic heritage of Basques in the frame of Francoism, which 
severely repressed peripheral nationalisms, cultures and languages such as Basque. 
Since its beginnings, ETA defined itself as a Movimiento Revolucionario Vasco 
de Liberación Nacional [revolutionary Basque movement of national liberation]: its 
main ideological features were the independence of the Basque territories situated 
between Spain and France, the official use of Basque language, representative 
democracy, a form of mitigated liberalism with social aims, and the laity of State. These 
last three points, together with the use of Basque as diacritic of identity, instead of 
surname or race, are the main differences from the racist Basque nationalism of PNV’s 
founder, Sabino Arana. From these initial positions, and through a complex process 
made up of several meetings, discussions, documents, etc. ETA became increasingly 
left wing, embracing Socialism, and progressively separating from PNV. In this process 
of separation from PNV, ETA adopted an increasingly active commitment to the 
liberation of the Basque Country from Spanish occupation through direct actions, 
following the example of the (Marxist) decolonizing movements that arose in the 1950s 
and 1960s in Africa, Latin America and Asia. ETA declared the definite split from PNV 
in 1964 (Idoyaga 2009). That same year ETA decided to embrace armed conflict as the 
means of achieving its objectives. Since its first murder, in 1968, to the present day 
ETA has killed 829 persons, more than the half of them soldiers, and most of them of 
                                                          
180
 See, for instance, Mata (2005); Woodworth (2005). 
181
 Partido Nacionalista Vasco [Basque Nationalist Party] is the right wing, Catholic and once racist 
Basqueist party founded in 1898 by Sabino Arana. 
261 
 
right wing ideology. Indeed, the main association of the victims of terrorism, the 
Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo (AVT
182
), founded in 1981, is essentially right 
wing, and, like other right wing Spanishist Catholic movements (Manos Limpias) or 
media (Libertad Digital, COPE, VeoTV, Intereconomía, ABC), adopts an aggressive 
stance toward terrorists and in general toward Basqueism and peripheralism. In 
December 2001 ETA was defined as a “terrorist organization” by the EU, and in 
February 2002 the U.S. Department of State did the same
183
. 
Dealing with the role played by ETA in Spanish politics is extremely complex, so 
here I will just point out briefly some questions about the issue of the truce, in order to 
pave the ground for understanding the interventions of the two candidates in the 
debate
184
. Throughout its history ETA has declared numerous truces. Traditionally the 
Right has claimed that ETA takes advantage of truces to rearm itself after having been 
weakened by military repression (captures and confiscation of arms by police). A short 
list of all the truces includes the following: 28 January–19 March 1988 (the first), 8 
January–12 April 1989, 24 June–1 July 1996185. The two first truces took place during 
Felipe González’s government, and the third during José María Aznar’s period in office. 
On 16 September 1998 ETA, again under Aznar’s government, declared an “indefinite 
truce” that lasted until 28 November 1999. On 22 March 2006 ETA declared a 
“permanent truce” that, despite the bomb in the car park at Madrid Airport on 30 
December 2006, officially lasted until 5 June 2007. This last truce is of interest for this 
work, since it took place during ZP’s government and was a key issue on the political 
agenda during the entire PSOE legislature and the election campaign
186
. 
Generally speaking truces coincide with political negotiations between the 
Government or some of its members (often from an unofficial position) and ETA or 
some of their emissaries. It would therefore not be surprising to learn that ZP’s 
government was negotiating with the armed organization in order to find a political 
solution for the situation in the Basque Country that excluded armed options.  
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 Obviously candidates’ discourses are completely immersed in the wider discourses (determined by the 




 More recently, on 20 October 2011 ETA announced “the definitive end of armed activity”, calling on 
the French and Spanish governments to look for political solutions to the Basque situation.  
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9.2. Terrorism in the debates: Strategies, moves, devices for managing presidentiability 
As we know, PP’s head of the election campaign, Gabriel Elorriaga, said that the main 
campaign issues would be the economy, immigration and nationalist issues. Indeed, RJ 
would devote considerable time to terrorism, as part of the nationalist question. It must 
be noted that I have separated the Basque question, dealt with as a problem of National 
Security in the FP block (under the label of terrorism), from the Catalonian question, 
dealt with as a problem of IP in the corresponding block (under the label of the Catalan 
question). 
RJ presents ZP as incapable, incoherent, a divider and liar in order to detract 
support from him.  
In turn, ZP also will construct his presidentiability in relation to the attribute of 
ability, confuting RJ’s attacks by presenting his antiterrorist policies as being more 
efficient as the PP’s; he will also accuse RJ of being opportunistic in using terrorism for 
his political ends. These moves are visible from the OS of both debates (I.133-175; 
II.44-78), where ZP presents PP as a hurdle (obstáculo), a disloyal group that 
contested the election result, insulted (here there is a personal reference to RJ), tensed 
the atmosphere, lied, exaggerated, divided citizens, and used terrorism and the victims’ 
pain for its own electoral ends, as well as failing to support the government. While PP is 
framed in the light of negative features (confrontation, problems, opportunism) PSOE is 
framed according to positive ones (dialogue, solutions; selflessness). This dichotomist 
description allows ZP to present himself as sincere, selflessness, poen to dialogue , 
sensitive, responsible and progressive, and delegitimizes RJ as insincere, opportunist, 
authoritarian, insensitive, irresponsible and a cheat. 
 
9.2.1. RJ’s moves to manage presidentiability 
 
9.2.1.1. Ability: ZP as incapable 
According to the overarching strategies, RJ increases his own presidentiability and 
decreases ZP’s through narratives that indicate ZP’s failure to deal with the real 
problem (the economy), but entertained himself with secondary questions nobody cares 
about, such as the Alianza de Civilizaciones and Memoria Histórica, and only did two 
things: modifying the structure of the Spanish State and negotiating with terrorists 
(I.100-105; II.124-127; II.264-270; II.379-385). From the OS of both debates RJ 
deploys the main moves for delegitimizing ZP in reference to Nation (Terrorism and the 
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Catalonian question): 1) representing ZP as incapable, inexperienced, frivolous, and 
weak; 2) as having broken the traditional agreements between government and 
opposition in the form of state and terrorism; 3) of being incoherent; and 4) of being a 
liar. 
 
¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4 años 
además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la Alianza de 
Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras cuestiones? Ha hecho 
dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y las dos las ha hecho mal: 
la estructura de España y los tratos con ETA. Ha querido modificar 
por su cuenta el modelo de Estado y ha querido negociar con los 
terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas operaciones le han salido mal. 
Ninguna de esas dos cosas contaba con el apoyo de los electores, 
porque no figuraban en su programa electoral. Lo ha hecho sin 
encomendarse a nadie, por eso para salirse con la suya, necesitó 
romper todos los consensos de la Transición, incluido el Pacto 
contra el Terrorismo, para no tener testigos. Necesitó mentir a 
los españoles sobre lo que estaba haciendo, y necesitó dividir a 
la opinión pública para silenciar cualquier protesta. Ningún 
gobernante ha sembrado en la historia de la Transición Moderna 
tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez que hablaba de 
entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia. Ninguno ha transmitido 
a los españoles una sensación comparable de falta de rumbo, de 
improvisación y de vivir pendientes de la ocurrencia cotidiana 
(I.100-120)  
 
el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las prioridades. Ha tenido dos 
grandes proyectos: el primero, cambiar España y el segundo, 
negociar con ETA. Ambos han sido un fracaso (II.124-127) 
 
Given the space dedicated to this issue during the campaign, in the manifestos or the 
debates, we can conclude that terrorism is one of the main topics on RJ’s agenda, but he 
accuses ZP of having mixed priorities. This is only apparently incoherent, since 
terrorism is intended by RJ as a fight against terrorists with military means, and not as 
negotiating with them.  
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In RJ’s narrative, ZP holds sole responsibility for any negotiations with terrorists: he did 
it all alone (por su cuenta), without the support of his electors or of the more 
experienced members of PSOE (II.752-755). Insisting on ZP’s agency, RJ tries to 
weaken his strong leadership and personal appeal, distancing him from the electors 
and his party, and showing that he is the country’s real problem. This is the reason 
why RJ’s attacks are so personalized, as shown by the use of the deictic usted.  
RJ presents ZP as inexperienced through words such as improvisación or the 
metaphor (II.752) of aprendiz de brujo [sorcerer’s apprentice]187; and incapable 
(the only two things that ZP did, he did them badly: han salido mal; han sido un 
fracaso). 
In order to delegitimize ZP on a personal level RJ also presents him as being naïve and 
frivolous. 
 
Lo que hizo usted fue una frivolidad, que benefició a los 
terroristas y que perjudicó a los demás (I.730-731) 
 
These representations decrease ZP’s presidentiability since there is agreement on the 
fact that a president should be experienced, capable, realistic and serious. 
 
9.2.1.2. Unity: ZP as a divider and breaker of traditional consensus 
At many points in the debates RJ presents ZP as having broken the traditional 
consensus between the two main national parties (I.110-111; I.715-723; II.736). 
According to RJ, the truce and talks were not previously agreed with PP, as had been 
the case since the Transition; this allows RJ to use an argument based on the topic of 
tradition, according to which acting in line with tradition is positive and the contrary is 
bad: 
 
necesitó romper todos los consensos de la Transición, incluido el 
Pacto contra el Terrorismo […] y necesitó dividir a la opinión 
pública (I.110-111)  
                                                          
187
 RJ uses this metaphor twice and always in relation with nationalist issues: once in reference to 




This argument, according to which ZP divides the Spanish, works thanks to the 
agreement that the quest for consensus and unity is considered one of the main 
presidentiable attributes (see also below). 
 
9.2.1.3. Coherence and consistency: ZP as incoherent 
Another move is that of presenting ZP as incoherent, since he does not do what he says 
(Ningún gobernante… convivencia). The discursive devices for implementing this 
move are the tu quoque argument and the topic of uniqueness. As for the latter, 
quantifiers such as ningún absolutize representations beyond the contingence of events 
and fix flaws as stable aspects of the opponent’s personality. Another device for 
highlighting inconsistency is the quotation of key words ZP normally uses in his own 
discourse to positively frame himself (entendimiento, talante, convivencia) in an 
entextualization that frames him negatively. Both the arguments of ZP as a breaker of 
consensus and as incoherent are aimed at presenting him as a divider; this can be seen 
from RJ’s clear accusations of his having divided the Spaniards (I.113-117). 
In detracting from ZP’s credibility, RJ repeatedly highlights ZP’s incoherence 
and inconsistency (he says something and does the opposite or says something and 
then says the opposite), through the abusive argument (liar) or the tu quoque argument 
(incoherence); apart from the examples presented above (I.114-117), this is also clear 
from the long narrative presented at (I.787-805) or the following examples: 
 
Ha dicho una cosa y la contraria muchísimas veces (I.870) 
 
Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dejó que De Juana Chaos se 
diera paseos por San Sebastián. Luego lo metió en la cárcel, 
cuando le vino bien. […] Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dijo 
que nunca hablaría de política con ETA. Y, sin embargo, habló de 
política con ETA (II.900-916) 
 
As at other points of the debate, the role played by reported speech or other 
metapragmatic statements based on verba dicendi is again crucial in order to 
demonstrate incoherence and inconsistency. As we have seen, coherence and 
consistency are two of the main presidentiable attributes.  
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9.2.1.4. Sincerity: ZP lies to Spaniards 
One of the main moves used by RJ for delegitimizing ZP is to accusing him of lying to 
Spaniards. It is very common throughout the debates and especially in this terrain of 
struggle (I.112; I.805; I.868; I.945; II.741). It is easy for RJ to attack ZP on this lack of 
sincerity, since this kind of negotiations are normally held in secret to prevent any 
external intereference. The two following passages are particular interesting: 
 
Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dijo que nunca hablaría de 
política con ETA. Y, sin embargo, habló de política con ETA. Lo ha 
dicho todo el mundo. Lo ha dicho usted. Lo ha dicho usted Tengo 
aquí los datos. Se lo puedo enseñar. "Con ETA no se hablará nunca 
de política". Habló de política (II.892-919) 
 
Usted ha mentido. Porque usted miente siempre, usted no dice la 
verdad nunca, ése es el problema (II.971-973) 
 
Of course RJ insists on representing ZP as liar because lying is one of the greatest 
forms of betrayals to electors, and one of the most common ways for losing credibility; 
indeed, accusing a candidate of lying is one of the easiest ways to detract from his 
presidentiability. Reported speech is used to mimetically represent the speaker and 
oblige him to stick to his previous declarations, whilst quantifiers (siempre, nunca) are 
employed to stabilize the negative features. 
 
9.2.1.5. Strength vs. weakness: Fighting against vs. negotiating with terrorists 
PP’s strategy is based on particular narratives, according to which PP’s repressive 
policies managed to weaken ETA, enabling RJ to present PP as a strong and severe 
party fighting disorder and evil. According to RJ’s narrative, PP excluded from 
councils and Parliament those parties that politically supported ETA, illegalizing them 
through the Ley de Partidos [Law of Political Parties] (BOE 2002: 23600), while ZP, 
through his negotiations, included ETA in the political debate as an interlocutor, 
allowing them access to councils and Parliament. In short, ZP strengthened ETA, in 
accordance with the agreed premise that ETA is bad, and ZP’s behavior is bad. 
 
cuando llegó usted al Gobierno ETA estaba más débil que nunca, 
llevaba un año sin matar porque no podía. Batasuna estaba fuera de 
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los ayuntamientos y del Parlamento. El terrorismo callejero se 
había liquidado. Y lo más importante es que había un pacto entre 
el Partido Popular y el Partido Socialista que quitaba a ETA toda 
esperanza de negociación. ¿Qué hizo usted? Negoció con ETA, rompió 
el pacto, les dio esperanza, nos dijo que querían retirarse, que 
mostraban una voluntad inequívoca, que usted había verificado. Que 
no iba a hablar de política. ¿Cuál fue su resultado? ETA está en 
los ayuntamientos y en el Parlamento con nuestro dinero. Vuelve la 
violencia callejera, han vuelto a matar, ha roto un gran acuerdo 
nacional que iba a suponer el fin de ETA… […] Y además dividió a 
la sociedad y se enfrentó a las víctimas. Esto ha sido lo que 
usted ha hecho. Una muestra de imprudencia y de irreflexión de la 
que por lo visto no está dispuesto a arrepentirse. […] Lo que hizo 
usted fue una frivolidad, que benefició a los terroristas y que 
perjudicó a los demás. Y no busque precedentes, no los busque. 
Porque lo que hizo usted, negociar políticamente con una 
organización terrorista, como le han denunciado en numerosas 
ocasiones, han aparecido en los medios declaraciones, y usted 
mismo ha reconocido, es algo que no hizo absolutamente nadie en 
España. Este es el fracaso más importante de esta Legislatura. Ha 
afectado a la dignidad del Estado, ha sido lesivo en la lucha 
contra ETA, y yo desde luego le garantizo que yo nunca negociaré 
como nadie hizo nunca en España salvo usted, políticamente con una 
organización terrorista (I.711-741) 
 
With these narratives (I.858-859; II.734-740 II.953-959) RJ represents the PP 
government as the hero that weakened ETA and ZP as the villain that strengthened it, 
acting as its accomplice. These narratives, “when we X(+), then you Y(–)”, are very 
common throughout the two debates and allow for the positive self-presentation and 
negative presentation of the other thanks to the opposition in personal deixis, the tense 
of the verbs, in lexis, as well in different semantic propositions. The main propositions 
used by RJ for delegitimizing ZP are that he negotiated with ETA instead of fighting it, 
broke traditional consensus, lied to the Spaniards, and was incoherent (I.103-106; I.807; 
I.857-867; II.124-127; II.264-270; II.379-385; II.727-767). They are repeated ad 
nauseam throughout both debates, but the excerpt given above is particularly 
significant: it shows how RJ creates the difference between negotiating with and 
fighting against: by narrating ZP as negotiating with ETA, RJ’s presents ZP as weak, 
surrendering to terrorists and their blackmail (I.807-809: ha cedido ante los 
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terroristas y ha aceptado el chantaje); equally he let the audience infer that he 
is a strong leader (cf. II.131-132: se necesita un Gobierno que dé 
certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé seguridad). This opposition between a strong 
leader fighting terrorists and a weak one negotiating with them (or suspiciously close to 
them) is coherent with the self-representation of right wing leaders as authoritative and 
left wing leaders as open to dialogue (Lakoff 2004). Worthy of note is the use of the 
topic of uniqueness for representing ZP as the only president in Spanish history to 
negotiate with terrorists (I.732-736; I.857; II.751), and therefore a unique (negative) 
phenomenon. 
 
9.2.1.6. ZP’s contiguity with terrorists 
Representing ZP as being close to terrorists is one of the main moves of the 2008 
election campaign. In his attempts to detract from ZP’s presidentiability, RJ describes 
ZP as helping terrorists such as José Ignacio De Juana-Chaos
188
 or politicians close to 
ETA such as Arnaldo Otegi
189
, whilst at the same time betraying the victims of 
terrorism or antiterrorist activists like María San Gil
190
. This use of real persons as 
representing terrorism (villains) or victims (heroes) is functional to RJ’s strategy of 
doggedly depicting ZP as a friend of terrorists and foe of the victims, Spaniards and the 
rule of law and the State. 
 
Usted […] dejó que De Juana Chaos se diera paseos por San 
Sebastián. […]. Usted […] calificó al señor Otegui como un hombre 
de paz, señor Zapatero. Usted como hombre de paz, que trató al 
señor Otegui mejor que a María San Gil (II.900-904) 
 
According to RJ’s narrative, ZP benefitted terrorists and damaged victims (cf. I.730-
731). Throughout this narrative the de/legitimation strategy is based on the premise that 
negotiating with terrorists, instead of militarily repressing them, is anti-patriotic. And 
indeed at a point of the debate RJ goes as far as to question ZP’s ability to show any 
form of patriotism (I.958-961): RJ does so, since, as De Santiago-Guervós (1996) states, 
                                                          
188
 Member of ETA, and found guilty of 25 murders. 
189
 Arnaldo Otegi is a Basque politician and the main representative of the izquierda abertzale, the radical 
Marxist Basqueist political movement aimed at the Independence of the Basque Country. 
190
 María San Gil Noain is a Basque politician and one of the main representatives of the Basque PP. 
Catholic and Spanishist, she spent the most of her political career fighting ETA, after having witnessed 
the murder of a colleague of hers by ETA. 
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in Spain the concept of the fatherland has traditionally been monopolized by the Right, 
and hence any action which is not in line with right wing policy cannot be patriotic. 
This is not only a means of denigrating the opponent and damaging his image; this is a 
strategy aimed at highlighting the legitimate ownership of the concept of patriotism. In 
doing so, RJ restates the right wing monopoly on the concept of the fatherland and its 
defense, even if in his CS of the second debate, RJ appeals to socialist Spanishists, in a 
clear example of ideological convergence, typical of the fight for the center
191
. 
RJ’s presentations of ZP as being close to terrorists and removed from victims 
were constant throughout the election campaign as well as the debates (I.1523-1547): 
they are aimed at reinforcing the opposition between the hero (RJ), friend of victims and 
the villain (ZP), friend of terrorists. Yet PP started sowing suspicions about ZP’s 
(ideological) proximity with terrorists as far back as 2006, when former PP MP and 
former Minister of the Interior, Ángel Acebes, said that ZP’s program was ETA’s 
program
192
. Moreover, in many AVT rallies against ETA during 2005 and 2006, one of 
the most popular banners was the slogan ZETAP, where the acronym with which José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is known in Spain, “ZP” read as /θeta'pe/, encompasses the 
three letters of the acronym of ETA typographically highlighted (see fig. 2).  
 
  
Figure 2. The letters “ZP” encompassing the letters of ETA (right); Zapatero depicted as a snake (left) 
 
During the 2008 campaign, in a video hosted on a PP official website, ZP was 
represented as a snake (fig. 2), in reference to the symbol of ETA, a snake wrapping an 
axe (fig. 1), speaking with his typical pronunciation, where the final <d> sounds like /θ/ 
instead of /ð/. The figure of the snake is an archetypical metaphor for someone that is 
untrustworthy. In addition, many other campaign texts linked ZP to ETA: in some 
                                                          
191
 In a certain sense nation is for Left a form of ideological dilemma (Billig et al. 1988). 
192
 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2006/06/05/actualidad/1149458406_850215.html  
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images the PSOE logo (a rose in a fist) was spoofed as a rose wrapped in a snake; or in 
the video Que no viva por ti ¡rompe con Zapatero! references were made to the many 
rallies that took place between 2005 and 2008 against the antiterrorist politics of 
PSOE
193 and to the controversial case of De Juana Chaos. 
 
9.2.2. ZP’s moves to manage presidentiability 
 
9.2.2.1. Ability: PP antiterrorist politics less effective than PSOE 
ZP’s strategy for increasing his presidentiability and decreasing that of RJ is based on 
challenging RJ’s narratives of ETA as near to defeat in 2004, as PP insinuates, since 
otherwise PP would not have accused ETA of being the author of the terrorist attack of 
11M, and ETA could not have killed 11 times more persons (46) than in the ZP’s term 
in office (4 persons). 
 
Mire, señor Rajoy. Cuando llegué al Gobierno veníamos de una 
Legislatura en la que había habido 238 víctimas mortales por el 
terrorismo. 46 a manos de ETA y 192 en el atentado del 11 de marzo 
a manos del terrorismo islamista. Mi primer objetivo, mi primer 
deber moral como presidente del Gobierno era eliminar o reducir al 
máximo estas cifras de víctimas mortales de ETA. Lo que lamento, 
lo que más lamento es no haber podido evitar las cuatro víctimas 
mortales a manos de ETA que hemos tenido en este periodo. […] hora 
lanza usted su última mentira. Lo ha hecho aquí ahora. Afirma que 
ETA estaba acabada al final de su legislatura. ¿Cómo es posible 
que ETA estuviera acabada cuando ustedes le atribuyeron el 
atentado más grave de la historia de Europa, que fue el atentado 
del 11-M del 2004? Usted mismo lo dijo en la jornada de reflexión: 
“Tengo la convicción moral de que era ETA”. Y estaba acabada… Ni 
convicción, ni moral […] Señor Rajoy (I.743-772)  
                                                          
193
 During those years many rallies took place, often organized by AVT or the right wing Spanishist 
Fundación DENAES Fundacion para la Defensa de la Nacion Española [Foundation for the Defense of 
Spanish Nation] often with the official cooperation of PP: 22 January 2005, 4 June 2005, 25 February 
2006, 10 June 2006, 1 October 2006, 25 November 2006, 3 February 2007, 2 March 2007, 10 March 




194 ZP presents PP antiterrorist politics as being less effective 
than PSOE’s (11 times fewer victims); but especially frames RJ as a liar. Moreover it 
allows ZP to refer to the 11M terrorist attack (see below). In an act of self-
legitimization ZP says he tried to negotiate with ETA to prevent more deaths, 
presenting himself as committed to peace. Peace is essential in the definition of ZP’s 
image as a pacifist in opposition to PP: after the 2003 rallies against the Iraq war, ZP 
promised during the 2004 election campaign that if elected he would withdraw Spanish 
troops from Iraq, which he did in fact do. And in the speech to present the Plataforma de 
Apoyo a Zapatero, two references were made to peace, as well as in the videos Con 
Zapatero vuelve a creer en la política and No seas él. In accordance with PSOE’s 
overarching strategy of positively present itself as Joy, a metonym for values 
universally judged as positive such as optimism, peace, solidarity, freedom, democracy, 
fair play, etc., ZP increases his own presidentiability by constructing the image of a 
leader engaged with peace; but also as a unifier, an able and selfless politician. On the 
other hand he decreases RJ’s presidentiability through three main moves: the opposition 
opportunism vs. selflessness; that between the fair and the unfair player; and the 
many references to the bombs of 11M. These will be dealt with separately. 
 
9.2.2.2. Opportunism vs. Selflessness 
The opposition between selflessness and fair play vs. opportunism and unfair play has 
been extensively used by ZP as means for de/legitimation in many campaign texts: in 
the song Defender la Alegría, in the videos for presenting the Plataforma de Apoyo a 
Zapatero or in the videos of the series Vota con todas tus fuerzas. In all these texts ZP 
presented himself as selfless, for instance inviting voters of each party to vote to prevent 
a high rate of abstention and to exercise democracy; at the same time he presented PP as 
an opportunistic and unfair player. In both debates one of the main moves ZP uses to 
delegitimize RJ is to present both him and PP as using terrorism for their own 
electoral ends: 
 
ustedes han sido un partido que en el Parlamento y en la calle no 
han hecho más que debilitar al Gobierno en la lucha contra el 
                                                          
194
 Cf. also ZP’s interruption: señor Zapatero, cuando usted llegó al Gobierno, ETA 
estaba debilitada y ETA llevaba un año sin matar y además se actuaba con la 
dignidad del Estado [ZP: Sí, ¿ah sí? Por eso dijeron que era ETA la autora del 
atentado del 11-M] (II.952-957). 
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terrorismo. Son el único partido el único partido del mundo que se 
ha manifestado contra el Gobierno por la lucha contra el 
terrorismo (I.760-764, see also I.247-249) 
 
Sí, señor Rajoy, vuelve usted a hacer uso del terrorismo y la 
verdad es que lo han hecho desde hace varios años hasta para 
justificar la guerra de Irak lo hicieron […] Dejen ya de utilizar 
el terrorismo, unas veces para justificar la guerra de Irak, otras 
para hacer oposición al Gobierno de España con el terrorismo y la 
lucha contra el terrorismo de ETA (II.769-793; see also II.857-859; II.948-
951) 
 
In this representation, the topic of uniqueness plays a crucial role (Son el único 
partido) in aggravating the negative features. Since selflessness is one of the main 
presidential attributes, and presidentiability management is a two-fold activity, on the 
one hand ZP presents RJ as an opportunist and on the other he presents himself as 
selfless. This attribute is linked to that of patriotism and democraticness. This move is 
based on the agreement that a president should be democratic and loyal above his 
party’s interests. ZP implements this move through expressions that essentialize 
dis/loyalty beyond the contingence and link them to the candidates’ inner personality 
(es lo que me sale de dentro). 
 
En política antiterrorista, mis principios y mi convicción es 
apoyar al Gobierno entre demócratas. Eso es lo que me sale de 
dentro. Y a usted lo que le ha salido es hacer oposición con el 
terrorismo y utilizarlo partidistamente (I.829-833) 
 
In this description, ZP’s loyalty and RJ’s disloyalty are linked to stable and continuous 
features of their respective characters. As for patriotism and democraticness the 
following excerpt must also be considered: 
 
Ustedes, siempre están siempre que van al extranjero denigrando el 
Gobierno de España. Y yo, en la Cumbre de Chile, defendí al Sr. 
Aznar, de los ataques que públicamente le lanzaba el Sr. Chávez, 
el Sr. Chávez, como patriota lo hice, como patriota lo hice, como 
persona con principios democráticos (I.954-964)  
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Through this narrative where ZP defended former Spanish PM Aznar (PP), while PP 
always denigrates the PSOE Government when abroad, ZP constructs a difference 
between patriotic, and therefore presidentiable, candidates, and those that are not. As 
we have seen, ZP’s attempt of to portray himself as a patriot is rejected by RJ.    
 
9.2.2.3. Unity: the quest for agreement 
This move is connected with the moves on the attributes of selflessness and patriotism 
and democraticness. In response to RJ’s claims that he has divided the Spanish, ZP 
presents himself and PSOE as committed to reaching an agreement with PP: 
 
Cuando era líder de la oposición propuse, firmé un pacto 
antiterrorista para dar mi apoyo pleno al Gobierno. Sin 
condiciones. Nunca critiqué al Gobierno, nunca llevé al Parlamento 
ningún debate terrorista. Siempre di mi apoyo con un cheque en 
blanco. ¿Por qué? Porque para mí es inmoral usar en la lucha 
partidista el terrorismo. Inmoral. Forma parte del espíritu de la 
Transición colaborar siempre con los gobiernos democráticos en la 
lucha contra el terrorismo. Forma parte del espíritu 
constitucional (I.751-759; see also I.796-798) 
 
The quest for agreement is crucial in constructing presidentiability, since unity is one 
of the main presidentiable attributes. ZP also legitimizes himself through references to 
the Transition and the Constitution, using the topic of tradition. In these strategic 
narratives, positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the opponent are 
strengthened by quantifiers such as siempre or nunca: they stabilize (positive/negative) 
features of personality beyond the contingency. This essentialization of positive or 
negative features of candidates in description is a useful mechanism for increasing or 
decreasing presidentiability. 
 
9.2.3. A particular case: 11M for Spain: a bad debater and fair play 
The event known in Spain as 11M is the jihadist attack of March 11 2004, when 10 
bombs exploded in different points of Madrid’s metropolitan train network: 191 people 
were killed and almost 2000 were wounded. The PP government immediately accused 
ETA, and partially maintained this position even when soon after a Spain based jihadist 
group claimed responsibility for it. This attitude of PP, at the time in government, seems 
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to have been the responsible for the unexpected loss of the 2004 elections of 14 March. 
Like RJ at the time, some conservatives still believe that ETA provided some kind of 
support for jihadist terrorists and were actively involved in the attack, which had a 
decisive influence on the unpredicted results of the 2004 elections. Although the police 
investigations and trials concluded that there was no evidence to prove ETA’s 
involvement in the attack, some conservatives think that the judicial power and even the 
police somehow conspired with ETA and jihadists to return PSOE to power. 
PP tried to blame ETA, because in doing so it could reinforce the image of a party 
fighting terrorism and it could gather (conservative or not) Spanishists around a figure 
of strong, paternalistic and authoritarian father, as is often the case in situation of threat 
(consider the election success of George W. Bush after the attack of 11 September 
2001). But PP mystification had the opposite effect of favoring PSOE. Even though 
PSOE’s success in the 2004 elections was due to numerous factors, including the lack of 
a clear leadership in PP after Aznar’s decision to quit195; ZP’s charismatic leadership; 
PP’s inadequate management of the ecological crisis of the Prestige196; PP’s 
authoritarian decision to get involved in the Iraq war acting against public opinion
197
; a 
general desire for change, expressed in the Catalan municipal and regional elections; the 
events of 11M with PP accusing ETA and Spaniards feeling betrayed certainly 
contributed to putting PSOE back in government. 
This issue is very important for both parties and candidates, albeit for contrasting 
reasons and results. The historical context helps explains why it is used extensively by 
ZP, and –at least initially– avoided by RJ. In this sense, there are clear differences 
between the first and second debates: in the first, RJ avoids the issue (I.851-854; I.930-
931), whilst in the second he uses it to attack ZP through a tu quoque argument (II.917: 
Usted usó el 11-M. Usted apoyó lo que ocurrió en el 11-M). This issue is 
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 See, for instance, Campmany (2005). 
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 On 19 November 2002 a Liberian mono-hull oil tanker under Bahamas flag sank in front of Galician 
coast. The slow and poorly-organised reaction of regional (Galician) and national governments, both run 
by PP, caused one of the biggest ecological disasters in the recent history of Spain.  It also strengthened 
the image of a party unconcerned with ecological matters. This accident also seemed to give a solid 
argument for changing the Government in Galicia: actually for the first time since the restoration of 
democracy, PP was defeated in the land of Fraga and PSOE governed in coalition with the Galician 
nationalist party (BNG). 
197
 On19 March 2003, thanks to its absolute majority and despite the opposition of all other parties and 
the majority of Spaniards, who repeatedly demonstrated in rallies against the war, Aznar (PP) sent 
Spanish troops to invade Iraq alongside the USA, UK, Italy and Australia. The adduced motive (that Iraq 
had weapons of mass destruction and that the USA would help Spain in fighting against ETA), was 




absolutely strategic for ZP in presenting PSOE as a responsible and sincere party 
committed to peace and PP as a party that lies to the Spanish in order to obtain 
power, imagining conspiracies and carrying out a disloyal opposition against PSOE. 
ZP does so through circumstantial argument and a narrative that favorably presents 
PSOE and negatively presents PP; also it should also be noted that ZP mainly 
delegitimizes PP as a group rather than RJ personally, so personal references to him are 
rare (but contra see I.764). 
Well aware of the fact that even the mere recollection of this issue could damage 
PP’s image, RJ refuses to engage in the discussion of this issue (I.779; I.851-854). RJ 
accuses ZP of avoiding addressing the present situation and of using this argument 
strategically to win the elections:   
 
Oiga ¿Usted quiere que le voten por lo de la otra vez? ¿Bush, el 
11-M, Iraq, Aznar? Oiga, cambie un poco de discurso y hable de lo 
que le importa a los españoles (I.931-933) 
 
Usted ha ganado unas elecciones por Irak y por el 11-M. Da la 
sensación de que quiere volver a ganar unas elecciones por Irak o 
por el 11-M (II.959-961) 
 
Even though candidates know, as the audience does, that their intention is to win the 
elections, they present themselves as uninterested and selfless. Therefore, revealing 
the opponent’s real intentions (winning the elections) constitutes an attack. More 
specifically, RJ uses circumstantial argument to present ZP as an opportunist, and 
metapragmatic statements on ZP’s discourse to present ZP as a bad debater avoiding 
certain issues such as ETA terrorism, thereby making him less presidentiable. In the 
second debate RJ uses the same move of accusing ZP of having won the election thanks 
to the 11M terrorist attack and of continuing to use it for electoral ends (II.917). In 
doing so RJ creates a connection between ZP and terrorists. This shows that despite 
efforts (I.774) to remove himself from the position that senior PP members used during 
the 11 M crisis (accusing ETA and ZP), and despite as attempts to portray himself as 
moderate, RJ insists on delegitimizing ZP as having been involved with the attacks.  
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Even though both ZP and RJ use 11M to attack each other, the issue is far more 
profitable for ZP, who refers to it far more frequently than RJ: he is the first to introduce 
this issue, accusing PP in general (ustedes) and RJ in particular (I.769-772) of having 
lied regarding responsibility for the attack out of electoral interests (I.743-772). ZP 
accuses PP of inventing a conspiracy, because it did not accept the (unexpected) 
election result (I.814-819). In order to disable RJ’s attacks and discredit him, ZP 
represents PP as an unfair player of the electoral game that failed to accept the 
election results. The following excerpt is very significant: 
 
en cuanto ganamos las elecciones tuvimos que ir a una comisión de 
investigación del 11-M, yo respondí como no ha hecho ningún 
presidente 14 horas en esa comisión de investigación, y en el 
2005, en el primer debate de Estado de la Nación, ya me dijo que 
traicionaba a los muertos. Y el Sr. Acebes, ha dicho que mi 
proyecto era el proyecto de ETA. Todos los españoles han visto que 
ustedes han utilizado de manera partidista, sólo han tenido un 
objetivo de oposición, ETA y el terrorismo (I.901-909) 
 
Through circumstantial argument, ZP represents RJ as an unscrupulous opportunist who 
uses terrorism for his own electoral interests; as he did for the block of the economy, 
through this move ZP deactivates RJ’s attacks by presenting them as coming from an 
untrustworthy person. As he did in the case of the economy ZP backdates PP and RJ’s 
attacks to the beginning of the PSOE legislature, showing that RJ always accused ZP of 
contiguity with ETA, and not only in the present circumstances as consequence of the 
negotiation. In doing so, ZP deactivates RJ’s accusations, showing that they are 
business as usual.  
ZP insists on referring to 11M, as it is a means of portraying both PP and RJ as 
unfair players, as unreasonable and liars (II.872-881) and therefore not presidentiable. 
The following passage is particularly meaningful: 
 
Sí, señor Rajoy, aquí está su declaración (enseña un periódico): 
"No le quepa la más mínima duda de que, al final, el terrorismo 
islamista y el de ETA estarán relacionados". 2004. ¿Dónde está la 
relación? Han estado intoxicando, creando confabulaciones 
hipotéticas sobre el 11-M, sobre el atentado más grave que nos 
costó 192 muertos en toda la legislatura, poniendo en cuestión el 
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sumario judicial, poniendo en cuestión a las fuerzas y cuerpos de 
seguridad del Estado, todo porque no asumieron el resultado 
electoral (II.926-934) 
 
ZP insists on presenting RJ as using ETA for his electoral ends; to strengthen his attack, 
ZP reports RJ’s speech from a newspaper before shifting the deixis (from usted to 
ustedes) to accuse PP of having intoxicated the legislature and of unpresident-like 
behavior, such as casting doubts on the integrity of the police and judges. This point is 
obviously crucial in detracting from RJ’s presidentiability, since a president respects 
democratic institutions
198
. As in the block on the economy, this description of RJ as 
disloyal and opportunistic contrasts with descriptions of ZP as loyal and selfless. Since 
there is agreement on the fact that a responsible president acts for the good of the State 
and democracy, these polarized descriptions increase ZP presidentiability and decrease 
that of RJ.  
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 The same move will be used again by ZP in the second debate when discussing the issue of education, 
for accusing RJ of criticizing Spanish teachers (II.1374-1390) and will be immediately contested by RJ 




In this subsection I have presented the way candidates managed their presidentiability in 
the debate in relation to the issue of terrorism according to the main presidentiable 
attributed: general attributes (unity, sincerity, loyalty, coherence, consistency, activity, 
capacity, efficacy, selflessness, strength, realism, experience, etc.) and particular 
attributes like being a nurturing father (dialogue) or a strict father (strictness). 
The main moves employed by candidates for managing their presidentiability can 
be resumed as follow: 
 
RJ → ZP: villain (negotiates with terrorists); removed from victims; feeble 
(cedes to terrorists’ blackmail); a liar; broke traditional agreement between PP-
PSOE; raised ETA to the level of a political interlocutor; removed from victims 
(betrays victims); incapable, inexperienced, frivolous; a divider; incoherent and 
inconsistent; opportunistic (he used 11M); a bad debater (does not speak about 
what matters). 
RJ → RJ: hero (fights terrorists); strong; close to victims. 
 
ZP → RJ: ineffective in fighting terrorism; a liar; unfair player; opportunist, 
disloyal; a divider. 
ZP → ZP: effective in fighting terrorism; concerned with peace; a fair player; 
selfless; loyal; a unifier; sincere; a patriot; democratic. 
 
As one can see these moves concerned the main general and particular attributes of a 
president. 
As for the main discursive-argumentative devices employed, we can see that 
candidates have extensively used different and often opposing narratives to describe the 
situation. Lexical choice played a crucial role in the description of reality in positive or 
in negative terms (fracaso; improvisación; indigno; inmoral); among them 
metaphor deserves a particular space, as that of aprendiz de brujo [sorcerer’s 
apprentice]. In the polarized representation of the situation, deixis has proved important 
in de/personalizing attacks. 
The use of reported speech, in the form of quoting the other’s statements or key 
words, such as when RJ entextualizes ZP’s words entendimiento, talante, 
convivencia, not only shows the intrinsic dialogicity of the debates, as well as their 
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polyphony and interdiscursivity, but is also relevant in observing how candidates use 
them as the basis for their arguments, for instance for showing incoherence or lies. 
Particularly, together with quantifiers (siempre, nunca, ningún), they essentialize and 
stabilize positive or negative features of the candidate. Quantifiers also construct the 
topics of quality and quantity, as well as that of uniqueness, thereby demonstrating the 
absolute positivity or negativity of the candidates. 
As for the arguments, we can see that ad hominem is frequently used. There are 
also examples of the abusive, tu quoque and circumstantial variants for representing the 
other as a liar, incoherent and opportunistic. The ad populum variant is also used for the 
purpose of alignment with the audience: Todos los españoles han visto (I.907). 
Finally, the metapragmatic statements deserve at least a mention for their role in 
directing the debate; they show that ethos is discursively constructed and that what is 
said is crucial in dis/constructing credibility. On this same line, it should be noted that 
one of the main accusations the use to attack each other is that of being a liar. Given the 
value of discourse in the construction of ethos, accusing someone of not telling the truth 
is crucial in reducing their credibility. 
Some observations need to be made about the similarities and differences between 
the first and second debates. Even if differences exist, showing the dynamicity of the 
construction of discourse, some common patterns emerge in the de/construction of 
presidentiability, which sometimes are common to how the presidentiability has been 
constructed in relation to other themes. For instance, the presentation of the situation 
where PP is against terrorists and with victims while ZP (and not PSOE) is with 
terrorists against victims is aimed at isolating ZP from his (former) electors and his 
party. Something similar occurred in the block on the economy. RJ’s accusations are 
personalized towards ZP, rather than against PSOE, in order to damage his own image 
and leadership, which is one of his main electoral assets. In fact, RJ presents ZP as the 
first and the only president to break the traditional consensus between PP and PSOE, 
portraying him as inexperienced, frivolous, irresponsible, and weak, as well as 
(somewhat absurdly) damaging to victims. This description is obviously based on the 
attributes that a president should have: experience, seriousness, responsibility and 
strength, and that RJ, referring to inflexibility, which is a local attribute (the strict 
father), for instance, attaches to his persona. In doing so, he increases his 
presidentiability and decreases ZP’s. As for personalization, criticizing ZP alone, 
presenting him as separate (different) from the rest of PSOE executives, cardholders and 
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electors, RJ isolates ZP and demonstrates that he is wrong, and not the entire PSOE 
establishment, nor all PSOE electors, whose votes PP is trying to get, and whose face 
PP should not threaten. PP aims less at convincing PSOE voters to reject their beliefs 
than at convincing them not to vote for ZP, because he is incapable and a liar: the 
problem was him. Given ZP’s strong leadership within PSOE, RJ tries to disalign 
electors from him, by reducing his personal appeal among PSOE electors but also 
executives, trying to persuade them that the electoral risk for PSOE is personified in ZP. 
The next chapter addresses the terrain of struggle of the Catalan question.  
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As we have seen above, in his statements on the electoral campaign, Elorraiga stressed 
that PP’s election strategy was based on sowing doubts about “the economy, 
immigration and nationalist issues”; in relation to this final point, I have already dealt 
with terrorism and I will now address the Catalan question
199
.  
The following pages provide an introduction to the question of the unity of 
Spain
200
, before going on to the Catalan question. Moving from the general to the 
particular, I will focus on the issue of the Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña, since it 
was a significant topic before and during the 2008 election campaign. To a certain 
degree it epitomizes the question of unity of Spain. Again, I will firstly historically 
introduce the question, before arriving 2008. I will then analyze how the two candidates 
articulate their discourses on this issue –which is central to Spanish politics– in order to 
manage their presidentiability, discussing the moves and discursive devices they 
employ.   
 
10.1. The Catalan question from the 15th century to the present 
Spain is one of the oldest European nation-states: its unification began in 1479, when 
the sovereigns of two of the major realms of the Iberian Peninsula, Isabelle I of Castile 
and Ferdinand II of Aragon, were married. Later, in 1492, these monarchs completed 
the Reconquista, i.e. the conquest of the kingdom of Granada, until then ruled by the 
Moors. From 1479 to 1715 the kingdom of Spain is constituted by two distinct but 
integrated realms, Castile&Leon and Aragon. Even if in condition of coordination, 
Castile was in a more favorable position, for example, exclusively owning the rich 
American colonies. The two realms kept their respective legal orders called fueros and 
any attempt to homogenize them sparked a reaction, especially in Aragon
201
. This last 
point is central since it is the origin of dispute concerning fueros (see below). Even at 
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 Interestingly enough, when Spanish politicians talk about nationalism(s), they refer to peripheralism as 
Basqueism, Catalanism and Galicianism, and never to Spanishism, which goes unnoticed and is taken for 
granted as patriotism (see Billig (1998) about their nationalism our patriotism). 
200
 See Comellas Garcia Llera (1999); Vilar (2001); Balfour & Quiroga (2007). The issue of unity of 
Spain practically does not concern Galicia (only briefly referred to in II.1273) due to the lukewarm nature 
of Galician nationalism: as for the Basque Country instead it is treated rather as a problem of Terrorism. 
201
 The term fuero(s) refers to a system of local rights, norms, and privileges in use in some regions of 
Iberian Peninsula from the Middle Ages. 
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the risk of oversimplification it is safe to say that by the beginning of the 16th century 
Spain was already a unified kingdom, despite its many historical, cultural, juridical, and 
linguistic differences, rooted especially in three areas: 1) in what is today called the 
Basque Country and Navarra, roughly corresponding to the former kingdom of Navarre; 
2) in what is today called Catalonia, which corresponded to the earlier kingdom of 
Aragon; 3) and in what is today called Galicia, which corresponds to the former 
kingdom of Galicia. These historical, cultural, juridical and linguistic differences were 
the motive for internal tensions throughout modern Spanish history between the 
centralist (Castilianist) and peripheralist forces.  
Each of the three movements of resistance to centralization, i.e. Basqueism, 
Catalanism and Galicianism, has its own historical and cultural specificities. The 
Catalan case is by far the most interesting: together with the Basque one is more radical 
than the Galician one; but unlike the Basque movement, its evolution has been less 
violent. Actually the violent drift of a part of Basqueism, for instance ETA, allows 
Spanish centralist parties to deal with it in terms of national security or fight against 
terrorism, whilst Catalan resistance is considered as a “purely” political issue. The 
thematic division of the debates reflects this ideological division: Basqueism has been 
treated as a problem of FP and national security, while Catalanism will be dealt with as 
a problem of IP. Moreover, tensions between Castilianism and Catalanism seem to be 
rooted more deeply in the past compared to Basqueism.  
Indeed tensions between Castile and Catalonia were already apparent in the 17th 
century, as shown by the War of Separation and the Revolta dels Sesgadors (1640-
1652), or the anti-Catalanism expressed in some of the works of one of the main 
Spanish (Castilian) literati as Francisco de Quevedo: La vida del Buscón and La 
rebelión de Barcelona no es por el huevo ni por el fuero (Balcells 1974; Arredondo 
1998; Simon 2006). 
These tensions increased during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713) 
between Philip V Bourbon Duke of Anjou (of France) and the pretender Archduke 
Charles Habsburg (of Austria). The Castilians supported Philip, whilst the Catalonians 
supported Charles in an attempt to maintain their fueros. The historic capital of Aragon, 
Barcelona, faithful to the Archduke, was militarily besieged and then occupied by 
Bourbon troops: the war finished 11 September 1714 with the capitulation of Barcelona. 
This day, also known as the Diada, is considered Catalonia’s national(istic) feast day to 
commemorate those that died defending Barcelona. After succeeding to the throne, 
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Philip unified the two crowns under the Spanish crown, imposed a Castile-based central 
policy and extended the Castilian political, legal and administrative model to the 
territories of Aragón: all fueros were abolished, except those of Navarra and the Basque 
Country, due to the nobility’s loyalty to Philip during the war. Catalan nationalists 
consider these events to mark the start of the Castilian oppression of the Catalonians. 
Indeed, after 1715 Aragon passed from a situation of coordination to one of 
subordination with the other Spanish regions. 
Although not all historians agree, fueros were also the motive for three Carlist 
Wars (1833-1840; 1846-1849; 1872-1876), a sort of succession wars between those 
supporting moderate and liberal sovereigns and those supporting integralist Catholic 
sovereigns (Moreno 2002). Although an in-depth study of this fascinating yet confusing 
period of Spanish history is not appropriate here, it is important to state that the Liberals 
(whose position were very close to centralist nationalism based on the example of the 
French Revolution) were fought by the Catholic elite as well as the Basque, Navarre, 
and Catalonian elite, who saw them as an opportunity to regain local rights, derechos 
forales, currently referred to as derechos históricos, lost during the War os Spanish 
Succession. This coincides approximately with the emergence of two progressively 
radicalized cleaveages, which predominate in Spain for almost two centuries: centralism 
vs. peripheralism and confessionality vs. laity. 
Although some historians disagree (Canal 2008: 42, 53-54), others associate 
Carlism with separatism (Oyarzun 2008[1944]: 486-488). Others, such as Elias de 
Tejada (1971), think that when people lost all hope of maintaining or recovering fueros 
with and within a centralist Spanish Monarchy, they also lost faith in the Monarchy and 
centralism, embracing anti-monarchism (republicanism) and anti-Spanishism 
(separatism). However it is reasonable to think that Catalanism is rooted partly in 
Carlism, which was traditionalist, conservative, monarchic and catholic, and partly in 
Catalonian Republican Federalism (see Figueres 2010). These two trends towards 
conservatism and republicanism are still present in the institutional expression of 
Catalanism: on the one hand Convergencia i Unió (CiU), a coalition of right wing 
conservative Catalanist parties, and on the other Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC), a left-wing progressive republican Catalanist party (Dowling 2005)
 202
.  
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 Catalanism also received the influence of Romanticism: for example the celebration of the Diada 
started in 1886 (Anguera 2008: 8-10, 20). History is used for inventing tradition, for de/legitimation and 
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In order to gain an insight into Catalanism in Spanish society we must focus on four 
more periods: the two dictatorships, the Second Republic, and the transition to 
democracy, because the echoes of these periods have a major influence on the Spanish 
political field. 
The Castilianization process which began in 1715 reached its peak during the 
dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), Prime Minister under King 
Alphonse XIII; despite growing calls for autonomy from Basqueists, Catalanists, and 
Galicianists, Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship was Monarchist, Catholic and 
Centralist/Unitarian, as would be that of Francisco Franco
203
. These features are still 
common to Spanish right wing parties. In contrast, laicism, federalism and 
republicanism would, in varying degrees, constitute common characteristics of Spain’s 
left wing parties.  
During the Second Republic (1931-1939), the central government devolved a 
number of competencies to regions, allowing, within their historical territories, the use 
of Basque, Catalan and Galician, which were prohibited during Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship. The 1931 Constitution tried to solve the two major cleavages within 
Spanish society: 1) centralism vs. peripheralism, or, the “problema catalán”, as Primo 
de Rivera called it in some of his discourses (Cambó 1991: 835-852; Jacob & Jordá 
1998); and 2) clericalism vs. laity. With the regards to the first problem, the decision 
was to integrate centralism and federalism (CE1931: art. 1, par. 3), recognizing some 
prerogatives to peripheralisms. As for the second, the choice was laicism (CE1931: art. 
3). This openness to peripheralism and laicism seemed too dangerous to extremist 
Spanishist conservatives (the Catholic Church, monarchists and the Army), since they 
interpreted it as the breakup of the five hundred unity of Catholic Spain
204
, something 
which still is fetishized today, as RJ’s words show (I.1264). Right wing national 
Catholics grouped together under the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas 
Autónomas), which supported the second government of the Republic. This second 
government tried to correct some of the reforms of first Republican government, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
for strategically reinterpret past in connection with new or contemporary claims (Anderson 1991[1983]; 
Bauman & Briggs 2003; Billig 1995; Gellner 1997; Hobsbawm 1990; Wodak et al. 1999). 
203
 Actually Franco considered Primo de Rivera as the first Francoist and the first savior of the nation 
against atheism, communism, and separatism. 
204
 In Spain the Catholic religion is strictly linked to Nation: the unification process starts recovering and 
reconverting to Catholicism peninsular territories under Muslims and since then, Spanish sovereigns were 
the only awarded by Roman Church with the title of “Catholic Monarchs”. Unitarianism is so linked to 
Catholicism that there exist a term such as nacional-catolicismo for defining this link. 
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especially in the fields of laicism and peripheralism. When in 1936 the left wing Frente 
Popular won the elections, the highly radicalized right wing Catholic nationalist forces 
decided to put a stop to this situation at any cost. They carried out a coup d’état, which 
led to the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship of Francisco Franco
205
. During the 
dictatorship peripheralisms were severely repressed, since the main ideological elements 
of Francoism were Unitarianism, Centralism, Castilianism (the idea of the superiority of 
Castilian), Catholicism, militarism, and anticommunism. The principal Francoist slogan 
was “[España] una, grande, libre”. As the official Francoist emblem (Esparza-Leibar 
2006: 247-248), reproduced below shows, Unitarianism was the first and foremost 
ideological axis of Francoism. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Spanish Francoist emblem 
 
Unitarianism was so crucial to Francoism that during the Spanish Civil War its forces 
were known as the bando nacional, framing its opponents as anti-national. The concept 
Nacional-catolicismo, i.e. the sum of (Spanish) Nationalism and Catholicism was 
absorbed by Spain’s new right wing parties such as AP and PP206. 
Transition meant a new opportunity for peripheralism. The current structure of the 
Kingdom of Spain as stipulated in the 1978 Constitution and ratified by referendum, is 
called the Estado de las autonomías, in reference to the fact that the State is organized 
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 Note the role played by military in the Spanish politics; during the 113 years from 1868 until 1981, 
military led 7 coup d’état: September 1868, January 1874, December 1874, September 1923, August 
1932 (unsuccessful), July 1936, and February 1981 (unsuccessful). Military are contrary to federalism or 
separatism, Communism, atheism and Republic. 
206
 Although PP tries to moderate this ideological feature, especially in strategic terms in the run-up to 
elections, other subjects, including IU, still use this term to define PP, in an attempt to bring PP ideology 
to the fore (IU 2008). 
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in regions (comunidades autónomas) with a high degree of legislative, executive and 
administrative devolution in an attempt to balance centralism and peripheralism. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish Constitution clearly favors centralism: autonomy is possible 
within the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation (CE1978: art. 2); other languages can 
be used but the official language is Castilian (CE1978: art. 3); etc. The Estado de las 
autonomías is the form agreed upon during the Transition by opposition groups in order 
to overcome the post-Francoism impasse and resolve tensions between centralist and 
federalist radicals. These two irreconcilable positions only could reach a minimum 
agreement. However, this agreement, which at the beginning seemed to work well, 
would sooner or later show its limits, especially for peripheralists
207
. In recent years 
peripheralist forces, convinced that the dictatorship is now sufficiently removed in time 
and that conservative radicals lack the power to impose their will, are trying to change 
the status quo in order to obtain considerably greater administrative and symbolic 
recognition. 
Now that the historic development of the struggle between centralism and 
peripheralism in Spain has been discussed, I will provide a detailed insight into one of 
the main issues of the struggle regarding the unity of Spain: the Estatut de Autonomia 
de Catalunya. I will briefly present its genealogy and then the relative position of PP 
and PSOE towards the Catalan question, the unity of Spain, and the type of 
administration, with particular attention to the space this issue occupies in party 
manifestos.  
 
10.1.1. The Estatut de Autonomia de Catalunya 
The Estatut de Autonomia de Catalunya or Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña in 
Spanish is the basic institutional statute of Catalonia: it establishes autonomous 
competencies and self-government for Catalonia. First approved by the Spanish 
Parliament in 1932, during the Second Republic, it was abolished during Franco’s 
dictatorship. Then in 1979, after the end of dictatorship, a new Estatut was approved. 
This last text was reformed in 2006, under the first ZP government. On 18 June 2006, 
the reformed Estatut, approved by both Spanish Parliament and Senate, was ratified in a 
referendum by the Catalonians. Together with other issues, it deals with the Catalan 
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 It worked because at the beginning of the transition the need for avoiding dictatorship continuity 
exceeded every other ideological claim. Actually all groups lost something for getting something else (see 
De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 19-20). 
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institutional system, its forms and governing bodies, its competencies, citizens’ rights 
and duties, linguistic politics and policies, institutional relationships and funding. It was 
approved despite the harsh opposition of PP, of other Spanish regions governed by PP, 
and of many Right catholic and conservative groups and media. 
The 1932 text conferred a high degree of autonomy for Catalonia, although it 
failed to satisfy the Catalanists’ demands. Prior to its ratification by the Spanish 
Parliament, it underwent a number of modifications: from “Catalonia as autonomous 
state” to “an autonomous region within the Spanish State”; and from “Catalan as the 
only official language” to “Catalan and Castilian as co-official languages”. Towards the 
end of the Spanish Civil War, when Francoist troops entered Barcelona in January 1939, 
they immediately abolished the Estatut.  
The 1979 Estatut emerged against a complex background of negotiations and 
fragile agreements, just after the end of Franco’s dictatorship and the promulgation of a 
new Constitution (1978). Although granted Catalonia some degree of autonomy, in 
terms of the most symbolic issues it was similar to the 1932 Estatut. Indeed, it was if 
time had stood still: fifty years on, the Catalanists still had the same degree of autonomy 
as in 1936.   
During the Catalonian regional elections of 2003, ZP, the PSOE candidate for the 
2004 general elections, promised that if he was elected he would support a new Estatut 
put forward by the Catalonian Parliament. In contrast, the Catalonia section of PP made 
no reference in their program to any modification of the 1979 Estatut.   
It must be stated that in the most disputed topics concerning nationalism, 
language, abortion, etc. PP prefers immobilism. Most of these highly symbolic issues 
were agreed on in the early years of Spain’s young and fragile democracy. All decisions 
taken at that time regarding the preeminent cleavages of Spanish society, crystallized by 
the 1978 Constitution, are the result of that search for balance between conservative and 
progressive movements. The latter accepted moderate agreements in order to secure 
democracy in the hope that they could be improved and extended in the future. This 
democracy is actually often defined as imperfect precisely because of the way it arose 
(Colomer 1998). This partially explains the attempts of progressive movements to 
change the 1978 Constitution, as well as the conservatives’ fetishism for 1978 
Constitution and the agreements established in it. PP’s constant and staunch defense of 
the 1978 Constitution is an excellent example of conservatism.  
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In 2003 the three co-allied ruling parties that emerged from the 2003 Catalonian 
elections, as known as Tripartit (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA), in office for the first time after 
a quasi-monopoly of the Catalanist conservative liberal Catholic and bourgeois party 
CiU, reached an agreement with CiU regarding the modification of the existing Estatut 
on issues such as defining Catalonia as a nation and the obligation to be able to speak 
both Catalonian and Castilian. Catalonia’s Parliament, with the sole opposition of PP, 
approved the draft. In November 2005, the Spanish Parliament agreed to consider the 
draft, opposed only by PP. After a period of negotiation, the new Estatut was approved, 
with the abstention of ERC, which called for a greater degree of federalism, and the 
opposition of PP, which demanded the opposite. It came into effect on 20
 
July 2006 
(BOE 2006a). Whilst the Catalanists celebrated the passing of the new Estatut, an 
appeal was presented before the Constitutional Court by PP MPs as well as by the 
governments of some Spanish regions governed by PP. PP’s appeal was based on the 
claim that 187 (out of 223) articles of the Estatut were unconstitutional. 
Even though we can measure the level of opposition to the new Estatut by the 
number of articles appealed against, it is equally true that some articles were more 
important that others, with a greater capacity for polarizing electors in favor and against, 
and therefore received greater media attention. This is so not only because they are 
legally crucial for determining the right of Catalonia to autonomy or independence, but 
also because of their symbolic significance. They were the articles defining Catalonia as 
a nation and Catalan as a national language
208
. Legislative competencies, the 
administration of justice, funding or competencies regarding infrastructures, etc. (which 
were the object of most of the articles appealed) are key factors in determining the level 
of autonomy of a region, but it is very difficult to convince electors to take a stance on 
such complex issues. It is far easier to polarize electors about simpler but highly 
symbolic issues such as the definition of Catalonia as a nation and policies on the 
“national” language209; since people –politicians as well as electors– need symbols 
(Edelman 1964).  
The case of the Estatut also shows that when it comes to symbolically critical 
issues such as the laws approved by PSOE on homosexual marriage, Educación para la 
Ciudadanía, Memoria Histórica and Estatut de Catalunya, the battle engaged by PP 
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 Preamble and articles 5, 6.1, 6.2, 8.1, 33.5, 34, 35, 50.5 (BOE 2006a: 27.269-27270). 
209
 This is always a delicate theme, since it is related to identity, and to nation in the actual “monolingual” 
ideology of nation-states (Duchêne 2008). 
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was not only discursive but also legal, through appeals to Constitutional Court with the 
aim of abolishing them. This is also related to the idea of de/legitimation, since the 
Supreme Court’s decisions will de/legitimize parties: a decision of unconstitutionality 
legitimizes the appealing party, delegitimizing those that promulgated the law, whilst in 
contrast decision of constitutionality legitimizes the party that promulgated the law, 
delegitimizing the one that appealed. 
 
10.1.2. Unity of Spain for PSOE and PP 
An extensive introduction to the historic background and the genealogy of the Estatut 
was necessary in order to grasp fully its importance with Spain’s political field and to 
understand the construction of presidentiability in relation to this issue, the stance 
adopted by the candidates and their strategies for positive self-presentation and the 
negative presentation of the other. 
As we have seen, the unity of Spain is a deeply-rooted cleavage in Spanish 
politics: it is a political myth and a crucial symbol that caused major tensions and wars. 
For (Catholic) conservatives in particular, unity is a political fetish, which has value per 
se, by virtue of recalling a glorious colonial past (cf. I.1264: España es una nación 
con cinco siglos de historia). 
According to De Santiago-Guervós, since the Transition, Marxism, Separatism 
and Terrorism the most negative words for the Right (1996: 18, 56). Manuel Fraga, 
founder of AP-PP, was clearly contrary to separatism and to Marxism (apud De 
Santiago-Guervós 1996: 19). To some extent these three issues (socio-economic 
measures, form of state, and terrorism) still lie at the center of the political debate, 
proving the continuity between Francoism and PP. It should also be noted that the Right 
attribute the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War to Marxism and separatism (ibid.). Since 
the years of Transition, PP has used the memory of the Civil War as an argument for 
maintaining the status quo, according to the implicit premise that changing things could 
lead to a new conflict
210
. At present this argument is still used by PP through the 
fetishization of the agreement reached during the Transition between right and left, 
as shown in RJ’s references to division and tensions or the expression “opening old 
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 The failed attempt of coup d’état of Colonnel Tejero on 23 February 1981 was due to the reaction of 




wounds” in topics such as Memoria Histórica211, Educación para la Ciudadanía212 or 
Estatut de Catalunya. 
One more observation needs to be made about the word Spain. As De Santiago-
Guervós states: 
 
España es una palabra que llega a la Transición española a la democracia casi como sinónimo de 
derecha, de extrema derecha e incluso de fascismo. Sólo la derecha habla de España, símbolo de 
unidad, de imperio, de nacionalismo español. Los que desean ser identificados como derecha 
llevan la bandera de española en su reloj, en su coche, etc. Algunos partidos, como Alianza 
Popular (antecedente inmediato del Partido Popular actual) la utilizan incluso como bandera de su 
partido y en sus mítines ondea por doquier. Digamos que hay una apropiación de la palabra y la 
bandera por parte de la derecha. Decir España es decir derecha, sobre todo si observamos que los 
partidos más progresistas y los nacionalistas [catalanes, gallegos, vascos, n.d.r.] hablan de Estado 
español o, simplemente, de este país (1996: 2). 
 
So Spain, the concept of a united nation but also the word itself, is the property of the 
Right. For the Right Spain means ‘one-and-the-only-nation’; while for the Left it means 
a ‘nation-of-nations’213. Since federalism constitutes for Spanishists a risk to the unity 
of Spain and as a result of PP’s effort to set the political agenda, PP’s politicians and 
conservative media (LibertadDigital, Hispanidad, HazteOír, ABC, El Mundo, La Razón, 
                                                          
211
 It is widely-known that contemporary democratic Spain is built upon collective oblivion (Aguilar-
Fernández 1996; Resina 2000; Bernecker 2009; see also Renan (1987[1882]: 7) on the relationship 
between memory and oblivion in the national construction). The so called Ley de Memoria Histórica 
(BOE 2007b), recognizes and increases rights for those persons persecuted during the Civil War and the 
Francoist dictatorship. Proposed by PSOE in 2006, it was approved at the end of 2007, a few months 
before the 2008 elections. The law recognizes the illegitimacy of sentences issued by Francoist tribunals 
and the legitimacy of the previous Republic; the Spanish state would help to locate, identify and exhume 
of missing victims or buried in communal graves. All objects commemorating Francoism will be removed 
from public spaces. A Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica will be created in Salamanca. PP and 
conservative groups and media criticized the law, accusing PSOE of opening old wounds or of seeking 
revenge. On 20 February 2008 RJ promised to withdraw public funds for the law for finding bodies in 
communal graves if he won the 2008 elections. 
212
 Educación para la Ciudadanía y los Derechos Humanos (BOE 2007a: 715-721) is the name of a 
subject designed for the last cycle of mandatory primary education (children aged 10-12) and for 
compulsory secondary education (young people aged 12-16) in Spain by ZP’s Socialist government, and 
approved by the Spanish Parliament. In accordance with a recommendation of the European Council 
(12/2002), it aims to teach democratic and constitutional values and promote freedom, pluralism, 
tolerance, and respect for human rights. In its last reform of the education laws (BOE 2006b; BOE 2007a; 
BOE 2006a), PSOE included this new subject matter, Educación para la ciudadanía. PP, the Catholic 
Church and conservative associations severely criticized and opposed the law, obstructing its enforcement 
and presenting an appeal before the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court. Like the rest of his party, RJ 
was highly critical of this new subject, declaring that he would repeal the law if elected in 2008.  . 
213
 The relative positions of Left and Right on nation, centralism, federalism, etc. have changed 
throughout history (Balfour & Quiroga 2007, especially ch. 4 and 5; Balfour 2005b; Nuñez-Seixas 2005), 
but the picture I portray here is quite faithful. 
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TeleMadrid, InterEconomía, Actualidad Económica, COPE, etc.) continually stressed 
the importance of Spanish unity, as an unquestionable vital issue, presenting a dramatic 
image of disruption, as with the slogan “(con Zapatero) España se rompe214”, and 
insisting on the question of languages (Castilian vs. Catalan), due to their symbolic 
significance in nation-building processes. 
Since for PP unity of Spain is an undisputable value that cannot undergo any 
revision or change, as a fetish, much of the PP election program is dedicated to this 
issue from a Spanishist and Castilianist stance
215
 (PP 2008: 7-8, 11-12, 22-45). This 
overwhelming presence of unity of Spain in PP’s discourse (manifesto, debates, etc.) 
shows the relevance that this issue had and continues to have for the Spanish Right. In 
its manifesto PP calls for a strong central government, expressing a clear preference 
against change and in favor of tradition, aligning itself full with the Constitution.    
In contrast PSOE, which is not a separatist party, but has a greater sensitivity 
towards regional idiosyncrasies, dedicates relatively little attention in its program to the 
unity of Spain. Moreover, it addresses this issue in a radically different manner, with 
numerous references to concepts such as agreement, collaboration, cooperation, and 
coordination between central and peripheral government institutions. 
Now that we have considered the importance of this issue, we can analyze the 
way it is addressed during the two televised debates.  
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 http://www.elmundo.es/opinion/columnas/isabel-san-sebastian/2009/07/17424027.html  
215
 By these two terms I refer respectively to the ideology according to which Spain must be a Unitarian 
nation and to the ideology according to which Castilian is the main language. 
292 
 
10.2. The Unity of Spain in the debate: strategies, moves, devices 
As stated by senior PP member Gabriel Elorriaga (Crawford 2008), the Catalonian 
question is, together with the economy and immigration, one of the 4 main themes on 
the political agenda strategically set by PP in order to win votes from PSOE: for this 
reason it was one of the main terrains of struggle of the 2008 election campaign. The 
Unity of Spain and administrative issues were dealt with in the IP. The analysis will 
show that candidates manage their presidentiability according to the general and local 
presidentiable attributed described in chapter 1. 
 
10.2.1. RJ’s moves to manage presidentiability 
 
10.2.1.1. Ability: ZP as incapable 
As in the blocks on the economy, immigration and terrorism, one of RJ’s key strategies 
at all stages of both debates is to present ZP as incapable: as mixing priorities, as only 
having achieved two things, namely negotiating with terrorists and modifying the 
structure of state, neither of which led to a positive outcome: las ha hecho mal 
(I.103-104); le han salido mal (I.107); ha equivocado las prioridades 
(II.124-125); ambos han sido un fracaso (II.126-127); no lo ha conseguido 
(I.1028); usted aquí ha fracasado (II.1289); este con su negociación con ETA 
fue el gran fracaso de esta legislatura (II.1054-1055). This is a very easy 
move in order to detract from the opponent’s presidentiability, since it is agreed that 
citizens need an able and capable president. 
 
10.2.1.2. Unity: ZP as a divider  
Another move employed by RJ is to present ZP as a divider. This point must be 
understood in two different but related senses: a divider of citizens and a divider of 
parties, through the breaking of the agreements of the Transition. As with other 
moves, here too RJ frequently employs narratives based on the scheme “before(+) vs. 
now(–)”, where ZP is represented as the first and the only president to interrupt the 
(positive) tradition. This representation is constructed through the topic of uniqueness 
(ZP is negatively unique). As in many other points of the debate RJ uses the tu quoque 
argument (ZP says one thing and does the opposite) in order to present ZP as 
incoherent. Interestingly, in order to highlight what ZP says and what he does, RJ 
quotes (positive) keywords of ZP’s discourse as entendimiento, talante and 
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convivencia, while ZP is presented as sowing discord. We can clearly see this move in 
the OS of the first debate. 
 
¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4 años 
además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la Alianza de 
Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras cuestiones? Ha hecho 
dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y las dos las ha hecho mal: 
la estructura de España y los tratos con ETA. Ha querido modificar 
por su cuenta el modelo de Estado y ha querido negociar con los 
terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas operaciones le han salido mal. 
[…] para salirse con la suya, necesitó romper todos los consensos 
de la Transición […] Ningún gobernante ha sembrado en la historia 
de la Transición Moderna tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez 
que hablaba de entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia (I.100-
118) 
 
The same moves are implemented in the OS of the second debate, where RJ gives a 
negative description of the situation through references to one of the most historically 
entrenched fears in Spanish society, namely the risk of secession represented by the 
referenda of separation put forward in Catalonia and the Basque Country: 
 
Se nos dice que España está más unida y cohesionada que nunca, 
pero tenemos un referéndum de separación convocado para este año y 
tenemos uno anunciado para el futuro. Al señor Zapatero sé que no 
le gusta que le diga esto, se enfada conmigo, pero debiera 
enfadarse con quien convoca los referéndum. Hay españoles que han 
visto cómo sus derechos han sido afectados. Hay españoles que son 
conscientes de que se ha perdido la igualdad en muchos temas. 
Cuando él llegó al Gobierno, recibió un modelo de Estado en el que 
había un acuerdo sustancial entre los españoles y un modelo de 
financiación de las autonomías que trataba todo por igual. Ahora 
todo está en el alero y todo está abierto (II.104-115) 
 
Here again we can see a narrative according to which before ZP things were fine; there 
were agreements between PP and PSOE and equality among Spaniards (acuerdo, 
igualdad), while now everything is up in the air, based on the notion that “equality” 




¿Qué ha pasado en los cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de España 
ha equivocado las prioridades. Ha tenido dos grandes proyectos: el 
primero, cambiar España y el segundo, negociar con ETA. Ambos han 
sido un fracaso. Se ha dividido a los españoles, se ha generado 
mucha tensión y, sobre todo, se ha olvidado lo esencial, que es la 
economía, que son los precios, que es la vida de las personas, que 
es su forma de sentir, de vivir, son sus preocupaciones. Creo que 
se necesita un Gobierno que dé certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé 
seguridad, que se ocupe de los problemas reales de los españoles, 
que busque acuerdos, que sea un Gobierno para todos y que no 
divida a los españoles (II.124-134) 
 
RJ presents ZP as a divider (Se ha dividido a los españoles, se ha generado 
mucha tensión), and therefore unpresidentiable. The conclusion of RJ’s 
argumentation is an explicit positive self-presentation, the implicit premise being that 
RJ possesses the qualities that ZP lacks: stability, strength, prioritization, agreement, 
and unity. So RJ presents himself as Unitarian: as the President of all Spaniards and 
as the defender of the unity of Spain. 
At many other points of the debate in the IP block RJ deploys his moves to 
present ZP as a divider and as breaking traditional consensus, as shown by the 
following excerpt:  
 
no sé si sabía usted, pero antes de llegar usted al gobierno las 
cuestiones que afectaban al modelo territorial de España se 
pactaban entre los grandes partidos. Y usted rompió ese acuerdo 
como ha roto otros muchos en España. Los resultados están a la 
vista ha creado usted enfrentamiento entre las CCAA por el 
patrimonio, por la financiación, por las inversiones, por el agua… 
ha dividido a los españoles y ha afectado a su igualdad. Por 
primera vez desde 1978, por primera vez eh, con usted de 
presidente del Gobierno, un estatuto se ha pactado sin el acuerdo 
de los grandes partidos nacionales (I.1015-1025)  
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These two moves are repeatedly employed in both debates, almost through the same 
propositions: 
 
Enfrentó a todas las comunidades autónomas entre sí […]. Dividió a 
los españoles […]. Propició por primera vez en la historia un 
Estatuto que no contaba con el acuerdo de todos (II.1055-1061) 
 
la primera vez desde 1977 que esto se ha roto ha sido con usted 
[…] Jamás hubo un estatuto que no fuera apoyado por los grandes 
partidos nacionales (II.1276-1283) 
 
As we can see, RJ implements this move through a narrative based on the scheme 
“before(+) vs. now(–)” and through the topic of uniqueness to represent ZP as 
extraordinarily negative. ZP is presented as the agent who worsens the situation (Así 
ha conseguido usted que nos vean, I.1009). RJ uses deixis (nosotros) to align 
himself with Spaniards, dealigning them from ZP (usted dividió a los españoles, 
II.1055). In order to realistically represent ZP as a divider, RJ reports ZP’s own words 
on the concept of nation (comenzó usted su mandato diciendo aquello de que 
“el concepto de nación es discutido y discutible”, I.1009-1010). In doing 
so, RJ presents ZP as being unconcerned about the unity of Spain and therefore an anti-
patriot. 
Since the management of presidentiability is always twofold, RJ also constructs a 
positive image of himself in relation to this issue. He presents himself and PP as the 
agents of unity: i.e. as the defenders of Spain and Spanishism and as the agents of 
collaboration between PP and PSOE. 
 
Oiga, yo tengo, he pactado muchas cosas con su partido. El Pacto 
Autonómico del 1992, fui a Moncloa, lo firmé con González, lo 
firmó Aznar, yo estaba con él, luego en el año 1996 (I.1252-1261) 
 
10.2.1.3. Sincerity: ZP as a liar or as removed from reality 
As in the other blocks, RJ refers to the attribute of sincerity. Again, detracting from the 
opponent’s presidentiability is implemented through metapragmatic statements. RJ’s 
aims to present ZP as a liar or at least as naive or irresponsible. In order to achieve 
this, RJ constructs a contrast between what ZP says and reality:  
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Se nos dice que España está más unida y cohesionada que nunca, 
pero tenemos un referéndum de separación convocado (I.104-107) 
 
¿De verdad cree que España como dice usted, está más unida y 
cohesionada que nunca? (I.1034-1035) 
 
usted sigue diciendo que estamos muy unidos […] hay convocado un 
referendum de separación […] ¿Sigue usted creyendo que estamos muy 
unidos? (I.1097-1104) 
 
The premise being that a president should be sincere and by no means naive or removed 
from reality, this move is very effective in eroding ZP’s credibility, and indeed it has 
been employed also in other terrains of struggle. This move is a way of demonizing the 
opponent in his personal features (intelligence, realism, etc.), through the abusive 
argument. It is used widely throughout the debates, principally by RJ as in usted no 
se entera (II.1399; II.1436; II.1441; these attacks are responded by ZP in II.1437; 
II.1537). Here again deixis is crucial in aligning RJ with the audience (se nos dice) 
and in dealigning the audience from ZP. 
 
10.2.1.4. ZP as ignorant and unserious, inexpert and irresponsible 
Related to the move of demonizing the opponent through personal attacks –the 
principal feature of RJ’s interaction– is his recurrent use of abusive argument in order to 
represent ZP as ignorant, for instance through propositions like “nobody knows your 
idea of Spain/you have no idea of Spain” (I.1012-1013; I.1111-1112; I.1261-1267; 
II.1049-1069; II.1144-1161; II.1220-1224); as if he is frivolizing serious issues: 
 
Usted no tiene una idea de España, […] usted no tiene una idea de 
España. España es una nación de más de quinientos años de historia 
y usted se lo ha tomado a broma (I.1261-1266) 
 
Also RJ represents ZP as being inexpert and irresponsible, through the metaphoric 
expression actuó de aprendiz de brujo [you acted as sorcerer’s apprentice] 
(II.1051), as he previously did in the block on terrorism (II.753).  
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In order to portray ZP as a person with no clear ideas, and therefore a bad president, 
RJ presents ZP as a person for whom everything is normal: 
 
Tiene dos referéndums convocados. ¿Le parece que eso es normal? 
Para separarse de España. Uno este mes… este año, en octubre. A 
usted ¿eso le parece normal? A usted todo le parece normal (I.1186-
1198) 
 
This can also be compared with following passage where ZP is represented as having no 
clear ideas: 
 
Le da igual una cosa que la contraria, […]. Si es que usted, usted 
es el que quien no tiene ningún criterio sobre este asunto […] no 
tienen ningún criterio (II.1220-1224) 
 
Obviously, all these propositions aimed at demonizing the opponent are based on the 
personalized deixis usted, and are part of the strategy to isolate ZP as irrational, 
unserious, foolish and irresponsible, etc. 
 
10.2.1.5. ZP as isolated and radical 
RJ also implements two further moves designed to delegitimize the opponent through a 
personalized demonization: to present ZP as isolated and as radical. The first is 
particularly coherent with the general strategy of separating ZP from his own electors as 
well as from potential ones, as we have seen in the terrains of the economy and 
terrorism. Moreover, both moves are aimed at presenting ZP as a threat to Spaniards’ 
wellbeing: their economic security, their safety, and their unity. 
RJ attempts to present ZP as being distant and removed from other citizens (as 
we have seen in the block addressing the economy) as well as from other members of 
his own party (as in the block on terrorism). In this sense, RJ employs expressions that 
depict ZP as standing alone (por su cuenta) and doing things nobody asked him to. 
Another very effective way is to report the speeches of some respected PSOE 
veterans, including González, Leguina, and Guerra, who severely criticized ZP’s 
institutional policies (I.1092-1097). The argumentum ad verecundiam that ZP is unable 
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to contest without generating conflict within his own party ranks enables RJ to appeal to 
PSOE voters without threatening their face: the problem is ZP, not PSOE. 
RJ also hints that as ZP has reached agreements with radical groups (ERC, IU), 
this also makes him radical. This representation is mirrored on the PP website with the 
expression “va como un poseso”, to describe ZP’s intention to reach an electoral 
agreement with IU and ERC, which PP class as radical parties. This move, aimed at 
counteracting ZP’s efforts to present himself as a moderate leader, detracts from ZP’s 
presidentiability, the premise being that moderation is a central feature of a president 
(Usted es el que ha querido pactar con partidos […] radicales y 
extremistas, I.1186). This question is dealt with in greater depth in section 10.3. 
 
10.2.1.6. ZP as antidemocratic and incoherent 
Among the moves employed by RJ to decrease ZP’s presidentiability is the 
representation of ZP as being incoherent and antidemocratic, through the reference to 
Pacto del Tinell, signed by ERC, ICV and PSC (the Catalonian federations of IU and 
PSOE respectively), and that in a clause explicitly excluded agreement with PP at a 
regional or state level
216
. The corollary of this issue is that ZP broke the traditional 
consensus, is incoherent, antidemocratic and intolerant: 
 
El Pacto del Tinel […] es el mayor rasgo de intolerancia que se ha 
hecho en la historia democrática española. ¿Sabe quién es usted, 
señor Rodríguez Zapatero? Es un señor que con una mano predica el 
entendimiento; con otra mano, con la otra, le prohíbe a los demás 
que nos den los buenos días, y para colmo… me echa la culpa de 
todo. Ese es exactamente usted. Usted es el que ha sembrado la 
discordia. Usted es el que ha querido pactar con partidos […] 
radicales y extremistas. Usted es el que ha impedido que el 
Partido Popular tuviera la más mínima posibilidad de llegar a un 
entendimiento en estas materias. Usted ha querido excluirnos 
(I.1188-1190) 
 
Again thanks to the topic of quality, ZP is presented as the most intolerant of the 
Spanish democratic history and the most antidemocratic, as he will say shortly after 
(I:1248-1249). As in other negative narratives, RJ highlights ZP’s agency in impeding 





consensus between PP and PSOE, choosing to ally with radicals, thereby making him 
directly responsible for any tension.    
In reference to the Pacto RJ can also present ZP as incoherent: and RJ does so 
by retaking, as at other points in the debate, ZP’s keywords (entendimiento) in order 
to question them and refute ZP’s action/words with a tu quoque. 
 
10.2.1.7. The idea of Spain: ZP as not sharing the notion of a (united) Spain 
One of the main propositions stated by RJ in the debate is that ZP did not have a notion 
of Spain; or in other words, that he did not share the notion of Spain as a unified nation. 
This point is of interest when considering the changes between the first and second 
debates, the way the candidates adopt their corresponding stances and respond to each 
other, reformulating their statements for the purpose of alignment or dealignment in 
relation to the audience and each other. In the first debate RJ accused ZP of not having 
an idea of Spain: 
 
lo hizo sin dejar establecido antes cuál era su idea de España 
(I.1012-1013) 
 
Usted no tiene ninguna idea de la nación española (I.1111-1112; see 
also I.1261-1267) 
 
In the second debate ZP responds to RJ’s attacks by echoing these words and through 
references to the Constitution: Esta es mi idea de España, la de la 
Constitución, la de la cohesión (II.1025-1026; also of relevance in this sense are 
his references to PSOE as the party of Constitutional agreements with all Spanish 
parties since the Transition in II.1090-1095). These references, which enable him to 
align himself with the tradition of the Transition, are strategic for retaining PSOE 
Spanishist electors and gaining wavering (PP) ones. Moreover, they allow ZP to dispute 
the monopoly on the Transition and on agreements. 
However, RJ obviously insists on his propositions that ZP has no idea of Spain 
(II.1049-1069), referring to secession referenda and the alleged repression of Castilian-
speakers in Catalonia (II.1144-1155).  
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10.2.1.7. Patriotism vs. Anti-patriotism: ZP as a threat to the unity of Spain 
One of the principal moves RJ uses to detract ZP’s presidentiability is to present him as 
threatening the unity of Spain, claiming that he is not committed to the unity of the 
Spanish people and their equality, has no (clear) idea of Spain or fails to take the notion 
of the Spanish nation seriously. RJ also portrays ZP as being irresponsible or inexpert 
and failing to heed the advice of PSOE veterans in matters of IP. He also accuses him of 
being a radical that broke the traditional consensus held with a supposedly moderate PP 
in order to ally himself with extremists. RJ also refers to ZP’s impression of normality 
in calling two separation referenda in the Basque County, where a positive result would 
result in secession
217
. In corroborating his representation of Spain as a country that is 
being broken up and fragmented and the role of ZP as for a threat to the unity of 
Spain, RJ reports ZP’s speech: 
 
yo no he dicho nunca que la transición se hizo mal y que España no 
estaba cuajada, eso lo ha dicho usted […] Yo no he dicho que los 
vascos tuvieran el derecho a decidir, ni los extremeños, ni los 
murcianos, ha sido usted (I.1104-1115) 
 
With this device, RJ can construct the image of a ZP that disputes and challenges 
Spanish unity. Quoting an opponent’s speech in one’s own interests is a highly effective 
device, since the opponent cannot deny or refute it without seeming to contradict 
himself, and appearing to be incoherent or a liar. With this move RJ presents ZP as an 
anti-patriot, which is extremely damaging for a president, the accepted premise being 
that a president must assume and defend the unity of Spain. ZP’s anti-patriotism is also 
constructed through references to his agreements with ERC, the most radical Catalanist 
party and the promoter of an independence referendum and to his indifference to the 
supposed repression of Castilian in Catalonia: in short, ZP is represented as an 
accomplice to separatists, and therefore as being unpresidentiable. I will discuss the 
issue of Castilian-speakers in Catalonia separately.  
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 Obviously this issue of referenda is strategically avoided by ZP, who never refers to them, and 
strategically employed by RJ, who makes repeated references to it (I.1099; I.1103; I.1194; I.1301; II.105-
109; II.1148; II.1155), even in the block referring to CFF and to have the last word on IP (I.1300-1302). 
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Patriotism is also constructed according to seriousness: if ZP is unpresidentiable 
because he has joked about the idea of Spain, RJ is presidentiable because he 
expresses his pride in being Spanish through the topic of the glory of the nation: 
 
España es una nación de más de quinientos años de historia y usted 
se lo ha tomado a broma, y eso a mí, me parece inaceptable […] y 
quiero que lo sepa, inaceptable (I.1261-1267) 
 
Through this opposition, where ZP (more than PSOE) is anti-patriotic due to his lack 
of seriousness and RJ is the only patriot, the sole defender of the nation, RJ also re-
appropriates the Nation as belonging to the Right. This reproach goes hand in hand with 
the sentence where RJ questions ZP’s patriotism (I.958-961). RJ again uses his self-
presentation as a patriot at the end of his CS in the first debate (I.1627-1636), in the 
extended hypotyposis where he refers to a little girl “born in Spain”, with “a deep pride 
in being Spanish, for belonging to such an ancient and admirable nation”. Through this 
move RJ tries to obtain the goodwill of the Spanish through his Spanishism and his 
commitment to a united nation: España es cosa de todos y debemos tomárnosla 
muy en serio (I.1634-1635). 
Even though in March 2008 some mistrust still remained in Spain towards the 
idea of the Nation
218
, Spanishism was nonetheless also considered a positive value 
among the majority of PSOE voters. As a result, RJ’s discourse did not run the risk of 
seeming far-right. Moreover, coherently to PP strategy, it also targeted PSOE voters. As 
we can see more clearly in the CS of the second debate, where RJ openly refers to them, 
RJ tries to catch PSOE voters who are dissatisfied with ZP’s decisions on nationalist 
issues. For this reason he has presented ZP (and only him, instead of the whole PSOE) 
as a threat to the unity of Spain; under this perspective deictic ambiguity is crucial: to 
whom does the deictic nosotros refer? To PP? To PP and Spanishist PSOE voters? To 
all Spaniards? This ambiguity allows PSOE voters to be included in the statements, as 
shown in the following excerpt:  
 
Buenas noches. Yo creo que España es un gran país, una gran 
nación, una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales que en estos 
momentos tiene problemas, pero creo que si actuamos con realismo, 
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si actuamos con trabajo y si actuamos con humildad, vamos a 
superarlo en el futuro. Yo quiero que la próxima legislatura no 
sea la legislatura de la tensión y de la división entre los 
españoles. Quiero que sea una legislatura de consenso entre todos. 
Le voy a proponer al principal partido de la oposición acuerdos en 
los temas importantes. Quiero que España sea lo que todos los 
españoles queremos que sea. Una gran nación de ciudadanos libres e 
iguales. Sé que hay muchos votantes del partido socialista, la 
inmensa mayoría de los votantes del partido socialista que creen 
que España es una gran nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales, y 
hay cosas que no se han hecho bien. […] Yo seré fundamentalmente 
el presidente del Gobierno de todos los españoles porque mi 
objetivo es gobernar sin generar tensiones, ni confrontaciones, ni 
divisiones. […] Se necesita que todos los españoles estemos 
unidos, que España esté unido en sus tierras y esté unido en sus 
gentes. Eso es fundamental. El Estado de las autonomías es lo que 
yo defiendo, pero hay que hacer que funcione bien y que sirva para 
fortalecer al conjunto (II.1642-1690) 
 
RJ’s first idea, repeated three times, that Spain is one great nation of free and equal 
citizens is intended to display his unquestionable Spanishism. RJ’s open appeal to 
PSOE Spanishist voters is not only discursive evidence of PP’s electoral strategy, but 
seems to corroborate what I called convergence, i.e., the fact that since the center of 
both parties’ electorate is unstable, and could therefore vote either PP or PSOE, the two 
parties become ideologically increasingly similar, as do their discourses. RJ refers on 
two separate occasions to tensions and divisions, establishing a difference between the 
past legislature (PSOE) characterized by discord and the future (supposedly PP) 
legislature of concord. In doing so, RJ, like ZP before him, presents himself as the 
president of all Spaniards, a very common topic in electoral discourse (Santulli 2005: 
129). 
 
10.2.2. ZP’s moves to manage presidentiability 
 
10.2.2.1. Unity: PP as a divider 
Presenting PP as a divider is also one of the main moves ZP uses to detract from his 
opponent’s presidentiability. This move is evident right from the OS of the first debate, 
where he represents PP as a disloyal opposition:   
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hemos tenido que superar obstáculos. El principal obstáculo ha 
sido una oposición […] Que ha crispado, que ha enfrentado a 
ciudadanos de unas comunidades con otras, que se ha movido entre 
la mentira y la exageración, que no ha dado respaldo al Gobierno 
en ninguna de las grandes cuestiones de Estado, […]. Una oposición 
que ha establecido la crispación y la división. La disyuntiva en 
las próximas elecciones es: diálogo o confrontación, aquellos que 
buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican problemas, aquellos que 
desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y aquellos que han 
intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar al poder (I.160-
175): 
 
ZP repeatedly insists on this presentation of PP (more than RJ) as a divider and often 
refers to its agency in creating discord, for instance when he claims that PP did not 
have a constructive attitude: 
 
Mire, le tengo que recordar que en nuestro país hay un modelo 
autonómico que ha funcionado bien, cuando se tiene una voluntad 
constructiva, y ustedes no la han tenido. Ustedes han utilizado 
las reformas de los estatutos (I.1213-1217) 
 
10.2.2.2. PP as authoritarian vs. PSOE as open to dialogue and progressive 
Another move for de/legitimization, in line with PSOE’s overarching strategy of 
providing abstract positive values, is to present PP as authoritarian and conservative, 
and PSOE as open to dialogue and progressive: 
 
Quien ha sembrado la discordia y el enfrentamiento entre 
comunidades han sido ustedes. […] Mire, nosotros creemos en el 
Estado de las Autonomías, estamos convencidos que ha sido muy 
bueno para bienestar de España, que favorece la libertad 
eliminando el centralismo. Y ustedes siempre han estado a rastras 
con el Estado Autonómico. El PSOE siempre ha votado todos los 
estatutos, en todos los consensos. Ustedes no. […] Hemos hecho 
reformas de los estatutos para mejorar el autogobierno, y en este 
periodo hemos vivido más cooperación y menos conflictividad ante 
el TC que en cualquiera de sus ocho años de gobierno. Tienen una 
gran desfachatez, han sembrado discordia entre los ciudadanos y, 
especialmente, con el Estatuto de Cataluña. La que han liado con 
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la enseñanza del castellano, que es la misma regla que hace 20 
años, incluso cuando usted era ministro de educación (I.1046-1073) 
 
ZP uses the tu quoque device to present RJ as a divider and a polarized description in 
which PP is represented as centralist, conservative and authoritarian and PSOE as 
peripheralist, progressive and dialoguing, as the party of agreement and 
consensus. In this description, the metaphoric expression estar a rastras [dragging 
along the ground] visually portrays PP’s backwardness and the quantifiers siempre 
and todos stabilize PSOE’s positive features.  
As for ZP’s presentation of RJ as regressive, it should be noted that references to 
the past are an effective means of implementing the delegitimation of PP, since they 
allow ZP to present PP as still holding ties with Francoism
219
. He will use this 
argument of PP as past, as conservative again in his CS (I.1638-1645). Referring to PP 
as past, and by extension as being Francoist, is a very effective move, and has been used 
since the first debate between Felipe González and José María Aznar
220
.  
At many other stages of the debate ZP presents himself as open to dialogue and 
inclusive, promoting agreements, dialogue and transparency and PP as an 
authoritarian party that sows discord, as shown in the following passage: 
 
Lo que sucede, Sr. Rajoy, es que este país que es plural, que es 
diverso hay que construirlo entre todos con el diálogo, y no 
sembrando la discordia entre unas Comunidades y otras, como han 
hecho ustedes […], sin excluir a nadie. Y desde luego, con un 
gobierno, que es lo que ha practicado el mío, que intente 
dialogar. He tenido un diálogo fecundo con todas la Comunidades 
Autónomas. Ahora todos los presidentes entran en Moncloa, no como 
en la etapa del Sr. Aznar. He convocado la Conferencia de 
Presidentes en tres ocasiones, para coordinar, cooperar y unir a 
todas las Comunidades Autónomas con el Gobierno de España, eso es 
fortalecer el Estado y fortalecer España (I.1269-1287)  
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por qué retroceder”. 
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 This move was used also in the 1993 and 1996 PSOE party political broadcasts (Décobert 2011). 
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ZP uses a polarized narrative to establish the difference between Aznar’s former 
government (representing PP), which he portrays as being authoritarian and less 
democratic than his own government. 
At another crucial point in the debate, ZP situates PSOE at the center of the 
Spanish political spectrum, as the party of dialogue, consensus and agreements, 
despite differences with interlocutors and as the main actor of the Estado de las 
Autonomías (II.1090-1101). The positive description of PSOE as open to dialogue 
and unifier goes in hand with the presentation of PP as divider (II.1102-1110). 
Interestingly enough, ZP’s appropriation of the center of Spanish politics will elicit 
mutual accusations of extremism between the two candidates (see section 10.3). 
 
10.2.2.3. PP as incoherent and opportunistic 
Presenting the opponent as incoherent and opportunistic is always a very effective move 
to detract from presidentiability. In order to highlight PP’s incoherence and 
opportunism, ZP quotes the main PP candidate in Catalonia, who says that Castilian is 
not oppressed in Catalonia, in contrast to claims made by PP; ZP also claims that the 
legislation remains unchanged from when RJ was Minister of Education (I.1070-1073; 
see section 10.2.3). ZP insists on the ideas of incoherence and opportunism on many 
occasions in the debates (I.1200-1213; I.1220-1225). An example of this is his reference 
to two very similar articles in the statues of Andalusia and Catalonia, highlighting the 
fact that PP only appealed against it in the latter case (I.1143-1157). In some instances 
ZP refers explicitly to PP’s incoherence and opportunism: 
 
Usted ha utilizado los territorios, las comunidades autónomas para 
enfrentar, para dividir. Presume tener una idea de España, pero le 
voy a decir cuál es desde mi punto de vista: la que a usted le 
interesa en cada momento, lo que a usted le interesa en cada 
lugar. […] Usted no ha tenido coherencia y por tanto no tiene una 
idea global de España (II.1163-1197; see also I.1202) 
 
ZP presents PP and RJ as opportunistic, classifying RJ’s claims as being insincere, 
interested and designed exclusively for electoral ends. ZP also defines this behavior 
of creating and using a language conflict for electoral gain as irresponsible, thereby 
reducing RJ’s presidentiability (II.1254-1268).  
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Although this accusation of opportunism is a recurrent feature of ZP’s discourse, it is 
also used on occasions by RJ:  
 
Oiga, yo tengo, he pactado muchas cosas con su partido. El Pacto 
Autonómico del 1992, fui a Moncloa, lo firmé con González, lo 
firmó Aznar, yo estaba con él, luego en el año 1996. Ustedes el 
Estatuto Catalán quisieron dejarlo fuera a propósito, si no no se 
explica que […] no nos aceptaran ni una sola enmienda y no nos 
venga, con el viejo truco de decir, que somos anti-catalanes 
(I.1252-1259) 
 
Yo he recorrido Andalucía a lo largo de estos cuatro años, me he 
ocupado de sus problemas, he estado con mucha gente, he visto 
muchos lugares. Usted sólo ha ido allí en campaña electoral 
(II.1123-1130) 
 
The narratives presented in the two excerpts allow RJ to delegitimize the opponent as an 
opportunist and divider and legitimize himself as the defender of Spaniards’ interests 
and as a unifier. In order to neutralize the accusation of having used the Estatut for 
opportunistic ends, RJ uses a tu quoque move to blame PSOE for not seeking an 
agreement or consensus on the Estatut and ZP of using the old trick of accusing PP of 
being anti-Catalan. In doing so, RJ rejects the accusation of being anti-Catalan. 
 
10.2.2.4. Optimism vs. pessimism 
As has emerged in the case of other terrains of struggle, one of ZP’s main moves in 
order to delegitimize the opponent is to present RJ as a pessimist, in line with PSOE’s 
overarching strategy for the 2008 election campaign. It is very effective, since it 
automatically delegitimizes all the opponent’s statements, effectively terming them as 
being irrational: 
 
Mire señor Rajoy, su Apocalipsis, que es lo que ha hecho en estos 
cuatro años parece que se retrasa en la historia. Ni “España se 
rompe”, […] ni “Cataluña está en un proceso de secesión”, más bien 




estoy comprometido con una España unida, en convivencia y que 
respete la diversidad. Porque el futuro es la convivencia y no la 
división, porque llegaremos mejor al futuro si tenemos confianza y 
no pesimismo (II.1631-1635) 
 
ZP legitimizes himself through references to confidence and delegitimizes the opponent 
through references to pessimism (Apocalypse). The construction of this opposition 
PSOE=optimism vs. PP=pessimism is consistent with the general strategy 
implemented in other texts, videos, songs, etc. Interestingly, ZP quotes PP discourse (se 
rompe España I.1061; I.1119; I.1209) in order to present PP as pessimistic and 
opportunistic: the party attempts to make the situation appear worse in order to win 
votes (circumstantial argument). 
In order to dispel any accusations of pessimism, and despite insisting on the 
negative situation left by ZP’s government, RJ also refers, for instance in his CS, to 
optimismo y esperanza and presents himself as selfless (yo sólo quiero lo que 
todos queremos). 
 
10.2.2.5. PSOE, the defender of joy and freedoms vs. PP a threat to freedom 
In line with the previous move is ZP’s attempt to increase his presidentiability and 
detract from that of RJ with regards to the topic of freedom and civil rights, whereby he 
presents himself and his party as open to dialogue and defending freedom: 
 
Lo cierto es que en materia de autonomías, en materia de 
libertades, en estos cuatro años hemos avanzado; hay más 
autogobierno, más unidad y más fortaleza del Estado. Hay también 
más derechos y libertades, porque hay nuevas leyes del divorcio, 
del matrimonio homosexual, de igualdad, de rehabilitación de 
memoria, de las personas, de su dignidad… Hay más diálogo y más 
democracia. El ejemplo es este debate que están retransmitiendo 
varias televisiones, como la televisión pública, que ahora es 
plural, independiente y que con ustedes, tuvo una condena de la 
Audiencia Nacional por manipulación. Cuando ustedes gobiernan, se 
resiente la democracia, se pierde el pluralismo (I.1225-1238)  
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This move is crucial in the overarching strategy of using abstract values to present PP 
as a threat to freedom and joy, and PSOE as their defender, of presenting PP as the 
(Francoist) past, and PSOE as progress.  
In this sense it is also important to note the reference to the debate: ZP 
appropriates the debate as a space for democracy, and at the same time represents PP as 
manipulating information, through a reference to High Court sentence against PP 
(argumentum ab auctoritate). The conclusion of ZP’s argument, related to the attribute 
of a fair player, clearly delegitimizes PP as being antidemocratic: Cuando ustedes 
gobiernan, se resiente la democracia, se pierde el pluralismo. We have 
also witnessed this shift at other stages of the debate, when ZP avoids contesting the 
topics put forward by RJ, turning instead to issues such as euthanasia, individual 
freedoms, and laicism, in order to present himself as a modern and progressive leader 
(I.1143-1157; I.1225-1238; I.1284-1287). 
 
10.2.2.6. Unity 
We have seen above that ZP presents PP and RJ as dividers. This presentation goes 
hand in hand with the presentation of PSOE and ZP as unifiers. He does so in his CS 
by insisting on unity (both in terms of unity of nation, and of agreements between 
parties): 
 
Tengo plena confianza en las enormes posibilidades de la España 
libre y unida. Creo que nuestro país puede continuar avanzando, 
incrementar su prosperidad y ese avance, lo podemos hacer 
trabajando unidos (I.1640-1643) 
 
This reference to España libre y unida could seem a discursive hybridation with and 
an ideological convergence toward right wing discourse (cf. the Francoist slogan: 
España: una, grande y libre), in order to appeal to Spanishist PSOE electors and even to 
PP electors. Yet it seems to be rather a reference of the unity within the difference. This 
interpretation is doubtlessly coherent with PSOE ideology, its history, and its stance 
concerning territorial organization, and could be corroborated by the numerous 
references to regional autonomy and central government cooperation in PSOE 
manifesto (where expressions like en colaboración con or de acuerdo con or en 
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cooperación con las comunidades autonomas are repeated extensively), and by the 
reference to convivencia and unidad made in the OS and the CS of the second debate: 
 
una gran potencia como es España. Un país en convivencia, con más 
derechos para todos, y un país unido (II.64-65)  
 
estoy comprometido con una España unida, en convivencia y que 
respete la diversidad (II.1631-1635)  
 
Note that the reference to Spain as a major power is an expression of Spanishism and is 
crucial in representing ZP as a patriot, an idea that is constantly challenged by RJ. 
As we have seen, one of ZP’s main self-legitimizing moves, in line with PSOE’s 
overarching electoral strategy, is to associate himself and PSOE with general positive 
values. ZP implements this move by reframing the unity of Spain under three new 
ideas: economic and social solidarity, territorial infrastructural interconnection and 
respect for diversity through dialogue and cooperation (II.994-1026). ZP’s 
argumentation is aimed at aligning himself with the topic RJ has brought up, but at the 
same time dealigning from RJ’s ways of framing it; he enhances the issue of unity of 
Spain beyond the administrative relationship with the central government (the right 
wing idea of territorial and administrative cohesion); in doing so he reduces RJ’s 
capacity for maneuver, displacing particular issues such as the Estatut de Catalunya or 
Castilian-speakers in Catalonia. ZP relates the unity of Spain to greater economic 
equality, better infrastructural connections and better institutional cooperation between 
central and peripheral regions
221. ZP’s argument is that the economic convergence of 
regions, whose level of income per person was far below that of Madrid, is a way of 
uniting Spain, reducing territorial inequalities. Changing the former radial conception of 
communication (all railways or highways starting from Madrid) to a different and more 
integrative conception is a way of uniting Spain. Thirdly, ZP refers to the dialogic 
cooperation between central and regional governments. Madrid is obviously referred to 
as the geographical center of Spain and as symbolizing centralism, especially if we 
consider that Madrid’s regional and municipal councils have been governed by PP since 
the early 1990s. In displacing the discourse of the unity of Spain from the administrative 
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equality or cohesion: they for RJ mean ‘territorial unity’; whilst for ZP they represent ‘social cohesion’. 
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relationships to economic and social convergence, ZP cannot only present some of his 
government’s achievements, but can also self-legitimize as contributing to the unity 
of Spain. Moreover, in reframing it, ZP disputes the Right’s claims to this idea. In order 
to realign himself with the audience in terms of the respect for tradition and unity (this 
was one of main RJ’s accusations) he refers to the Constitution (Esta es mi idea de 
España, la de la Constitución, la de la cohesión, II.1025-1026) which 
safeguards the unity of Spain. 
 
10.2.3. A particular case: the Castilian language in Catalonia 
The use of Castilian and Catalan languages as synecdoches for the nations they refer to 
and for constructing the dis/unity of Spanish State and people is absolutely strategic. 
Language is a central issue in Nationalism, in that it is the very means
222
 that allows for 
the construction and maintenance of the imagined community, the construction of in-
group identity, especially in relation with others, but also participation in the workings 
of the State, for relations with administration, for access to the job market, education, 




In Spain (meta)discourses on languages have long been circulating; but during the 2008 
election campaign, and linked to the approval of the new Estatut de Catalunya (2006), 
which controversially established the preeminence of Catalan over Castilian in 
Catalonia, discourses on languages became particularly salient. Those produced by 
politicians received widespread media coverage. Obviously, these discourses on 
languages are connected to those on nation-building. The Catalan and Castilian 
languages indeed work as synecdoche for their respective speakers, and, moreover, for 
the political and glotopolitical stances and the complete set of ideologies, discourses and 
situations they refer to: Catalanism (separatism, peripheralism) and Spanishism 
(Unitarianism, centralism). In a certain sense they are political symbols that are easily 
understandable: it is easy to take (or to suggest) a stance on them and therefore they 
epitomize the struggles for the unity/separation of Spain. 
It is therefore of no surprise that the language issue was introduced into the 
debates, featuring particularly in the IP block. Even though it is first mentioned by ZP, 
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 Actually, as Bauman & Briggs (2003) have shown, beside the language itself, are rather the 
ideological constructions of the metadiscourses produced and circulated on language that allows creating 
and keeping the unity. 
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  The role of language for defining a nation is well known since at least Renan (1987[1862]). 
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RJ is quick to take it up, an indicator of the significance of this issue. A brief review of 
the party manifestos reveals that PP dedicates a lot of space to this issue (PP 2008: 35, 
38-39, 52, 142-145, 214, 219-220, 241, 250, 305), always from a Spanishist and 
Castilianist stance. In contrast, the PSOE program contains very few references to 
language(s), and they are mainly concerned with the development of the Instituto 
Cervantes and the promotion of Spanish abroad (PSOE 2008: 9, 299, 312, 313) as well 
as the protection of the linguistic diversity of Spain. Indeed, the preferred form is the 
plural “nuestras lenguas” (id: 144, 251, 264, 265). Coming back to the debate, even 
though the issue appeared to hold greater relevance for RJ, it was used by both 
candidates as part of their discursive and election strategies: RJ presents ZP as a threat 
to the unity of Spain, whilst ZP portrays RJ as being incoherent and opportunistic. 
As for the first debate, ZP is the first to raise the issue in order to represent RJ as 
a divider, sowing discord for electoral ends, and therefore incoherent and 
opportunistic, employing tu quoque and circumstantial arguments. 
 
[…] cizañando con el tema del catalán, para que ahora veamos como 
hoy su candidata número uno, la señora Nadal, ha dicho que el 
castellano no se persigue en Cataluña. […] La que han liado con la 
enseñanza del castellano, que es la misma regla que hace 20 años, 
incluso cuando usted era ministro de educación (I.1062-1073) 
 
RJ’s incoherence is constructed by referring to the speech of PP’s main candidate in the 
Catalonian elections and by referring to RJ’s time as Ministry of Education. According 
to ZP’s narratives, PP has presented two opposing ideas (“Castilian is persecuted” and 
“Castilian is not persecuted”) merely out of electoral interests. The attack is also 
personalized against RJ, who during the campaign used the teaching of Castilian to 
create divisions, even though legislation in this sense has remained unchanged since his 
time as Minister of Education. 
This stance is immediately contested by RJ: he takes up ZP’s words, aligning with 
the topic, but adopting an opposing stance:    
 
El castellano no se persigue en Cataluña, pero lo que es evidente 
es que no se puede estudiar en castellano (I.1074-1075)  
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Interestingly RJ does not even argue his stance; he simply states the opposite by 
reformulating ZP’s statements. No further references are made to this issue in the first 
debate, although it will be addressed more extensively in the second, when it is RJ who 
brings it up, probably after receiving advice and instructions from his team.  
In the second debate, RJ brings up the issue with an example of a Castilian 
speaker who is discriminated against in Catalonia: 
 
Y fíjese usted, las cosas que hacen ustedes en Cataluña. Tengo 
aquí un expediente de un ciudadano catalán, me lo ha dado (lee de 
un folio), al que se le ha multado con 400 euros porque en la 
fachada de su comercio consta "Fincas Nebot AP-compra venta de 
pisos, solares y rústicos", y por lo visto eso vulnera los 
derechos lingüísticos de los consumidores. Eso lo hace un Gobierno 
suyo, del Partido Socialista, suyo (II.1155-1161) 
 
This narrative on the alleged repression of Castilian speakers works as synecdoche for 
the threat of the unity of Spanish State. RJ tries to present ZP as anti-Spanishist, due to 
his indifference in the light of the persecution of Castilian-speakers. This victimization 
of the dominant language (Castilian), and its defense, allows RJ to present himself as 
the defender of Spaniards and Spanishness. In contrast, ZP’s indifference reduces ZP’s 
presidentiability, constructing the image of an anti-patriot. In his presentation RJ 
highlights ZP’s agency through a shift in deixis from ustedes to usted and the 
expression eso lo hace un gobierno suyo. 
During his turn, ZP responds on this same issue, insisting on the same argument 
used in the first debate: linguistic laws are the same as 20 years ago and PP uses the 
issue of language exclusively for its electoral ends: 
 
Mire, usted con su política territorial no ha dejado de enfrentar 
unas Comunidades con otras, incluso a ciudadanos de una misma 
Comunidad. Como, por ejemplo, con el tema de la lengua. La 
política lingüística que se sigue en Cataluña, señor Rajoy, es la 
misma de los últimos 20 años. La misma. Ustedes estuvieron 8 años 
de Gobierno […] y usted fue ministro de Educación y nunca le 
escuché nada sobre el problema o los problemas que el castellano 
pudiera tener en Cataluña. Ahora lo han cogido para dividir y para 
enfrentar. […] Presume tener una idea de España, pero le voy a 
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decir cuál es desde mi punto de vista: la que a usted le interesa 
en cada momento, lo que a usted le interesa en cada lugar. Si hay 
que… si interesa en Cataluña hacer una tarea en contra del catalán 
y diciendo que el castellano se discrimina, porque le interesa en 
el resto de España, lo hacen; […] Usted no ha tenido coherencia y 
por tanto no tiene una idea global de España (II.1163-1197) 
 
Through circumstantial and tu quoque arguments ZP presents PP as being incoherent 
and opportunistic. In the last part ZP also explicitly accuses RJ of incoherence and 
opportunism: Usted no ha tenido coherencia (II.1197; see also I.1202). In doing 
so, ZP deactivates RJ’s criticisms as being biased.   
Instead of responding to ZP’s accusations of incoherence and opportunism, RJ 
retakes his own previous statements on the supposed repression of Castilian speakers in 
Catalonia to accuse ZP of supporting sanctions on those writing in Castilian in 
Catalonia. The aim is to present ZP as an accomplice of the repressors of Castilian:  
 
¡Todos lo han visto! Es evidente que el señor Zapatero apoya que 
una persona por poner el título de su negocio en castellano se le 
multe, y es lógico porque quien le multa es el partido socialista. 
Es decir, a mí me gustaría que desautorizara esta resolución 
porque desgraciadamente hay muchas como esta. Mire, yo le hago una 
propuesta: yo voy a hacer una ley para garantizar que todos los 
ciudadanos puedan mandar a sus hijos a estudiar en castellano en 
toda España. ¿Usted la va a apoyar o no la va a apoyar? Porque 
claro, España es el único país del mundo donde hay ciudadanos que 
en determinadas zonas del territorio nacional no pueden estudiar 
en castellano, yo voy a hacer esa ley y espero que me diga si la 
apoya o no… No, no, no, luego me dice si la apoya o no… La 
resolución sancionadora, voy a ver si usted apoya o no esa 
resolución sancionadora. […] Pero yo le digo, es decir, a mí me 
gustaría conocer su criterio porque usted representa a un partido 
nacional. ¿Va a aprobar esa ley, la va a apoyar cuando yo la 
presente en parlamento esa ley? ¿Su grupo parlamentario lo va a 
hacer? ¿Está usted de acuerdo? ¿Va a hacer algo? ¿Se cree que es 
normal un país donde por poner un letrero en castellano 
automáticamente se te sancione? ¿Hay algún país del mundo donde 
ocurra eso? Sólo en este, en el que gobierna usted, señor 
Zapatero, ¿qué ha hecho usted? (II.1198-1240)  
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RJ’s intervention is made up of two parts: in the first one ZP is presented as being 
responsible for the repression of Castilian; in the second he presents himself as the 
defender of Spaniards through the defense of Castilian, promising that if he is elected, 
he will promulgate a law to guarantee the right to study in Castilian in all regions of 
Spain, and asking ZP if he will support this proposal. The question is intended to show 
the audience the dealignment between the candidates and between ZP and the audience. 
RJ uses the topic of uniqueness to refute ZP’s arguments; he defines Spain as the only 
country where someone is punished for displaying a sign in Castilian (II.1206-1209; 
II.1237-1240). As the logical premise is that it is absurd for a Spaniard in Spain to be 
punished for speaking Spanish, RJ presents the situation as aberrant and ZP as aberrant. 
RJ therefore starts and ends his turn by presenting ZP’s in/action as the cause of the 
problem.   
ZP does not respond to RJ’s questions, insisting on presenting PP claims in 
defense of Castilian as insincere, interested and seeking electoral ends, through the 
argument that the linguistic policy is the same as 20 years before. Even though the 
deixis switches from usted to ustedes and usted again, in this turn ZP personalizes his 
attacks against RJ, through references to his role as Minister of Education, and presents 
him as incoherent, opportunistic and irresponsible for creating and using a language 
conflict for electoral ends. 
 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, llevamos veinte años con el mismo régimen 
lingüístico, que por cierto, apoyó Alianza Popular.  
RJ: En absoluto, no es verdad. No es verdad. Alianza Popular no 
aprobó el Estatuto pero sí esto, hombre por favor, por favor, por 
favor...  
ZP: Y usted fue ministro de Educación.  
RJ: Sí, pero empezaron ustedes con Maragall en el 2003...  
ZP: pero ¿qué hizo usted como ministro de educación? ¿Habló alguna 
vez del castellano en Cataluña?  
RJ: Sí, sí, hombre, que si hablé del castellano... infinidad de 
veces 
ZP: No podían hablar, porque era la etapa del Majestic, del 
catalán en la intimidad, [RJ: no, no, no, hablé muchas veces del 
catalán] [OV: señor Rajoy] entonces el catalán era una lengua de 
todos [RJ: Muchas veces, muchas veces], era una lengua que había 
que defender… [RJ: Yo defiendo el catalán y el castellano] Ahora, 
como no están en La Moncloa ni en Cataluña tienen ninguna 
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representatividad, pues han cogido lo de Cataluña para crispar, 
para intentar poner a gente a los ciudadanos del resto de España 
frente a Cataluña y eso es una irresponsabilidad, porque ustedes 
gobernaron con el apoyo de partidos catalanes, de Convergencia i 
Unió. Usted como ministro de Educación nunca defendió nada ni la 
pio, [RJ: Absolutamente falso] sobre el castellano en Cataluña. No 
la pio ni hizo nada como ministro [RJ: Esto es falso], lo cual a 
mí tampoco me extraña que no hiciera nada (II.1254-1268) 
 
RJ responds to ZP’s attacks by returning to his first statement, presenting ZP’s lack of 
response to his question as evidence that ZP supports the repression of Castilian. In 
doing so RJ presents ZP as an accomplice of the Catalanists, and therefore a threat to 
the unity of Spain. 
 
Bien, eh… Creo que ha quedado claro eh… que al señor Zapatero le 
parece bien que a una persona que rotule en España en castellano 
se le multe y le parece bien que haya muchísimos ciudadanos, no 
sólo en Cataluña, sino en otras zonas, en el País Vasco, empiezan 
en Galicia, que no pueden estudiar en su idioma, algo que no 
ocurre en ningún país del mundo. Queda constancia de que a usted 
le parece bien […] (II.1269-1275) 
 
He again uses the topic of uniqueness to represent the situation as extremely aberrant: 
no ocurre en ningún país del mundo. RJ will return to this issue of the repression 
of Castilian in the CFF block, when dealing with the issue of education, to criticize ZP’s 
education policies. In his words the low level of Spanish education is due to the fact that 
ZP did not do what he is expected to do and instead does something he should not do:  
 
usted mientras tanto está con la Educación para la Ciudadanía o 
con quitarle a la gente la posibilidad de estudiar en castellano 
(II.1358-1359) 
 
In RJ’s representation of reality, ZP revokes people’s right to study in Castilian and 
therefore he is a threat to Castilian. Here again, as at other points of the debate, RJ 
highlights ZP’s agency in doing what is agreed as a bad thing: in this case, preventing a 
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Spaniard in Spain from studying in Spanish. The ultimate aim is to present ZP as a non-




In this chapter, I have dealt with the fourth terrain of struggle that confronts ZP and RJ: 
the Catalan question, as epitomized by the Estatut and the issue of the Catalan language. 
In order to historically contextualize the reasons for the tensions between the center and 
periphery I have first briefly mentioned the history of the process of unification of Spain 
since 1479. I have fixed 1714 as the inflection point. This chapter also includes a short 
discussion of tensions between Spanishism and Catalanism in the context of the II 
Republic and the two dictatorships of the 20th century before arriving at the Transition 
(late 1970s) and the present day. In this overview I briefly traced the history of 
Catalonia’s three statutes of autonomy. I have also presented the way the two candidates 
use the unity of Spain and in particular the Estatut and languages for the purpose of 
positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other. I analyzed the 
overarching strategies of the two candidates, as well as the local moves and the 
discursive devices employed in terms of arguments, metaphors, deixis, reported speech, 
quantifiers and implicitness. 
We have seen that in general and unlike RJ, ZP does not dedicate much space to 
the issue of nation. This observation can be corroborated by triangulating this point with 
the observation of secondary data: for instance, the unity of Spain was not a major issue 
in the PSOE program. It was instead a key point in PP’s election strategy, occupying 
considerable space in its program. The question of the unity of Spain is a cardinal point 
in PP ideology that has a strong historic and ideological symbolism, deep implications 
and meanings and that groups together national-Catholic Right forces, i.e. Spanishists, 
around PP
224
. Indeed as De Santiago-Guervós (1996) states, Separatism is one of the 
three obsessions of Francoism, and it passed to the Francoist ideological heirs of AP and 
then to PP. 
As we have seen candidates managed their presidentiability in relation to this 
topic according to general presidentiable attributes (unity, sincerity, loyalty, 
selflessness, coherence, consistency, defending people’s interests, activity, capacity, 
efficacy) and particular attributes like being a nurturing father (open to dialogue, 
optimistic) or a strict father (authoritarian, realistic, strong). 
The main representations provided by candidates to manage their presidentiability 
can be summarized as follows:  
                                                          
224
 On National-Catholicism see Pérez-Agote (2003). 
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RJ → ZP: incapable (confusing priorities), isolated, a divider (citizens; parties: a 
threat to the unity of Spain and breaker of the Transition consensus), incoherent, a 
liar (naive or unaware), ignorant (unserious), inexpert and irresponsible, radical, 
opportunist, antidemocratic, anti-patriotic; 
 
RJ → RJ: moderate, a patriot (proud of being Spanish), unifier (citizens: the 
president of all Spaniards; parties: consensus), selfless (yo sólo quiero lo que 
todos queremos), the defender of Spain unity, Spaniards and Spanishness; 
 
ZP → PP RJ: a divider, authoritarian, centralist, conservative, regressive (past, 
Francoism), undemocratic, a threat to freedom and joy, pessimistic, incoherent, 
opportunistic, radical; 
 
ZP → PSOE ZP: progress, democracy, a defender of liberty and joy, open to 
dialogue, a peripheralist, optimist, unifier (citizens: economic convergence and 
parties: agreements), moderate. 
 
As can be seen, these representations concerned the main general and particular 
attributes of a president. 
As for the main discursive-argumentative devices employed, we can see that 
candidates have extensively used the tu quoque or circumstantial argument, to 
demonstrate their opponent’s incoherence or inconsistence. RJ made extensive use of 
the abusive argument, as when he states that ZP says meaningless things: eso que 
usted dijo es lisa y llanamente una de esas cosas que usted dice y no 
significa nada (II.1129-1130). The abusive variant is the argumentum ad hominem 
that most directly attacks the opponent’s personal features, damaging his integrity, but 
in this case it is even more effective, in that, as we have seen, credibility is constructed 
discursively, so claiming that discourse is meaningless is a direct attack on the speaker’s 
ethos. 
In order to increase/decrease credibility and de/align with the audience or credible 
speakers, RJ also used argumentum ab auctoritate with references to other politicians, 
newspapers, etc. and ad populum through references to the people, like in todos lo 
han visto (RJ.II.1198). ZP also uses this argument in todos los españoles lo han 
escuchado (I.1209). Also common is the use of reported speech either as argumentum 
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ab auctoritate to support the speaker’s own argument or as a way for demonstrating the 
opponent’s incoherence. We have seen that narratives such as “when we X(+), now 
you Y(–)” play a central role. Of course the lexical choice is decisive: as when RJ uses 
the metaphor of sorcerer’s apprentice to class ZP as being inexpert and irresponsible, 
as in the block on terrorism.  
In the strategic description of actors, quantifiers (único, ningún) and the topic of 
uniqueness played a particular role in absolutizing the positive or negative dispositions. 
I wish also to point out the importance of implicit and presumptive meanings 
and their ability to surreptitiously persuade receivers by building common ground 
meanings in disputed issues. For instance, when referring to the unity of Spain, RJ 
states:   
 
Yo creo que España es una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales y 
que sobre España decidimos todos y cada uno de los españoles 
(I.1111-1115) 
 
España es el único país del mundo donde hay ciudadanos que en 
determinadas zonas del territorio nacional no pueden estudiar en 
castellano (II.1206-1209) 
 
ha quedado claro que al señor Zapatero le parece bien que a una 
persona que rotule en España en castellano se le multe (II.1269-
1271) 
 
All these expressions presuppose –i.e. establish as a logical premise– the fact that 
Catalonians are Spaniards or that Catalonia is Spain, which is precisely the object of 
dispute. And this is indeed the force of implicit meanings: they establish as agreed what 
actually is the object of discussion. 
In the polarized representation of the situation deixis also plays an important role 
in aligning the speaker with the audience or disaligning the opponent from the audience, 
as well as de/aligning the speaker to/with the opponent. Deixis also merits a further 
observation in terms of the un/personalization of attacks: by shifting it, candidates can 
be represented as standing out from their group or not. In this block, as in other blocks, 
we can observe a difference in the use of deixis: RJ mainly personalizes his attacks 
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against ZP (usted) more than against PSOE (ustedes), while ZP mainly 
depersonalizes his attacks against PP (ustedes) more than RJ (usted). This responds to 
RJ’s strategy of distancing ZP from PSOE and from his electors, in order to present 
him as the problem and not to threaten electors’ face. On the other hand ZP prefers to 
link RJ to the past (AP, Francoism, Aznar) and to the negative features it represents. 
Obviously, these are general trends and ZP often shifts ustedes→usted to personalize 
his attacks against RJ. 
I wish to draw attention to the role played by metapragmatic statements
225
 
regarding who said what at what time. They are crucial in that ethos is constructed 
discursively, i.e. candidates are what they say and how they say it (mainly at a verbal 
level, but also at a proxemic level, and in particular paralanguage and kinesics). See, for 
instance what I noted above regarding the abusive argument. In this sense there is a 
passage of particular interest, where we can observe a high concentration of these 
statements: RJ denies having said that España se rompe, as ZP claimed. But in order 
to support the argument that Spain is being broken up, he reports the speeches of some 
PSOE veterans that criticized ZP’s institutional policies: 
 
[…] Mire usted, usted ha dicho que España, me ha imputado que 
España… que yo dijera que España se rompía. Yo nunca he dicho eso 
y va a tener que demostrarlo usted, pero ¿sabe usted quién dijo 
que en España se está centrifugando el Estado? Felipe González. 
Que el señor Zapatero ha abierto el melón del Estado sin saber a 
dónde van, don… el señor Leguina. Lo que está pasando en España se 
parece a la disolución de la Unión Soviética, don Alfonso Guerra. 
El Estado se está fragmentando, el señor Leguina, pero usted sigue 
diciendo que estamos muy unidos. Pues mire, el 25 de octubre de 
este año hay convocado un referéndum de separación en el País 
Vasco y no lo convocó Batasuna, lo convocó el lehendakari del 
Gobierno Vasco. ¿Sigue usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Y un 
socio de gobierno suyo, el vicepresidente del Gobierno de Cataluña 
ha anunciado otro referéndum para el año 2014, ¿sigue usted 
creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Mire usted, yo no he dicho nunca 
que la transición se hizo mal y que España no estaba cuajada, eso 
lo ha dicho usted, yo no he dado a entender […] a los 
nacionalistas que me proponía a refutar España, ha sido usted […]. 
                                                          
225
 On metapragmatic statements in politics see Wortham & Locher (1999). 
321 
 
Yo no he dicho que los vascos tuvieran el derecho a decidir, ni 
los extremeños, ni los murcianos, ha sido usted. (I.1089-1111) 
 
RJ’s metapragmatic statements serve four different aims: 1) to present ZP as a liar 
(usted ha dicho, […] yo nunca he dicho eso y va a tener que demostrarlo 
usted); 2) to present ZP as naive, constructing an opposition between what ZP says 
(usted sigue diciendo que estamos muy unidos) and reality (hay convocado un 
referendum de separación), and therefore dealigning him from PSOE’s audience 
and especially distancing him from his own party; 3) to corroborate his arguments by 
reporting the speeches of PSOE veterans on the risk of secession; 4) to represent ZP as a 
threat to the unity of Spain (yo no he dicho nunca que la transición se hizo 
mal y que España no estaba cuajada, eso lo ha dicho usted) through the 
reporting of ZP’s speeches. Quoting the opponent’s speech is a very effective move, 
since it obliges the opponent to align with it: indeed he cannot deny or refute it without 
seeming problematically incoherent or a liar.  
Further observations must be made about the discourse produced and spread in 
terms of ideological convergence and discourse hybridation. Since PP and PSOE are 
catch-all parties, their electoral strategy is to catch wavering voters, i.e. the less 
ideologized and therefore the most central, i.e. those closest to (or rather less far from) 
the other party’s positions. For this reason parties that are already becoming 
increasingly similar (because they share more and more ideological features, such as 
Neoliberalism, human rights protection, etc.) try to moderate their discourses during 
elections. One of the outcomes of this premise is that PP and PSOE fight to occupy the 
center. This outcome is visible in the fact that discourses already similar in the 
arguments used, given the characteristics of the communicative event and the polarized 
situation, become increasingly hybridized in themes and formulas.  
One of the principal moves in the construction of presidentiability is for a 
candidate to build his centerness or moderation, i.e. his relative position in the center of 
political spectrum. Since there is general agreement on moderation or centerness as a 
fundamental attribute of a president, presenting a candidate as radical delegitimizes him, 
whilst presenting him as moderate legitimizes him. As a consequence of this we can 
observe how the candidates accuse each other of being radical and presenting 
themselves as moderate. The first example comes from ZP, who, in order to draw 
attention to RJ’s regressive and conservative nature, refers to his past in AP. Since AP 
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emerged from the ashes of the Francoist regime, and that there is a majority opinion that 
Francoism was negative, this reference to AP linking PP to Francoism could be very 
pernicious for RJ, who through a tu quoque argument accuses ZP of the same, i.e. of 
being radical, attempting to damage his image with reference to PSOE’s Marxist past, 
the premise being that Marxism was radical and therefore bad (I.1049-1055): 
 
RJ: […] Fui vicepresidente de la Xunta…  
ZP: […] sí, como Alianza Popular, que fue militante de Alianza 
Popular […] 
RJ: y el PSOE era marxista hace 30 años  
ZP: […] sí, pero usted era de Alianza Popular 
 
Since a center candidate receives more votes, the battle for the center proves crucial in 
the strategy of self-legitimation. At various stages of the debate RJ describes ZP as 
radical and therefore unpresidentiable, for having reached agreements with radical 
parties such as ERC or IU (I.1187-1188). The fight for the center also emerges in the 
second debate, where ZP, in response to RJ’s accusation of breaking agreements, 
presents PSOE as a dialoguing party and situates it at the center of the Spanish 
political spectrum: 
 
Usted se atreve a hablar de nuestro modelo de España, de los 
consensos constitucionales, señor Rajoy, ¡Pero si el PSOE es el 
eje central de la democracia en España! [RJ: el eje central…] […] 
Un partido que ha estado en todos como eje central (II.1090-1101) 
 
This move of self-legitimation (PSOE as the central axis of Spanish democracy) and the 
following accusations of extremism between the two candidates corroborate the 
importance of centerness and prove the efforts each party makes to present itself as the 
“center”. RJ’s quick denial that PSOE is the center is coherent with De Santiago-
Guervós’ observations on PP’s ongoing obsession for occupying the center since it 




RJ: Dice que el PSOE es el centro o el eje central, mire, perdone 
usted, sinceramente, en el centro de este país en este momento 
está el PP  
ZP: No. 
RJ: sí, lo que pasa es que usted pierde perspectiva porque se ha 
ido muy, muy hacia el extremo y entonces nos ve en otro lugar. 
ZP: No. Ustedes están en la derecha, en la derecha (II.1130-1138) 
 
As the previous passage shows, each candidate tries to occupy the center and displace 
the opponent to the right or the left. Interestingly enough openly speaks of the 
“extreme”. Again, presidentiability management is two-fold: occupation of the center 
and self-presentation as moderate go hand in hand with the accusation of radicalism 
or extremism. 
As a corollary of the convergence to the center, we can also witness the increasing 
hybridation of discourse
226
. One example of this is what RJ said regarding who is 
responsible for decisions regarding the unity of Spain: decidimos todos y cada uno 
de los españoles (I.1115). Now compare this expression with one of the 14 slogans 
of ZP’s campaign227, which reads “vivimos juntos, decidimos juntos”. This slogan 
quoted a statement made by ZP in response to the rejection of the Plan Ibarretxe in the 
Spanish Parliament on 1 February 2005. The Plan Ibarretxe was a proposal to reform 
the existing Statute of the Basque Country (1979). The plan, presented by the then 
president of the Basque Government Juan José Ibarretxe, was perceived as being overly 
independentist and was rejected by the Spanish Parliament, with PSOE, PP and IU 
voting against it. RJ and ZP coincide in their choice of words, indicating ideological 
convergence and the hybridation of discourse.  
                                                          
226
 Obviously this is a trend and in no way implies that they are completely similar. 
227
 Under the general slogan “Motivos para Creer”, the slogans for the 2008 electoral campaign were the 
following: “Por todo lo que merece la pena”; “Comprometidos con la Igualdad”; “Vivimos juntos, 
decidimos juntos”; “No es lo mismo”; “Porque lo estamos consiguiendo”; “Somos más”; “Soñar con los 
pies en la tierra”; “Por todo lo logrado”; “Por el pleno empleo”; “Porque no está todo hecho”; “La octava 
potencia económica, la primera en derechos sociales”; “Ahora que avanzamos, por qué retroceder”; 
“Podemos llegar tan lejos como queramos”. 
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11. CONCLUSIONS. Presidentiability, the field, and the ideological convergence 
 
11.1. Introducing the conclusions 
This dissertation began with a discussion on the structure and the working of the field of 
Spanish institutional Politics. This field works as a field of battle where candidates, the 
main actors, together with journalists, fight for power by imposing their principles of 
vision and division of the world, i.e. their ideology on a majority of citizens. I based the 
discussion on two main concepts drawn from Bourdieu’s sociology: field and capital. 
Candidates try to modify the relations of force of the field. In particular they fight for 
political capital, which is a particular form of symbolic capital based on recognizability 
and (good) reputation. Thanks to the convertibility of capital, political capital can be 
converted into social capital, i.e. votes, which in representative democracies represent 
the social support of a party. 
In order to connect the structure and the functioning of the field with the 
functioning of a particular discursive practice such as that of the debate, it was 
necessary to enhance the scope of the concept of capital; for this reason I have related it 
to the concepts of face, which highlights the interactivity of social encounters and the 
reference to more or less socially shared attributes, and with that of ethos, which refers 
more widely to the role of discourse and argumentation as well as pre-discourse in the 
construction of speaker’s credibility. These three concepts have allowed me to articulate 
the discussion around the interactivity of the debates and face-working and around the 
analysis of the main argumentative-discursive devices employed for managing 
presidentiability. This latter term must be understood as subsuming the three concepts 
of political capital, face and ethos, integrating and enhancing the main theoretical and 
operational reaches of the three concepts: the link with the field structure and with its 
main stake (political capital), interactivity, and discursivity. 
The main ideas underlying this work are that politics is a competitive game and 
that the game is conducted mainly through discourse and also symbols. The description 
of the structure and the working of political field as a competitive zero-sum game, 
where candidates fight for capital can help to explain why politicians are constantly 
engaged in positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other: candidates 
acquire capital by detracting it from their opponents. I have called this process 
presidentiability management. The de/increasing of presidentiability is related to the 
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main features of ideological discourse, i.e. de/legitimation. This process preludes the 
extra-discursive legitimation that candidates receive by the fact of being voted. 
Given the centrality of the structure of the political field in explaining candidates’ 
interaction on the front-stage of the debates, I have extensively described and analyzed 
the Spanish party system and the political-administrative structure, providing 
information about the main electoral processes at national, regional, provincial and 
municipal levels. Through charts and figures I have shown the relations of force 
between the main actors of Spanish political field, and hence the monopoly exerted by 
PP and PSOE on the Spanish politics. I have analyzed in great detail the main Spanish 
parties and the relations of force between them; in particular I have shown the systemic 
links between the results of the three parties (PP-PSOE; PP-UCD; PSOE-IU) and the 
duopoly of PP and PSOE, as it emerged in 1993. This duopoly was sanctioned by the 
1993 televised debates and consolidated by the 2008 debates. 
The theoretical framework presented, where the term presidentiability subsumes 
the concepts of political capital, face and ethos, has had its logical counterpart in the 
analytical tools I have employed for the analysis. Trying to compensate the limits of an 
analysis that could have proved overly textual, I have employed an interactional 
analytical approach and a discursive analytical approach. All the tools employed were at 
the crossroads of many disciplines, mainly Sociolinguistics, Pragmatics, Semantics, 
Semiotics, Argumentation, and Rhetoric. 
In the part most properly dedicated to the analysis, I have firstly pointed out some 
of the main features of the debates. They are to be seen as a front-stage where 
candidates enact their identities and thus construct their presidentiability through an 
interaction that is mainly verbal. In particular I have framed the debate as a mediatized 
communicative (pseudo)event, i.e. as an event created with the sole aim of being talked 
about. From this perspective, I have highlighted the mediatization, personalization, and 
rituality of the Spanish politics, conceiving the debate as a ritual of confrontation based 
on myths such as the existence of opposing parties and the citizens’ freedom of choice. I 
have also recalled the role of debates in perpetuating the Spanish two-party political 
system. 
I have described the structure of the debates, focusing in particular on their 
thematic organization. In line with the design of the dissertation, constructed as a 
triangular discussion around the attributes of the presidentiable, the themes about which 
the presidentiability is constructed and the discursive devices employed, I have 
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dedicated part of my discussion to the topics. In order to frame the debate as a 
homological representation of the Spanish political field, I have shown the relationship 
between the themes and the traditional and new cleavages of Spanish society. The main 
topics on which presidentiability is constructed during the debates are the same as those 
employed during the rest of the campaign: the economy, immigration, terrorism and the 
unity of Spain. All four topics were deeply entrenched in the discourse circulating in 
Spain during the period of the election campaign and were related to the traditional 
cleavages defining and distinguishing the main Spanish parties.  
In the four analytical chapters I have analyzed the way the two candidates have 
managed presidentiability in relation to the 4 main themes, namely the attributes they 
have invoked, how they have interacted, the moves employed by the candidates in 
implementing their strategies, and the argumentative-discursive devices they deployed 
in order to increase their presidentiability and detract from that of their opponent. 
After this short overview I will proceed now to draw the main conclusions.  
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11.2. The main values invoked through the attribute of the presidentiable 
Candidates have managed their presidentiability in both negative terms, detracting from 
that of their opponent, and in a positive manner, building up their own, in relation with 
the following general and particular attributes: 
 
RJ→ZP: inactive; incapable; indifferent; unrealistic; a liar; not keeping his 
promises; confusing priorities; distant from laymen; a divider; unaware; lax; 
incoherent; inconsistent; feeble; a bad debater (does not speak about what 
matters); a non-patriot (not defending Spain and Spaniards’ interests); a villain 
(negotiates with terrorists); removed from victims; a divider (breaking a 
traditional PP-PSOE agreement; dividing the Spanish); inexperienced; frivolous; 
naive; opportunistic; isolated; irresponsible; radical; antidemocratic. 
 
RJ→RJ: active; capable; strict; close to laymen; a patriot (defending Spain and 
Spaniards’ interests); a good debater; a hero (fights against terrorists); strong; 
close to victims; moderate; a unifier (defends traditional PP-PSOE agreements; 
unifies Spaniards); selfless; realistic; capable; sincere. 
 
ZP→RJ: unsupportive; far from laymen; a pretender; an unfair player (disloyal); 
a divider; a liar; authoritarian; ineffective; incoherent; incapable; xenophobic; a 
centralist; conservative; regressive (past, Francoism); undemocratic; threat to 
freedom and joy; pessimistic; radical; opportunistic. 
 
ZP→ZP: supportive; close to laymen; a fair player (loyal); sincere; open to 
dialogue; optimistic; tolerant; a good-debater; capable; effective; pacifist; a 
patriot; democratic; progressive; a defender of freedom and joy; a peripheralist; a 
unifier (traditional PP-PSOE agreements; unifies Spaniards economically); 
moderate; selfless. 
 
As we can see, and coherently with the observations made in the previous chapters, 
candidates have referred mainly to the same attributes, except for some differences in 
the main frames used, such as those of the nurturing or strict father
228
.  
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 Moreover, not all the attributes have been mobilized at the same time for all the terrains of struggle. 
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11.3. The main devices employed for constructing presidentiability 
Candidates have used many devices for managing their presidentiability; the following 
lines provide a summary of the most important ones. Yet before doing so, two 
observations must be made. Firstly, these devices should not be seen as belonging to 
closed categories; they are instead intertwined and work on different planes of the 
process of constructing meaning, so, for example, the topic of uniqueness is inserted 
into narratives through the use of certain quantifiers and deixis, etc. 
Secondly, the differences and analogies between the first and second debates must 
be considered. Even though both debates follow essentially the same patterns, 
implementing the same strategies, making almost the same moves and deploying 
practically the same devices even in relation to different themes, it would nevertheless 
be a mistake to consider them as perfectly equal. A week elapsed between the first and 
second debates, and the candidates have received feedback on the impressions they 
made on lay and expert audiences. It is therefore reasonable to assume that debaters 
have changed or corrected some stances, modifying their style in line with the 
comments that appeared on the news or in other media on the debates, etc. This point is 
essential for recognizing the dynamicity of the construction of discourse, the circulation 
of metadiscourses about the debate, the complexity (non-linearity) and stratification of 
discursive construction. Nevertheless, it is still possible to see a number of patterns in 
the discursive construction of presidentiability. 
As for arguments, for instance, candidates have extensively used the ad 
hominem in all the three variants: tu quoque, circumstantial, and abusive. The first 
two variants have been used to demonstrate the opponent’s incoherence, inconsistence, 
and opportunism, while the last one has been employed for directly destroying the 
opponent’s credibility, as when RJ stated that ZP says meaningless things: eso que 
usted dijo es lisa y llanamente una de esas cosas que usted dice y no 
significa nada (II.1129-1130). Yet these direct attacks failed to be so efficient, and 
gave an aggressive image of RJ that could have been proved negative for his electoral 
results. In addition, ad verecundiam has been extensively used: as for the ab auctoritate 
variant, the candidates have referred to other politicians, newspapers or organisms such 
as the EU, UN, Banco de España, etc. often in connection with reported speech. As for 
ad populum, it has been mainly used for aligning with audience through references to 
the people: todos lo han visto (RJ.II.1198); todos los españoles lo han 
escuchado (ZP.I.1209).  
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The candidates made extensive use of reported speech either as an argumentum ab 
auctoritate, for instance quoting other’s words to support their own argument or as 
circumstantial or tu quoque in order to demonstrate their opponent’s incoherence. In this 
latter case, we should consider the quotation of the opponent’s statements or key words, 
as when RJ entextualizes ZP’s words entendimiento, talante, convivencia, in order 
to show his incoherence. This move, together with other metapragmatic moves, not only 
demonstrates the intrinsic dialogicity of the debates, their structural polyphony and 
interdiscursivity, but also the fact that the construction of presidentiability is mainly 
discursive. An example of this is ZP’s move of quoting Elorriaga’s statements in order 
to reveal PP’s election strategy. In terms of reported speech mention must be made of 
all the metapragmatic statements such as “you said/I said” for their role in directing 
the debate, for instance in constructing the de/alignment with the opponent. Re-saying 
what has been said shows that candidates are what they say and what they have said, 
i.e. that the construction of ethos is discursive as well as pre-discursive. This kind of 
statements are used to deny, retract, corroborate, one’s own previous statements or those 
of the opponent and serve as the main tools in de/increasing presidentiability. 
A central role has been played by narratives such as “when I/we p(+), now you 
q(–)”; candidates have used different and often opposing narratives to describe the 
situation and actors in different ways that have de/legitimized them. 
It is obvious that in a competitive situation where the main weapon is discourse, 
lexical choice is fundamental in the strategically polarized description of the world and 
actors, as well as for conveying particular ideological meanings. When RJ tries to get 
close to laymen, he uses simple terms, popular expressions, and refers to foods typical 
of laymen’s diet (eggs, milk, and potatoes), a move that will be imitated by ZP for the 
same reason. For instance, in delegitimizing ZP, RJ says that ZP entertained himself 
with issues nobody cares about, denoting a lack of the sense of duty. Particular lexical 
choice could be used to describe reality in positive or negative terms, such as when ZP 
uses desaceleración and RJ crisis to refer to the drop in the same macro-economic 
indicators. 
Among the lexical choices, particular mention must be made of the metaphor, for 
its power in shaping the phenomenon it refers to and directing human attitudes and 
responses to such descriptions. Apart from metaphors on immigration (threat, danger) 
that allow RJ to describe ZP as inactive, or the metaphor of allergy, according to which 
PP is unable to talk, one metaphor is particularly interesting since it appeared twice in 
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issues concerning Nationalism (once for terrorism and once for the Catalan question): 
that of aprendiz de brujo [sorcerer’s apprentice] used by RJ to criticize ZP as being 
inexpert and irresponsible. 
As a particular kind of lexical choice, at the crossroads between pragmatics and 
semantics, we can consider those expressions that trigger particular presumptive 
meanings, verbs like continuar, or the metaphor of encarrilar, etc. These devices are 
important for their ability to surreptitiously persuade receivers by constructing common 
ground meanings in issues that are the object of dispute. If we consider RJ’s following 
statement Sobre España decidimos todos y cada uno de los españoles 
(I.1112-1115), the expression presupposes that Catalonians are Spaniards, which is 
precisely the object of the dispute. The force of implicit meanings lies in forcing hearers 
to take as agreed, as common ground, the very object of discussion. 
In the polarized representation of the situation deixis is also important in aligning 
the speaker to the audience, dealigning the opponent from the audience or de/aligning 
the speaker from/with the opponent. If we look carefully at how speakers have used it, 
we can notice some differences between the two candidates: even though he sometimes 
widens his criticisms to PSOE with a plural you, RJ mainly personalizes his attacks 
against ZP through the use of a singular you; in referring to himself he mostly uses I and 
uses we for creating a community and aligning with Spaniards. In contrast, ZP mainly 
criticizes PP rather than RJ, using the plural instead of the singular you and mostly uses 
we instead of I, widening the self-reference to his Government or PSOE. ZP also uses 
we to align himself with the Spanish. This personalization in deixis is the result of the 
personalization of politics, which reduces complex disputes to an easily understandable 
“fight between you and me”. However, this strategic de/personalization of attacks also 
has other functions. In line with the main PP electoral strategy of separating ZP from 
other PSOE executives, cardholders and electors, RJ personalizes his attacks, 
highlighting ZP’s agency in the negative situation. By doing so, RJ reduces ZP’s face 
and leadership, which is one of his main electoral assets and avoids threatening the face 
of PSOE voters, to whom he also addresses his discourse. Equally, RJ’s personalization 
in referring to himself (I) is aimed at increasing his instable and disputed leadership 
within PP. We can see the opposite in ZP’s discourse: he mainly depersonalizes his 
attacks against PP, preferring to flatten RJ against a group (PP), which allows him not to 
draw attention to his leadership and referring to the entire history of the party also in 
relation with Aznar or even Francoism. Obviously, RJ also occasionally refers to PP as 
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a group (we), depersonalizes his attacks against PSOE (plural you) and ZP also 
personalizes his attacks on RJ (singular you) or uses I for self-reference. 
Another particular kind of lexical choice, this time at the crossroads between 
semantics and rhetoric, are the quantifiers (todo, nada, ningún, único, siempre, 
nunca, etc.): they have proved crucial in the strategic description of actors. They are 
related to the topic of quality and quantity, and in particular to that of uniqueness: 
together they contributed to absolutizing the positive or negative dispositions of the 
candidates and persons described. 
Finally, one more rhetorical device needs to be mentioned due to its role in the 
construction of presidentiability: disclaimers. They are used to balance the image of the 
speaker between two different representations or when invoking two contrasting 
attributes. There is a clear example of this in the block on immigration: RJ says that 
immigrants contribute, but they are needy: the first part is a concession that creates a 
positive image of immigrants, through which RJ refers to attributes such as solidarity 
and tolerance, while the second part, by portraying immigrants as needy, entailing that 
they drain the social services, gives a negative image of immigrants and preludes the 
reference to the attribute of strictness. The disclaimer thus balances strictness with 
tolerance. ZP uses the same structure albeit with a different aim when he says he fights 
strongly against illegal immigration, but immigrants are productive. The first part, a 
concession to the need for controlling immigration, allows him to present himself as 
being strict, while the second part, by representing immigrants as productive, and 
therefore implying that they are beneficial, allows ZP to refer to the attribute of 
tolerance. In doing so, ZP balances strictness with tolerance. Through these moves, 
candidates can stay at the center and create a discourse characterized by centerness. 
This moves shows ideological convergence and the hybridization of discourse, which 
will be discussed in the following section.  
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11.4. The discourse produced: hybridization and ideological convergence 
The discourse that the two candidates produce and disseminate on the front-stage of the 
debates is characterized by two main features: hybridization and ideological 
convergence; both features are related: the former refers to the existence in one 
candidate’s discourse of topics and expressions traditionally belonging to the 
opponent’s discourse and the latter to the ideological similarity of the discourses 
produced by the candidates. 
For instance, we can see RJ discursively presenting himself as a “lefty”. Since 
PP’s overarching strategy is to distance ZP from previous PSOE voters, RJ tries to 
present himself as close to laymen as possible. He does so by speaking the language of 
the people (apretase le cinturón) and referring to the issues that concern them 
(mortgages, prices, etc.). However, he also speaks the language of the Left, for instance 
referring to social inequalities or the redistribution of wealth. These statements 
apparently in favor of the poorer segments of society are in line with the global strategy 
of presidentiability management, whereby RJ presents ZP as being removed laymen. In 
order to win votes from ZP, RJ portrays him as having betrayed laymen and 
insufficiently left wing, whilst at the same time portraying himself as the new defender 
of former voters of the Left, employing a discourse peppered with “lefty” words and 
topics.  
Nevertheless, despite this discursive hybridation where lefty words appear in RJ’s 
discourse, ideological convergence is rather a movement towards the Right. In line with 
his Neoliberal ideology, RJ does not aim to solve the divide between rich and poor, 
which is a constant feature of Neoliberal societies; instead he exploits it for his own 
electoral ends. The dynamics of the debate seem to prove that both candidates converge 
on this: the war of figures and mutual accusations about rising prices, mortgages, 
housing, etc. show that prices have risen, housing is hard to get, social services have 
diminished and the Spanish have become poorer, regardless of who is in power. 
Yet there are also other ways of constructing and spreading ideologically marked 
assumptions that are accepted as common ground throughout the debate: an example is 
the thematic organization of the debate: treating separately the economy and social 
policies in two blocks demonstrates that both candidates, despite their attempt to present 
themselves as being close to laymen, conceive the wellbeing of citizens, as being 
separate from the economy. This formal organization of the debate reveals the 
candidates’ acceptance of Neoliberal postulates.  
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From this perspective, the exclusion of Gaspar Llamazares (IU) cancelled any 
ideological alternative to the undisputedly assumed Neoliberal values, on which PP and 
PSOE seem to vary only in terms of degrees. 
Another clear example of hybridization and ideological convergence is the way 
both candidates handle the issue of immigration. Besides the superficial differences, 
where RJ negatively presents immigrants as a problem (for the safety of the country or 
for the feasibility of social policies) and ZP presents them positively as a resource, in 
reality both representations are based on the same ideological assumptions. In this case 
too, both candidates hybridize their discourse: RJ balances his racist positions with 
mitigating disclaimers and by framing immigration as a matter of realism and 
pragmatism; ZP balances his lefty and tearful representation of immigrants as fleeing 
hunger with references to strictness, realism and pragmatism, which is a form of 
rightization. It can be seen that each candidate hybridizes his discourse with his 
opponent’s stances in a move determined by the nature of the Spanish political field, 
and in particular the fact that both PP and PSOE are catch-all parties.  
Again this hybridization does not exclude ideological convergence towards 
Neoliberalism. On the one hand, RJ’s strategy of shifting the burden for the worsening 
of Spaniards conditions of life determined by cuts to social services, allows him to save 
Neoliberalism and its policies of weakening the State role in balancing market-
determined inequalities, privatizing and marketizing social services. On the other hand, 
ZP’s representation of immigrants as workers, under the superficial enactment of a 
positive attitude towards immigration, actually conceals the assumption of Neoliberal 
ideological perspectives. Openness to immigrants is based not on humanitarianism but 
on economicism: immigrants are a resource and they are good if and only if they pay 
our pensions. 
Ideological convergence is also evident in the way candidates categorize 
immigrants as legal/illegal, assuming the same ideological definitions; in the way they 
conceive on the aids to developing countries as a counterpart for repatriations of 
illegal immigrants; and in the role that both candidates assign to the EU as ultimate 
authority on Spanish immigration policies. 
We can see that, despite the efforts to enact opposition, the ideological 
assumptions underlying the discourse of both candidates are widely shared. Obviously, 
this ideological concomitance becomes visible in the candidates’ discourse: both use the 
same categories, such as legal-illegal, the same arguments such as the reproaches as to 
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who legalized more illegal immigrants, and the same expressions, such as the metaphor 
of the coladero. The war of figures about how many illegal immigrants have been 
legalized indicates that both candidates assume that legalizing immigrants detracts from 
their presidentiability. 
Another very clear example of ideological convergence is the fight for the center. 
It is clear that centerization of political positions is not only an attempt to avoid overly 
radical stances in order to gain the majority of electors by catching wavering ones (less 
ideologized, hence “moderate”), supposed to be in the center of the political spectrum; it 
is rather a real shift in parties’ ideologies. This also is due to the way the political field 
functions: as PP and PSOE are catch-all parties and since electoral victory mainly lies in 
the occupation of the center, PP and PSOE increasingly lean toward similar positions in 
a growing trend towards conservatism: preserving the status quo, erasing alternative 
visions, and never questioning the basic pillars of the present capitalist world order. 
This centerization is especially serious for the Left, since it implies a definite shift to the 
Right. The fight to occupy the center and efforts to avoid overly radical positions is 
corroborated by similarities in the discourse of both PP and PSOE. 
These similarities include the arguments, the discursive devices employed, the 
subjacent categories of their discourse and the terms used. For instance, one of the 
moves employed by candidates in de/legitimizing the other is to present themselves as 
moderate (situated in the center) and presenting the other as radical (situated either to 
the Right or Left). In the first debate ZP reproaches RJ for his relationship with AP and 
RJ accuses ZP of being Marxist; in the second debate ZP and RJ fight to present their 
party as being situated at the center of Spanish politics, whilst situating their opponent’s 
party at one of the two poles of the spectrum, i.e. the Right or Left. These similarities 
are determined by the specific structures of the field and of the debate as particular 
communicative practice, which is entirely entrenched in the field and which 
homologically represents it.  
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11.5. Contribution to the academic field, limitations and further developments 
The major contribution of this study is the light it will help to shed on the Spanish 
political field in contemporary late capitalistic society, showing its structure, 
functioning, and specificities, in relation with its particular historical and cultural 
features. From this perspective, by considering the way candidates construct their 
discourse in relation to certain attributes and themes, this dissertation can also provide 
cultural and sociological insights into the values perceived or constructed as relevant by 
political organizations, providing a deeper vision of contemporary Spanish society and 
the representations circulating within it. 
One of the aims of this dissertation was to contribute to the analysis of political 
discourse by providing a record of the main rhetoric-discursive strategies, moves and 
devices used in the 2008 election campaign. Furthermore, it attempts to contribute to the 
theory of political discourse analysis throughout the articulation of a multidisciplinary 
framework that by integrating different but related theoretical backgrounds is able to 
correlate the social structure and the discourse produced at a certain point of the social 
organization in a particular communicative event. As for this latter point, the present 
study was intended to add to the wide literature on presidential debates in Western 
countries; in particular, it aspired to providing a major historic record of a particular 
moment in Spanish democracy, namely the 2008 general elections. 
In terms of advocacy, and linked to my personal activism, this work intended to 
provide a coherent theoretically-based argument to the discussions of alternative groups 
on the workings of the institutional political field, shedding light on the idea often put 
forward that PP and PSOE have become increasingly similar. From this perspective, I 
tried to prove this point through a detailed analysis of the political field and of the 
discourse produced in it. 
I am well aware that, despite my efforts, this work suffers many limitations. From 
a methodological perspective, my multidisciplinary theoretical framework could seem 
too undisciplined; it could also seem too deterministic in the way it postulates that the 
social structure mainly determines the way discourse is constructed on the front-stage of 
the debates. My analytical approach could seem overly textual, even despite my 
attempts to balance it with interactive approaches that insisted on the dialogicity of the 
stance-taking and of the face-work. My analysis could seem to have paid scant attention 
to the multimodality of audiovisual data and to the paralinguistic and kinetic features of 
such a complex communicative event as a debate. From the perspective of the textual 
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organization of this work, it is possible to find the analytical chapters difficult to read, 
due to the many excerpts presented, the density of the information provided and some 
repetitions. I chose to present the analysis in this detailed but somehow uneasy way with 
the idea of showing as much as possible that my claims were based on a fine-grained 
analysis of data. It is also possible to observe a certain imbalance between chapters, in 
particular chapters 8 and 10 that address the topics of immigration and Catalan question, 
which are far longer than those dealing with the economy (7) or terrorism (9). In the 
case of the latter, for example, following the permanent truce declared by ETA, the 
sociological, cultural and political salience and topical interest of terrorism seems to 
have reduced dramatically, especially compared to the former topics, which are of major 
relevance in present day Spain. Moreover, and with regards to immigration and the 
Catalan question, I must admit that they fit in better than others with my personal 
interest in nations and nationalisms, on the construction of otherness and the treatment 
of the other; in particular they seem to me of special interest in that they clash with 
internationalism and class-based categorization of society that should prevail in left 
wing parties. Therefore, their interest lies in the institutional Left’s inability to produce 
emergent discourses on global poverty and inequalities as a consequence of the 
abandoning of a principle of vision and division of the world based on socio-economical 
categories such as that of class. 
Further development of this work would include a comparative analysis of the 
2008 debates with the other Spanish presidential debates (1993 and 2011), in order to 
see the analogies and differences; to contrast the validity of the basic assumption 
posited here that the structure of political field mainly determines the way candidates 
construct their discourse; to observe the contextual specificities concerning the topics 
treated and attributes invoked, and therefore to note any historical continuities or 
breaking points. It would also be of undoubted interest to compare the 2008 debates 
with the debates of other countries in order to contrast the discursive behavior of 
candidates on the front-stage of the debates, revealing the analogies and differences and 
to determine which are related to historical, cultural and geographic idiosyncrasies or 
particularities. 
At the time of writing the Spanish political panorama has experienced dramatic 
change. The movement of indignados that emerged on 15 May 2011 and referred to 
15M has finally concretized into a new political party, called Podemos, which is 
changing the Spanish field and its relations of force. The 15M and Podemos have 
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highlighted the erosion of the two party system and a desire for new political options 
and new political discourses, beyond the ideological convergence of PP and PSOE 
towards the center, clearly represented by the expression “PPSOE”, where the parties’ 
names are fused into one in order to show their sameness (see, for instance, Hughes 
2011; De Nieves 2013). Consequently, after two legislatures by PP, after the emerging 
of new political forces that represent the 15M claims, in the light of the 2008 global 
economic crises, with the rise of a new (lefty) populism characterized by its proximity to 
laymen’s demands229, it may be necessary to completely rethink this work, which, on 
reaching its conclusion, appears only to have arrived at a new starting point.  
                                                          
229
 The term populism has here a new meaning that challenges the traditionally negative definitions 
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Appendix I. First debate 
Transcription of the first presidential debate between Mariano Rajoy and 








Manuel Campo Vidal (MCV): Bienvenidos todos al primer debate 1 
electoral cara-a-cara, antes de las elecciones del 9 de marzo, 2 
en en… en este caso de los candidatos a la presidencia del 3 
gobierno en un debate organizado por la Academia de las 4 
Ciencias y las Artes de Televisión. Han pasado casi 15 años 5 
desde aquellos cara-a-cara Felipe González-Aznar y por fin 6 
recuperamos los ciudadanos la oportunidad de escuchar frente a 7 
frente los candidatos de las formaciones políticas con mayor 8 
representación parlamentaria. Este es en España el primer 9 
debate del siglo XXI de esta envergadura. Este es el primer 10 
debate de esta naturaleza en la era de la información así que 11 
tenemos que saludar a los telespectadores, a los oyentes de 12 
radio y también a los internautas. Telespectadores de las más 13 
de 30 televisiones que nos siguen en España: 3 generalistas 14 
nacionales, la 1, 4, y la sexta, varias autonómicas, 15 
Telemadrid, Televisión de Galicia, de Asturias, Castilla la 16 
Mancha, Canal Nou, IB3 de Baleares, de Murcia, de Extremadura y 17 
también televisión Castilla y León, televisiones de ámbito 18 
nacional, televisión nacional terrestre, tdt, como VeoTV y 19 
NetTV así como cadenas de televisiones locales, TDT’s, 20 
autonómicas y de grandes ciudades hasta superar el número de 21 
30. Un saludo también a los telespectadores que nos siguen 22 
desde otros países, en Europa y en América, a través de los 23 
canales internacionales de TVE y del canal Antena 3 24 
Internacional, y a los que reciben la señal en varios países de 25 
forma fragmentada, fragmentos de este debate. Por ejemplo en 26 
Portugal, en México, en Alemania, en Italia, en Austria y en 27 
otros países. Sus equipos profesionales están aquí con nosotros 28 
hoy en Madrid. Un saludo también a los que prefieren escuchar, 29 
seguir este debate a través de la radio. Oyentes de Cadena Ser, 30 
de RNE, de Onda Cero, de Cope, Punto Radio, Cataluña Radio, RAC 31 
U, IBE3 y otras emisoras. Y bienvenidos los internautas de todo 32 
el mundo, que siguen, a través de medios digitales este debate. 33 
Un debate verdaderamente global, podríamos decir. Todos los 34 
medios tecnológicos y ninguna frontera. En la historia 35 
electoral española quedará la fecha de hoy, 25 de febrero del 36 
2008, como el día en que se reanudaron los cara-a-cara entre 37 
candidatos a la Presidencia del Gobierno de España. Nuestro 38 
agradecimiento, desde la Academia, a los dos partidos 39 
políticos, que nos han honrado con su confianza. También a 40 
todas las televisiones, a todas las empresas, a todos los 41 
profesionales, entre ellos muchos académicos actuando de forma 42 
voluntaria, que han hecho posible que pusiéramos en marcha este 43 
complejo dispositivo solo en diez días del momento en que se 44 
produjo la aceptación por parte de los dos partidos. Y de forma 45 
especial, cómo no, nuestra gratitud a los dos candidatos. Sin 46 
su aprobación, sin su decisión final, y tenemos entendido que 47 
de forma personal, estos cara-a-cara tan esperados no podrían 48 
ser una realidad. Buenas noches José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.  49 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (ZP): Buenas noches.  50 
                                                          
1
 Video available at: http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/elecciones-20-n/primer-debate-
zapatero-rajoy-2008-integro/1240401/ 
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MCV: Debo pedirle que durante esta media hora del debate 51 
acepte, por favor, que le trate solamente como el candidato del 52 
PSOE y no como presidente del Gobierno en funciones.  53 
ZP: Por supuesto.  54 
MCV: Muy bien. Gracias. Bienvenido Mariano Rajoy, candidato del 55 
PP.  56 
Mariano Rajoy (RJ): Muchas gracias, buenas noches.  57 
MCV: Buenas noches. También gracias por su confianza y por su 58 
decisión personal de aceptar este cara a cara organizado por la 59 
Academia de Televisión. Bien, los candidatos conocen las reglas 60 
del juego, conocen que básicamente lo que aquí se pretende es 61 
la voluntad de ser estrictos en la administración de los 62 
tiempos, y por supuesto equilibradísimos, y la petición de que 63 
en ningún caso haya alusiones personales como estamos seguros 64 
que así será. Tendremos una primera intervención de los 65 
candidatos, digamos de situación, de apertura del debate, y al 66 
final otra intervención, también de tres minutos mirando al 67 
futuro. Pero en medio habrá un debate cruzado, muy intenso, 68 
esperamos cómo no, estamos en elecciones y hay cosas 69 
importantes que decir, con réplicas y con contrarréplicas sobre 70 
cinco bloques importantes: el primero, economía y empleo; 71 
después políticas sociales; política exterior y seguridad; 72 
política institucional y posteriormente los retos del futuro. 73 
Señoras y señores, sin más preámbulos el debate comienza. Según 74 
lo acordado, Mariano Rajoy abrirá todos los turnos y los 75 
cerrará todos los turnos el señor Rodríguez Zapatero, y la 76 
próxima semana, en el segundo debate será justo a la inversa. 77 
Primera intervención de Mariano Rajoy, por tanto. Vamos a 78 
comenzar. Defínanos, por favor, a su juicio, dónde estamos, el 79 
país, nuestra situación, nuestra perspectiva, es la apertura 80 
del debate. La palabra para Mariano Rajoy, candidato del PP.  81 
RJ: Buenas noches. A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que 82 
hace cuatro años? Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si 83 
se la hacemos al señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el 84 
mejor de los mundos, pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a 85 
ustedes, algunos nos dirán que hay cosas que están bien, otras 86 
regular, y que en los últimos tiempos hay cosas que están mal y 87 
otras que están muy mal. Y eso se comprende, porque en los 88 
últimos tiempos han subido los precios, las hipotecas, vuelve 89 
el desempleo y hay muchos españoles que tienen muchas 90 
dificultades para llegar a fin de mes, y tienen que apretarse y 91 
muy mucho el cinturón. ¿Cómo se puede decir que España está muy 92 
bien?, ¿en qué otras materias de las verdaderamente importantes 93 
estamos bien, en Vivienda, en Educación? Estamos a la cola de 94 
Europa, según dicen los organismos internacionales. En 95 
Inmigración, toda Europa ha protestado por el desorden que 96 
provoca este gobierno y nosotros los sufrimos. En Seguridad, la 97 
inseguridad ciudadana crece de una manera alarmante e 98 
importamos delincuentes organizados en bandas muy violentas. 99 
¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4 100 
años además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la 101 
Alianza de Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras 102 
cuestiones? Ha hecho dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y 103 
las dos las ha hecho mal: la estructura de España y los tratos 104 
con ETA. Ha querido modificar por su cuenta el modelo de Estado 105 
y ha querido negociar con los terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas 106 
operaciones le han salido mal. Ninguna de esas dos cosas 107 
contaba con el apoyo de los electores, porque no figuraban en 108 
su programa electoral. Lo ha hecho sin encomendarse a nadie, 109 
por eso para salirse con la suya, necesitó romper todos los 110 
consensos de la Transición, incluido el Pacto contra el 111 
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Terrorismo, para no tener testigos. Necesitó mentir a los 112 
españoles sobre lo que estaba haciendo, y necesitó dividir a la 113 
opinión pública para silenciar cualquier protesta. Ningún 114 
gobernante ha sembrado en la historia de la Transición Moderna 115 
tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez que hablaba de 116 
entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia. Ninguno ha 117 
transmitido a los españoles una sensación comparable de falta 118 
de rumbo, de improvisación y de vivir pendientes de la 119 
ocurrencia cotidiana. Sr. Zapatero, no estará de acuerdo 120 
conmigo. Espero que él exponga sus razones y no me critique a 121 
mí, que es lo que está haciendo normalmente. Él es el que 122 
estado gobernando en España. Yo les voy a decir de verdad, cómo 123 
veo las cosas. Voy a aportar mis soluciones, que pasan por un 124 
cambio de gobierno [MCV: vaya concluyendo quedan dos segundos], 125 
no lo puedo remediar quién lo ha causado. Vamos a elegir entre 126 
seguir dando bandazos o corregir el rumbo. Yo voy a proponerles 127 
un camino y la decisión es de ustedes.  128 
MCV: Gracias Sr. Rajoy, ha cumplido el tiempo escrupulosamente. 129 
Tres minutos y un segundo, por tanto, perfecto. La palabra 130 
ahora, al candidato del Partido Socialista, José Luis Rodríguez 131 
Zapatero. 132 
ZP: Buenas noches, me alegro que por fin tengamos este debate. 133 
Mi satisfacción no es por mí mismo, si no por los ciudadanos 134 
que van a poder comparar esta noche dos proyectos políticos 135 
bien definidos y diferentes. Curiosamente, es la primera vez 136 
que en los 30 años de democracia, comparecemos como candidatos 137 
a la presidencia de gobierno, dos personas que han estado en el 138 
Gobierno y en la Oposición. Por tanto, se nos va a poder 139 
examinar, no sólo por lo que decimos, sino, también por lo que 140 
hemos hecho en el Gobierno y en la Oposición. Por mi parte, 141 
vengo a pedir el respaldo para un proyecto que está en pleno 142 
desarrollo. Un proyecto ambicioso para España que necesita 143 
cuatro años más. Un proyecto para una España próspera y una 144 
España decente. España es un país que se ha convertido en la 145 
octava potencia económica del mundo. Hemos superado en renta 146 
per cápita a Italia, un país que atiende a los jóvenes, que ha 147 
creado tres millones de empleos en esta legislatura, más de la 148 
mitad para las mujeres. Un país que apoya a los mayores, en 149 
este período hemos subido las pensiones mínimas un 30%, la 150 
mayor subida de pensiones en una legislatura en la Democracia. 151 
Un país que defiende a las mujeres, con la histórica Ley de 152 
Igualdad. Un país que se preocupa por atender a las personas 153 
que no pueden valerse por sí mismo, con la Ley de la 154 
Dependencia. Un país que ha trabajado con diálogo social, hemos 155 
tenido el periodo de menos huelgas de la historia de la 156 
Democracia. Un país que apoya a los más necesitados, con el 157 
brazo de la sanidad pública, de la educación pública, de la 158 
seguridad pública. Esta es la tarea que hemos hecho. Hemos 159 
trabajado con firmeza, con convicción y con humildad. Y hemos 160 
tenido que superar obstáculos. El principal obstáculo ha sido 161 
una oposición que desde el primer día no aceptó el resultado 162 
electoral, que ha practicado el insulto personal, usted mismo, 163 
señor Rajoy, que es una barrera que no se puede traspasar en 164 
democracia. Que ha crispado, que ha enfrentado a ciudadanos de 165 
unas comunidades con otras, que se ha movido entre la mentira y 166 
la exageración, que no ha dado respaldo al Gobierno en ninguna 167 
de las grandes cuestiones de Estado, que no ha dudado de 168 
utilizar el terrorismo con fines partidistas, que no ha dudado 169 
de utilizar el dolor de las víctimas. Una oposición que ha 170 
establecido la crispación y la división. La disyuntiva en las 171 
próximas elecciones es: diálogo o confrontación, aquellos que 172 
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buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican problemas, aquellos que 173 
desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y aquellos que han 174 
intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar al poder. 175 
MCV: Muchas gracias. Los dos candidatos han abierto el debate 176 
en un análisis particular sobre la situación, y a partir de 177 
ahora el debate avanzará con replicas y contrarréplicas, como 178 
decíamos, con cinco bloques temáticos. El primer de ellos, la 179 
economía y el empleo. Naturalmente, ustedes pueden referirse a 180 
lo que crean conveniente, siempre que estemos en el marco de 181 
ese bloque. Pueden utilizar, por ejemplo, datos 182 
macroeconómicos, hablar de empleo, de competitividad de la 183 
economía española, de precios, de salarios, de fiscalidad… de 184 
lo que crean conveniente. Abre, con dos minutos en este caso el 185 
turno, Mariano Rajoy y la contrarréplica será del señor 186 
Rodríguez Zapatero. 187 
 
 
2. ECONOMÍA Y EMPLEO 
 
RJ: Bien, hablamos de economía. En marzo del año 2004, poco 188 
antes de su llegada al Gobierno, según los institutos 189 
oficiales, el 15% de los españoles creían que la situación 190 
económica de España estaba mal. Hoy, es el 47%, el triple. Es 191 
decir, se ha dado una vuelta completa durante su mandato. ¿Y 192 
por qué pasa esto? Pues pasa porque los precios, sobre todo los 193 
artículos de primera necesidad, crecen sin control. Sólo en el 194 
año 2007 la leche ha subido el 29%, los huevos, el 11%, el 195 
pollo, el 10%, el pan, el 13%, porque los salarios y las 196 
pensiones han subido muy por debajo y porque los tipos de 197 
interés de las hipotecas se han doblado en los últimos tres 198 
años. Y porque tenemos un crecimiento de paro que ha sido nada 199 
menos que de 4.500 personas al día en el mes de enero. En los 200 
últimos siete meses de su Gobierno, el paro ha aumentado en 201 
300.000 personas. Por lo tanto, a pesar del crecimiento de la 202 
economía y del empleo en los últimos años, y del estado de las 203 
cuentas públicas, fruto de la herencia y de la inercia que 204 
impulsaba la economía cuando usted llegó… [ZP: Vaya inercia… ] 205 
La gente concreta… sí, sí, la gente concreta, señor Zapatero. 206 
Los españoles viven hoy con muchas más dificultades que cuando 207 
usted llegó al Gobierno. Y el Gobierno no ha tomado ni una sola 208 
medida de política económica, no ha tomado ninguna. Estaba en 209 
otras cosas, a las cuales antes he hecho referencia. Es más, ha 210 
permanecido impasible… e insensible, sin tomar una sola medida 211 
ante la subida de precios que se han producido en los últimos 212 
meses. Se ha limitado a ver lo bien que iba todo, hasta que 213 
dejó de ir bien. Usted no le ha dado cuerda al reloj, y el 214 
reloj se ha parado. ¿Sigue usted manteniendo que es lo que 215 
acaba de decir ahora [MCV: vaya concluyendo] que la situación 216 
económica de España está mejor que nunca?  217 
MCV: Primera intervención; bloque de economía.  218 
ZP: Señor Rajoy, debería haber tomado nota del debate entre el 219 
señor Solbes y el señor Pizarro, para darse cuenta que no vale 220 
la demagogia en la economía. Hemos vivido cuatro años de un 221 
crecimiento magnífico y de una creación de empleo magnífica. 222 
Hemos crecido más que los ocho grandes países industrializados 223 
y hemos creado más empleo que los ocho grandes países 224 
industrializados. Ese balance nos da tranquilidad para asumir 225 
un proceso de desaceleración, que tenemos en estos momentos, 226 
que es una desaceleración mundial. Hemos crecido de media el 227 
3,8%, y cuando llegamos al Gobierno crecíamos mucho menos. La 228 
Comisión Europea acaba de pronosticar que España será el país 229 
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que más crezca en 2008. Y el crecimiento para nosotros supone 230 
distribuir la riqueza. Hemos alcanzado el récord histórico de 231 
empleo en estos cuatro años, con más de 20 millones de 232 
ocupados. Con tres millones de nuevos empleos, más de la mitad 233 
para mujeres. El paro está en la cifra más baja de toda la 234 
historia de la democracia, señor Rajoy. Yo lo encontré en el 235 
11,5, y está en estos momentos en el 8,5. La tasa más baja de 236 
la historia de España. Hemos creado 2.000  puestos de trabajo 237 
cada día. Y las cuentas públicas han tenido superávit todos los 238 
años. 70.000 millones de euros de superávit que nos permiten 239 
tener una garantía, una fortaleza para atender cualquier 240 
necesidad. Hemos reducido lo que representan impuestos, y por 241 
supuesto hemos aumentado la productividad. Pero, ¿ahora a qué 242 
viene usted si no se ha preocupado por la economía en cuatro 243 
años? Si hemos tenido tres debates sobre el Estado de la 244 
Nación, y en sus discursos, que son largos, sólo ha dedicado 245 
una media de tres minutos a la parte de la economía… Si usted 246 
no se ha dedicado en nada a la economía. Todo el mundo sabe a 247 
lo que se ha dedicado: a hacer oposición con lo único que no 248 
tenía que haber hecho oposición; con ETA.  249 
MCV: Debe concluir. Turno para Mariano Rajoy.  250 
RJ: Mire usted, no se esconda usted, señor Zapatero, detrás de 251 
los datos  macroeconómicos, ni nos hable de otros debates. Aquí 252 
estamos hablando usted y yo. Mire, cuando llegamos al Gobierno 253 
nosotros había una inflación del 4,3%. Cuando nos fuimos del 254 
Gobierno, la inflación era del 2,1. Y ahora ustedes nos la 255 
vuelven a dejar en el 4,3. Y mire la tendencia de su última 256 
época; está en el 4,3; está usted exactamente igual que en el 257 
año 1995. No me hable de paro, porque nosotros, el señor Solbes 258 
nos dejó una tasa de paro del 22%, que era un auténtico récord. 259 
La bajamos al 11% y cuando nos fuimos de Gobierno había dos 260 
millones de parados, señor Zapatero. Y ahora hay 2.200.000 261 
parados. Y aquí están los datos del INEM: 300.000 parados más 262 
en los últimos siete meses. Esos son sus datos… Pero lo más 263 
importante no es eso. Lo más importante es que España, como 264 
consecuencia de los acontecimientos que se han producido, está 265 
en una situación mucho peor que otros países para abordar los 266 
problemas económicos que nos vienen por delante. Está en una 267 
situación porque España tiene un déficit exterior del 10%, que 268 
es el más alto de todos los países desarrollados. Hoy hay un 269 
problema de liquidez; hoy nadie da un euro. Y pregúntele a 270 
todas esas personas que tienen que pedir un crédito, pequeñas y 271 
medianas empresas, si alguien le da un euro. Y ese es el 272 
problema señor Zapatero, que nosotros necesitamos para mantener 273 
nuestro nivel de crecimiento financiación exterior y esa 274 
financiación en estos momentos es muy difícil de conseguir. Por 275 
tanto, ni me hable de cifras macroeconómicas ni me dé datos que 276 
nadie entiende. Aquí pregúntele a los españoles por los 277 
precios, pregunte a los españoles que están perdiendo en este 278 
momento su puesto de trabajo y pregunte a la gente que va a 279 
pedir un crédito al banco y no lo recibe. Eso es la economía y 280 
eso es lo que le importa a los españoles.  281 
MCV: Adelante.  282 
ZP: Señor Rajoy vamos a hablar de la vida real, de salarios y 283 
de la economía familiar. Le recuerdo que usted siendo Ministro 284 
de Administraciones Públicas congeló el sueldo de los empleados 285 
públicos. Y le recuerdo que ustedes en el gobierno hicieron 286 
perder poder adquisitivo a las rentas más bajas, a los 287 
trabajadores que cobran el Salario Mínimo Interprofesional. 288 
Mire, estos son los datos del crecimiento económico y la 289 
comparación con otros países. Estos son los datos de la 290 
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evolución de ocupados en este período que hemos llevado al 291 
mayor nivel de ocupados de la historia de España. Y la 292 
reducción máxima de la tasa de paro que le debería de alegrar 293 
que tengamos la tasa de paro más baja de toda la democracia. 294 
Mire, los precios en sus últimos cuatro años de Gobierno 295 
crecieron al 3,4 de media anual, ahora han crecido al 3,2, 296 
prácticamente igual. Lo que entonces era un milagro hombre, 297 
ahora es desolador y con una diferencia que los precios del 298 
petróleo y de los cereales en el mercado internacional con 299 
ustedes estaban tres veces más bajos. Nosotros sí hemos, tres 300 
veces más bajo en su período, hemos hecho medidas para apoyar a 301 
la gente. Hoy mismo una medida que ha anunciado el 302 
Vicepresidente económico en relación con las hipotecas. Hemos 303 
reducido lo que ha sido un crecimiento del precio de la 304 
vivienda, hemos duplicado la construcción de viviendas 305 
oficiales, le diré, en sus ocho años de Gobierno los salarios 306 
de los españoles perdieron poder adquisitivo, en el 2007 están 307 
ganando poder adquisitivo. El aumento medio en su período de 308 
gobierno fue de 400 euros al año de los salarios y con el 309 
nuestro 650 euros. Hemos subido el salario mínimo. Usted no es 310 
creíble para representar a la gente de la calle porque cuando 311 
gobernaban toleraron lo que fue la vergüenza del redondeo con 312 
el euro. No hicieron nada, Precios, cosas que valían cien 313 
pesetas pasaron a valer un euro. No tienen credibilidad [MCV: 314 
Debe ir cumpliendo] y usted era miembro de ese Gobierno.  315 
MCV: Señor Rajoy 316 
RJ: Eh… Mire usted, señor Zapatero, según los datos suyos, 317 
porque yo sólo utilizo datos suyos, los datos del gobierno, el 318 
salario medio español ha subido desde el primer trimestre de 319 
2004 hasta el tercer trimestre del 2007 un 10% y la inflación 320 
ha subido un 14,5% pero si quiere le vuelvo a dar más datos de 321 
lo que han subido los productos de primera necesidad. Solo el 322 
año pasado el pan el 13%, la carne de ave el 10%, los huevos el 323 
10%, la leche el 29, los productos lácteos el 10, las frutas 324 
frescas el 8, las legumbres y hortalizas el 10%. ¿Qué me dice 325 
usted? Dígaselo eso a los españoles, es decir, deje de dar 326 
cifras macroeconómicas que nadie entiende. Con quien han 327 
perdido poder adquisitivo los españoles es con usted, la tasa 328 
de paro [ZP: NO, fue con ustedes con quien perdieron poder 329 
adquisitivo] no, fue con usted y la tasa de paro es que le he 330 
dado los datos. No me hable de tasas de paro, cuando usted 331 
llegó al Gobierno había 2 millones de parados, ahora hay 332 
2.200.000 parados y además en las últimas fechas en los últimos 333 
meses [ZP: Porque ha subido afortunadamente la población 334 
activa, señor Rajoy] se ha aumentado en 300.000 parados, no me 335 
interrumpa, 300.000 parados, esta es la tendencia que deja 336 
usted. No me diga usted que la congelación de los sueldos de 337 
los funcionarios es que nos dejaron la Seguridad Social 338 
quebrada, una tasa de paro del 22% [ZP: Eso es falso], un 339 
déficit público y una deuda pública y unos tipos de interés que 340 
no nos permitían en ningún caso cumplir los requisitos del Euro 341 
y entrar en Maastricht, por tanto no me hable ni me haga 342 
demagogias con esas cosas. Pero lo más grave, lo más grave de 343 
lo que ha dicho usted es lo de la igualdad de las rentas. Yo 344 
tengo aquí los datos de Eurostat es que hemos perdido en 345 
igualdad el 20% más rico gana hoy bastante más que el 20% más 346 
pobre, son los datos que da la Comisión Europea, los datos que 347 
da el señor Almunia, que también pone de relieve los datos de 348 
competitividad de la economía española. Mire, yo le pido que se 349 
deje de darnos datos macroeconómicos y que le diga a la gente 350 
los precios, cómo lo va a resolver, que hable del paro, que 351 
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hable de los temas que importan, del nivel adquisitivo de los 352 
salarios, no me cuente lo demás.  353 
MCV: Debe concluir, última intervención de dos minutos para el 354 
señor Zapatero.  355 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, los tres millones de empleos son personas 356 
de carne y hueso, muchas de las cuales nos podrán estar 357 
escuchando esta noche y la tasa de paro la más baja de la 358 
historia. Ahora vivimos un momento de recesión económica 359 
mundial. Similar a lo que pasó en el 2002, ¿Qué hicieron 360 
ustedes en aquel momento? El Decretazo. Un decreto para 361 
restringir derechos de los trabajadores, para facilitar el 362 
despido libre que provocó una huelga general. Hace alusión, 363 
usted, de vez en cuando a que debemos dar cuerda al reloj de la 364 
economía. Sr. Rajoy, quizá no se ha enterado que hoy los 365 
relojes van a pilas y nosotros hemos cargado las pilas de la 366 
Economía, tenemos 3 millones más de empleos, superávit y hemos 367 
reducido la deuda, el país que más lo ha hecho del mundo 368 
desarrollado, 130.000 millones. A pesar de la desaceleración, 369 
seguiremos creciendo porque tenemos una buena salud de las 370 
cuentas públicas, porque hemos hecho la creación de 3 millones 371 
de empleos, porque además hemos hecho políticas sociales. La 372 
desaceleración no va a ser ni profunda, ni prolongada. Va a ser 373 
una desaceleración, para la cual, nuestro país está mejor 374 
preparado que nadie, por la fortaleza de su Sistema Financiero, 375 
por la fortaleza de sus Cuentas Públicas y trabajaremos con los 376 
sindicatos y empresarios, para seguir promoviendo empleo para 377 
ayudar a las familias que puedan tener más    dificultades, 378 
como hemos hecho nosotros a diferencia de lo que hacían 379 
ustedes. ¿Sabe cuál es la diferencia? Que ante una dificultad, 380 
nosotros hemos propuesto una medida, que es devolver 400 euros 381 
a asalariados, a pensionistas y a autónomos. Una medida 382 
parecida, la ha tomado el Sr. Bush en los EE.UU. de 383 
Norteamérica, de 600 euros, ¿sabe lo que ha hecho allí la 384 
oposición, que también están en campaña presidencial? Apoyar. 385 
Hay muchas diferencias entre el gobierno del Sr. Bush y el mío, 386 
pero las diferencias entre la oposición de España y la 387 
oposición norteamericana son totales. Ustedes nunca han apoyado 388 
en nada al Gobierno, no tienen parangón [MCV: debe ir 389 
concluyendo… debe ir concluyendo] con ninguna oposición 390 
democrática de los países que conocemos.  391 
MCV: Vamos al último minuto de este bloque. Yo les ruego, han 392 
sido ustedes extraordinariamente disciplinados, y les ruego, 393 
que cumplan también este minuto. Sr. Rajoy en primer lugar, el 394 
Sr. Zapatero a continuación. 395 
RJ: Nunca creí que el Sr. Zapatero pusiera de ejemplo al Sr. 396 
Bush. Mire usted, con los 400 euros que dice usted que va a 397 
devolver, si gana las elecciones en Junio, a un señor que gana 398 
un millón de euros le va a devolver 400 euros, y a los que 399 
ganan 10.000, 11.000, 12.000 o 13.000 o 14.000 euros pues no 400 
les va a devolver usted ni un solo euro como es perfectamente 401 
entendible. Celebro que usted hable de superávit, porque en el 402 
año 2003 dijo usted, como recordará, que en España nunca habría 403 
superávit mientras hubiera déficit de camas hospitalarias, o 404 
déficit de centros de días, o déficit de pensiones. En 405 
cualquier caso, me gustaría decirle una cosa, Sr. Zapatero. 406 
Quienes son de carne y hueso son las 300.000 personas que han 407 
perdido su empleo. Quienes son de carne y hueso son todos los 408 
españoles que se levantan todos los días a las 7 de la mañana y 409 
que van a comprar [ZP: y a las 5] y que ven lo que han subido 410 
los precios… y a las 5, y a las 6. Todos, todos esos son de 411 
carne y hueso, pero parece que usted no los conoce. Y son de 412 
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carne y hueso también los pensionistas. Ustedes en materia de 413 
política económica no han hecho nada. Nosotros en el año 96 414 
demostramos que se podían hacer las cosas, hemos presentado un 415 
gran programa económico y lo vamos a llevar a la práctica para 416 
relanzar nuestra economía.  417 
MCV: Muchas gracias.  418 
ZP: Sí. No ha dado ninguna idea, nosotros sí. Hemos apoyado 419 
subiendo las pensiones mínimas, el salario mínimo, 420 
estableciendo nuevas prestaciones como los 2.500 euros, 421 
manteniendo la, el poder adquisitivo de los empleados públicos, 422 
que ustedes congelaron. Hace cuatro años, en el primer debate 423 
de investidura me dijo usted: “España debe crecer al 3% y crear 424 
dos millones de empleos. Por esas cifras le juzgaremos el PP y 425 
la sociedad española”. Me retó a crecer al 3%, y hemos crecido 426 
al 3,7%. Me desafió a crear dos millones de empleos y hemos 427 
creado tres millones de empleos. Y me dijo además: “No olvide 428 
esto que acabo de decirle”. Haga ahora su valoración. Hemos 429 
superado todo lo que usted nos exigía. Señor Rajoy, no olvide 430 
esto que acabo de decirle.  431 
MCV: Bien señores, hemos concluido este primer bloque en 432 
relación con la economía y el empleo. El segundo bloque es el 433 
de la política social, en general, las políticas sociales, se 434 
puede hablar aquí de lo que crean conveniente los candidatos: 435 
pensiones, sanidad, educación, inmigración, dependencia, 436 
igualdad y familia. Política de familia. Doy, de nuevo, la 437 
palabra en primer lugar al candidato del PP Mariano Rajoy. 438 
 
 
3. POLÍTICA SOCIAL 
 
RJ: Bien, los pilares fundamentales de cualquier política 439 
social son fundamentalmente la sanidad, la educación y las 440 
pensiones. No sólo son los únicos, pero sí son los 441 
fundamentales. Pero en los últimos años ha surgido un fenómeno 442 
nuevo y creciente, que es la inmigración, que puede afectar a 443 
estos pilares a que acabo de hacer referencia. Son personas que 444 
vienen a España, que trabajan y que, en su mayoría, 445 
contribuyen. Pero también son los más necesitados y, por tanto, 446 
demandan muchos servicios sociales y los recursos de esos 447 
servicios pues a veces se quedan cortos. Por lo tanto para que 448 
lo que puede ser una operación de éxito no se convierta en un 449 
drama hay que poner un orden y control en el fenómeno 450 
migratorio. Voy a dar algunos datos. En el año 2005, entraron 451 
en España más de 700.000 extranjeros. En el año 2006, más de 452 
670.000, más que Francia, Alemania y el Reino Unido juntos. En 453 
el año 2007, más de 725.000, también más que Francia, el Reino 454 
Unido y Alemania juntos. Somos el segundo país del mundo, sólo 455 
superado por EEUU, a la hora de entrar ciudadanos extranjeros. 456 
Es evidente que esto no está controlado, es evidente que esto 457 
es una avalancha. Usted no ha hecho nada más que complicar las 458 
cosas, provocando hace tres años un efecto llamada que se oyó 459 
en todo el mundo. Y en lo demás, pues, se limita a decir lo 460 
bien que va todo y a ignorar la realidad. Y, además, cuando 461 
alguien hace propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y las 462 
tilda de ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he 463 
propuesto prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he 464 
propuesto el contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad 465 
de derechos, oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones. He 466 
propuesto que se expulse a los extranjeros que cometan delitos, 467 
y para usted eso no tiene ninguna importancia [ZP: Está en la 468 
ley…] Sí, está en la ley. ¿Mantiene usted que no pasa nada, que 469 
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es lo que le ocurre a usted habitualmente y que no hay nada más 470 
que hacer en esta materia, salvo seguir como estamos?  471 
ZP: Mire señor Rajoy, cuando llegué al Gobierno había 700.000 472 
inmigrantes sin papeles en España trabajando ilegalmente, pero 473 
luego me referiré a la inmigración. Voy a hablar de los 474 
aspectos básicos de una política social que afecta a los 475 
ciudadanos. Empezaré por la educación. Señor Rajoy, usted como 476 
ministro de Educación redujo las becas. Hoy hay 250.000 477 
estudiantes que disponen de becas después de la política de 478 
este gobierno. Hay que comparar los hechos y la demagogia, con 479 
las palabras que ustedes pronuncian. Política de igualdad. 480 
Hemos hecho una ley de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres, sin su 481 
apoyo. Hemos establecido más medidas en defensa de la 482 
maternidad, en defensa del derecho a la paternidad para 483 
conciliar la vida laboral y la vida familiar. Hemos sufragado 484 
la educación infantil de tres a seis años al 100% y ahora nos 485 
proponemos hacerlo del cero a tres por cien [n.d.r. de cero a 486 
tres años]. Hemos aprobado la Ley de la Dependencia, ustedes no 487 
hicieron nada por apoyar a las personas que no se pueden valer 488 
por sí mismas y ahora tenemos como un derecho el apoyo a más de 489 
un millón de dependientes que va a ser un cambio histórico en 490 
nuestro modelo social. Hemos subido un 30% las pensiones 491 
mínimas más en cuatro años que ustedes en ocho cuando la 492 
economía según ustedes iba muy bien y hemos subido el salario 493 
mínimo al 30%, eso es política social. Hemos apoyado a los 494 
jóvenes para la vivienda en alquiler con una renta de 495 
emancipación [RJ: Sí eheheh…] que va a ayudar a 350.000 496 
jóvenes, ustedes ni un euro para los jóvenes en alquiler, hemos 497 
establecido una prestación de 2.500 euros por nacimiento y 498 
ustedes que tanto hablan de la familia no hicieron ninguna 499 
prestación, ningún apoyo por nacimiento a las familias en este 500 
país. La estadística es abrumadora, y déjeme que subraye este 501 
último ejemplo 2.500 euros a 500.000 familias al año, ustedes 502 
cero euros. Cero. 500.000 familias dividido por cero es 503 
infinito. Lo mismo que la diferencia entre su política social y 504 
la nuestra que es abrumadora [MCV: Tiene que ir concluyendo] e 505 
ineficaz.  506 
MCV: Mariano Rajoy…  507 
RJ: Bien, ya veo que usted no tiene el más mínimo interés en 508 
hablar de inmigración pero yo sí. Y los españoles también y por 509 
lo tanto yo voy a hablar de inmigración. Pero antes quisiera 510 
decir que usted ha dicho dos mentiras: la primera sobre mi 511 
gestión en las becas, mire según datos del Ministerio de 512 
Educación que usted dirige hay más becarios en el año 1999 513 
cuando yo era ministro que en el año 2007. En becarios 514 
universitarios y en el resto del modelo educativo, por lo tanto 515 
ha mentido usted. En el tema de la dependencia nosotros hemos 516 
apoyado la ley de dependencia pero mientras Madrid, simplemente 517 
un ejemplo la Comunidad de Madrid le dedica 700 millones de 518 
euros al año usted el año pasado 2007 le ha dedicado 200 519 
millones de euros al año. Pero voy a hablar de la inmigración, 520 
mire, antes le di los datos de las personas que entraron en 521 
España en 2005, 2006 y 2007, ahora le voy a dar los datos de su 522 
gobierno, de sus permisos de residencia. En junio de 2004 había 523 
en España 1.776.000 personas con permiso de residencia. En 524 
diciembre de 2007 hay tres millones 900, es decir, mucho más 525 
del doble, ésa es su gestión. Esto para usted no plantea ningún 526 
problema pero hay gente a la cual sí que se lo plantea los que 527 
quieren una plaza escolar, los que quieren becas comedor, los 528 
que van a la sanidad, los que buscan el acceso a la vivienda 529 
pública y hay que trabajar para que los derechos de uno porque 530 
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todos tienen derecho evidentemente no perjudiquen a los otros. 531 
Eso a usted no le importa pero a mucha gente sí, como a usted 532 
no le importa el hecho de que siendo el 10% de los extranjeros, 533 
de los extranjeros que viven en España siendo el 10% el número 534 
de reclusos en las cárceles españolas sea de reclusos 535 
extranjeros, el 34% y el 40% en Cataluña, ¿y sabe por qué pasa 536 
esto? Pues porque no hay control, señor Rodríguez Zapatero 537 
entonces aquí hay que poner orden y control que es lo que usted 538 
no quiere hacer inmigración legal y con contrato, lucha contra 539 
la inmigración ilegal y desde luego contrato de integración y 540 
que todos iguales derechos y obligaciones, iguales deberes, 541 
iguales oportunidades.  542 
MCV: Señor Zapatero…  543 
ZP: Señor Rajoy no tiene ninguna política social corresponde a 544 
la trayectoria del gobierno del Partido Popular, ni ninguna 545 
propuesta, solo habla de inmigración, luego me referiré a ella. 546 
En esta legislatura se han producido importantísimos avances 547 
para los derechos sociales y ciudadanos de nuestro país. Hemos 548 
desbloqueado lo que ustedes frenaron que es la investigación 549 
con células madre, la investigación bio-médica para dar 550 
esperanza a enfermedades tan graves como el Alzheimer, como el 551 
Parkinson o como la Diabetes… Quizá los jóvenes necesiten o 552 
sería bueno que los jóvenes les dijéramos lo que ha pasado en 553 
el periodo democrático, ustedes nunca han apoyado las leyes que 554 
han supuesto avances de derechos, no apoyaron la ley del 555 
divorcio, no apoyaron la ley de despenalización del aborto en 556 
determinados supuestos, no apoyaron la ley que establecía la 557 
universalización de la sanidad pública, no apoyaron la ley que 558 
establecía la escolarización gratuita hasta los 16 años y ahora 559 
han vuelto a hacer lo mismo, no han apoyado la ley que elimina 560 
los trámites farragosos del divorcio, no han apoyado la ley que 561 
amplía derechos individuales como la ley de matrimonio 562 
homosexual, no han apoyado ningún avance de derechos de los 563 
ciudadanos en este periodo democrático y ¿sabe cuál es la 564 
reflexión que me lleva a hacer? Que desde hace 30 años no han 565 
movido un dedo para que los españoles tengan más derechos ni en 566 
la Sanidad, ni en la Educación, ni en las libertades 567 
individuales, ni en la expectativa a través de la investigación 568 
biomédica. Si ustedes hubieran gobernado durante 30 años 569 
seguidos lo que es evidente es que en España hubiera habido 570 
menos Educación, menos Sanidad, menos derechos, peores 571 
pensiones… Desde luego seríamos un país menos libre y más 572 
intransigente. Esa es la realidad señor Rajoy. 573 
MCV: Adelante Señor Rajoy… su tiempo 574 
RJ: Bien, es evidente que el señor Zapatero no quiere hablar de 575 
inmigración después de las críticas que ha producido su 576 
política [ZP: no hablaré cuando… cuando yo crea conveniente, Sr 577 
Rajoy]. Uno de los asuntos más importantes que tenemos 578 
planteado hoy en España. Habla de Educación… ¿sabe lo que 579 
hicieron ustedes en materia de Educación? Mire 48 horas después 580 
de llegar al Gobierno derogaron la Ley de Calidad de la 581 
Educación que no había entrado en vigor. Tras dos años de 582 
debates y de polémicas y disputas aprobaron una ley que era 583 
igual que la que existía desde hace años… Al día siguiente cesó 584 
a la ministra de Educación… ¿Y sabe lo que dice el Informe 585 
Pisa, sabe lo que dice? Que somos el tercer país de la Unión 586 
Europea en tasa de abandono escolar, el tercero, el 31 de la 587 
OCDE en Ciencias, el 32 en Matemáticas, el 35 en Lectura… ¿Sabe 588 
lo que hay que hacer en materia de Educación? usted que le 589 
gusta tanto hablar de derechos: mérito, trabajo, esfuerzo, 590 
autoridad del profesor que es el que enseña y el alumno es el 591 
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que aprende, nivel de exigencia, menos Educación para la 592 
Ciudadanía y más inglés, sociedad de la información y nuevas 593 
tecnologías. Su gestión en materia de educación ha sido un 594 
clamoroso fracaso como saben todos los españoles. Me habla de 595 
pensiones y presume. Mire: yo formé parte de un gobierno, yo, 596 
en el año 1996, que tuvo que pedir un crédito en el mes de 597 
diciembre [ZP: Eso es falso] para pagar… Eso es absolutamente 598 
cierto [ZP: Ya se lo explicó Solbes a Pizarro, hombre, ya se lo 599 
explicó], las pensiones de la Seguridad Social. Para pagarlo.  600 
Tuve que pedir un crédito. Luego hicimos una ley reconociendo 601 
las pensiones por ley, hicimos una ley donde se decía que las 602 
pensiones subirían al menos como el IPC, cuando ahora han 603 
cobrado los pensionistas una paga a final de enero fue por la 604 
ley que hizo el Partido Popular. Le dejamos un fondo de 605 
reserva, subimos las pensiones y mire, ahora vamos a volver a 606 
subirlas. Por cierto, usted en su programa electoral decía que 607 
iba a subir las pensiones de las viudas, la base reguladora del 608 
52 al 70. ¿Por qué ha mentido a las viudas y no cumplió su 609 
programa electoral? Yo, sin embargo, sí lo voy a cumplir. ¿La 610 
ley de dependencia? Insisto. No la ha dotado económicamente. Es 611 
uno: gasta mucho más Madrid, la Comunidad, el Ayuntamiento, 612 
Valencia o Navarra [ZP: 900 millones de euros. La Comunidad de 613 
Madrid lo que tiene que hacer es cumplir sus obligaciones] 614 
Nada, no la ha dotado. 700 millones de euros. No, no, no. [ZP: 615 
y lo sabe muy bien Esperanza Aguirre]La Comunidad de Madrid 616 
gasta mucho más sólo en Madrid que usted en toda España.  617 
ZP: No, está boicoteando la ley.  618 
MCV: Tiene ahora dos minutos, señor Zapatero.  619 
ZP: Señor Rajoy, en política educativa ustedes hicieron dos 620 
leyes sin memoria económica y sin financiación. Tuvo que llegar 621 
este Gobierno para financiar la educación de tres a seis años y 622 
en su etapa redujo las becas. Inmigración: mire, cuando llegué 623 
al Gobierno, usted ha sido ministro del Interior responsable de 624 
la inmigración. Cuando llegué al Gobierno había en España un 625 
millón de ciudadanos sin papeles que se les colaron a ustedes 626 
porque no controlaron las fronteras ni hicieron una política de 627 
inmigración mínimamente ordenada. Hicieron cinco 628 
regularizaciones, cinco. 500.000 inmigrantes a los que dieron 629 
papeles. Y cuando llegamos al Gobierno todavía se les había 630 
colado 700.000 más que tuvimos que regularizar. Eso sí, 631 
nosotros hicimos la regularización con contrato de trabajo, con 632 
acuerdo entre empresarios y sindicatos y ustedes hicieron las 633 
regularizaciones con un bono-bus, ¿qué valía un bono-bus siendo 634 
usted ministro del Interior? 635 
RJ: ¿Qué es eso? Eheheeh ¿Un bono bus? 636 
ZP: Sí, ahora se lo explicaré. Nosotros hemos hecho una lucha 637 
tenaz en contra de la inmigración ilegal, hemos aumentado los 638 
medios en colaboración con Europa para controlar las fronteras, 639 
hemos hecho acuerdos con los países de origen para repatriar 640 
más y hemos incrementado tres veces la ayuda al desarrollo para 641 
la cooperación con los países de origen, donde hay hambre, 642 
donde hay miseria, para dar más oportunidades a los jóvenes que 643 
son los que escapan de allí, lamentablemente, en busca de una 644 
esperanza. Ustedes no dedicaron un duro a la integración de 645 
inmigrantes, nosotros 200 millones a los ayuntamientos para la 646 
integración de inmigrantes. Y sí, de las cinco 647 
regularizaciones, señor Rajoy, que regularizó… que hizo el PP, 648 
tres pertenecen a su etapa de ministro. Requisitos: bastaba una 649 
factura de una noche de hotel o un bono-bus. Señor Rajoy, ¿con 650 
qué cara habla usted de regularizaciones, usted que como 651 
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ministro regularizó inmigrantes con un bono-bus? Diga usted si 652 
es cierto o no.  653 
MCV: Debe ir concluyendo. Bien, estamos en el minuto final de 654 
este bloque. Yo les ruego eh, que sean lo más ajustado al 655 
tiempo posible. Un minuto final para concluir. Don Mariano 656 
Rajoy.  657 
RJ: Señor Zapatero, en relación a eso es mentira. La reducción 658 
de becas es mentira. Su política de educación ha sido un 659 
fracaso, y lo sabe todo el mundo. No me hable de derechos ni me 660 
haga eslogans. Ha sido un fracaso y hay que modificar el 661 
modelo. Se necesita trabajo, esfuerzo, mérito. Hay que 662 
modificarlo. Su política de inmigración: usted puede decir lo 663 
que quiere, pero le he dado unos datos que son demoledores. Es 664 
que hay más del doble de personas con permiso de residencia 665 
desde 2004 hasta hoy. Es que esto ha sido un auténtico 666 
coladero. Es que a usted lo han puesto de vuelta y media en la 667 
UE y luego me critica a mí por unas regularizaciones que hice 668 
pactadas con la UE. Dice usted que ha hecho un gran esfuerzo. 669 
Ha hecho un gran esfuerzo, pero el resultado ha sido 670 
absolutamente lamentable. Usted no ha hecho nada para la 671 
integración de los emigrantes. Usted se opone ahora al contrato 672 
de integración. Usted en esta política, como en la económica, 673 
se ha limitado a no hacer nada, a decir: “Oiga, esto va muy 674 
bien. Qué listos somos, qué bien hacemos las cosas”. No se ha 675 
ocupado de lo importante, ha estado en otras cosas. En las 676 
Civilizaciones, en la Memoria Histórica…  [ZP: Risas] Si sí, en 677 
lo que no le importa a nadie. Y lo fundamental lo ha 678 
desatendido.  679 
MCV: Último minuto, señor Zapatero.  680 
ZP: Sí. Aquí hay un expediente de regularización con un bono-681 
bus. Está aquí, a su disposición, señor Rajoy. Hemos repatriado 682 
a 200.000 inmigrantes irregulares más que ustedes en su periodo 683 
de gobierno. 200.000 más por eficacia en la colaboración [RJ: 684 
XXX personas]. Ahora usted propone un papel para evitar que los 685 
inmigrantes aquí cometan delitos como la ablación, la poligamia 686 
o las ablaciones. ¿Sabe las penas que tienen en el Código 687 
Penal? La poligamia hasta un año. La ablación del clítoris 688 
hasta 12 años. Y lo que representa la lapidación hasta 20 años. 689 
Está en el Código Penal. Es un papel inútil [RJ: que lo tiene 690 
toda Europa]. Señor Rajoy, señor Rajoy junto a los españoles 691 
hay inmigrantes en este país como voluntarios en las ONGs, como 692 
donantes de órganos… [RJ: Si ya lo sé] y también entre los 693 
fallecidos en las misiones de paz del Ejército español. Y en 694 
los atentados terroristas del 11 de marzo y de la T-4. 695 
¿Deberíamos pedirles que firmen su papel de delincuente 696 
potencial a todos los inmigrantes que nacen, viven y mueren con 697 
nosotros y a veces por nosotros, señor Rajoy?  698 
MCV: Debe ir concluyendo… Concluye y entramos, señoras y 699 
señores, en el último bloque de esta primera parte del debate. 700 
Hemos hablado de economía y empleo, de políticas sociales, y 701 
ahora de política exterior y seguridad. Es difícil meter la 702 
vida del país en estos turnos, en estos réplicas y 703 
contrarréplicas, pero vamos a intentar hablar, ahora en 704 
política exterior y seguridad, de nuestra política exterior, de 705 
la cooperación internacional, de la ayuda al desarrollo, de la 706 
política de defensa y la lucha contra el terrorismo que hay 707 
aquí y contra el terrorismo internacional. Seguridad ciudadana, 708 
seguridad vial, etc. Don Mariano Rajoy.  709 
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RJ: Vamos a empezar por lo que más le interesa a la gente, que 710 
es el terrorismo. Mire, cuando llegó usted al Gobierno ETA 711 
estaba más débil que nunca, llevaba un año sin matar porque no 712 
podía. Batasuna estaba fuera de los ayuntamientos y del 713 
Parlamento. El terrorismo callejero se había liquidado. Y lo 714 
más importante es que había un pacto entre el PP y el PS que 715 
quitaba a ETA toda esperanza de negociación. ¿Qué hizo usted? 716 
Negoció con ETA, rompió el pacto, les dio esperanza, nos dijo 717 
que querían retirarse, que mostraban una voluntad inequívoca, 718 
que usted había verificado. Que no iba a hablar de política. 719 
¿Cuál fue su resultado? ETA está en los ayuntamientos y en el 720 
Parlamento con nuestro dinero. Vuelve la violencia callejera, 721 
han vuelto a matar, ha roto un gran acuerdo nacional que iba a 722 
suponer el fin de ETA… [ZP: Usted.] No, usted. Y además dividió 723 
a la sociedad y se enfrentó a las víctimas. Esto ha sido lo que 724 
usted ha hecho. Una muestra de imprudencia y de irreflexión de 725 
la que por lo visto no está dispuesto a arrepentirse. Y no me 726 
diga eso que dice usted de que buscó la paz. Todo el mundo la 727 
buscó. Ni de que habló de buena fe, hizo las cosas de buena fe. 728 
¿Es que hace usted algunas cosas de mala fe? La buena fe se le 729 
presupone a un político. Lo que hizo usted fue una frivolidad, 730 
que benefició a los terroristas y que perjudicó a los demás. Y 731 
no busque precedentes, no los busque. Porque lo que hizo usted, 732 
negociar políticamente con una organización terrorista, como le 733 
han denunciado en numerosas ocasiones, han aparecido en los 734 
medios declaraciones, y usted mismo ha reconocido, es algo que 735 
no hizo absolutamente nadie en España. Este es el fracaso más 736 
importante de esta Legislatura. Ha afectado a la dignidad del 737 
Estado, ha sido lesivo en la lucha contra ETA, y yo desde luego 738 
le garantizo que yo nunca negociaré como nadie hizo nunca en 739 
España salvo usted, políticamente con una organización 740 
terrorista.  741 
MCV: Señor Zapatero.  742 
ZP: Mire, señor Rajoy. Cuando llegué al Gobierno veníamos de 743 
una Legislatura en la que había habido 238 víctimas mortales 744 
por el terrorismo. 46 a manos de ETA y 192 en el atentado del 745 
11 de marzo a manos del terrorismo islamista. Mi primer 746 
objetivo, mi primer deber moral como presidente del Gobierno 747 
era eliminar o reducir al máximo estas cifras de víctimas 748 
mortales de ETA. Lo que lamento, lo que más lamento es no haber 749 
podido evitar las cuatro víctimas mortales a manos de ETA que 750 
hemos tenido en este periodo. Cuando era líder de la oposición 751 
propuse, firmé un pacto antiterrorista para dar mi apoyo pleno 752 
al Gobierno. Sin condiciones. Nunca critiqué al Gobierno, nunca 753 
llevé al Parlamento ningún debate terrorista. Siempre di mi 754 
apoyo con un cheque en blanco. ¿Por qué? Porque para mí es 755 
inmoral usar en la lucha partidista el terrorismo. Inmoral. 756 
Forma parte del espíritu de la Transición colaborar siempre con 757 
los gobiernos democráticos en la lucha contra el terrorismo. 758 
Forma parte del espíritu constitucional. Eso es lo que pienso. 759 
Y ustedes han sido un partido que en el Parlamento y en la 760 
calle no han hecho más que debilitar al Gobierno en la lucha 761 
contra el terrorismo. Son el único partido el único partido del 762 
mundo que se ha manifestado contra el Gobierno por la lucha 763 
contra el terrorismo. Y hora lanza usted su última mentira. Lo 764 
ha hecho aquí ahora. Afirma que ETA estaba acabada al final de 765 
su legislatura. ¿Cómo es posible que ETA estuviera acabada 766 
cuando ustedes le atribuyeron el atentado más grave de la 767 
historia de Europa, que fue el atentado del 11-M del 2004? 768 
Usted mismo lo dijo en la jornada de reflexión: “Tengo la 769 
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convicción moral de que era ETA”. Y estaba acabada… Ni 770 
convicción, ni moral [MCV: Tiene que ir concluyendo, tiene que 771 
ir concluyendo] Señor Rajoy. 772 
MCV: señor Rajoy 773 
RJ: Hubo mucha gente que lo pensaba en aquél momento. Yo me 774 
enteré de este asunto porque oí al señor Ibarretxe, presidente 775 
del Gobierno vasco en la radio. Usted dijo, sin embargo, en los 776 
medios de comunicación, y estuvo llamando a todos, que había 777 
tres terroristas suicidas. Eso fue lo que hizo usted en 778 
aquellos momentos. Pero yo creo que hay que hablar de lo que ha 779 
pasado ahora. Usted dice que no se le ha apoyado… Mire, usted 780 
no apoyó a un Gobierno. Usted apoyó la política antiterrorista 781 
de un Gobierno que había pactado con usted [Z: no]. Que era una 782 
política eficaz y que, además, excluía las negociaciones 783 
políticas [ZP: Apoyé al Gobierno sin condición alguna… sin 784 
condición alguna] perdón, si usted hubiera hecho lo mismo que 785 
yo, si usted hubiera hecho lo mismo que yo, yo no sólo le 786 
hubiera apoyado… Yo le hubiera aplaudido. Señor Rodríguez 787 
Zapatero: ¿cuándo había que apoyarle a usted? ¿A qué Zapatero 788 
hay que apoyar? ¿Al que dice hace tres años que Partido 789 
Comunista de las Tierras Vascas es legal? ¿O al que tres años 790 
después, ahora, porque hay elecciones y por oportunismo 791 
político quiere ilegalizar? ¿Al Zapatero que hace un año dice 792 
que ANV es legal o al Zapatero que ahora, un año después, 793 
porque hay elecciones, por puro oportunismo político quiere 794 
ilegalizar? ¿Al Zapatero que deja pasear a De Juana Chaos por 795 
la calle en San Sebastián o al que luego lo mete en la cárcel 796 
porque le conviene? ¿Al Zapatero que dice que Otegi es un 797 
hombre de paz y no actúa contra él, o al Zapatero que mete a 798 
Otegi en la cárcel? ¿Al Zapatero que dice… mire usted, mire, 799 
lea (enseña periódicos): “no voy a hablar de política con ETA” 800 
o al Zapatero que dice: “hablamos de política con ETA”? ¿O al 801 
Zapatero que dice después del atentado de la T4 que nosotros no 802 
vamos a volver a hablar con ETA nunca más, y tengo aquí un 803 
sinfín de declaraciones, o al que luego dice que volvió a 804 
hablar con ETA? Usted ha mentido. Usted ha engañado a todos los 805 
españoles. Primero a mí, y al conjunto de los españoles. Ha 806 
negociado políticamente con ETA; ha puesto en tela de juicio el 807 
Estado de Derecho; ha jugado con la Ley; ha cedido ante los 808 
terroristas y ha aceptado el chantaje. Es usted el primer 809 
presidente del Gobierno de la historia de España de De Juana 810 
Chaos, como todos los españoles, con tristeza, pudimos 811 
comprobar. 812 
MCV: Señor Zapatero.  813 
ZP: Quienes mintieron fueron ustedes con el atentado terrorista 814 
del 11-M. No sólo mintieron, sino que estuvieron toda la 815 
primera fase de la legislatura intentando crear una 816 
conspiración; una fabulación indigna, inmoral, sobre lo que 817 
había representado aquel atentado, porque no asumieron el 818 
resultado electoral. Señor Rajoy, yo apoyé al señor Aznar, que 819 
dijo que ETA era el movimiento de liberación nacional vasco, 820 
que es la afirmación política más grave que yo he oído en 821 
democracia… No hay ningún gobierno del mundo que se haya 822 
atrevido a decir de ETA que es un movimiento, o sea, no un 823 
grupo terrorista, de liberación, porque hay alguien que 824 
sojuzga; nacional, porque se refiere a una nación, vasco. Eso 825 
lo dijo el señor Aznar, quien le ha designado a usted. Yo apoyé 826 
al señor Aznar en ese momento. Y apoyé cuando decidió 827 
ilegalizar Batasuna. Cuando usted me llamó por teléfono y en un 828 
minuto le dije: “Adelante”. En política antiterrorista, mis 829 
principios y mi convicción es apoyar al Gobierno entre 830 
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demócratas. Eso es lo que me sale de dentro. Y a usted lo que 831 
le ha salido es hacer oposición con el terrorismo y utilizarlo 832 
partidistamente. Esa es la realidad. Pero, no sólo preocupa a 833 
los ciudadanos el terrorismo, también la seguridad. Usted fue 834 
ministro del Interior, la seguridad ciudadana, su filosofía era 835 
conocida: “la seguridad para el que se la pueda pagar”. [RJ: 836 
ohohehheh] Nosotros tenemos una defensa de la seguridad 837 
pública. Ustedes redujeron 7.500 policías. Usted es el ministro 838 
que tiene el record de menos policías de la historia de la 839 
Democracia. Nosotros hemos aumentado en 17.000. Con usted, los 840 
delitos más graves llegaron al nivel más alto de la democracia. 841 
1.200 homicidios, ahora los hemos reducido a 800. Pero también 842 
hemos trabajado en otra seguridad que importa mucho a los 843 
ciudadanos, como la seguridad vial, porque los accidentes de 844 
tráfico son la primera causa de víctimas mortales en este país. 845 
Cuando usted era ministro hubo 4.000 muertes en la carretera, 846 
[MCV: vaya concluyendo] y ahora lo hemos reducido a 3.000, 847 
porque no nos resignamos. Nosotros hemos trabajado por la 848 
seguridad pública.  849 
MCV: Señor Rajoy…  850 
RJ: Ya veo que el señor Zapatero quiere hablar del 11-M y 851 
quiere hablar de Aznar. Pero el problema es que aquí estamos 852 
hablando del terrorismo de ETA. El 11-M ya lo ha juzgado la 853 
justicia, y Aznar ya no está en la vida política española… [ZP: 854 
no es usted, es usted…] No, no no, no, sí, no soy yo. [ZP: es 855 
usted… es usted…] Yo le voy a decir que usted con ETA negoció 856 
políticamente, cosa que nadie se había atrevido a hacer en 857 
España nunca. Usted, con ETA, le dejó ir a los Ayuntamientos y 858 
al Parlamento, de donde los habíamos expulsado, y ahora 859 
pretende dar marcha atrás. Usted dejó que su partido se 860 
entrevistara, con las televisiones delante, con una 861 
organización terrorista como es Batasuna. Usted le dio a ETA la 862 
categoría de interlocutor político. Sabe usted que la política 863 
la hacen los partidos y los votantes, la gente, los ciudadanos. 864 
Y usted y lo que hace el terrorista es usar el terrorismo como 865 
arma para hacer política, y usted, al negociar con ellos, dijo: 866 
“el terrorismo es un instrumento hábil para hacer política”. Y 867 
usted, sobre todo, ha mentido, ha engañado, ha faltado a la 868 
verdad pero en infinidad de ocasiones, se lo he demostrado. Ha 869 
dicho una cosa y la contraria muchísimas veces. [ZP: Nunca, 870 
jamás, nunca jamás…] Siempre, señor Rodríguez Zapatero [ZP: 871 
nunca]. Ya me hubiera gustado a mí, ya me hubiera gustado poder 872 
apoyarlo, ya me hubiera gustado. Pero era imposible. Hasta lo 873 
fui a apoyar después de la tregua y me engañó. [ZP: ¿A apoyar?, 874 
¿a apoyar? ¿Apoyar?…] Y mintió, como mintió a los españoles. Y 875 
ahora vamos a hablar de seguridad ciudadana. Mire, tengo aquí 876 
los datos de seguridad ciudadana, porque a usted le gusta decir 877 
que yo soy… como usted no habla de cómo está España en este 878 
momento, sino de lo que hicimos los demás hace tiempo… [ZP: no 879 
comparo, comparo] No no no, pues mire, yo voy a comparar. 880 
Cuando fui ministro del Interior, el número de infracciones en 881 
España fueron de 2.044.000. Ahora, en el año 2006, son de 882 
2.260.000. Usted ha dado datos homicidio. Violencia de género. 883 
Pues mire, 52 personas, cuando yo era ministro, y éste ha sido 884 
el peor año de la Democracia. Policías y guardias civiles. En 885 
el 96, cuando llegamos al Gobierno, 1.400 ofertas de empleo 886 
público de policía. Cuando yo llegué al ministerio la 887 
tripliqué: 4.275. [MCV: debe ir concluyendo… ] no mienta, por 888 
favor, no mienta… 889 
ZP: no, pero bueno, por favor [RJ: no mienta, no mienta]. 890 
Policías y guardias civiles en España (enseña un gráfico) [RJ: 891 
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pero si me es igual, me es igual]: el momento más bajo, 113.000 892 
con usted [RJ: pero me es igual, es igual] de ministro del 893 
Interior, y ahora hemos recuperado hasta 136.000 [RJ: me es 894 
igual, me es igual] si a usted [RJ: Es igual, yo yo yo tengo 895 
mis datos, si si...] la seguridad pública no les importó… no 896 
estos son datos oficiales, ¿no? mire ¿Pero habrá alguna 897 
nominación política mayor que llamar a ETA “Movimiento de 898 
liberación nacional vasca”? Era su gobierno, que era su 899 
gobierno, y nadie les dijo nada. A usted nunca le ha salido de 900 
dentro apoyarme. Nunca. Y la prueba es evidente es que en 901 
cuanto ganamos las elecciones tuvimos que ir a una comisión de 902 
investigación del 11-M, yo respondí como no ha hecho ningún 903 
presidente 14 horas en esa comisión de investigación, y en el 904 
2005, en el primer debate de Estado de la Nación, ya me dijo 905 
que traicionaba a los muertos. Y el Sr. Acebes, ha dicho que mi 906 
proyecto era el proyecto de ETA. Todos los españoles han visto 907 
que ustedes han utilizado de manera partidista, sólo han tenido 908 
un objetivo de oposición, ETA y el terrorismo. Yo quiero 909 
referirme también, a la Política Exterior, que es muy 910 
importante para España, pero ya veo que para usted, no. ¿Cuál 911 
fue su política exterior? Al Sur, Perejil; al Norte, unas 912 
malísimas relaciones con Francia; en América Latina, se 913 
dedicaron a reclutar soldados para Bush en la guerra de Iraq. Y 914 
lo que se recuerda de su Política Exterior, fue la foto en las 915 
Azores. Ahora han cambiado las cosas, tenemos buenas relaciones 916 
con el Sur, con todos los gobiernos europeos. Prueba de ello, 917 
es que han puesto a Felipe González al frente del Grupo de 918 
Reflexión para diseñar la Europa del futuro. En América Latina 919 
hemos duplicado la ayuda a la cooperación al desarrollo y para 920 
luchar contra la pobreza, y desde luego, ahora hay un país en 921 
el mundo defiende la paz, la cooperación internacional a 922 
diferencia de su período, que fue defender las guerras 923 
ilegales, estar sometido al presidente Bush y congelar, porque 924 
no subieron nada, los recursos para la ayuda al desarrollo a la 925 
cooperación y la lucha contra la pobreza y la miseria [MCV: 926 
debe concluir, muchas gracias] Ustedes.  927 
MCV: Vamos al último minuto, vamos al último minuto. Es su 928 
tiempo (Rajoy).  929 
RJ: Oiga ¿Usted quiere que le voten por lo de la otra vez? 930 
¿Bush, el 11-M, Iraq, Aznar? [ZP: no, por lo que he hecho 931 
ahora, comparemos] Oiga, cambie un poco de discurso y hable de 932 
lo que le importa a los españoles. Si, mire, yo voy a comparar. 933 
En Seguridad Ciudadana, fíjese usted, cuando yo era Ministro 934 
del Interior, se celebraron, aquí en España, dos Consejos 935 
Europeos, presidíamos la Unión Europea y 17 de Ministros. 936 
Ustedes tuvieron que suspender un Consejo de Ministro de la 937 
Unión Europea de Vivienda en Barcelona, porque no eran capaces 938 
dijeron ustedes, de mantener la seguridad de los ciudadanos. 939 
Esos para la imagen de España, es algo verdaderamente notable. 940 
Como por cierto, es verdaderamente notable el número de bandas 941 
organizadas de delincuentes extranjeros especialmente violentos 942 
que están llegando a España sin que el Sr. Rubalcaba, más 943 
preocupado por otras cosas, ni Usted, pueda hacer nada en este 944 
sentido. En el tema de ETA, Sr. Zapatero, usted ha mentido. ¿Yo 945 
quiere que le apoye en lo de De Juana Chaos o en lo de ANV? 946 
[ZP: no XXX nada, si lo saben los españoles, en nada] Es que no 947 
le puedo apoyar, [ZP: XXX partidismo] porque usted rompió el 948 
acuerdo… Y en Política Exterior, mire, yo Merkel y Sarkozy; y 949 
usted, Chávez y Castro. Ese es el resumen de su Política 950 
Exterior.  951 
MCV: Último minuto.  952 
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ZP: sí, ahora que me cita usted a Chávez, le voy a decir que 953 
esas son las diferencias entre los dos proyectos. Ustedes, 954 
siempre están siempre que van al extranjero denigrando el 955 
Gobierno de España. Y yo, en la Cumbre de Chile, defendí al Sr. 956 
Aznar, de los ataques que públicamente le lanzaba [RJ: su amigo 957 
Chávez] el Sr. Chávez, el Sr. Chávez, como patriota lo hice 958 
[RJ: ¿patriota usted?], como patriota lo hice, como persona con 959 
principios democráticos, con respeto democrático y ustedes han 960 
estado [RJ: ¿patriota usted?] han estado han estado cuatro años 961 
denigrando al Gobierno de España. El Sr. Aznar diciendo que 962 
estábamos en un proceso de Balcanización, y usted, siempre 963 
haciendo declaraciones en contra del Gobierno de España. 964 
Afortunadamente ahora la imagen de España es la de la paz, es 965 
la de la paz [RJ: no va usted por Europa para ver la imagen de 966 
España], es la imagen de la cooperación, es la imagen de la 967 
solidaridad. Mire lo de Felipe González, si le ha apoyado toda 968 
Europa [RJ: sí, sí], a un español y socialistas [RJ: sí, sí], 969 
aunque les pese a ustedes, [MCV: por favor, vaya concluyendo] y 970 
desde luego, concluyo. Y desde luego, volviendo a los 971 
inmigrantes, mire España ha sido un país de inmigrantes [RJ: sí 972 
yo soy gallego, yo soy gallego y lo sé, soy gallego y lo sé]. 973 
Hay muchos que nos están viendo, hay muchos que nos están 974 
viendo, les doy un saludo y desde aquí le digo, [MCV: debe ir 975 
concluyendo señor Zapatero] que tenemos que tener mucha 976 
prudencia con las personas que vienen a trabajar con nosotros 977 
[RJ: con esos sí, con los delincuentes no].  978 
MCV: Terminamos este bloque de Política Exterior y Seguridad. 979 
Es un debate realmente intenso. Es un debate, se lo digo con 980 
toda sinceridad, Sr. Rajoy, Sr. Zapatero, magnífico. Vamos a 981 
continuar después de una breve pausa. Tenemos todavía algunos 982 
asuntos muy importantes que debemos referirnos, que es la 983 
política institucional y los retos que tiene este país para el 984 
futuro y desde luego además de la investigación y el desarrollo 985 
todas las cuestiones relativas al cambio climático, las 986 
infraestructuras, la vivienda, etc. Estamos en el primer cara a 987 
cara decíamos del siglo XXI, en la era de la información, dos 988 
candidatos a la presidencia del gobierno organizado por la 989 
Academia de las Ciencias y las Artes de la Televisión y después 990 
de una breve pausa volvemos y continuamos. Muchas gracias 991 
señores.  992 
 
 
SEGUNDA PARTE  
 
MCV: Continuamos, continuamos en el primer debate electoral 993 
cara a cara entre los candidatos a la presidencia del Gobierno, 994 
Mariano Rajoy por el Partido Popular y José Luis Rodríguez 995 
Zapatero, candidato del Partido Socialista. Vamos a hablar en 996 
esta segunda parte, algo más corta, del debate primero de 997 
política institucional, como saben y después de los retos del 998 
futuro, temas que nos interesan en sobremanera a los 999 
ciudadanos. Comenzamos si les parece por la política 1000 
institucional aquí se puede hablar de lo que ustedes crean 1001 
conveniente, Estado autonómico, reformas constitucionales, 1002 
justicia… tiene la palabra el candidato del Partido Popular, 1003 
Mariano Rajoy.  1004 
 
 
5. POLÍTICA INSTITUCIONAL 
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RJ: Bien, hace poco más de un mes, uno de los principales 1005 
periódicos europeos se preguntaba sobre España. Qué se puede 1006 
esperar de un país en el que sus habitantes no se pueden poner 1007 
de acuerdo sobre cuántas naciones son ¿qué le parece? Así ha 1008 
conseguido usted que nos vean, y no es raro porque comenzó 1009 
usted su mandato diciendo aquello de que el “concepto de nación 1010 
es discutido y discutible”. Inició un debate absurdo y abrió un 1011 
melón que no reclamaba nadie. Además lo hizo sin dejar 1012 
establecido antes cuál era su idea de España, es decir a dónde 1013 
quería llevarnos y como en todo lo hizo por su cuenta porque no 1014 
sé si sabía usted, pero antes de llegar usted al gobierno las 1015 
cuestiones que afectaban al modelo territorial de España se 1016 
pactaban entre los grandes partidos. Y usted rompió ese acuerdo 1017 
como ha roto otros muchos en España. Los resultados están a la 1018 
vista, ha creado usted enfrentamiento entre las CCAA por el 1019 
patrimonio, por la financiación, por las inversiones, por el 1020 
agua… ha dividido a los españoles y ha afectado a su igualdad, 1021 
ha propiciado un estatuto de autonomía que tiene siete recursos 1022 
ante el tribunal constitucional. Por primera vez desde 1978, 1023 
por primera vez eh, con usted de presidente del Gobierno, un 1024 
estatuto se ha pactado sin el acuerdo de los grandes partidos 1025 
nacionales. Claro, decía usted que es que quería integrar a los 1026 
nacionalistas en el sistema a costa de echar a la mitad de la 1027 
población española. Pues, mire usted, no lo ha conseguido, los 1028 
ha radicalizado. Y en muchos casos los ha mandado al monte. 1029 
Claro, no me diga ahora usted que España es ahora más plural, 1030 
porque ya era plural antes de que fuera usted el presidente del 1031 
Gobierno. Era muy plural, pero los españoles tenían los mismos 1032 
derechos y las mismas obligaciones. ¿Podría usted explicarnos 1033 
para qué hizo todo esto y si de verdad cree que España como 1034 
dice usted, está más unida y cohesionada que nunca?  1035 
ZP: Mire señor Rajoy. Ha puesto usted el ejemplo del agua. 1036 
Quien ha sembrado la discordia y el enfrentamiento entre 1037 
comunidades han sido ustedes. Resulta que ahora para que se 1038 
haya demostrado que ustedes el trasvase del Ebro, ni le iban a 1039 
hacer ni le mantienen en su programa. Lo cual, constituye un 1040 
engaño bastante grave a todos los ciudadanos de la Comunidad 1041 
Valenciana y de Alicante, que, por cierto, afortunadamente, han 1042 
visto como en este periodo tienen 335 hectómetros cúbicos más 1043 
de agua, gracias a las inversiones que estamos haciendo, 1044 
después de que en su periodo de gobierno no tuvieron ni un 1045 
hectómetro cúbico más de agua. Mire, nosotros creemos en el 1046 
Estado de las Autonomías, estamos convencidos que ha sido muy 1047 
bueno para bienestar de España, que favorece la libertad 1048 
eliminando el centralismo. Y ustedes siempre han estado a 1049 
rastras con el Estado Autonómico [RJ: ¿Pero qué dice usted? Fui 1050 
vicepresidente de la Xunta…] a rastras sí, como Alianza 1051 
Popular, que fue militante de Alianza Popular, que le recuerdo 1052 
que no votaron el Estatuto de Cataluña, ni el Estatuto del País 1053 
Vasco [RJ: Y el PSOE era marxista hace 30 años…], o sea que… 1054 
no, sí, pero usted era de Alianza Popular. El PSOE siempre ha 1055 
votado todos los estatutos, en todos los consensos. Ustedes no. 1056 
Ahora ha habido siete propuestas de reforma de estatutos, de 1057 
las cuales hemos votado juntos seis. Una en contra, que fue la 1058 
propuesta del Plan Ibarretxe. Y sólo en Cataluña, y menuda la 1059 
que han montado con el Estatuto de Cataluña. Crispando, 1060 
trasladando a todas las comunidades el “se rompe España”, lo 1061 
cual era radicalmente falso, cizañando con el tema del catalán, 1062 
para que ahora veamos como hoy su candidata número uno, la 1063 
señora Nadal, ha dicho que el castellano no se persigue en 1064 
Cataluña. Hemos hecho reformas de los estatutos para mejorar el 1065 
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autogobierno, y en este periodo hemos vivido más cooperación y 1066 
menos conflictividad ante el TC que en cualquiera de sus ocho 1067 
años de gobierno. Tienen una gran desfachatez, han sembrado 1068 
discordia entre los ciudadanos y, especialmente, con el 1069 
Estatuto de Cataluña. La que han liado con la enseñanza del 1070 
castellano, que es la misma regla [MCV: debe ir concluyendo] 1071 
que hace 20 años, incluso cuando [MCV: debe ir concluyendo] 1072 
usted era ministro de educación.  1073 
RJ: El castellano no se persigue en Cataluña, pero lo que es 1074 
evidente es que no se puede estudiar en castellano. En cuanto 1075 
al tema del agua, la discordia es suya. Había un plan 1076 
hidrológico votado por el 80% del Consejo Nacional del Agua, 1077 
votado por Castilla la Mancha y Extremadura donde gobernaba el 1078 
PSOE y con la abstención de… de Andalucía, del señor Chaves. Sí 1079 
sí, eso es lo que pasó en su día. Yo desde luego no le quepa la 1080 
menor duda que yo haré las obras del pacto del agua en Aragón, 1081 
las voy a hacer y luego haré transferencias a las otras 1082 
cuencas, haré trasvases, claro que sí.  1083 
ZP: ¿El trasvase del Ebro lo hará? ¿Hará el transvase del Ebro? 1084 
¿Hará el transvase del Ebro? ¿Hará el transvase del Ebro? 1085 
RJ: Yo haré, haré el trasvase del agua cuando abran las aguas 1086 
del Pacto de Aragón. ¿Sabe cuál es usted la alternativa que ha 1087 
dado? Llevar agua de Almería a Barcelona, ésa es la única 1088 
alternativa que ha hecho en materia de agua. Mire usted, usted 1089 
ha dicho que España, me ha imputado que España… que yo dijera 1090 
que España se rompía. Yo nunca he dicho eso y va a tener que 1091 
demostrarlo usted, pero ¿sabe usted quién dijo que en España se 1092 
está centrifugando el Estado? Felipe González. Que el señor 1093 
Zapatero ha abierto el melón del Estado sin saber a dónde van, 1094 
don… el señor Leguina. Lo que está pasando en España se parece 1095 
a la disolución de la Unión Soviética, don Alfonso Guerra. El 1096 
Estado se está fragmentando, el señor Leguina, pero usted sigue 1097 
diciendo que estamos muy unidos. Pues mire, el 25 de octubre de 1098 
este año hay convocado un referéndum de separación en el País 1099 
Vasco y no lo convocó Batasuna, lo convocó el lehendakari del 1100 
Gobierno Vasco. ¿Sigue usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Y 1101 
un socio de gobierno suyo, el vicepresidente del Gobierno de 1102 
Cataluña ha anunciado otro referéndum para el año 2014, ¿sigue 1103 
usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Mire usted, yo no he 1104 
dicho nunca que la transición se hizo mal y que España no 1105 
estaba cuajada, eso lo ha dicho usted, yo no he dado a entender 1106 
[ZP: no, nunca he dicho eso] a los nacionalistas que me 1107 
proponía a refutar España, ha sido usted [ZP: nunca he dicho 1108 
eso] [MCV: tendrá su turno]. Yo no he dicho que los vascos 1109 
tuvieran el derecho a decidir, ni los extremeños, ni los 1110 
murcianos, ha sido usted. Usted no tiene ninguna idea de la 1111 
nación española. Usted piensa que cada uno puede decidir lo que 1112 
quiere, mire yo pienso distinto. Yo creo que España es una 1113 
nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales y que sobre España 1114 
decidimos todos y cada uno de los españoles.  1115 
MCV: Señor Zapatero...  1116 
ZP: Mire señor Rajoy, su Apocalipsis, que es lo que ha hecho en 1117 
estos cuatro años parece que se retrasa en la historia. Ni 1118 
“España se rompe”, ni “Navarra ha sido entregada a ETA”, más 1119 
bien gobiernan ustedes Navarra con el apoyo del Partido 1120 
Socialista, ni “Cataluña está en un proceso de secesión”, más 1121 
bien está más unida porque ahora ya hay Alta Velocidad. Bueno, 1122 
nos hemos enterado al menos que ya no hay trasvase del Ebro y 1123 
por qué le parece mal que el agua que produce una desaladora en 1124 
Carboneras en Almería vaya a Cataluña ¿es que reniega? [RJ: No, 1125 
en absoluto, no en absoluto, ya sabe usted que no]… ¿que vaya a 1126 
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Cataluña? [RJ: no en absoluto] Pues a mí me parece un modelo de 1127 
solidaridad [RJ: es un gran modelo] y de cohesión en nuestro 1128 
país [RJ: sobra agua en España y hay que mandarla ahí] que unas 1129 
CCAA puedan llevar agua a otras cuando tengan necesidad [RJ: de 1130 
otras a Barcelona]. Y el hecho de que Barcelona esté con 1131 
problemas de agua o pueda estar [RJ: Es por lo que hicimos en 1132 
su idea el Plan Hidrológico Nacional] pone de manifiesto, pone 1133 
de manifiesto que el Trasvase del Ebro era una medida absurda, 1134 
me alegro que hayan venido a nuestra posición [RJ: No, no XXX y 1135 
no he venido… XXX] y se hayan olvidado ya del trasvase del Ebro 1136 
[MCV: Después tendrá su turno, después tendrá su turno] usted 1137 
ha dicho aquí que no hará el Trasvase del Ebro.  1138 
RJ: Me ha entendido mal.  1139 
ZP: Pues diga que diga que lo hará.  1140 
MCV: Después tendrá su turno, señor Rajoy tendrá su turno 1141 
después...  1142 
ZP: hemos entendido lo que hemos entendido claramente. Mire, le 1143 
voy a leer un texto del Estatuto de Cataluña: “Todas las 1144 
personas tienen derecho a recibir un adecuado tratamiento del 1145 
dolor y cuidados paliativos integrales y a vivir con dignidad 1146 
el proceso de su muerte”, artículo 20.1 del Estatut de 1147 
Catalunya. El art. 20 del Estatuto de Andalucía dice lo mismo. 1148 
Ustedes en el Estatuto de Cataluña votaron en contra de este 1149 
artículo y lo recurrieron ante el Tribunal Constitucional y en 1150 
el Estatuto de Andalucía diciendo lo mismo votaron a favor y 1151 
aquí en Madrid, en el Severo Ochoa, a los profesionales que 1152 
practicaban los cuidados paliativos les han querido encarcelar. 1153 
Ésa es su actitud de discordia en Cataluña votan en contra en 1154 
Andalucía a favor y en Madrid quieren encarcelar a quien 1155 
practica desde su profesionalidad el intento de paliar el dolor 1156 
ante una muerte inevitable.  1157 
MCV: Señor Rajoy…  1158 
RJ: Vamos a hablar de discordia, señor Zapatero. Usted ha 1159 
hablado del Estatuto andaluz y del Estatuto catalán y a mí me 1160 
han reprochado que yo haya apoyado el estatuto andaluz y que no 1161 
haya apoyado el estatuto catalán. Mire usted… En el Congreso 1162 
presentamos 73 enmiendas al Estatuto catalán y en el Senado 74. 1163 
Nos aceptaron cero. Al andaluz presentamos 150 enmiendas, lo 1164 
corregimos, es constitucional y por eso lo apoyamos. Pero mire 1165 
usted… hablando de discordia, le voy a leer una cosa que a 1166 
usted le sonará. El Pacto del Tinel. Fíjese de discordia… “Los 1167 
partidos firmantes del presente acuerdo se comprometen a 1168 
impedir la presencia del PP en el Gobierno del Estado, y 1169 
renuncian a establecer pactos de gobierno y pactos 1170 
parlamentarios estables en las cámaras estatales”. Bueno, aquí 1171 
está el origen de todo lo que ha pasado en esta legislatura con 1172 
el Estatuto catalán. Y por qué usted rompió por primera vez en 1173 
la historia el acuerdo PP-PSOE a la hora de aprobar el 1174 
estatuto. Sí, sí… Y por eso no es de extrañar lo que pasó en el 1175 
Estatuto catalán ni por qué rompió usted el pacto 1176 
antiterrorista. Porque usted prefirió hacer el pacto del Tinel, 1177 
que le voy a decir lo que es… El Pacto del Tinel, que es la 1178 
obsesión [ZP: su obsesión] no no, sí sí, por dejar fuera de 1179 
juego a media España… mire, es el mayor rasgo de intolerancia 1180 
que se ha hecho en la historia democrática española. ¿Sabe 1181 
quién es usted, señor Rodríguez Zapatero? Es un señor que con 1182 
una mano predica el entendimiento; con otra mano, con la otra, 1183 
le prohíbe a los demás que nos den los buenos días, y para 1184 
colmo… me echa la culpa de todo. Ese es exactamente usted. 1185 
Usted es el que ha sembrado la discordia. Usted es el que ha 1186 
querido pactar con partidos [ZP: usted] radicales y 1187 
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extremistas. Usted es el que ha impedido que el Partido Popular 1188 
tuviera la más mínima posibilidad de llegar a un entendimiento 1189 
en estas materias. Usted ha querido excluirnos, y usted ahora 1190 
habla del Apocalipsis. Del Apocalipsis hablaron los que he 1191 
citado antes: González, Guerra [ZP: Haga caso a González] y 1192 
Leguina [ZP: Haga caso a González lo que está diciendo] Y ¿qué 1193 
tiene que decir usted de los referéndums? [ZP: haga caso a 1194 
González ya que le cita] Tiene dos referéndums convocados. ¿Le 1195 
parece que eso es normal? Para separarse de España. Uno este 1196 
mes… este año, en octubre. A usted ¿eso le parece normal? A 1197 
usted todo le parece normal 1198 
MCV: Tiempo para el señor Zapatero.  1199 
ZP: Mire, señor Rajoy. Ustedes sembraron la discordia con el 1200 
Estatuto de Cataluña y la prueba de ello es que han sido 1201 
profundamente incoherentes, porque hay 20 artículos del Estatut 1202 
de Cataluña que han recurrido al Tribunal Constitucional que 1203 
son exactos que en el Estatuto de Andalucía, que ustedes 1204 
votaron a favor. No les importaba el contenido del Estatuto, ni 1205 
los artículos. Les importaba sembrar la discordia; alarmar con 1206 
la secesión de Cataluña, para ver si así en el resto de España 1207 
podían obtener algún respaldo. Eso es lo que hicieron, al grito 1208 
de “Se rompe España”, que todos los españoles lo han escuchado 1209 
[RJ: Eso lo dijo González y Guerra] Sí, igual que Navarra… 1210 
igualJ que Navarra [RJ: González y Guerra] Que fue usted a 1211 
Navarra [RJ: le voy a hablar de Navarra] a decir lo que dijo, 1212 
para que ahora estén gobernando con nuestro apoyo. Mire, le 1213 
tengo que recordar que en nuestro país hay un modelo autonómico 1214 
que ha funcionado bien, cuando se tiene una voluntad 1215 
constructiva, y ustedes no la han tenido. Ustedes han utilizado 1216 
las reformas de los estatutos, y no me hable del pacto del 1217 
Tinel, porque hemos votado junto cinco reformas del estatuto… 1218 
Es una invención. [RJ: ¡Menos mal!] Es una invención Cinco [RJ: 1219 
¡Menos mal!] Cuando les interesaba porque gobernaban en esas 1220 
comunidades autónomas, como en Valencia, que venía la reforma, 1221 
ahí sí. Pero en Cataluña, que no tienen representación 1222 
prácticamente, no tenían nada que ganar ni que perder, lo 1223 
utilizaron para poner a todos los ciudadanos, o intentar poner 1224 
a los ciudadanos, en contra de ese proyecto. Lo cierto es que 1225 
en materia de autonomías, en materia de libertades, en estos 1226 
cuatro años hemos avanzado; hay más autogobierno, más unidad y 1227 
más fortaleza del Estado. Hay también más derechos y 1228 
libertades, porque hay nuevas leyes del divorcio, del 1229 
matrimonio homosexual, de igualdad, de rehabilitación de 1230 
memoria, de las personas, de su dignidad… Hay más diálogo y más 1231 
democracia. El ejemplo es este debate que están retransmitiendo 1232 
varias televisiones, como la televisión pública, que ahora es 1233 
plural, independiente y que con ustedes, tuvo una condena de la 1234 
Audiencia Nacional por manipulación. Cuando ustedes gobiernan, 1235 
se resiente la democracia, se pierde el pluralismo [MCV: debe 1236 
ir concluyendo] y no hay debates [RJ: XXX]. Este es el mejor 1237 
ejemplo. 1238 
MCV: Debe ir concluyendo y entramos en el último minuto. Les 1239 
rogaría que cumplieran, porque son desde luego muy 1240 
disciplinados y se lo agradezco en los tiempos. Último minuto 1241 
para cerrar este bloque de la Política Institucional. Candidato 1242 
del Partido Popular, Mariano Rajoy.  1243 
RJ: Mire, hablar de discordia una persona que firma el Pacto 1244 
del Tinel, cuyo objetivo es echar fuera del del mapa político 1245 
de España [ZP: yo no he firmado ese pacto nuca], a un partido 1246 
que representa a la mayoría [ZP: yo no he firmado ese pacto 1247 
nunca, ni lo conozco]… a la mitad de los españoles. Esto es lo 1248 
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más antidemocrático que se ha producido en España. Usted ha 1249 
actuado en consecuencia, esos son sus pactos, esos son sus 1250 
socios, eso es la gente con la que ha pactado, y por eso se ha 1251 
producido lo que se ha producido en España. Oiga, yo tengo, he 1252 
pactado muchas cosas con su partido. El Pacto Autonómico del 1253 
1992, fui a Moncloa, lo firmé con González, lo firmó Aznar, yo 1254 
estaba con él, luego en el año 1996. Ustedes el Estatuto 1255 
Catalán quisieron dejarlo fuera a propósito, si no no se 1256 
explica que [ZP: ustedes, ustedes, ustedes] no nos aceptaran ni 1257 
una sola enmienda y no nos venga, con el viejo truco de decir, 1258 
que somos anti-catalanes. Venga, eso es mentira, porque yo voté 1259 
en contra del Estatuto Andaluz, y cuando se reformó en la 1260 
Cortés, 150 artículos, voté a favor. Usted no tiene una idea de 1261 
España, [ZP: pero si hay 20 artículos exactos que ustedes votan 1262 
en un sitio y luego votan en contra] [MCV: por favor, por 1263 
favor] usted no tiene una idea de España. España es una nación 1264 
de más de quinientos años de historia y usted se lo ha tomado a 1265 
broma, y eso a mí, me parece inaceptable [MCV: debe ir 1266 
concluyendo] y quiero que lo sepa, inaceptable.  1267 
MCV: Último minuto.  1268 
ZP: Lo que sucede, Sr. Rajoy, es que este país que es plural, 1269 
que es diverso hay que construirlo entre todos con el diálogo, 1270 
y no sembrando la discordia entre unas Comunidades y otras, 1271 
como han hecho ustedes [RJ: discordia], sin excluir a nadie. Y 1272 
desde luego, con un gobierno, que es lo que ha practicado el 1273 
mío, que intente dialogar. He tenido un diálogo fecundo con 1274 
todas la Comunidades Autónomas. Ahora todos los presidentes 1275 
entran en Moncloa, no como en la etapa del Sr. Aznar. He 1276 
convocado la Conferencia de Presidentes en tres ocasiones, para 1277 
coordinar, cooperar y unir a todas las Comunidades Autónomas 1278 
con el Gobierno de España, eso es fortalecer el Estado y 1279 
fortalecer España. Hemos promovido, además, que el Gobierno se 1280 
someta más al control, a la crítica en el Parlamento. Yo he 1281 
respondido preguntas en el Senado y en el Congreso, como 1282 
actitud democrática, el doble de preguntas de la oposición que 1283 
en la etapa anterior [MCV: debe ir concluyendo]. Y desde luego, 1284 
hemos puesto en marcha la Formación Cívica de los más jóvenes, 1285 
y hemos acabado con el intento de que la Religión fuera 1286 
evaluable en la Escuela.  1287 
MCV: Debe concluir, debe concluir. Bien, vamos al último bloque 1288 
de este interesantísimo debate entre Mariano Rajoy y José Luis 1289 
Rodríguez Zapatero. Vamos a hablar ahora de los retos de 1290 
futuro, porque todo el mundo sabe que estamos en una sociedad 1291 
en transición y desde luego, la investigación, el desarrollo 1292 
tecnológico, la innovación son absolutamente fundamentales, 1293 
porque estamos ya en la Sociedad del Conocimiento, y además, 1294 
hay otras cuestiones que nos preocupan: el cambio climático, el 1295 
desarrollo sostenible, y desde luego, muchas cosas muy 1296 
cercanas, muy inmediatas, como la vivienda y las 1297 
infraestructuras. Es el último bloque de este Debate. Tiene la 1298 
palabra Mariano Rajoy.  1299 
 
 
6. RETOS DE FUTURO 
 
RJ: Permítame que le diga antes, porque me ha hecho gracia, 1300 
dice España está muy fortalecida, pero con un referéndum de 1301 
Autodeterminación convocado para el mes de octubre. Pero en 1302 
fin, vamos a hablar de los retos de futuro. Uno de los cuales 1303 
es ese, por cierto. El mayor reto de futuro que tenemos en este 1304 
momento es la Globalización, para que se entienda, China e 1305 
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India, el 38% de la población mundial están creciendo al 10%, 1306 
en los últimos años y por tanto ya nada es lo mismo. Y por 1307 
tanto, vamos a vivir un nuevo mundo y hay que trabajar, para 1308 
que eso, que es un reto, pues se convierta en una auténtica 1309 
oportunidad. Ahora bien, yo quisiera decir una cosa, para los 1310 
españoles de a pie, y sobre todo, para los más jóvenes, el reto 1311 
más importante de futuro es disponer de una vivienda. Y es 1312 
natural que esto les preocupe, porque durante su gobierno el 1313 
precio de la vivienda ha aumentado en un 43%, porque los 1314 
intereses que tienen que pagar por las hipotecas se han 1315 
duplicado durante su Gobierno, y porque quienes quieran 1316 
alquilar no encuentran viviendas en alquiler, ya que no hay 1317 
garantías jurídicas y económicas bastantes para los 1318 
propietarios. Usted creó un Ministerio de Vivienda, anunció 1319 
grandes planes, cambió a su titular, la señora Trujillo, sin 1320 
que hubiera ejecutado ninguno, y nombró a otra persona que 1321 
también anunció grandes planes, nada menos que para la 1322 
emancipación de los jóvenes. De momento hemos sabido que la 1323 
Sociedad Pública de Alquiler, lo cual es una vergüenza, tiene 1324 
cient… mil… 1200 pisos vacíos que los está pagando, lo cual es 1325 
una vergüenza. Señor Zapatero, usted ante un problema como esto 1326 
ha estado instalado en una sucesión de ocurrencias 1327 
disparatadas. Hemos visto aquello de las zapatillas a los 1328 
jóvenes, hemos visto los mini-pisos, las soluciones 1329 
habitacionales. Oiga, ha habido muy poquita reflexión y ha 1330 
hecho muy pocas cosas para resolver uno de los problemas más 1331 
importantes que tiene nuestro país, que usted había dicho que 1332 
lo iba a resolver y creó el Ministerio de la Vivienda. Ha sido 1333 
un fiasco colosal. ¿Cómo se explica usted que uno de los países 1334 
de la UE con menor densidad de población, que es España, pues 1335 
sea mucho más caro que Holanda, que tiene casi cinco veces más 1336 
población [MCV: Tiene que ir concluyendo] por kilómetro 1337 
cuadrado que España? ¿Cómo se lo explica?  1338 
ZP: Mire señor Rajoy, vamos a hablar de vivienda. Ésta es la 1339 
evolución del precio de la vivienda con el gobierno del Partido 1340 
Popular, que llegó al máximo histórico, y la evolución con el 1341 
Partido Socialista que ha ido decreciendo hasta estar en una 1342 
subida del 4,8%. ¿Sabe cuántas viviendas protegidas construían 1343 
en el último año de su mandato? 56.000. ¿Sabe cuántas se 1344 
inician ahora? 100.000 viviendas protegidas para que las 1345 
familias puedan acceder, y tengo el compromiso de que sean 1346 
150.000 cada año en la próxima legislatura. ¿Cuántas ayudas 1347 
hacían ustedes a los jóvenes para el alquiler de vivienda? Cero 1348 
euros. Nosotros 200 euros para 350.000 jóvenes que van a poder 1349 
tener vivienda. Pero para mí la prioridad es la educación y la 1350 
investigación. Esa es la gran prioridad del futuro, la base. 1351 
Una educación en donde hemos duplicado la inversión en este 1352 
periodo, una educación en donde hemos hecho dos leyes 1353 
educativas con acuerdo y con memoria económica. Una educación 1354 
en donde hemos reforzado la lectura, las matemáticas y el 1355 
inglés con becas para jóvenes. 50.000 jóvenes han tenido una 1356 
beca para viajar durante un mes al extranjero, con ustedes 1357 
ninguna. Y en los próximos cuatro años vamos a llegar a los 1358 
200.000. Futuro es investigación. ¿Sabe que hemos multiplicado 1359 
por tres el gasto en I+D+i? No llegaba a 3000 millones con 1360 
ustedes y ahora está en más de 7000 millones de euros. ¿Sabe 1361 
que hay 40000 investigadores más en España que cuando ustedes 1362 
gobernaban? ¿Sabe que somos el segundo país de Europa que más 1363 
aumenta en patentes? ¿Y sabe que en Internet cuando llegamos al 1364 
Gobierno solo disponían de él, de acceder a él uno de cada 10 1365 
ciudadanos y ahora son cinco de cada 10? Por el contrario, 1366 
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usted en materia de investigación y en materia de educación, lo 1367 
mismo que en materia de Interior: en vez de reducir los 1368 
delitos, que es lo que tenía que haber hecho, redujo los 1369 
policías. En materia de investigación, en vez de aumentar el 1370 
gasto y en materia de educación, aumentar las becas, lo que 1371 
hizo fue reducir y congelar el gasto, las becas [MCV: Tiene que 1372 
ir concluyendo] el apoyo a lo que representa el futuro que es 1373 
educación. 1374 
MCV: Mariano Rajoy 1375 
RJ: Lleva una temporada diciendo que soy el peor ministro de la 1376 
democracia a todos los ministerios en los que estamos. En fin, 1377 
seguramente usted es el mejor presidente del Gobierno de España 1378 
[ZP: no no] desde los Reyes Católicos, pero ese no es el tema. 1379 
Me ha hablado de vivienda, y de las viviendas que han 1380 
construido. Mire, viviendas protegidas: Comunidad de Madrid, 1381 
Andalucía y Cataluña. Aquí gobierna el Partido Popular y aquí 1382 
gobierna el Partido Socialista. ¿Precio de la vivienda? 1383 
Viviendas de protección oficial: año 2004, 112.000 euros, año 1384 
2008, con ustedes, 200.000 euros. Pero es que el espectáculo 1385 
que han dado ustedes con esto del alquiler… solo el 1386 
Ayuntamiento de Madrid alquila más viviendas, sólo el 1387 
Ayuntamiento de Madrid que el propio Ministerio de la Vivienda. 1388 
Fíjese usted, Vivienda pide a bancos y cajas que den ya las 1389 
ayudas al alquiler aunque no tengan comprobados los datos, 1390 
claro y los bancos dicen oigan aunque estemos en elecciones, 1391 
está aquí, hay que cumplir la ley. Las ayudas al alquiler un 1392 
coladero de fraudes… mire, el espectáculo ha sido grotesco, es 1393 
que ya no es lo de las zapatillas ni los mini-pisos es que ha 1394 
sido grotesco lo que ha hecho usted en el Ministerio de la 1395 
Vivienda. Ha vuelto a hablar de educación, oiga ¿pero es que 1396 
usted no se lee los datos del Informe Pisa? ¿Qué ha hecho usted 1397 
en educación? Nos ha anunciado la educación para la ciudadanía 1398 
y que se puede pasar de curso si uno suspende cuatro 1399 
asignaturas pero si se lee los informes internacionales oiga en 1400 
matemáticas, en lectura, es que estamos muy mal, es que hay que 1401 
cambiar el modelo, se necesita trabajo, esfuerzo, mérito, es 1402 
que eso es fundamental porque es el elemento más competitivo 1403 
para el futuro de España, no vamos a competir con petróleo, 1404 
vamos a competir con personas y esas personas tienen que estar 1405 
muy bien formadas. Me parece muy bien que hable usted del I+D+i 1406 
porque es un elemento para la competitividad de la economía 1407 
española muy importante, bueno usted ha dado una serie de datos 1408 
que no sé de donde se saca… [ZP: Están en los presupuestos 1409 
públicos y en los informes de la Unión Europea] pero yo sí le 1410 
digo que lo más relevante es que usted ha eliminado la 1411 
deducción en I+D+I en el Impuesto de Sociedades y por tanto 1412 
[ZP: No, ya se lo explicó el señor Solbes al señor Pizarro] las 1413 
empresas que tienen dificultades… no no, sí sí, pero a mí no me 1414 
hable del señor Solbes y el señor Pizarro, hábleme de usted y 1415 
yo. [ZP: es un cambio normativo como consecuencia de…] no no, 1416 
usted las ha eliminado, las ha eliminado. 1417 
MCV: Bien, tiempo…  1418 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy pero lo cierto es que con ustedes subió el 1419 
precio de la vivienda a los niveles máximos, que con nosotros 1420 
ha bajado, que ustedes construían 56.000 al año, que nosotros 1421 
100.000 que no tenían ninguna ayuda al alquiler a los jóvenes y 1422 
nosotros sí. Que en educación y en investigación ustedes 1423 
congelaron el gasto, no hubo ningún avance sustancial en I+D+i, 1424 
ahora sí lo ha habido en un año solo de gobierno con datos de 1425 
2006 ya llegamos al 1,20 de gasto de Investigación Desarrollo e 1426 
Innovación. 40.000 investigadores más y desde luego una 1427 
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capacidad mucho más fuerte de nuestro país por ese esfuerzo que 1428 
tiene más productividad para que la economía sea más 1429 
competitiva en el futuro. A mí me interesa hablar del cambio 1430 
climático, le he oído estos días decir que propone una ley 1431 
integral del cambio climático ahora, bueno en fin ya sé que es 1432 
muy aficionado a los refranes.  1433 
RJ: Sí.  1434 
ZP: Le diría, a buenas horas mangas verdes, señor Rajoy. [RJ: 1435 
Eso se lo expliqué yo] Y nunca mejor dicho, nunca mejor dicho, 1436 
porque ustedes aumentaron un 40% las emisiones de gases con 1437 
efecto invernadero [RJ: Qué barbaridad] ahora las hemos 1438 
reducido nosotros [RJ: Qué barbaridad] a partir de 2006 un 4% a 1439 
pesar del gran crecimiento económico y hemos establecido todas 1440 
las medidas necesarias para que la lucha contra el cambio 1441 
climático, que comprendo no es un tema que a usted le sea muy 1442 
atractivo [RJ: no, no, me es muy atractivo], sea un elemento 1443 
central de lo que es el futuro de nuestro país que además 1444 
supone una gran oportunidad económica porque tenemos empresas 1445 
que son líderes en el mundo en energías alternativas como en 1446 
energía solar o energía eólica, a las cuales hemos apoyado, 1447 
vamos a apoyar porque tenemos el objetivo que ha marcado la 1448 
Unión Europea de llegar en el 2020 al 20% a través de esas 1449 
energías.  1450 
RJ: Ehhh bueno, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero ha vuelto al 1451 
pasado, a lo que subió el precio de la vivienda cuando 1452 
gobernaba el Partido Popular, oiga no debió subir mucho cuando 1453 
en su época ha tomado la decisión o gracias a sus gestiones ha 1454 
subido el 43% ¿no? Lo que desde luego sí ha subido también este 1455 
es el precio de las viviendas de protección oficial éste sí que 1456 
es un tema importante, de 112.000 euros a 200.000 euros. 1457 
Insisto ha sido un verdadero fiasco. Yo estoy dispuesto a 1458 
hablar con usted del cambio climático, el Partido Popular fue 1459 
el primer partido que creó en España un Ministerio de Medio 1460 
Ambiente en el año 1996, no lo creó el PSOE en 14 años de 1461 
Gobierno [ZP: Que no hizo nada]. Fue un gobierno del partido 1462 
popular el que firmó el Protocolo de Kioto y fui yo quien lo 1463 
firmó en representación de la Unión Europea como presidente del 1464 
Consejo porque Aznar estaba ausente por motivos de agenda. 1465 
España en estos últimos cuatro años es uno de los países que 1466 
más incumple sus compromisos frente al cambio climático con un 1467 
exceso de emisiones del 38%, es que usted habla y luego actúa 1468 
de forma distinta a como habla. Dice una cosa y hace 1469 
exactamente lo contrario. En el año 2006 las energías 1470 
renovables y yo estoy de acuerdo en que es bueno que haya 1471 
energías renovables representaron apenas poco más del 6% del 1472 
consumo de la energía primaria, pero luego, señor Zapatero, ha 1473 
habido muchos incendios en España a lo largo de estos años en 1474 
Huelva, en Guadalajara, en Galicia, ¿cuál fue su actuación ahí? 1475 
¿Qué hizo usted? ¿Cuál ha sido su política forestal? ¿Fue usted 1476 
sensible con la gente? ¿Lo fue en Guadalajara? ¿Atendió a la 1477 
gente? ¿Atendió sus necesidades? A usted que le gusta tanto 1478 
hablar de la gente… porque yo estuve allí con la gente, con sus 1479 
problemas y hubo mucha tensión y usted no fue capaz, usted no 1480 
atendió a la gente [ZP: siempre he intentado atender a la 1481 
gente, siempre] y ahora quiere procesarlos… No hombre no, usted 1482 
no atiende a nadie [ZP: siempre], usted fue con una cámara de 1483 
televisión en un helicóptero [ZP: siempre, siempre, siempre] 1484 
para salir en el telediario, eso es exactamente lo que hizo 1485 
usted.  1486 
ZP: No, no, no, no hice como los ministros [MCV: última 1487 
intervención] de su gobierno que cuando había problemas… [RJ: 1488 
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ya vuelve a su gobierno… qué barbaridad… yo no tuve ningún 1489 
gobierno] en Galicia, el chapapote… cuando había problemas se 1490 
iban de caza. Eso solo pertenece a su Gobierno [RJ: sí sí, pero 1491 
yo estaba dando la cara ahí ¿eh? Yo estaba dando la cara ahí y 1492 
usted organizándome manifestaciones]. Eso solo pertenece a su 1493 
Gobierno… mire esta es la evolución de los gases de efecto 1494 
invernadero, con el Partido Popular cada año en aumento con el 1495 
PSOE ya se ha empezado a reducir. [RJ: Pues no XXX con su 1496 
Ministerio porque yo quiero hablar de su Ministerio…] quiero 1497 
hablar de futuro quiero hablar de futuro, no, son datos 1498 
oficiales de la Unión Europea. Quiero hablar de futuro [RJ: ah 1499 
bueno, entonces su ministerio está equivocado] y de lo que 1500 
representa el esfuerzo que este país tiene hacer en materia de 1501 
educación y en materia de cultura. Mire, señor Rajoy, España 1502 
sufre un atraso que estamos recuperando en materia de educación 1503 
y en materia de ciencia. El Gobierno ha acompañado a los 1504 
cuidadores y a los investigadores. Hace unos días un conjunto 1505 
de personas investigadores, rectores, gente de la cultura 1506 
nombres tan representativos como Mikel Barceló, como Serrat, 1507 
como Sabina expresaron su apoyo a mí candidatura y usted les 1508 
llamó “untados”, [RJ: ¿cómo?] les llamó “untados”, a las 1509 
personas que habían salido de la cultura y de la investigación 1510 
apoyando mi candidatura. Señor Rajoy, un país que desprecia a 1511 
sus profesores, a sus creadores, es un país que vuelve la 1512 
espalda al futuro y un político que incurre en ese desprecio a 1513 
la gente de la cultura, a la gente de la investigación no 1514 
merece presidir un país.  1515 
MCV: Última intervención, tienen ahora un minuto para concluir 1516 
este bloque. Por favor, sean estrictos en los tiempos que lo 1517 
hacen fantásticamente. Señor Rajoy, un minuto.  1518 
RJ: oiga, mire usted, yo defiendo a los creadores, yo he sido 1519 
ministro de cultura y defiendo a los artistas pero yo no estoy 1520 
dispuesto a que me llamen a diez millones de votantes del 1521 
Partido Popular para apoyarle a usted “turba de imbéciles y de 1522 
estúpidos” eso se puede hacer. Yo lo que nunca haría sería 1523 
agredir a las víctimas del terrorismo como ha hecho usted, 1524 
porque eso sí que son personas indefensas y no el señor Serrat 1525 
y esos señores [ZP: Yo no he agredido a ninguna víctima del 1526 
terrorismo, y no le acepto que diga eso] que ha citado usted. 1527 
No no no eso es lo que no haría yo [ZP: ¿que yo he agredido a 1528 
una víctima del terrorismo?] yo estoy a favor… no no si si si 1529 
si siempre [ZP: no no no se lo acepto señor Rajoy, es una 1530 
afirmación muy grave], es que me es igual que no me lo acepte 1531 
[ZP: yo no he agredido a ninguna víctima del terrorismo no 1532 
puede decir eso] porque ustedes han estado en campaña 1533 
continuada contra las víctimas del terrorismo [ZP: no puede 1534 
decir que yo he agredido a una víctima del terrorismo] es que 1535 
me es igual que no lo acepte  [MCV: vamos a hacer una cosa] si 1536 
es que me trae completamente sin cuidado [ZP: no pero es que es 1537 
muy grave] no no pero es que es la verdad [ZP: eso es muy 1538 
grave] es la verdad… como que no han agredido [ZP: que yo no he 1539 
agredido a ninguna víctima del terrorismo] pero si han 1540 
manifestado XXX ocasiones [ZP: yo no he agredido a ninguna 1541 
víctima del terrorismo]. 1542 
MCV: Señor Zapatero, tendrá ahora su turno para contestar… Y 1543 
prorrogamos un poco más el tiempo que tenía usted. Adelante, 1544 
señor Rajoy…  1545 
RJ: Yo mantengo lo que he dicho: que el señor Zapatero ha 1546 
agredido a las víctimas del terrorismo. Lo mantengo. Que quede 1547 
claro. Yo, desde luego, lo que es evidente es que yo no puedo 1548 
aceptarle a una persona que pide el voto para usted que insulte 1549 
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a los demás. Porque eso es inaceptable. Se llame Serrat, o sea 1550 
la persona más humilde del mundo. Se llame como se llame. Hay 1551 
que tener un poco de tolerancia. Y un poco de respeto a las 1552 
personas. Y hay muchas personas que votan al Partido Popular 1553 
porque quieren y porque les apetece. Y hay que tratarlos con 1554 
tolerancia, como yo trato también a la gente. [MCV: vaya 1555 
terminando] Ahora, yo tengo que defender a la gente. Y usted 1556 
debería haber defendido a aquellas personas que fueron 1557 
insultadas por todos aquellos que estuvieron en el acto de los 1558 
artistas. [MCV: vaya terminando] ¿Por qué no defendió a los 1559 
insultados?  1560 
MCV: Tiempo para el señor Zapatero.  1561 
ZP: Señor Rajoy, usted vinculó su declaración de untados al 1562 
canon digital, intentando hacer demagogia populista, [RJ: 1563 
demagogia la suya] y descalificó a gente de la cultura, a gente 1564 
como Mikel Barceló, como Joan Manuel Serrat, como Joaquín 1565 
Sabina, como Pedro Duque, que estaban en ese acto de la 1566 
Plataforma. Creadores que son universales y que dan la imagen 1567 
de España al mundo. Mire, aquí dije que iba a haber claramente… 1568 
que se iba a advertir una diferencia de proyectos políticos. 1569 
¿Sabe cuál ha sido la diferencia? Usted apoyó a un grupo de 1570 
deportistas, algunos de ellos que nos dan una brillante imagen 1571 
en el mundo, y yo lo respeto. Tienen derecho, me parece bien 1572 
que le apoyen a ustedes [RJ: Pero no le insultaron a usted…] 1573 
No… El señor Barceló, el señor Pedro Duque, no… No insultaron a 1574 
nadie. [RJ: ah no, eehh] Usted les atacó, porque les llamó 1575 
“untados por el canon digital”. Y alguien que ofende a gente de 1576 
la cultura. A quien transmite la creación española, como hoy 1577 
Javier Bardem, que ha terminado su intervención dedicando a 1578 
España su Oscar… [MCV: Tiene que ir terminando, señor 1579 
Zapatero]… hay que defenderles [RJ: yo lo he felicitado]. Y 1580 
alguien que les ofende y les descalifica, no puede presidir 1581 
este país [RJ: Y a las víctimas del terrorismo…] Yo no he 1582 
descalificado a las víctimas del terrorismo. [RJ: usted, sí] 1583 
Nunca [RJ: Y yo no he descalificado a los artistas] nunca, 1584 
nunca, sí, usted les llamó “untados” [RJ: No, no. A los que nos 1585 
descalificaron a nosotros] “Untados por el canon digital” [RJ: 1586 
A los que nos descalificaron a nosotros] y yo respeté [RJ: oiga 1587 
es que yo desde luego estoy en contra del canon digital. Usted 1588 
estará a favor] y yo respeté a quien apoya [RJ: Y tiene derecho 1589 




MCV: Señores… Estamos en el último turno de este debate. Saben, 1591 
tanto señor Rajoy como señor Rodríguez Zapatero, que tienen 1592 
tres minutos cada uno para sacar conclusiones si lo desean, o 1593 
también, para plantearnos ideas para el futuro. Son tres 1594 
minutos, siempre en el orden que hemos establecido en este 1595 
primer debate… El señor Mariano Rajoy en primer lugar; el señor 1596 
Rodríguez Zapatero, a continuación. Últimos tres minutos. 1597 
RJ: Quiero que esta noche se vayan a dormir con la tranquilidad 1598 
de que podemos encarrilar las cosas. Las elecciones nos ofrecen 1599 
una gran oportunidad y no debiéramos perderla. No queremos 1600 
renunciar a nada. Podemos mirar al mañana con optimismo y con 1601 
esperanza. Sabemos perfectamente cómo se hace, porque ya lo 1602 
hicimos todos juntos en peores circunstancias. Yo estoy 1603 
dispuesto. El plan de trabajo está preparado, y las 1604 
herramientas a punto. Solamente falta que usted decida que nos 1605 
pongamos en marcha. No le pido el voto para mí. Yo no soy lo 1606 
que está en juego. Yo no soy quien gana o pierde estas 1607 
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elecciones. Lo gana o pierde España entera. Está en juego todo 1608 
lo que podemos hacer si vamos juntos. Y todo lo que podemos 1609 
perder si no lo hacemos. Por eso es muy importante que 1610 
acertemos con lo que España necesita. Necesitamos los votos, 1611 
pero me importan más los compromisos. Porque yo sólo quiero lo 1612 
que todos queremos. Y hay un ejemplo que resume todas mis ideas 1613 
y que todo el mundo puede entender. Yo quiero que la niña que 1614 
nace en España tenga una familia y una vivienda y unos padres 1615 
con trabajo. Esto es lo mínimo que debemos exigirnos para 1616 
todos, una familia, una vivienda y unos padres con trabajo. Yo 1617 
me esforzaré principalmente para que la familia esté atendida, 1618 
y la vivienda se pueda conseguir y para que no falte el 1619 
trabajo. Quiero que esa niña nazca donde nazca reciba una 1620 
educación, que sea tan buena como la mejor. Quiero que se pueda 1621 
pasear por todo el mundo sin complejos, porque sabrá idiomas y 1622 
porque tendrá un título profesional que se cotice en todo el 1623 
mundo. Quiero que sea un heraldo de la libertad, de la 1624 
tolerancia y de los derechos humanos, porque habrá crecido en 1625 
libertad y no tendrá miedo a las ideas de los demás. Y habrá 1626 
aprendido a respetar a todos los que respetan la ley. Quiero 1627 
que sienta un hondo orgullo por ser española, por pertenecer a 1628 
esa nación tan vieja, tan admirable, que le habrá ofrecido las 1629 
mejores oportunidades, pero que habrá sabido ser exigente con 1630 
ella para convertirla en una mujer madura y responsable. Eso es 1631 
lo que quiero. Esto y todo lo que esto lleva implícito. Y ¿por 1632 
qué no? Nada nos impide lograrlo, podemos hacerlos si ustedes 1633 
quieren que caminemos juntos, porque España es cosa de todos y 1634 
debemos tomárnosla muy en serio. Muchísimas gracias y muy 1635 
buenas noches.  1636 
MCV: Última intervención.  1637 
ZP: Sí, muchas gracias. Desde que España recuperó la libertad, 1638 
España está fortalecida y hemos dado un gran avance histórico. 1639 
Tengo plena confianza en las enormes posibilidades de la España 1640 
libre y unida. Creo que nuestro país puede continuar avanzando, 1641 
incrementar su prosperidad y ese avance, lo podemos hacer 1642 
trabajando unidos. En toda mi vida política, tanto en la 1643 
oposición como en el gobierno, he servido a España con lealtad, 1644 
he colaborado en los asuntos de Estado. Hace cuatro años pedí 1645 
el voto para que volviéramos a la legalidad internacional y los 1646 
soldados de Iraq regresaran de una guerra ilegal. Pedí el voto 1647 
para incrementar la prosperidad y el bien estar de España, y 1648 
hemos crecido económicamente y hemos creado 3 millones de 1649 
empleo. Pedí el voto para incrementar las pensiones mínimas, 1650 
para hacerlas más dignas y las hemos subido. Pedí el voto para 1651 
incrementar el Salario Mínimo Interprofesional, y lo hemos 1652 
hecho. Pedí el voto para avanzar en la igualdad de las mujeres 1653 
y en sus derechos, y lo hemos hecho con la Ley de Igualdad. 1654 
Pedí el voto para atender a los más necesitados, y lo he hecho 1655 
con la Ley de la Dependencia. He trabajado en este período con 1656 
toda mi fuerza y con toda mi humildad. He reconocido errores. 1657 
He puesto toda mi energía para hacer un país más próspero. Y en 1658 
los próximos cuatro años, me propongo seguir aumentado la 1659 
prosperidad, llegar al pleno empleo, trabajando juntos 1660 
empresarios y trabajadores. Estoy resuelto a que la igualdad de 1661 
hombres y mujeres, en derechos, en salarios haga compatible la 1662 
vida familiar y el trabajo avanzando en la conciliación y en 1663 
las plazas para los menores de 3 años. Estoy decidido a que 1664 
España esté en la vanguardia del cambio climático, de la lucha 1665 
contra el Cambio Climático, en la calidad de la Educación, en 1666 
Infraestructuras, está a nuestro alcance. Estoy decidido a que 1667 
España esté siempre en el mundo defendiendo la paz, lejos de 1668 
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las guerras ilegales, incrementando la ayuda al desarrollo 1669 
hasta el 0,7%. Todo esto es posible, está a nuestro alcance. 1670 
Trabajaré inspirado por los mayores, trabajaré con la ilusión 1671 
de hacer un futuro para nuestros hijos y con la ambición de 1672 
progreso que tienen los jóvenes. No puedo prometer que todas 1673 
las personas tengan éxito en su vida, pero sí me puedo 1674 
comprometer a trabajar para que todas las personas tengan las 1675 
mismas oportunidades para tener éxito, y aquellas que no lo 1676 
alcancen tendrán siempre el amparo de nuestro país. Buenas 1677 
noches y buena suerte.  1678 
MCV: Muchas gracias señores, hasta aquí el debate. Ha sido un 1679 
debate intenso, interesante, equilibrado en los tiempos, 1680 
magnífico. Nuestra gratitud sincera primero por haberlo 1681 
aceptado. Decíamos al principio que el 25 de febrero del 2008 1682 
quedará en la historia electoral española ¿no? Como ese 1683 
recuerdo, ese día que ustedes dos aceptaron, sus partidos 1684 
políticos también, comenzar de nuevo estos cara a cara, y ojalá 1685 
siga siendo así. De momento el próximo lunes lo será. Ustedes 1686 
ya saben que a partir del 9 de marzo el próximo presidente del 1687 
Gobierno de España se llamará Mariano Rajoy o José Luis 1688 
Rodríguez Zapatero. Se llamará Zapatero o se llamará Rajoy. Los 1689 
ciudadanos son los que deciden. Nosotros aquí, como 1690 
profesionales, desde la Academia y con ayuda de las 1691 
televisiones hemos hecho el debate que es lo que nos 1692 
correspondía. Aquí están acreditados hoy 400 profesionales que 1693 
están trasmitiendo este debate en diversos medios, y calculamos 1694 
más de 1000, probablemente sean cerca de 2000, los que están 1695 
desde distintas redacciones de televisión, de radio o de medios 1696 
digitales dando difusión para toda España, y en realidad para 1697 
todo el mundo, porque estamos, como se ha dicho aquí, en una 1698 
sociedad global, este debate tan interesante. Desde luego 1699 
nosotros les agradecemos su presencia, les deseamos mucha 1700 
suerte en las elecciones a los dos. También deseamos suerte a 1701 
todos aquellos candidatos de otras formaciones políticas que 1702 
aspiran a tener representación parlamentaria en el Congreso y 1703 
en el Senado que surjan del 9 de marzo próximo. Saben ustedes 1704 
que el próximo lunes, también organizado por la Academia de la 1705 
Televisión, Mariano Rajoy y José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 1706 
volverán a este plató para depararnos seguramente otro 1707 
extraordinario debate intenso, equilibrado, vehemente, en 1708 
algunos pasajes, claro que sí, pero desde luego absolutamente 1709 
interesante porque estamos hablando de una cuestión 1710 
absolutamente muy seria, que es el futuro de nuestro país. 1711 
Muchas gracias a todos. Gracias a ustedes por su atención, 1712 
buenas noches.  1713 
ZP: Muchas gracias.  1714 
RJ: Buenas noches.  1715 
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1. APERTURA  
 
Olga Viza (OV): Muy buenas noches señores, el próximo domingo a 1 
estas horas la suerte estará echada. Esa noche tendremos todos, 2 
una idea muy aproximada del resultado que hayan arrojado las 3 
urnas. A seis días de esa cita electoral, les doy la bienvenida 4 
en nombre de la Academia de las Ciencias y las Artes de la 5 
Televisión a este segundo debate "cara a cara" entre los dos 6 
candidatos a la Presidencia de los partidos políticos que 7 
tienen mayor representación parlamentaria. Seis días como digo 8 
para las elecciones, de modo que estamos en la fase decisiva y 9 
ante el debate definitivo. Señor José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 10 
muy buenas noches  11 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (ZP): Buenas noches.  12 
OV: Tal y como ocurrió la semana pasada semana le voy a pedir 13 
que me permita tratarle como candidato socialista, aunque sea 14 
presidente.  15 
ZP: Por supuesto.  16 
OV: Muchas gracias. Doy la bienvenida también al candidato del 17 
Partido Popular, don Mariano Rajoy. Muy buenas noches  18 
Mariano Rajoy (RJ): Buenas noches, muchas gracias.  19 
OV: Bienvenido, como digo. Los candidatos, como ven, vuelven a 20 
sentarse en la misma mesa, pero como habrán observado con los 21 
lugares cambiados. También debo decir que el orden también es 22 
inverso respecto al anterior debate. Abrirá los turnos el 23 
candidato socialista. Los cerrará el candidato del Partido 24 
Popular. Son las dos únicas alteraciones respecto al debate de 25 
hace una semana. Lo cierto es que la expectación es indudable. 26 
Más de trece millones de espectadores siguieron el primer 27 
encuentro, además de un altísimo número de oyentes y de 28 
internautas. Nos consta el seguimiento que hubo en muchos 29 
países europeos y el especial interés en algunos países 30 
iberoamericanos como en Argentina, Venezuela, Chile y Uruguay. 31 
Si la pasada semana hablábamos de treinta señales de 32 
televisión, sepan que en esta ocasión se suman otras emisoras, 33 
entre ellas Canal Sur y Canal Cuatro de Castilla y León y 34 
además la UER está distribuyendo en este momento la señal de 35 
este debate a todas las cadenas públicas europeas. Bien, vamos 36 
a comenzar, vamos a comenzar. El señor Zapatero y el señor 37 
Rajoy conocen el procedimiento, ambos. A mí me corresponde 38 
asegurar que se respeten esas pautas. La… la… el debate 39 
comienza como en la anterior ocasión con una intervención de 40 
tres minutos para cada uno. ¿Cómo ven la situación? ¿Dónde 41 
estamos? ¿Cuál es su idea de país? Una reflexión general. Señor 42 
Zapatero. 43 
ZP: Buenas noches. El lunes pasado expliqué la gestión 44 
realizada durante estos cuatro años y rendí cuentas de lo 45 
llevado a cabo. Esta noche, me propongo explicar cuál es mi 46 
proyecto para los próximos cuatro años, para un país que debe 47 
continuar creciendo económicamente, que juntos empresarios, 48 
sindicatos y Gobierno-, podemos superar un momento de 49 
desaceleración económica que vive España en un contexto 50 
                                                          
1
 Video available at: http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/elecciones-20-n/segundo-debate-
electoral-entre-zapatero-rajoy-integro/1239528/ 
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mundial, para traducir ese crecimiento económico en crecimiento 51 
social, para crear dos millones de empleos en los próximos 52 
cuatro años, la mitad de ellos para las mujeres, para reforzar 53 
la estabilidad en el empleo y combatir la precariedad, Para 54 
alcanzar la igualdad plena entre hombres y mujeres, también en 55 
los salarios, para conseguir un país que defienda los valores 56 
del desarrollo sostenible en la lucha contra el cambio 57 
climático y contra la pobreza en el mundo. Para hacer una 58 
España segura, unida contra el terrorismo, más segura en las 59 
calles, más segura en las carreteras pero más segura también en 60 
los centros de trabajo. Que plante cara al delito, a la 61 
imprudencia en las carreteras y, por supuesto, a los accidentes 62 
laborales. Un país que alcance las cotas de educación, de 63 
cultura que se merece una gran potencia como es España. Un país 64 
en convivencia, con más derechos para todos, y un país unido. 65 
Espero que el debate esta noche sea útil para todos los 66 
ciudadanos. En toda mi trayectoria política he intentado que el 67 
insulto, que la descalificación, no contamine el debate 68 
público. Deseo que esta noche tengamos un debate de ideas, de 69 
propuestas y de soluciones; es lo que nos exigen los 70 
ciudadanos, con limpieza, con limpieza y con veracidad. Por 71 
eso, he traído conmigo un libro blanco con todos los datos que 72 
el otro día aporté en el debate, con todos los que voy a 73 
explicar hoy. Lo dejo a disposición de la moderadora; estará 74 
del señor Rajoy, de los medios de comunicación y de los 75 
ciudadanos por internet, mañana, para que puedan contrastar 76 
todo lo que decimos aquí. La verdad por delante y por escrito, 77 
para que no haya ninguna duda. Ninguna, señor Rajoy.  78 
OV: Muchas gracias señor Zapatero. Señor Rajoy, le escuchamos.  79 
RJ: Muchas gracias. Muy… muy buenas noches. Yo voy a hablar 80 
también de la verdad y también de la realidad de cómo esta 81 
España y de lo que creo que debemos hacer en el futuro próximo, 82 
a lo largo de los próximos cuatro años. Yo creo que hay una 83 
mayoría de españoles que no lo están pasando bien. Cuando 84 
hablamos de que crece el paro, estamos hablando de personas de 85 
personas que tienen sentimientos, que a veces viven dramas 86 
personales, que tienen niños, que se tienen que preocupar por 87 
ellos. Cuando hablamos de la subida de los precios, también 88 
hablamos de personas, de quien mira su nómina, de quien ve su 89 
pensión, de quien ve lo que puede llenar del carro de la 90 
compra, de quien se tiene que apretar el cinturón para llegar a 91 
fin de mes. Cuando hablamos de hipotecas también hablamos de 92 
personas. Hoy, la situación económica de los españoles, de las 93 
familias españolas es peor que hace cuatro años, y no se puede 94 
negar la realidad porque quien niega la realidad, como hace el 95 
señor Zapatero, pues es imposible que pueda afrontarla. El 96 
señor Zapatero también nos dice que la inmigración está 97 
controlada. Yo no estoy de acuerdo. La inmigración no está 98 
controlada y hay que poner orden y control. Hay mucha gente que 99 
viene aquí a trabajar, se gana la vida dignamente, tiene 100 
derechos y debe tener los mismos derechos que los españoles, 101 
pero hay muchos derechos de españoles que se ven perjudicados. 102 
Por tanto, hay que poner orden y control para que no se 103 
perjudiquen sus derechos sociales. Se nos dice que España está 104 
más unida y cohesionada que nunca, pero tenemos un referéndum 105 
de separación convocado para este año y tenemos uno anunciado 106 
para el futuro. Al señor Zapatero sé que no le gusta que le 107 
diga esto, se enfada conmigo, pero debiera enfadarse con quien 108 
convoca los referéndum. Hay españoles que han visto cómo sus 109 
derechos han sido afectados. Hay españoles que son conscientes 110 
de que se ha perdido la igualdad en muchos temas. Cuando él 111 
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llegó al Gobierno, recibió un modelo de Estado en el que había 112 
un acuerdo sustancial entre los españoles y un modelo de 113 
financiación de las autonomías que trataba todo por igual. 114 
Ahora todo está en el alero y todo está abierto. La educación 115 
es un tema capital. No son los organismos internacionales. Lo 116 
sabemos todos los españoles. No va bien. Y este es un tema 117 
decisivo para el futuro y no se puede negar la realidad, sino 118 
que hay que afrontarla. Tampoco va bien la seguridad ciudadana 119 
y hay que afrontar la realidad, crece la delincuencia y hay 120 
muchas personas y muchas bandas organizadas que actúan de forma 121 
especialmente violenta. También el precio de la vivienda ha 122 
subido un 43 por ciento en estos años. ¿Qué ha pasado en los 123 
cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las 124 
prioridades. Ha tenido dos grandes proyectos: el primero, 125 
cambiar España y el segundo, negociar con ETA. Ambos han sido 126 
un fracaso. Se ha dividido a los españoles, se ha generado 127 
mucha tensión y, sobre todo, se ha olvidado lo esencial, que es 128 
la economía, que son los precios, que es la vida de las 129 
personas, que es su forma de sentir, de vivir, son sus 130 
preocupaciones. Creo que se necesita un Gobierno que dé 131 
certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé seguridad, que se ocupe de los 132 
problemas reales de los españoles, que busque acuerdos, que sea 133 
un Gobierno para todos y que no divida a los españoles.  134 
 
2. POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA  
 
OV: Muchas gracias señor Rajoy. Después de estas primeras 135 
reflexiones generales, vamos a entrar en los detalles. Abrimos 136 
el primero de los bloques. Macroeconomía, precios, salarios, 137 
cifras del paro, productividad. En definitiva, economía y 138 
empleo. Señor Zapatero.  139 
ZP: La buena marcha de la economía en estos años tiene un doble 140 
valor: por un lado nos ha permitido elevar el nivel de renta 141 
per cápita hemos subido la media… hemos superado la media 142 
europea; hemos superado a Italia y además nos ha permitido 143 
alcanzar un superávit que nos hace fuertes para afrontar 144 
dificultades, para apoyar a la economía productiva y para 145 
apoyar a las familias. Mi objetivo en la próxima legislatura es 146 
el pleno empleo. Mi primera acción será convocar a sindicatos y 147 
empresarios para firmar un gran acuerdo para toda la 148 
legislatura, con prioridades urgentes, para afrontar las 149 
consecuencias de la desaceleración que vive la economía 150 
mundial, vamos a poner en marcha una batería de acciones para 151 
la reactivación económica con sindicatos y empresarios. Primera 152 
acción: adelanto del Plan de Infraestructuras para compensar la 153 
caída de la construcción. Segundo: la construcción de 150.000 154 
viviendas de protección oficial este año. Tercero: planes de 155 
reciclaje y recolocación para los parados del sector de la 156 
construcción. Devolución del IRPF de 400 euros por 157 
contribuyente. Extensión gratuita del plazo de hipotecas para 158 
que se beneficien las familias con problemas. Sexto: propiciar, 159 
en línea con otros países europeos, un acuerdo con el sector de 160 
la distribución para el autocontrol de márgenes en los precios 161 
de los alimentos. Estas son medidas inmediatas, efectivas y 162 
constructivas, no como su habitual catastrofismo señor Rajoy, 163 
sólo se dedican a sembrar dudas cada día, a meter miedo sobre 164 
la economía, a describir una situación catastrófica. La verdad 165 
es la que se le ha escapado a uno de sus dirigentes, al señor 166 
Elorriaga, en un prestigioso periódico extranjero, cuando ha 167 
declarado "toda nuestra estrategia es desalentar a los votantes 168 
socialistas para que no voten, si sembramos dudas sobre la 169 
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economía, sobre la inmigración y sobre las cuestiones 170 
nacionalistas, quizás se queden en casa". Esa es la razón por 171 
la que siembran tantas dudas, y meten tanto miedo, intentar 172 
ganar votos.  173 
OV: Señor Rajoy.  174 
RJ: bien eh… Muchas gracias, eh… Yo voy a hablar de lo que 175 
afecta fundamentalmente a los españoles, y voy a hablar de cómo 176 
viven los españoles, que no viven como usted cree que viven los 177 
españoles. Usted ha dicho que hemos superado en renta per 178 
cápita a Italia y que ha mejorado mucho la renta per cápita en 179 
estos últimos años. Seguramente tiene ahí, ya que nos ha 180 
anunciado que va a traer muchos datos, los datos que ha 181 
publicado la UE. Eurostat, año 2006, somos el quinto país de la 182 
Unión Europea 27 en menos crecimiento per cápita, el quinto, 183 
sólo hay cuatro que crecen por debajo de nosotros. Por tanto, 184 
sería bueno que esos datos los conociese el conjunto de los 185 
españoles. Yo le recuerdo que han subido los precios de una 186 
manera eh en fin ciertamente no aceptable en los últimos 187 
tiempos. La leche el 29 por ciento en el último año, los 188 
huevos, el pollo y el pan, todos por encima del diez por 189 
ciento. La inflación en el mes de enero el 4,3 por ciento y en 190 
el mes de febrero el coma eh  el 4,4. La cogieron con el cero… 191 
eh… con el 2,1, es decir 0,35 más que la UE [ZP: más más…]. 192 
Siguen subiendo las hipotecas y el paro está aumentando, 4.500 193 
personas han aumentado en el último mes de enero. Y no hay peor 194 
médico que el que no quiere ver la enfermedad. Usted lleva 195 
mucho tiempo hablando de catastrofismo, de que nosotros somos 196 
unos exagerados, pero yo ya la primera pregunta que le hice en 197 
el Congreso de los Diputados en el año 2004 era que debería 198 
hacer usted reformas económicas porque si no, la herencia y la 199 
inercia se iban a terminar como así ocurrió y así nos 200 
encontramos en la situación en la que estamos. Usted ha citado 201 
a un periódico extranjero que es el Financial Times, yo le voy 202 
a decir lo que en el día de hoy, hoy, dice el Financial Times, 203 
fíjese: "El vencedor de las próximas elecciones se va a tener 204 
que pasar los próximos cuatro años poniendo orden en un 205 
estropicio sin precedentes en la moderna Historia de España. 206 
Nos esperan cinco años -dice el Financial Times- de crecimiento 207 
cero por la caída de la construcción y porque se han acabado 208 
los años en que la gente podía pedir créditos. El principal 209 
reto para el ganador será el modelo de crecimiento basado en la 210 
productividad".  211 
OV: Señor Zapatero.  212 
ZP: Sí, muchas gracias señor Rajoy… Hemos superado en renta per 213 
cápita a Italia, hemos superado la media europea, y debería de 214 
tener un poco más de memoria sobre la primera pregunta que me 215 
hizo en el Parlamento siendo usted líder de la oposición y yo 216 
presidente del Gobierno porque no fue ni de economía ni de 217 
precios. Pero hablemos de precios, yo sí quiero hablar de los 218 
precios que afectan a los ciudadanos. Nosotros llevamos en 219 
nuestro programa una medida concreta para contener la subida de 220 
los precios: es un observatorio que compara los dis… los 221 
precios de los distintos proveedores y que estimulará la 222 
competencia. Una medida similar acaba de tomarse en Francia. 223 
Ustedes sólo saben hacer demagogia con los precios. Los precios 224 
han subido lo mismo de media en su etapa de Gobierno que con 225 
nosotros, hay productos que hoy suben más ahora, y otros muchos 226 
que suben menos o que incluso bajan. El plan, el pan, la leche, 227 
y el pollo han subido, en efecto, pero vayamos a otros 228 
productos del mercado. Los huevos con ustedes subieron tres… 229 
veces más, las frutas subieron tres veces más con ustedes, y 230 
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las patatas subieron veintidós veces más con su Gobierno. Hay 231 
productos que con su Gobierno subían de precio y ahora incluso 232 
han bajado, como el vestido o los electrodomésticos. Hace poco 233 
usted viajó a Alemania a hacer campaña electoral y afirmó que 234 
quería ser presidente para que la leche costara en España menos 235 
que en Alemania. No hace falta señor Rajoy; es más barata en 236 
España. Ese mismo día el Gobierno alemán había anunciado que 237 
los productos de primera necesidad habían sufrido la mayor 238 
subida de los últimos veintiséis años. También está en el libro 239 
por si lo quiere comprobar alguien.  240 
OV: Gracias, señor Zapatero. Señor Rajoy.  241 
RJ: Bien, eh… la primera pregunta que yo le hice al señor 242 
Zapatero en el Congreso de los Diputados fue de economía la 243 
primera y por tanto le ruego que no falte a la verdad, esto se 244 
podrá comprobar en el día de mañana. Yo no sé si va a hacer o 245 
no un observatorio de precios, pero si lo hace va a tener que 246 
ser muy eficaz porque cuando usted llegó al Gobierno (enseña un 247 
gráfico) la inflación los precios subían el 2,1 y ahora suben 248 
el 4,5, más del doble. Me habla de los salarios, de lo que sube 249 
la vida y me habla de las patatas. Fíjese el nivel adquisitivo 250 
de los salarios (enseña un gráfico), el salario medio 251 
descontado de la inflación, estos son datos del Instituto 252 
Nacional de Estadística. Gobierno del Partido Popular, Gobierno 253 
del Partido Socialista: No se han ocupado usted de los 254 
asalariados, señor presidente del Gobierno, y ahora me dice que 255 
va a crear un observatorio. Debería crearlo, porque fíjese lo 256 
que dice el observatorio de precios, que ya lo tiene, del 257 
Ministerio de Agricultura, creará otro observatorio más… lo 258 
dice… entre el día 17 y 24 de febrero, mire lo que dice, los 259 
precios de la anchoa y la patata cayeron hasta un 19% en 260 
origen, hablando de patatas, y se encareció en destino, a la 261 
hora de comprar, entre un 19 y un 7. Ya hay un observatorio, 262 
señor Rodríguez zapatero, lo que hay que hacer es una política 263 
económica, que es lo que ustedes no hicieron. Ustedes se 264 
quedaron sentados tranquilamente, dijeron "qué bien se vive de 265 
la herencia y de la inercia, qué bien nos lo han dejado estos 266 
señores del Partido Popular y ahora vamos a no hacer nada. A 267 
dedicarnos a la Alianza de Civilizaciones, a enter… a 268 
entretenernos con la memoria histórica, vamos a negociar con 269 
ETA y otras cosas". Si quiere hacer una política de precios, le 270 
voy a decir cuatro cosas que a mí me parecen muy importantes: 271 
en primer lugar reduzca el gasto público por debajo del 272 
crecimiento nominal de la economía, que es lo hemos hecho 273 
nosotros en 4 años, en segundo lugar establezca competencia en 274 
los mercados, como hicimos nosotros por ejemplo en las 275 
Telecomunicaciones, hoy el que se compra un teléfono, o 276 
transporte aéreo, que hay muchas compañías en donde no hicieron 277 
nada, en tercer lugar hagan reformas económicas y una auténtica 278 
política económica, que es lo que no han hecho a lo largo de 279 
estos 4 años y en cuarto lugar cuiden aquellos precios que son 280 
regulados, porque con ustedes ha subido el gas y la 281 
electricidad sin parar y con nosotros bajó el gas y bajó la 282 
electricidad.  283 
OV: Señor Zapatero.  284 
ZP: Si, señor Rajoy, me sorprende la poca memoria o el intento 285 
que usted tiene de manipular. Yo tengo aquí su primera pregunta 286 
realizada como líder la oposición (enseña un folio del que lee) 287 
y dice así: "¿Cómo valora usted los primeros días de su 288 
Gobierno?". Y en esa pregunta habla de la coordinación del 289 
Gobierno, de los hechos que han sucedido, de los anuncios. No 290 
hay nada de precios [RJ: Y de las reformas económicas… que es 291 
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lo que le pido…] ni de la economía [RJ: la reformas económicas 292 
es lo que le pido] No, no, déjeme. La primera pregunta que 293 
usted hace de precios, de la subida de los precios ha sido hace 294 
pocas semanas. No ha tenido usted ninguna pregunta sobre subida 295 
precios, hace pocas semanas, prácticamente cuando ya estaban 296 
las elecciones. No le ha importado este tema. Pero yo quiero 297 
hablar de los problemas de los ciudadanos. Y el primero para el 298 
bienestar de una economía es el empleo. Me comprometo a crear 2 299 
millones de empleos en esta legislatura, más estables y un 300 
millón doscientos mil para mujeres. Me comprometo a subir las 301 
pensiones mínimas hasta 850 euros a los jubilados con cónyuge a 302 
cargo y 710 euros para las viudas. Me comprometo a subir otro 303 
30 por ciento el salario mínimo, hasta llegar a 800 euros. Creo 304 
en la creación de riqueza y en la distribución la riqueza, 305 
ustedes no. Por eso España ha avanzado no sólo en las grandes 306 
cifras de la economía sino en la calidad de vida cotidiana. 307 
¿Puede medirse objetivamente el bienestar de un país? Sí, lo 308 
hace Naciones Unidas en el informe de desarrollo humano. Cuando 309 
ustedes llegaron al Gobierno, España estaba en el puesto número 310 
11; con su Gobierno perdimos diez puestos y llegamos al número 311 
21 en 2003, y ahora ya hemos vuelto a adelantar 8 posiciones y 312 
llegamos al puesto número 13. El informe de Naciones Unidas 313 
sobre desarrollo humano contrasta la calidad de vida, la 314 
educación, el bienestar… No lo digo yo, señor Rajoy, lo dice 315 
Naciones Unidas y también figura en el libro el informe 316 
oportuno. 317 
OV: Señor Rajoy.  318 
RJ: En la primera pregunta que hice en el Congreso de los 319 
Diputados hablé de la necesidad de hacer reformas económicas y 320 
no de vivir de la herencia y de la inercia. Y si no hablé de 321 
precios hasta hace pocos meses es que, como ustedes vivieron de 322 
la inercia y de la herencia, durante un cierto tiempo las cosas 323 
fueron bien. Pero mire señor Rodríguez Zapatero (enseña un 324 
gráfico), a partir de agosto pasamos de una inflación del 2,2 a 325 
una inflación del 4,4. Pero esta es la consecuencia de no haber 326 
hecho ninguna política económica. Me ha hablado usted de la 327 
distribución de la riqueza. Le voy a dar algunos datos: la 328 
diferencia entre los más ricos y los más pobres es mayor en 329 
España. Hoy el 20% más rico gana un 5,3 más que el 20% más 330 
pobre, datos de la Unión Europea que también tengo yo. El peso 331 
de los salarios en la riqueza nacional era del 46,5 y antes era 332 
del 48,4. Y las personas en riesgo de pobreza han pasado en su 333 
mandato de un 22 a un 24 por ciento. Es decir que según dice la 334 
Unión Europea, según dice el comisario Almunia, hoy la 335 
diferencia entre los más ricos y los más pobres es mayor. Mire, 336 
yo en mi programa electoral voy a hacer algo similar a lo que 337 
hicimos en el año 1996 cuando recibimos la herencia económica 338 
que todo el mundo conoce, con unos datos demoledores de 339 
déficit, de deuda, con un 22 por ciento de tasa de paro y casi 340 
un 5 de inflación. Y volveremos a hacerlo, lo primero que voy a 341 
hacer es bajar los impuestos. El Impuesto a la Renta sobre 342 
Persona Física: todas aquellas personas que no ganen 16.000 343 
euros al año no pagarán el impuesto y no se les retendrá en la 344 
nómina. Porque es lo más justo, porque son las personas que más 345 
sufren las subidas de los precios y las consecuencias de su 346 
política. Vamos a bajar el impuesto de sociedades, para que, 347 
sobre todo a medianas y pequeñas empresas, que son las que 348 
crean riqueza y empleo, para que puedan competir. Vamos a… hoy 349 
en España trabajan 12 millones de hombres y 8 millones de 350 
mujeres. El reto es que puedan trabajar tantas mujeres como 351 
hombres fuera de casa. Ése es un reto capital. Vamos a 352 
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ocuparnos de la educación, una educación basada en mérito, el 353 
trabajo y el esfuerzo. Vamos a tener organismos reguladores que 354 
no se metan en la vida de las empresas y vamos a hacer una 355 
política económica ordenada y seria, lo que ustedes no 356 
hicieron.  357 
OV: Quiero recordarles que este último turno de intervención es 358 
de un minuto para cada uno de ustedes. Señor Zapatero.  359 
ZP: Si señor Rajoy, me sorprende y le acabo de referir (enseña 360 
un folio) y tengo aquí la pregunta parlamentaria, la primera 361 
que hizo, que no habló de economía ni era de economía ni de 362 
precios, habló de los primeros días de la valoración del 363 
Gobierno y de la coordinación de anuncios que habían hecho los 364 
distintos Ministerios. Usted ha estado engañando a los 365 
ciudadanos. A usted los precios sólo le han preocupado hace 366 
unas semanas, porque la primera pregunta que hizo sobre precios 367 
fue el 19 de diciembre de 2007, prácticamente ya [RJ: Se lo 368 
acabo de explicar…] estábamos en las elecciones. [RJ: Se lo 369 
acabo de explicar… al terminar la inercia y la herencia], no, 370 
no, usted, usted ha dicho que la primera pregunta fue de 371 
economía [RJ: y hablé de economía], y la tengo aquí y no habló 372 
de economía. Preguntó sobre la acción del Gobierno. Está 373 
engañando, engañando, no se ha preocupado de la economía. Los 374 
precios no le han interesado hasta hace unas semanas. ¿Sabe lo 375 
que le ha importado a usted la subida de los precios a los 376 
ciudadanos y la economía de las familias? Un bledo, eso es lo 377 
que le ha importado señor Rajoy.  378 
RJ: Bueno, Ha estado usted muy brillante, señor… al que no le 379 
ha importado la economía es a usted, que además era el 380 
presidente del Gobierno, que ha preferido dedicarse a otras 381 
cosas como le he dicho antes: a negociar con ETA, o a hacer 382 
cábalas sobre España eh… que al final han terminado como han 383 
terminado, o a entretenerse con cosas y cuestiones que no le 384 
importaban a nadie. Usted es el que no le ha dedicado ni un 385 
sólo minuto a la economía. Ya le he dicho antes por qué no le 386 
he hablado de precios, porque las cosas los primeros años 387 
fueron bien, porque vivían ustedes de la herencia y de la 388 
inercia, se lo dije absolutamente hasta la saciedad. Pero en 389 
fin, nosotros sabemos hacerlo, lo hemos hecho en su momento y 390 
volveremos a hacerlo. Ya le digo, volveremos a bajar el 391 
Impuesto sobre la Renta, cuidaremos a las personas que tienen 392 
menos ingresos, que han sido las grandes atacadas por su 393 
política porque hoy la desigualdad de renta entre españoles es 394 
mucho mayor. Nos ocuparemos de la generación de empleo, 395 
bajaremos el impuesto de sociedades, atenderemos el I+D+i, y no 396 
haremos esas cosas que hizo usted con las empresas letales para 397 
la seguridad jurídica, como intervenir en la vida de Endesa, 398 
organizar "opas" desde fuera y, al final, después de hablar de 399 
campeones nacionales, son las empresas extranjeras las que se 400 
han hecho con las empresas eléctricas españolas.  401 
OV: Bien señores, cerramos este primer bloque de economía y 402 
empleo, el segundo bloque gira entorno a la sanidad a la 403 
educación dependencia pensiones inmigración en definitiva todo 404 
aquello que engloba las políticas sociales. Señor Zapatero. 405 
 
3. POLITICA SOCIAL 
 
ZP: si muchas gracias, señor Rajoy, ha quedado claro la 406 
credibilidad de sus palabras y lo que ha pasado durante todos 407 
estos meses con su engaño a los ciudadanos. Quiero hablar de 408 
política sociales, porque tienen mucho interés los ciudadanos 409 
en conocer nuestras propuestas. Mi Gobierno ha sido el primero 410 
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en la historia de nuestro país que ha dedicado al gasto social 411 
más de la mitad de todo el Presupuesto [RJ: Falso] del Estado… 412 
[RJ: Falso] … y con su voto en contra… [RJ: Falso]. Para el 413 
futuro, tenemos dos metas primordiales. Primero, desarrollar la 414 
Ley de la Dependencia, una ley histórica. Al final de 2010 415 
todos los dependientes graves y severos que no puedan valerse 416 
por sí mismos van a estar atendidos con plazas residenciales, 417 
residencias de noche, teleasistencia, cuidados a domicilio. Y, 418 
al culminar este plan, en 2015, llegaremos a invertir cada año 419 
2.300 millones de euros. Segundo gran reto de política social 420 
para mí: la igualdad definitiva entre mujeres y hombres, con 421 
planes de empresa a empresa, para que se cumpla a rajatabla la 422 
regla de que a igual trabajo, igual salario. Y, como todos los 423 
trabajadores, mujeres y hombres, tienen igual derecho a hacer 424 
compatible su trabajo con la vida familiar, vamos a ampliar el 425 
derecho de paternidad y el derecho de maternidad. También vamos 426 
a crear 300.000 nuevas plazas de guardería, para niños de cero 427 
a tres años, promoveremos plazas de guardería dentro de los 428 
centros de trabajo cuando lo pidan seis trabajadores. Los 429 
ciudadanos saben que nosotros impulsamos las políticas sociales 430 
y que con Ustedes se frenan. Su Gobierno no dedicó ni un euro a 431 
la dependencia y además, ahora obstaculizan la aplicación de la 432 
Ley. La Comunidad de Madrid sólo ha reconocido a 3.000 433 
dependientes, y el gobierno andaluz a 65.000, veinte veces más, 434 
Sr. Rajoy.  435 
OV: su turno señor Rajoy. 436 
RJ: Bien, eh… diera la sensación de que las políticas sociales 437 
en España empezaron con el señor Zapatero; antes no había 438 
educación pública, ni sanidad pública, ni había dependencia… 439 
Mire usted, ehh… 700 millones de euros dedica al año la 440 
Comunidad de Madrid y 23 millones de euros dedica el Gobierno 441 
que usted preside. Puede prometer todo lo que quiere, pero 442 
tiene un pequeño problema de credibilidad. Puede prometer todas 443 
las plazas de guardería que quiere, porque son exactamente las 444 
mismas que había prometido hace 4 años y que luego no cumplió. 445 
Pero mire, yo le voy a decir una cosa. Todo eso que dice está 446 
muy bien pero ¿sabe usted cuál es la mayor amenaza a nuestra 447 
política social? ¿Sabe usted qué es lo más importante para que 448 
podamos tener una buena política social? Primero, que haya una 449 
buena política económica, que es lo que usted no ha hecho. Y en 450 
segundo lugar hay un peligro, que es la inmigración 451 
desordenada. Yo ya le he dicho el otro día y le reitero ahora 452 
mismo que usted no ha hecho nada en esta materia salvo una 453 
regularización masiva que se oyó en toda Europa. Entraron en 454 
España más de 2 millones y pico de personas en los últimos 3 455 
años y usted ha dado más de 2 millones doscientos mil permisos 456 
de residencia en el tiempo que lleva al frente del Gobierno. 457 
Bien, a usted esto le puede parecer bien o le puede parecer 458 
mal, ya sé que no le parece ningún problema y por eso no quiere 459 
hablar de este asunto [ZP: sí, sí vamos a hablar] Pero hay 460 
muchas personas… ¡Ah! Va a hablar… Pero hay muchas personas que 461 
se siente, que se pueden ver perjudicadas y que se ven 462 
perjudicadas, las personas que vienen de fuera tienen derechos, 463 
pero los españoles también tienen derechos y a la hora de ir a 464 
una plaza escolar, a la hora de ver qué se puede hacer con las 465 
becas comedor, a la hora de ir a la sanidad pública, a la hora 466 
de buscar viviendas, pues algunos españoles se pueden ver 467 
perjudicados. Y de lo que se trata es de poder atender a todos 468 
y ese es un problema, y usted parece que lo ha olvidado. Y 469 
usted desde luego, sus políticas de integración en materia de 470 
inmigración ha sido ninguna. Las únicas políticas que se han 471 
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hecho las han hecho las comunidades autónomas, y 472 
fundamentalmente la Comunidad de Madrid y la Comunidad 473 
valenciana donde se ha hecho mayor esfuerzo. Por tanto, el 474 
principal problema para hacer políticas sociales es una buena 475 
política económica y controlar la inmigración.  476 
OV: señor Zapatero. 477 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, su credibilidad sobre lo que ha dicho en 478 
materia de política social, los datos del dinero que pone el 479 
Gobierno para la dependencia es exactamente igual que la 480 
credibilidad que ha tenido con las preguntas de la economía y 481 
su interés por la economía en estos 4 años, la misma; están ahí 482 
los datos. Este es el Gobierno que ha hecho la ley de la 483 
dependencia, que ha destinado este año 800 millones en los 484 
presupuestos que vamos a llegar a los 1.500 y que deseamos la 485 
colaboración de todas las comunidades autónomas. Ya veo que 486 
usted no tiene política social, [RJ: sí, sí… el que no quiere 487 
hablar es usted de inmigración] ni de educación, ni de 488 
pensiones, ni de familia, ni dependencia… Por cierto, este es 489 
el gobierno que ha financiado la educación de 3 a 6 años al 490 
100%. Ustedes la aprobaron en su ley educativa, pero no 491 
pusieron ni un duro, ni una memoria económica, la hemos 492 
financiado nosotros. Vamos a hablar de inmigración [RJ: Muy 493 
bien]. Ustedes cuando hablan de inmigración se olvidan de una, 494 
de una cosa fundamental que es el acuerdo, el diálogo social... 495 
Ya sé que esto del diálogo les produce cierta alergia, pero no 496 
se puede hacer una política de inmigración eficaz de si no hay 497 
acuerdo con empresarios y sindicatos. Mire, toda la política de 498 
inmigración que hemos hecho en estos 4 años ha tenido el 499 
acuerdo de empresarios y de sindicatos. El diálogo social es 500 
verdad que nunca ha sido su punto fuerte, ni siquiera hablaron 501 
de él para hablar de inmigración. Lo demostraron con el 502 
decretazo y desde luego nosotros vamos a apoyar el diálogo 503 
social en estos próximos 4 años, en materia de inmigración, 504 
pero también para otras cuestiones decisivas, como es reducir 505 
la siniestralidad laboral, los accidentes laborales en 506 
cooperación trabajadores y empresarios, y reducir la 507 
precariedad laboral hasta conseguir que los contratos 508 
temporales estén por debajo del 25%, que es una gran necesidad 509 
de nuestros trabajadores, especialmente de los más jóvenes. Y 510 
esa es también una diferencia entre dos proyectos, usted es el 511 
proyecto del ordeno y mando, de hacer una política impositiva, 512 
en materia de inmigración, lo que quieran sin hablar con nadie, 513 
sin dialogar con nadie y lo nuestro es una política de diálogo 514 
con empresarios y sindicatos en materia de inmigración.  515 
OV: señor Rajoy. 516 
RJ: Usted en política de inmigración, eh…  no es que haya hecho 517 
una política dialogada con empresarios y sindicatos, es que 518 
usted no han hecho absolutamente nada. [ZP: no dialogada, 519 
pactada, pactada con empresarios y sindicatos, pactada] No ha 520 
hecho absolutamente nada, salvo una regularización masiva que 521 
ha sido criticada, que ha sido criticada en toda la Unión 522 
Europea y que le ha generado muchísimos problemas a los 523 
españoles. Usted no le ha dedicado un duro a la integración de 524 
la inmigración, usted no es consciente de este problema. Usted 525 
no es consciente [ZP: el primer gobierno que dedica dinero a la 526 
integración de inmigrante, que reciben los ayuntamientos, el 527 
primero, el mío] No, no, perdón, no, usted no es consciente de 528 
los grandes problemas que le está generando a muchos ciudadanos 529 
españoles. Este es un asunto que hay que tomárselo en serio y 530 
yo desde luego me lo voy a tomar en serio, porque esto requiere 531 
orden y requiere control y no palabras, que es lo que usted 532 
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hace ¿no? Usted habla de la dependencia, Fíjese, hoy sale los 533 
datos de la dependencia, es un ejemplo de hoy, es en Castilla 534 
León (enseña un artículo de periódico): doce discapacitados han 535 
recibido ayuda de las leyes de dependencia. Yo voté a favor de 536 
la ley de dependencia y estoy a favor de la ley de dependencia. 537 
[ZP: pues diga a sus comunidades que no la boicoteen] ¿Pero 538 
cómo la vamos a boicotear? [ZP: mire Andalucía, mire Asturias] 539 
Si son las Comunidades Autónomas las que se están gastando el 540 
dinero en dependencia. ¿Sabe usted cuántos centros hay de 541 
dependencia y cuántas personas se atienden en Madrid? 45.000. 542 
En Cataluña 38.000 y en Andalucía 17.500. ¿Qué se están 543 
gastando? [ZP: Pues dígales que no la boicoteen] Ustedes hablan 544 
mucho, no se gastan nada y no tienen ninguna política social 545 
sobre ningún asunto. Lo suyo es puramente propaganda. Yo desde 546 
luego voy a dotar la ley de dependencia, creo que es capital, 547 
de los más importantes, es fundamental para que la gente pueda 548 
también conciliar la vida laboral y familiar, para que se dé un 549 
gran salto en el empleo y para que logremos que puedan 550 
trabajar, como le he dicho antes, tantas mujeres fuera de casa 551 
como hombres en España. Ese es uno de los objetivos que tengo 552 
más importantes a lo largo de los próximos 4 años. De 553 
educación, por favor, no me hable, pero, ¿no conoce usted los 554 
datos del informe PISA? [ZP: Luego hablaremos de educación]  555 
pero si somos los que estamos más abajo. [ZP: Luego hablaremos 556 
de educación en los retos del futuro]. Hábleme de mérito, de 557 
trabajo, esfuerzo, no de que se pueda pasar de curso con 4 558 
asignaturas suspendidas. Hábleme de respeto al profesor, que va 559 
a enseñar, y que el alumno vaya a aprender, no de esas cosas 560 
que han hecho ustedes. Ustedes han hecho una pésima gestión de 561 
la educación pública en España y Están creando muchísimos 562 
problemas a muchísimos ciudadanos. 563 
OV: su turno señor Zapatero. 564 
ZP: Sí, gracias Señor Rajoy… Voy a hablar de inmigración y de 565 
la política que hemos realizado. Nuestra política de 566 
inmigración tiene un principio: sólo pueden venir y quedarse 567 
los que puedan trabajar de acuerdo con la ley. Es decir, lucha 568 
con firmeza contra la inmigración ilegal. Y eso hay que hacerlo 569 
en tres frentes. Permítame que se lo explique. Primero, que no 570 
salgan de sus países de origen personas empujadas por la 571 
desesperación. Segundo, que el control de fronteras impida la 572 
entrada de inmigrantes que no tengan un puesto de trabajo 573 
garantizado. Y, tercero, que se pueda devolver a los países de 574 
origen a las personas que entran ilegalmente aquí. Esto sólo es 575 
posible mediante la firma con los países de origen. Nosotros 576 
hemos firmado una decena de acuerdos con países 577 
fundamentalmente del África subsahariana. [RJ: ¿Puede decirme 578 
esos diez? ¿Una decena son diez?] sí una decena son diez. [RJ: 579 
¿Eso también lo tiene en los datos?] sí, sí, por supuesto. [RJ: 580 
ah, pues me gustaría escucharlo] sí, y por eso permitimos y 581 
conseguimos una repatriación, que en estos momentos está siendo 582 
fluida y permanente de los inmigrantes ilegales que llegan a 583 
nuestro país. Tanto es así que Francia nos ha pedido colaborar 584 
en este proceso. Hemos impulsado una política en la Unión 585 
Europea. Porque la inmigración ha de ser una política europea, 586 
dado que existe la libre circulación de personas en el 587 
territorio de la UE. Pero hemos de recordar una cosa: la mitad 588 
del crecimiento económico que hemos tenido en los últimos años 589 
es como consecuencia de la inmigración. Lo que cotizan a la 590 
Seguridad Social los inmigrantes equivale al pago de casi un 591 
millón de pensionistas españoles. Hemos invertido hasta ahora 592 
800 millones en esta legislatura en integración, en dinero que 593 
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va a las comunidades autónomas y a los ayuntamientos. Y vamos a 594 
llegar a 2.000 millones hasta 2010 para la integración de 595 
trabajadores en los municipios donde más inmigración hay, para 596 
que haya más ayudas sociales, más becas y, por supuesto, ningún 597 
ciudadano se vea perjudicado por ello.  598 
RJ: Vamos a ver eh… Señor… Zapatero. Lo que usted dice no tiene 599 
absolutamente nada que ver con lo que ha hecho a lo largo de 600 
estos años. Claro me dice que la inmigración tiene que ser una 601 
política europea y yo recuerdo a los ministros del Interior de 602 
Francia, del Reino Unido, de Italia, de Alemania y de Polonia, 603 
poniendo de vuelta y media, y perdón que utilice esta 604 
expresión, al Gobierno de España por su actuación en esta 605 
materia [ZP: pero si ha sido el Gobierno de España que ha 606 
promovido una política europea de inmigración en la primera 607 
Cumbre de Inglaterra] yo le voy a hablar, sí, sí, le voy a 608 
hablar de lo que yo creo que hay que hacer en materia de 609 
inmigración. Yo estoy a favor de la inmigración, pero la 610 
inmigración debe ser legal y con contrato. Hay que luchar 611 
contra la inmigración ilegal y hay que trabajar por la 612 
integración, que es exactamente lo que usted no ha hecho a lo 613 
largo de estos años. Hay que expulsar a todos aquellos 614 
extranjeros que delinquen aunque lleven cinco años en España, 615 
hay que prohibir por ley las regularizaciones masivas, hay que 616 
crear una agencia de inmigración y empleo para poder traer y 617 
contratar gente, y en materia europea, le voy a decir lo que 618 
hay que hacer: política común en materia de visados, de 619 
derechos y deberes, de control de fronteras, de reagrupación 620 
familiar y de expulsión de ilegales. Y ayudas al desarrollo. 621 
Hay que hacer ayudas al desarrollo a los países de donde viene 622 
gente y esas ayudas decirle que a cambio, pues lógicamente, les 623 
vamos a traer trabajadores, les vamos a ayudar, pero que nos 624 
acepten las repatriaciones. No le acepto que diga que ha 625 
firmado convenios con diez porque es absolutamente falso, pero 626 
mire [ZP: está aquí], escúcheme, escúcheme, sí ya sé que está 627 
ahí, escúcheme... "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está 628 
pasando ya en muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de 629 
integración de los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan 630 
derechos sociales porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel 631 
de renta más bajo, que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas 632 
sociales". Esto lo dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces 633 
menos grave, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero en el Congreso de los 634 
Diputados en un debate del Estado de la Nación, por eso nos han 635 
llamado a nosotros xenófobos y otras lindezas. Si es que usted 636 
cambia de criterio cada cuarto de hora [ZP: No, no, no, no, yo 637 
estoy de acuerdo con eso, lo que no estoy de acuerdo es exigir 638 
un contrato para que sean presuntos delincuentes los 639 
inmigrantes, eso es lo que no estoy de acuerdo] [OV: ahora 640 
tendrá su turno] dice una cosa y la contraria, no tiene ninguna 641 
propuesta. En materia de integración de inmigrantes, ninguna 642 
propuesta. Que la Comunidad de Madrid dedica el 2,5 por ciento, 643 
y la comunidad el 97,5, son los datos, y en Valencia igual. Yo 644 
también tengo datos, y también son ciertos.  645 
OV: última intervención de este bloque. 646 
ZP: Lo cierto es que este es el primer Gobierno que dedica 647 
dinero a la integración, 800 millones en esta legislatura, 648 
vamos a llegar a los 1.000 en 2010. Pero mire, antes de que 649 
hable usted de inmigración necesita credibilidad. Credibilidad. 650 
Esta declaración es suya: "Los inmigrantes vinieron a España 651 
cuando gobernaba el PP". Y es verdad: con su gobierno, con 652 
usted de ministro del interior se colaron más de un millón de 653 
inmigrantes sin papeles. Hicieron 5 regularizaciones. Nuestra 654 
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única regularización se hizo a trabajadores con contrato de 655 
trabajo en vigor, sin antecedentes penales y se hizo con el 656 
acuerdo de empresarios y sindicatos. Ustedes dieron papeles sin 657 
exigir contrato de trabajo, sin examinar los antecedentes 658 
penales de los países de origen en algunas regularizaciones. 659 
Bastaba presentar un bono para el autobús, un recibo de un 660 
televisor o la factura de una sola noche de hotel. No sé si fue 661 
por su conocida afición al ciclismo, Sr. Rajoy, pero se 662 
regularizaron inmigrantes con el recibo de compra de una rueda 663 
de bicicleta. Y me habla usted de rigor, de orden... y de 664 
seriedad… está aquí. 665 
RJ: Sí, sí, ya sé que está ahí. Oiga usted: ¿sabe cómo 666 
regularizaron ustedes inmigrantes? Con una orden de expulsión, 667 
ese era un documento válido. Pregúntele al señor Caldera. Eh… 668 
Anunciaron la regularización seis meses antes de comenzarla, 669 
con lo cual, claro, todas las personas ilegales que había en 670 
Francia, Italia, en el Reino Unido, todas vinieron a España, y 671 
por eso se produjo lo que se llamó la gran avalancha. Pero 672 
fíjese usted cómo lo juzgaron a usted en Europa. Ministro de 673 
Interior francés: la regularización española crea un efecto 674 
llamada y provoca nuevas llegadas. Ministro el alemán, otro sí, 675 
socialista: "La regularización en España afecta a otros 676 
Estados, porque los inmigrantes regularizados podrán 677 
desplazarse libremente". El alemán fue muy rotundo: "Pedir 678 
dinero a otra persona, porque usted fue a pedirlo a Europa, es 679 
siempre la manera más fácil de resolver el problema". Y fíjese 680 
lo que dijo la de inmigración de Holanda: "España es en parte 681 
el responsable del problema por haber legalizado a los 682 
inmigrantes. Las mafias vieron en ello una señal positiva". 683 
Mire, su política de inmigración ha sido débil, sin firmeza, y 684 
que desde luego no podemos mantenerla en el futuro ni un minuto 685 
más, porque vamos a una situación de enormes problemas.  686 
OV: Cerramos este segundo bloque y buscamos nuevos asuntos de 687 
relaciones internacionales, de terrorismo, de seguridad 688 
ciudadana, los candidatos abordan ahora la política exterior y 689 
seguridad. Señor Zapatero. 690 
 
4. POLÍTICA EXTERIOR Y SEGURIDAD  
 
ZP: Sí, muchas gracias. Simplemente quiero decir que tengo aquí 691 
(enseña un dossier) todas las regularizaciones de casos 692 
concretos con lo que he dicho, con una rueda de bicicleta, que 693 
no lo ha refutado. Eso es la falta de seriedad, de rigor. ¡Como 694 
para hablar ustedes de orden…! [RJ: sí, con una orden de 695 
expulsión, como han regularizado ustedes Si quiere puede hablar 696 
de rigor…], si quiere podemos hablar también de algún caso 697 
concreto, pero no lo voy a hacer. Quiero a hablar de la 698 
seguridad y voy a empezar por el terrorismo. Ahora que nos está 699 
viendo toda España, toda España, todos los españoles, quiero 700 
asumir un compromiso delante de las cámaras: sea cual sea el 701 
resultado del próximo domingo, del próximo día 9, el Partido 702 
Socialista apoyará al Gobierno de España en la lucha 703 
antiterrorista sin condiciones. Ese es el compromiso solemne 704 
que establezco aquí en nombre de mi partido. Me gustaría oírle 705 
decir lo mismo, señor Rajoy [RJ: No se preocupe], sería la 706 
mejor noticia que podíamos darle a los españoles [RJ: No se 707 
preocupe]. Hablemos de seguridad. Nuestra tasa de criminalidad 708 
está más baja que la media europea, como puede verse en este 709 
gráfico (muestra un gráfico) España con 51 infracciones por 710 
cada mil habitantes está claramente por debajo de países como 711 
Reino Unido, como Francia o como Italia, pero tenemos que 712 
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mejorar aún más y, por eso, mi compromiso es llegar a 140.000 713 
policías y guardias civiles. Hemos ya recuperado 15.000 en este 714 
periodo y llegaremos a 140.000. Vamos a crear el Servicio 715 
Nacional de Policía Científica dedicada a los delitos más 716 
graves: homicidios y robos con violencia. Vamos a potenciar los 717 
planes contra la venta de droga en los centros educativos y 718 
vamos a luchar contra la violencia de género haciendo un 719 
registro público de maltratadores, reforzando todo lo que son 720 
los medios judiciales y policiales para que esos 85.000 721 
cobardes machistas sientan la presión del Gobierno y de toda la 722 
sociedad.  723 
OV: Su tiempo, señor Rajoy.  724 
RJ: Bien, eh… sea cual sea el resultado electoral yo apoyaré al 725 
Gobierno si el Gobierno quiere luchar contra ETA, pero desde 726 
luego no apoyaré a ningún Gobierno que niega, que quiera 727 
negociar políticamente con ETA, [ZP: Nosotros sin condiciones, 728 
señor Rajoy] como ha ocurrido a lo largo de esta legislatura 729 
[ZP: Nosotros sin condiciones, nosotros sin condiciones]. Yo 730 
apoyo la lucha contra el terrorismo pero lo que no puedo apoyar 731 
es la negociación con los terroristas [ZP: Nosotros sin 732 
condiciones]. Y por eso yo apoyé, señor Zapatero, en el año 733 
2000, el pacto antiterrorista y por eso usted lo firmó. ETA 734 
estuvo más débil que nunca cuando usted llegó al Gobierno en el 735 
año 2004, y usted, se le ocurrió a usted, rompió el pacto 736 
antiterrorista y empezó una negociación política. Le dio a ETA 737 
la categoría de interlocutor político, la llevó al parlamento 738 
europeo, y luego los volvió a meter en el Parlamento. Metió a 739 
ANV, metió al Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas. Y señor 740 
Zapatero, mintió usted a los españoles, es decir, engañó usted, 741 
primero me engañó a mí como jefe de la oposición, luego engañó 742 
al Congreso de los Diputados, y luego engañó al conjunto de los 743 
españoles. Sí que lo engañó, después de la T-4. Es el caso más 744 
evidente. Después del asesinato de Barajas, usted le dijo al 745 
conjunto de los españoles que se había acabado cualquier 746 
negociación y luego continuó todavía. Hizo usted muchas 747 
negociaciones políticas y lo ratifican las propias personas del 748 
PNV, por tanto, que participaron en las mismas. Fíjese, El PSOE 749 
pasó a la frontera a negociar con ETA cuestiones políticas. 750 
Esto no lo había hecho nunca nadie antes en España. Éste ha 751 
sido su verdadero problema. Es decir, usted ha actuado como 752 
aprendiz de brujo, usted no ha hecho caso a nadie de las muchas 753 
personas dentro de su propio partido que conocían bien este 754 
tema. Se metió en una operación absurda, negoció políticamente 755 
con ETA, engañó a todos y creó mucho daño al conjunto de los 756 
españoles. Y ahora dice que va a apoyar al Gobierno. Oiga, yo 757 
apoyaré al Gobierno que quiera derrotar a ETA pero desde luego 758 
no estoy dispuesto a apoyar a un Gobierno que quiera negociar 759 
con una organización terrorista. Eso no lo hago yo, y entiendo 760 
que no lo hacen muchísimos españoles. Mi política en materia 761 
contra el terrorismo es muy clara: derrotar a ETA con la Ley y 762 
[ZP: Utilizar el terrorismo] y con el Estado de Derecho, con la 763 
Ley y con el Estado de Derecho. [ZP: Utilizar el terrorismo], 764 
Utilizarlo lo utiliza usted cuando dice lo que ha dicho al 765 
principio [ZP: partidistamente] en esta intervención. Hay que 766 
derrotar a ETA. No se puede negociar.  767 
OV: Señor Zapatero.  768 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, vuelve usted a hacer uso del terrorismo y 769 
la verdad es que lo han hecho desde hace varios años hasta para 770 
justificar la guerra de Irak lo hicieron, fíjese, que fue una 771 
de las mayores extravagancias que tuvimos que escuchar en su 772 
momento. Se inventaron que para justificar el apoyo a la guerra 773 
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de Irak porque Estados Unidos nos iba a ayudar en la lucha 774 
contra ETA. ¿Se acuerda de eso? [RJ: No] Sí, todos los 775 
españoles. Ya hemos visto el resultado. Irak se ha convertido 776 
en el campo de concentración del terrorismo internacional. Su 777 
Gobierno nos colocó en las peores relaciones con dos países 778 
clave en nuestra lucha contra el terrorismo etarra e islamista: 779 
Francia y Marruecos. Yo hace cuatro años me comprometí a 780 
retirar las tropas de Irak si conseguíamos el apoyo de los 781 
ciudadanos. Fue la primera decisión que tomé como presidente. 782 
Pocos días después usted declaró que la salida de las tropas de 783 
Irak es una decisión insolidaria que hace a España más 784 
vulnerable ante el terrorismo. Esta noche quisiera renovar mi 785 
compromiso personal con todos los ciudadanos españoles mientras 786 
yo sea presidente no saldrá un sólo soldado de España a una 787 
guerra ilegal. Ustedes lo hicieron contra la voluntad del 788 
pueblo español y la verdad es que no han tenido la actitud, la 789 
dignidad de reconocer su grave error. Dejen ya de utilizar el 790 
terrorismo, unas veces para justificar la guerra de Irak, otras 791 
para hacer oposición al Gobierno de España con el terrorismo y 792 
la lucha contra el terrorismo de ETA. Dejen de una vez y 793 
proclame una actitud que están deseando oír todos los 794 
ciudadanos de este país, que es que están dispuestos a 795 
colaborar, a apoyar como el Partido Socialista ha hecho siempre 796 
en su historia democrática, en la historia democrática de 797 
España. Espero que alguna vez podamos escuchar eso de sus 798 
palabras… de su boca.  799 
OV: Su turno, señor Rajoy.  800 
RJ: Mire usted, le voy a leer algunas afirmaciones suyas que 801 
son muy ilustrativas. Fíjese lo que dijo usted: "Yo quiero que 802 
nuestros soldados puedan regresar cuanto antes, pero entiendo 803 
que debemos responsabilizarnos de lo que por su voluntad, señor 804 
Aznar, hemos contribuido a desencadenar. Si abandonamos Irak a 805 
su suerte, el desastre humano en ese país puede tener 806 
proporciones gigantescas". Eso lo dijo usted en el Congreso de 807 
los Diputados en diciembre del 2003. Le voy a decir algo que es 808 
mucho más importante y que demuestra quién es usted. Después de 809 
retirar las tropas de Irak, usted me refiero a usted, el señor 810 
Zapatero aprobó la siguiente resolución en el Consejo de 811 
Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Después de irse, pide a los 812 
Estados miembros y a las organizaciones internacionales y 813 
regionales que presten asistencia a la fuerza multinacional, en 814 
particular, con fuerzas militares. Es decir, usted después de 815 
irse, le pide a todos los países del mundo que manden fuerzas 816 
militares. Pero mire, en cualquier caso, es usted el que por lo 817 
visto quiere volver a hablar de Irak. No quiere hablar de 818 
Afganistán, ni quiere hablar del Líbano, que es donde están los 819 
soldados españoles en este momento. Ha sido usted quien ha 820 
utilizado [ZP: sí, con el apoyo de Naciones Unidas y como 821 
misión de paz], sí, sí, sí. Y con el apoyo de Naciones Unidas 822 
también estaban en Irak. [ZP: no hombre, pero, pero…] Esa es 823 
una de las grandes mentiras, de las grandes contradicciones 824 
suyas a lo largo de esta legislatura.  825 
ZP: que diga, que diga… o sea que ¿sigue apoyando la guerra de 826 
Irak? ¿Sigue apoyando la guerra de Irak? No, dígalo, dígalo. 827 
Sería bueno que los ciudadanos lo supieran ¿Usted cree que fue 828 
una buena aventura? ¿Cree que fue una buena aventura? ¡Está 829 
defendiendo la guerra de Irak!  830 
RJ: no, el que sigue apoyando la guerra de Irak es usted. Es 831 
usted el que la ha apoyado (enseña un folio) Es usted el que la 832 
ha apoyado en la ONU pidiendo que mandaran fuerzas militares.  833 
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ZP: Esto sí que va a ser exclusiva mundial, señor Rajoy… ¡decir 834 
que yo apoyaba la guerra de Irak después de las decisiones que 835 
hemos tomado!  836 
RJ: usted, usted, consejo de seguridad, resolución de la ONU, 837 
usted, usted lo ha apoyado. En cualquier caso, señor Zapatero, 838 
usted le mintió a los españoles porque usted apoyó en el 839 
Consejo de Seguridad el envío de fuerzas militares después de 840 
haberlas retirado para quedar bien internamente y porque creía 841 
que le daba votos y apoyos. Usted sí que utilizó el terrorismo 842 
y no otros.  843 
OV: Señor Zapatero.  844 
ZP: o sea que ¿Cumplir la palabra dada a las ciudadanos es 845 
quedar bien? ¿Cumplir la palabra dada de retirar las tropas de 846 
Irak como yo prometí a los ciudadanos hace cuatro años es 847 
quedar bien? ¿Qué concepción tiene usted de la democracia? [RJ: 848 
Yo, esta (enseña el folio)]. No, Es dar honor a la palabra 849 
dada. Ahora entiendo muchas cosas, que les importe muy poco la 850 
voluntad de los españoles… [RJ: No, no…], aún en temas tan 851 
trascendentes como fue una guerra que ha costado decenas de 852 
miles de muertos y que usted sigue apoyando… [RJ: …ese es el 853 
valor de su palabra…] y que encima y que encima ahora no sé 854 
quién le ha aconsejado, no sé quién le ha aconsejado que venga 855 
ahora a discutir… [RJ: Ese es el valor de su palabra]. Pero 856 
bueno, ustedes utilizaron el terrorismo para justificar su 857 
apoyo a Irak, utilizan el terrorismo para hacer oposición al 858 
Gobierno de España en la lucha contra ETA. Y nosotros nos hemos 859 
preocupado de fortalecer la seguridad en la lucha contra el 860 
terrorismo. Hemos aumentado en 1.200 los policías que luchan 861 
contra el terrorismo internacional islamista en nuestro país 862 
que sufrió la tragedia del 11 de marzo, del atentado brutal del 863 
11 de marzo. Vamos a aumentar en 500 más el número de policías 864 
especializados en combatir el terrorismo islamista porque es 865 
una amenaza. Y desde luego quiero hoy reivindicar el trabajo de 866 
las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado, el trabajo de la policía, 867 
el trabajo de la justicia en lo que ha sido la detención y la 868 
condena de los responsables del 11 de marzo, del mayor atentado 869 
terrorista de nuestra historia y en general de toda la tarea de 870 
la Justicia y de las fuerzas y cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado. 871 
¿Cuál fue su actitud en el proceso del 11 de marzo, señor 872 
Rajoy? El día antes de las pasadas elecciones afirmó que tenía 873 
la convicción moral de que ETA era la autora del 11-M. Está 874 
aquí, lo saben todos los españoles que lo dijo. Más tarde llegó 875 
a defender con rotundidad que no tenía la más mínima duda de 876 
que tarde o temprano aparecerían las conexiones entre Al Qaeda 877 
y ETA. En el colmo de la sinrazón, en un momento dado pidió la 878 
paralización del procedimiento judicial. Yo tengo la convicción 879 
moral [RJ: XXX] de que debería pedirle disculpas a los 880 
españoles, señor Rajoy.  881 
RJ: No sé, lo que hicimos nosotros en el 11-M fue detener a 882 
todos los autores. Y por eso se pudo celebrar el juicio en su 883 
día y por eso pudieron ser condenados. Si dependiéramos de 884 
ustedes, probablemente no se hubiera celebrado el juicio. Yo 885 
creo que quien debe pedir a los españoles es usted perdón pero 886 
por sus múltiples mentiras. Es decir, le he presentado aquí una 887 
resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, votada por 888 
usted, por usted, y todavía no ha dado ninguna explicación 889 
aquí. Es que es usted el que pide que se ayude con fuerzas 890 
militares. Es usted, después de haberse ido para hacerse 891 
propaganda. Pero debería sobre todo [ZP: pfiiuuu, pero quién le 892 
habrá aconsejado meterse en este debate, quién le habrá 893 
aconsejado] pedir disculpas a los españoles por el sinfín de 894 
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mentiras [ZP: quién le habrá aconsejado] que ha hecho usted en 895 
materia de ETA. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dejó que el 896 
Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas, ETA, se presentara a 897 
las elecciones. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dejó que 898 
una parte de ANV se presentara a las elecciones. Usted mintió a 899 
los españoles cuando dejó que De Juana Chaos se diera paseos 900 
por San Sebastián. Luego lo metió en la cárcel, cuando le vino 901 
bien. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando calificó al señor 902 
Otegui como un hombre de paz, señor Zapatero. Usted como hombre 903 
de paz, que trató al señor Otegui mejor que a María San Gil 904 
[ZP: No]. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dijo que nunca 905 
hablaría de política con ETA. Y, sin embargo, habló de política 906 
con ETA. Lo ha dicho todo el mundo. Lo ha dicho usted. Lo ha 907 
dicho usted Tengo aquí los datos. Se lo puedo enseñar. "Con ETA 908 
no se hablará nunca de política". Habló de política. [ZP: No 909 
¿Por qué cree que ETA rompió la tregua?] Usted mintió a los 910 
españoles… [ZP: Porque le dijimos que no a la política. Es tan 911 
de sentido común como eso, porque le dijimos que no a la 912 
política] Usted mintió a los españoles cuando después de la T-913 
4, dijo que no iba a hablar con ETA. Y luego reconoció que 914 
había hablado con ETA. Usted sí que es el que le debe disculpas 915 
a los españoles. Usted le ha mentido a los españoles en todos 916 
los temas del terrorismo. [ZP: Nunca. Jamás] Usted usó el 11-M 917 
[ZP: Nunca. Jamás]. Usted apoyó lo que ocurrió en el 11-M [ZP: 918 
Nunca. Jamás]. Usted engañó hasta la saciedad [ZP: el 11M, el 919 
11M, ¿con todo lo que han insultado en esta legislatura?] sí, 920 
sí [OV: Ha acabado su tiempo señor Rajoy]. Usted mintió a los 921 
españoles en los temas del terrorismo. Y ahora me dice que pida 922 
disculpas. No, hombre. Disculpas tendrá que pedirlas usted y 923 
espero que lo haga ahora mismo.  924 
OV: Señor Zapatero.  925 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, aquí está su declaración (enseña un 926 
periódico): "No le quepa la más mínima duda de que, al final, 927 
el terrorismo islamista y el de ETA estarán relacionados". 928 
2004. ¿Dónde está la relación? Han estado intoxicando, creando 929 
confabulaciones hipotéticas sobre el 11-M, sobre el atentado 930 
más grave que nos costó 192 muertos en toda la legislatura, 931 
poniendo en cuestión el sumario judicial, poniendo en cuestión 932 
a las fuerzas y cuerpos de seguridad del Estado, todo porque no 933 
asumieron el resultado electoral. Yo comparecí catorce horas en 934 
una comisión de investigación para dar cuentas de un atentado 935 
terrorista que se cometió siendo ustedes Gobierno, siendo el 936 
señor Acebes ministro del Interior, y ahora encima pide 937 
explicaciones. ¿Qué política antiterrorista señor Rajoy 938 
prefiere? ¿La de esta legislatura con cuatro víctimas mortales, 939 
o la de la legislatura anterior con 238 víctimas mortales? Esa 940 
es, esa es una buena reflexión, después, después, después de 941 
que en todo momento en la legislatura anterior dimos pleno 942 
apoyo a su Gobierno, después al Gobierno de Aznar.  943 
OV: Última intervención, señor Rajoy.  944 
RJ: No creía yo que usted fuera a utilizar a los muertos y a 945 
presumir de cuánta gente había muerto en una legislatura o en 946 
otra.  947 
ZP: es usted quien ha utilizado al terrorismo y que durante 948 
cuatro años, ha dicho que yo he traicionado a los muertos... No 949 
ha hecho más que utilizar el dolor de las víctimas durante 950 
estos cuatro años.  951 
RJ: es usted, es usted quien lo ha utilizado. Mire, mire señor, 952 
señor Zapatero, cuando usted llegó al Gobierno, ETA estaba 953 
debilitada y ETA llevaba un año sin matar y además se actuaba 954 
con la dignidad del Estado.  955 
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ZP: sí, ¿ah sí? Por eso dijeron que era ETA la autora del 956 
atentado del 11-M.  957 
RJ: Con usted, ETA ha vuelto a los Ayuntamientos y con usted 958 
ETA ha vuelto a matar. Usted ha ganado unas elecciones por Irak 959 
y por el 11-M. Da la sensación de que quiere volver a ganar 960 
unas elecciones por Irak o por el 11-M [ZP: Quiero la verdad, 961 
la verdad, la verdad de las cosas], yo creo que los españoles 962 
son lo suficientemente, ya, ya, sí, sí,  la verdad ya se la he 963 
dicho. Yo quiero la verdad de ETA, señor Zapatero. Quiero la 964 
verdad de ETA. Fíjese lo que dijo usted, lo que dijo usted 965 
después del atentado de Barajas: "He ordenado suspender todas 966 
la iniciativas para desarrollar el diálogo con ETA. Dijo, el 967 
diálogo ha llegado a su punto final". Lo dijo en el Congreso de 968 
los Diputados y lo dijo a los españoles. Y después de decir que 969 
es un dislate decir que ha habido diálogo, reconoció ante todos 970 
los españoles que volvió a dialogar. Usted ha mentido. Porque 971 
usted miente siempre, usted no dice la verdad nunca, ése es el 972 
problema.  973 
ZP: No hombre no, no, no, no... nunca.  974 
OV: Si usted va a intervenir, señor Zapatero, le daré luego el 975 
uso de la palabra al señor Rajoy. Hemos agotado el tiempo, pero 976 
si ustedes quieren cerrar de alguna manera. El tiempo se ha 977 
agotado.  978 
ZP: Vamos a hacer el siguiente. No pasa nada.  979 
OV: perfectamente. Hemos conseguido tres bloques de este cara a 980 
cara. Ahora vamos a hacer la pausa para la publicidad. Como ven 981 




5. POLÍTICA INSTITUCIONAL  
 
OV: Saludos de nuevo, desde el Palacio de Congresos del 983 
Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Estamos en pleno debate en el segundo 984 
“cara a cara”, el definitivo entre los dos candidatos de los 985 
partidos políticos con mayor representación parlamentaria. 986 
Hasta el momento, en el primer tramo del debate se ha hablado 987 
de economía y empleo, de políticas sociales y de política 988 
exterior y seguridad. El debate se reanuda poniendo sobre la 989 
mesa asuntos como los derechos, las reformas constitucionales, 990 
la justicia, el estado de las Autonomías... Política 991 
institucional. Y, como en todos los tramos fijados, escuchamos 992 
en primer lugar al candidato socialista.  993 
ZP: Quiero hablar en primer lugar de la España de hoy, de la 994 
España de las autonomías. Trabajamos por la cohesión 995 
territorial de los españoles. (Muestra un gráfico) En este 996 
gráfico, aparece cómo han avanzado las comunidades autónomas en 997 
renta per cápita acercándose a la comunidad autónoma que más 998 
renta tiene de España, que es Madrid... esto era en los años 999 
del PP, sólo algunas lo hacían, y ahora prácticamente todas en 1000 
estos años han ganado renta per cápita y por tanto se reducen 1001 
las desigualdades territoriales. También fomentamos la cohesión 1002 
con la mejora de las comunicaciones, que es una de las maneras 1003 
más importantes de vertebrar España: ésta (muestra otro 1004 
gráfico) era la red de Alta Velocidad en 2004, cuando llegamos 1005 
al Gobierno, y ésta va a ser la red de Alta Velocidad en 2020. 1006 
En la próxima legislatura la Alta Velocidad va a llegar a todas 1007 
las comunidades autónomas, empezando por la Comunidad de 1008 
Valencia. Estas eran las autovías del Estado en 2004 (muestra 1009 
otro mapa) y esto es el mapa que vamos a completar en 2020 que 1010 
supera una concepción radial, según la cual, de Madrid salían 1011 
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todas hacia el conjunto de las comunidades, y ahora hay 1012 
autovías de norte a sur, de este oeste, y por tanto, una 1013 
concepción mucho más integradora y vertebral. La cohesión de 1014 
España tiene mucho que ver mucho con su igualdad territorial y 1015 
con sus comunicaciones y también con la política de 1016 
cooperación, de diálogo y de cooperación. En esta legislatura 1017 
vamos a celebrar, voy a proponer celebrar tres conferencias de 1018 
presidentes, que ha sido un foro muy útil para unir, para sumar 1019 
esfuerzos entre los Gobiernos autonómicos y el Gobierno de 1020 
España: van a ser sobre Violencia de Género, sobre Educación y 1021 
sobre Cambio Climático. Y además vamos a abordar un nuevo 1022 
modelo de financiación autonómica y local, fundamentalmente 1023 
pensando en las necesidades de la educación y de la sanidad de 1024 
muchas comunidades autónomas. Esta es mi idea de España, la de 1025 
la Constitución, la de la cohesión.  1026 
OV: Señor Rajoy.  1027 
RJ: sí, quisiera comenzar, para dejar claro alguna cosa, que en 1028 
la primera pregunta que hice en el Parlamento, esto es para que 1029 
veamos la credibilidad del señor Zapatero, hablé del IVA, la 1030 
financiación autonómica, los cien euros, del cálculo de las 1031 
pensiones… Esto es fútbol ¿no? para usted, señor Zapatero, es 1032 
decir, esta es la muestra de que usted no le dice la verdad a 1033 
los españoles e incluso con un papel delante, como no se lo ha 1034 
dicho en el caso de la resolución de Irak, a la que antes yo he 1035 
hecho referencia. Usted ha hablado, entre otras cosas, ahora 1036 
del Ministerio de Fomento, lo cual resulta verdaderamente 1037 
sorprendente porque nunca en la historia había sido reprobado 1038 
su responsable en el Senado y había sido responsable en el 1039 
Parlamento de Cataluña, donde por cierto, usted gobierna, 1040 
claro. Hacer promesas para el año 2020, después de haber 1041 
retrasado todo el plan del Partido Popular es algo que está muy 1042 
bien, pero mire, el 2020 queda un poco lejos. En Valencia habla 1043 
de AVE, pero es que en Valencia ya tenía que haber llegado el 1044 
AVE, de la misma forma que tenía que haber llegado el agua, de 1045 
la misma forma que tenía que [ZP: Sí, el agua, cómo va a…] 1046 
haber resuelto el problema de la financiación por población y 1047 
de la misma forma que debería haber resuelto la seguridad 1048 
ciudadana. Pero su idea de España me parece sorprendente, 1049 
porque su idea de España, oiga, es que no la conoce nadie. 1050 
Usted abrió aquí un proceso, actuó de aprendiz de brujo y abrió 1051 
un modelo para que todo el mundo hiciese lo que estimase 1052 
oportuno y conveniente sin saber a dónde iba. ¿Y sabe usted lo 1053 
que consiguió? Porque este con su negociación con ETA fue el 1054 
gran fracaso de esta legislatura. Enfrentó a todas las 1055 
comunidades autónomas entre sí, por el agua, por el patrimonio, 1056 
por las inversiones, por la financiación… Dividió a los 1057 
españoles, propició por primera vez en la historia un Estatuto 1058 
que no contaba con el acuerdo de todos y que además pasamos en 1059 
Cataluña de un Estatuto con el 52 por ciento a favor a uno con 1060 
el 35. Por primera vez en la historia y todo esto lo hizo para 1061 
agradar a los nacionalistas y para que estuvieran tranquilos y 1062 
lo que consiguió fue radicalizar mucho más a algunos partidos 1063 
nacionalistas y en algunos casos echarlos al monte. Esa es su 1064 
idea de España. Usted no tiene ninguna idea de España, usted se 1065 
presenta aquí con gráficos para el año 2020 pero usted no tiene 1066 
una idea de su país ni de la igualdad entre los ciudadanos de 1067 
su país, ni de la solidaridad, ni de la cohesión… de eso no 1068 
tiene una idea, señor Zapatero. 1069 
OV: Señor Zapatero.  1070 
ZP: Sí, muchas Gracias, señor Rajoy. Eso que se refiere de la 1071 
primera pregunta del IVA y de los cien euros, no era de 1072 
Appendix I. Second debate 
 
economía sino sobre comentarios que hacía sobre lo que decían 1073 
los ministros, sobre si se iba a aplicar o no. Aquí está la 1074 
pregunta [RJ: IVA, financiación autonómica, cien euros y 1075 
cálculo de pensiones… ¿eso no es economía?] No, no. [RJ: ¿Ah, 1076 
no es economía?] No, no, no, aquí está la pregunta. Era de lo 1077 
que decían. [RJ: El IVA es fomento… ¿y la financiación 1078 
económica? ¿Y el cálculo de pensiones?…] Ni era de economía ni 1079 
de los precios, ni de la economía ni de nada. [RJ: Así se 1080 
explica la situación de la economía española a fecha de hoy 1081 
conociendo su…] Era de lo que decían los ministros, porque 1082 
usted intentaba denunciar en la pregunta que había 1083 
descoordinación. No, no, que había descoordinación, [OV: XXX] 1084 
si luego lo van a  ver todos los ciudadanos lo que ha 1085 
preguntado… bueno, sobre el Estado de las Autonomías quería 1086 
hacerle un matiz. Nosotros hemos puesto 700 kilómetros en 1087 
servicio de alta velocidad y ustedes ninguno, porque a Lleida 1088 
llegaba sólo a 200 kilómetros hora y no podía por tanto 1089 
considerarse como alta velocidad. Usted se atreve a hablar de 1090 
nuestro modelo de España, de los consensos Constitucionales, 1091 
señor Rajoy ¡Pero si el Partido Socialista es el eje central de 1092 
la democracia en España… [RJ: el eje central…] Ha estado en 1093 
todos los consensos desde la transición democrática, en el 1094 
consenso constitucional, en todos los consensos autonómicos, en 1095 
todos los pactos antiterroristas, siempre sin condiciones. 1096 
Hemos pactado con UCD, con Alianza Popular, con Izquierda 1097 
Unida, con los partidos nacionalistas; hemos tenido la 1098 
capacidad de llegar a acuerdos con todo y estar en todo, 1099 
siempre. Un partido que ha estado en todos como eje central, el 1100 
Partido Socialista, y hemos desarrollado el modelo autonómico. 1101 
Hay una diferencia muy sencilla de porqué pasa esto y porqué 1102 
ustedes están en esa actitud. Nosotros creemos firmemente que 1103 
para defender España no hay que atacar ni a Andalucía, ni a 1104 
Cataluña ni al País Vasco. Fortalecer el conjunto es defender 1105 
también a cada una de las partes. Por eso he trabajado para con 1106 
diálogo por todas las Comunidades Autónomas, para que todos los 1107 
ciudadanos y todas las comunidades nos sientan cerca. Como por 1108 
ejemplo Ceuta y Melilla. Que he sido el primer presidente del 1109 
Gobierno que ha Ido en viaje oficial.  1110 
OV: Señor Rajoy.  1111 
RJ: Yo he ido muchas más veces que usted a Ceuta y Melilla, y 1112 
no he sido de [ZP: Sí, pero no de presidente del Gobierno] 1113 
momento presidente de Gobierno. Ha dicho cosas verdaderamente 1114 
sorprendentes, como que yo ataco ha dejado caer a Andalucía, a 1115 
Cataluña y el País Vasco, podía haber metido y a Castilla-La 1116 
Mancha y a Baleares, y al que pasaba por allí. Oiga el mayor 1117 
ataque a Cataluña que se ha hecho han sido los espectáculos que 1118 
ha dado usted con El Carmelo, con los trenes de cercanías, con 1119 
el AVE, con los apagones. Ese es el mayor espectáculo y la 1120 
mayor agresión que se ha podido producir. [ZP: Ustedes 1121 
recogieron firmas por toda España al grito de "En contra de 1122 
Cataluña"]. Yo he recorrido Andalucía a lo largo de estos 1123 
cuatro años, me he ocupado de sus problemas, he estado con 1124 
mucha gente, he visto muchos lugares. Usted sólo ha ido allí en 1125 
campaña electoral, y yo al País Vasco ¿sabe a lo que he ido? a 1126 
ayudar a mis compañeros del País Vasco a defender la libertad, 1127 
la vida y los derechos individuales de las personas. Por tanto 1128 
eso que usted dijo es lisa y llanamente una de esas cosas que 1129 
usted dice y no significa nada. Dice que el Partido Socialista 1130 
es el centro o el eje central, mire, perdone usted, 1131 
sinceramente, en el centro de este país en este momento está el 1132 
Partido Popular.  1133 
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ZP: No.  1134 
RJ: Sí, Lo que pasa es que usted pierde perspectiva porque se 1135 
ha ido muy, muy hacia el extremo [ZP: No, no] y entonces nos ve 1136 
en otro lugar.  1137 
ZP: Ustedes están, en la derecha en la derecha.  1138 
RJ: Del Ministerio de Fomento, del Ministerio de Fomento 1139 
hablaremos luego, porque toca en el quinto turno, pero lo que 1140 
han hecho ustedes ha sido inaugurar las obras que el PP había 1141 
puesto en marcha, ustedes no ha puesto en marcha nada y además 1142 
han paralizado todo por la peculiar forma de ser de quien 1143 
dirige el Ministerio de Fomento. Pero claro, usted me habla de 1144 
idea de España y todas esas cosas, le recordé el otro día 1145 
algunas afirmaciones de González, de Guerra. No voy a 1146 
repetírselo, pero usted tiene convocado en este momento un 1147 
referéndum en el País Vasco de secesión. Usted. Fíjese lo que 1148 
ha dicho hace poco con ocasión de lo de Kosovo la portavoz del 1149 
Gobierno vasco: "Es un nuevo ejemplo de vigencia del derecho 1150 
democrático a la libre determinación plasmada en legislación 1151 
internacional". Y usted tiene un problema en Cataluña porque 1152 
sus socios con los que se presenta, porque usted va en 1153 
coalición con Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, tienen 1154 
anunciado otro. Y fíjese usted, las cosas que hacen ustedes en 1155 
Cataluña. Tengo aquí un expediente de un ciudadano catalán, me 1156 
lo ha dado (lee de un folio), al que se le ha multado con 400 1157 
euros porque en la fachada de su comercio consta "Fincas Nebot 1158 
AP-compra venta de pisos, solares y rústicos", y por lo visto 1159 
eso vulnera los derechos lingüísticos de los consumidores. Eso 1160 
lo hace un Gobierno suyo, del Partido Socialista, suyo.  1161 
OV: Señor Zapatero.  1162 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy hablemos de Andalucía. Ustedes negaron la 1163 
existencia de 400.000 andaluces en el censo para el modelo de 1164 
financiación autonómica y tenían una deuda de 2.500 millones de 1165 
euros con Andalucía que me comprometí a satisfacer y que cumplí 1166 
y di al Gobierno de Andalucía 2.500 millones de euros. Ese es 1167 
el trato que ustedes tuvieron con Andalucía. Mire, usted con su 1168 
política territorial no ha dejado de enfrentar unas Comunidades 1169 
con otras, incluso a ciudadanos de una misma Comunidad. Como, 1170 
por ejemplo, con el tema de la lengua. La política lingüística 1171 
que se sigue en Cataluña, señor Rajoy, es la misma de los 1172 
últimos 20 años. La misma. Ustedes estuvieron 8 años de 1173 
Gobierno, es verdad que era la época en la que se hablaba 1174 
catalán en la intimidad por Génova y ahora. Y usted fue 1175 
ministro de Educación y nunca le escuché nada sobre el problema 1176 
o los problemas que el castellano pudiera tener en Cataluña. 1177 
Ahora lo han cogido para dividir y para enfrentar. Y para 1178 
dividir y para enfrentar, la mejor prueba es que cuando han 1179 
llegado las reformas de los Estatutos ustedes han votado 20 1180 
artículos en Andalucía a favor y en Cataluña han combatido 20 1181 
artículos que dicen lo mismo y lo han recurrido al Tribunal 1182 
Constitucional. Usted ha utilizado los territorios, las 1183 
comunidades autónomas para enfrentar, para dividir. Presume 1184 
tener una idea de España, pero le voy a decir cuál es desde mi 1185 
punto de vista: la que a usted le interesa en cada momento, lo 1186 
que a usted le interesa en cada lugar. Si hay que… si interesa 1187 
en Cataluña hacer una tarea en contra del catalán y diciendo 1188 
que el castellano se discrimina, porque le interesa en el resto 1189 
de España, lo hacen; si en un momento dado había que decir que 1190 
no al Estatuto de Andalucía, hasta que se dieron cuenta de que 1191 
podían cometer un grave error, atacaban el estatuto de 1192 
Andalucía y luego, si les interesaba, apoyaban el estatuto de 1193 
Andalucía que tiene, igual que el valenciano, un número 1194 
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elevadísimo de artículos similares al de Cataluña. Usted no ha 1195 
tenido coherencia [OV: vaya concluyendo] y por tanto no tiene 1196 
una idea global de España.  1197 
RJ: ¡Todos lo han visto! Es evidente que el señor Zapatero 1198 
apoya que una persona por poner el título de su negocio en 1199 
castellano se le multe, y es lógico porque quien le multa es el 1200 
partido socialista. Es decir, a mí me gustaría que 1201 
desautorizara esta resolución porque desgraciadamente hay 1202 
muchas como esta. Mire, yo le hago una propuesta: yo voy a 1203 
hacer una ley para garantizar que todos los ciudadanos puedan 1204 
mandar a sus hijos a estudiar en castellano en toda España. 1205 
¿Usted la va a apoyar o no la va a apoyar? Porque claro, España 1206 
es el único país del mundo donde hay ciudadanos que en 1207 
determinadas zonas del territorio nacional no pueden estudiar 1208 
en castellano, yo voy a hacer esa ley [ZP: Sí pueden] y espero 1209 
que me diga si la apoya o no… [ZP: tienen… en castellano] [OV: 1210 
señor Zapatero]. No, no, no, luego me dice si la apoya o no… La 1211 
resolución sancionadora, voy a ver si usted apoya o no esa 1212 
resolución sancionadora. Oiga, no me diga que yo no tengo una 1213 
idea de España, pero si usted ha dicho que España es una nación 1214 
discutida y discutible… [ZP: No], Si usted dijo del Estatuto de 1215 
autonomía de Cataluña: "aprobaré cualquier cosa que salga del 1216 
parlamento catalán". Fíjese la idea que tendrá: "cualquier 1217 
cosa". Le da igual una cosa que la contraria, que dijera sí o 1218 
que dijera 'sao'. Si es que usted, usted es el que quien no 1219 
tiene ningún criterio sobre este asunto. El estatuto catalán, 1220 
cuando no están de acuerdo, pacta con el señor Mas, engaña al 1221 
señor Mas, vuelve a reunirse con el señor Mas, vuelven a 1222 
cambiar todo… no tienen ningún criterio. En Cataluña, en 1223 
Andalucía aprueban una cosa y luego conseguimos que se 1224 
modificaran los 150 artículos, ¡pero a usted le da igual! [ZP: 1225 
No, a usted le da igual], Recuerdo cuando me dijo aquello de 1226 
que el estatuto catalán es una cosa que no le preocupa a nadie, 1227 
que esto es una cosa que sólo le interesa a los políticos. 1228 
Oiga, fíjese lo que han hecho ustedes: un estatuto que tenía el 1229 
apoyo del 52% del censo, hoy es un estatuto que tiene el apoyo 1230 
del 35% censo; es que lo han votado el 35% de las personas, es 1231 
que hay mucha gente que no está de acuerdo. Pero yo le digo, es 1232 
decir, a mí me gustaría conocer su criterio porque usted 1233 
representa a un partido nacional. ¿Va a aprobar esa ley, la va 1234 
a apoyar cuando yo la presente en parlamento esa ley? ¿Su grupo 1235 
parlamentario lo va a hacer? ¿Está usted de acuerdo? ¿Va a 1236 
hacer algo? ¿Se cree que es normal un país donde por poner un 1237 
letrero en castellano automáticamente se te sancione? ¿Hay 1238 
algún país del mundo donde ocurra eso? Sólo en este, en el que 1239 
gobierna usted, señor Zapatero, ¿qué ha hecho usted? 1240 
OV: Les recuerdo que es la última intervención de un minuto de 1241 
este bloque.  1242 
ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, llevamos veinte años con el mismo régimen 1243 
lingüístico, que por cierto, apoyó Alianza Popular.  1244 
RJ: En absoluto, no es verdad. No es verdad. Alianza Popular no 1245 
aprobó el Estatuto pero sí esto, hombre por favor, por favor, 1246 
por favor...  1247 
ZP: Y usted fue ministro de Educación.  1248 
RJ: Sí, pero empezaron ustedes con Maragall en el 2003...  1249 
ZP: pero ¿qué hizo usted como ministro de educación? ¿Habló 1250 
alguna vez del castellano en Cataluña?  1251 
RJ: Sí, sí, hombre, que si hablé del castellano... infinidad de 1252 
veces 1253 
ZP: No podían hablar, porque era la etapa del Majestic, del 1254 
catalán en la intimidad, [RJ: no, no, no, hablé muchas veces 1255 
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del catalán] [OV: señor Rajoy] entonces el catalán era una 1256 
lengua de todos [RJ: Muchas veces, muchas veces], era una 1257 
lengua que había que defender… [RJ: Yo defiendo el catalán y el 1258 
castellano] Ahora, como no están en La Moncloa ni en Cataluña 1259 
tienen ninguna representatividad, pues han cogido lo de 1260 
Cataluña para crispar, para intentar poner a gente a los 1261 
ciudadanos del resto de España frente a Cataluña y eso es una 1262 
irresponsabilidad, porque ustedes gobernaron con el apoyo de 1263 
partidos catalanes, de Convergencia i Unió. Usted como ministro 1264 
de Educación nunca defendió nada ni la pio, [RJ: Absolutamente 1265 
falso] sobre el castellano en Cataluña. No la pio ni hizo nada 1266 
como ministro [RJ: Esto es falso], lo cual a mí tampoco me 1267 
extraña que no hiciera nada.  1268 
RJ: Bien, eh… Creo que ha quedado claro eh… que al señor 1269 
Zapatero le parece bien que a una persona que rotule en España 1270 
en castellano se le multe y le parece bien que haya muchísimos 1271 
ciudadanos, no sólo en Cataluña, sino en otras zonas, en el 1272 
País Vasco, empiezan en Galicia, que no pueden estudiar en su 1273 
idioma, algo que no ocurre en ningún país del mundo. Queda 1274 
constancia de que a usted le parece bien [ZP: Queda constancia 1275 
de que usted hace demagogia] Creo que con el estado de las 1276 
autonomías hay que hacer lo que hicimos en los últimos treinta 1277 
años: grandes pactos nacionales, en 1992 y en 1996, hay que 1278 
pactar, hay que dialogar y hay que hablar y la primera vez 1279 
desde 1977 que esto se ha roto ha sido con usted. Porque no se 1280 
rompió ni con Suárez, ni con Calvo Sotelo, ni con González, ni 1281 
con Aznar. Jamás hubo un estatuto que no fuera apoyado por los 1282 
grandes partidos nacionales. Y le voy a decir una cosa: el 1283 
estado de las autonomías tiene dos componentes, el Estado 1284 
central y las autonomías. Nos hemos ocupado mucho de las 1285 
autonomías, pero ahora es preciso también ocuparse de un Estado 1286 
fuerte que pueda garantizar la igualdad de todos los españoles, 1287 
en derechos, deberes y oportunidades, la cohesión y la 1288 
solidaridad entre territorios. Usted aquí ha fracasado.  1289 
OV: Bien señores, llegamos al quinto y último de este debate 1290 
antes de las conclusiones, ese último bloque habla de los retos 1291 
del futuro y eso abarca desde la investigación, la vivienda, 1292 
pasando por la educación, desarrollo, innovación, urbanismo, 1293 
infraestructuras, primer turno para el candidato socialista. 1294 
 
 
6. RETOS DE FUTURO  
 
ZP: Nada hay más ligado al futuro que la educación. Hemos 1295 
puesto en este periodo las bases para un modelo educativo de 1296 
más calidad. Ahora tenemos nuevas leyes con financiación y con 1297 
consenso de la comunidad educativa. Pero tenemos 1298 
importantísimos retos para los próximos cuatro años. Hemos 1299 
conseguido la plena escolarización de tres a seis años. Ahora 1300 
hay que conseguir la plena escolarización de cero a tres años. 1301 
Tenemos que lograr que 4 de cada 5 jóvenes sigan estudiando más 1302 
allá de los 16 años, de la educación obligatoria. Para ello 1303 
tenemos nuevas medidas, como las becas-salario. Tenemos que 1304 
potenciar la formación de matemáticas, la lectura, que ya la 1305 
hemos potenciado, y el inglés. Nosotros proponemos que al menos 1306 
el 15% de la actividad en las aulas sea en este idioma, en 1307 
inglés. Y, además, que lleguemos en la legislatura hasta 1308 
200.000 jóvenes becados que puedan ir a perfeccionar el inglés 1309 
un mes fuera de nuestras fronteras. Es un programa que hemos 1310 
puesto en esta legislatura. Hasta ahora han ido al año 50.000, 1311 
por primera vez. Y queremos llegar al final de nuestra 1312 
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legislatura a 200.000. Queremos mejorar la formación del 1313 
profesorado y reforzar su autoridad. Pretendemos que el nuevo, 1314 
que nuestro sistema universitario esté entre los diez mejores 1315 
del mundo. Para ello me propongo hacer un gran acuerdo de 1316 
financiación con comunidades autónomas y universidades. Señor 1317 
Rajoy, lleva varias semanas criticando al Gobierno por el 1318 
informe PISA, el último informe PISA. Bien, denigran los 1319 
resultados, que no son para eso, porque tenemos unos resultados 1320 
de orden medio de los países desarrollados. Pero, además, señor 1321 
Rajoy, es lo que menos entiendo, tiran piedras contra su propio 1322 
tejado, porque el informe PISA examina sobre todo su gestión. 1323 
Son los niños de 15 años que lo hacen en el curso 2005-2006. 1324 
Niños que estuvieron el 80 por ciento de su periodo formativo 1325 
con usted en el gobierno [OV: Vaya concluyendo señor Zapatero]. 1326 
Por criticarme denigran hasta su propia gestión.  1327 
OV: señor Zapatero [sic] 1328 
RJ: No. En realidad el informe PISA lo que hace es criticar la 1329 
LOGSE [ZP: ah!], que es la ley que hicieron ustedes y que 1330 
nosotros cambiamos pero que no pudo entrar en vigor porque a 1331 
las 48 horas de entrar en el gobierno usted, demostrando que es 1332 
un gran demócrata, a las 48 horas la liquidó. [ZP: Estuvieron 8 1333 
años en XXX] [OV: Zapatero tendrá su tiempo]. Mire, el problema 1334 
que tiene usted es que como en tantos y tantos temas no está 1335 
usted en la realidad. La educación en España está funcionando 1336 
mal, pero no porque lo diga el informe PISA. Los últimos datos 1337 
son realmente pues, pues, pues, que, que, que, para 1338 
entristecerse… [ZP: XXX, no, no, no]. Estamos por debajo del 1339 
puesto 30 del mundo en lectura, estamos en matemáticas, estamos 1340 
en ciencias. Las tasas de abandono escolar y fracaso escolar 1341 
son tremendas, somos el tercero por la cola de la Europa de los 1342 
27. De verdad, es que lo que dice usted de educación no tiene 1343 
ninguna credibilidad. Y me parece muy bien lo que ha dicho 1344 
luego usted del inglés y todas esas cosas y las becas, pero, 1345 
mire usted, ¿sabe lo que es más importante en materia de 1346 
educación?: volver a los principios de mérito, de trabajo y 1347 
esfuerzo. Que para pasar de curso se necesite saber y para 1348 
saber haya que aprobar, y no se puede pasar de curso con cuatro 1349 
asignaturas. Es que no se puede. Es que lo que se ha bajado es 1350 
el nivel de la calidad de la educación en España. ¿Y habla 1351 
usted del profesorado? Podía haber hecho algo. Efectivamente, 1352 
el sistema educativo debe pilotar sobre los profesores y se les 1353 
debe dar autoridad, porque los profesores van a enseñar y los 1354 
alumnos van a aprender. Y luego inglés, ciencias, nuevas 1355 
tecnologías, sociedad de telecomunicación, porque ese es el 1356 
tema capital para poder competir en el futuro y usted mientras 1357 
tanto está con la educación para la ciudadanía o con quitarle a 1358 
la gente la posibilidad de estudiar en castellano. Su política 1359 
educativa, la de los últimos años nos ha conducido a donde 1360 
estamos. Hay otro tema de futuro que es muy importante, que es 1361 
el de la vivienda. Mire usted, los precios han subido el 43 por 1362 
ciento durante su mandato. El otro día dijo que los precios en 1363 
su mandato habían bajado. Han subido las hipotecas. Ha subido 1364 
el esfuerzo que tiene que dedicar la gente a pagar su vivienda, 1365 
y ustedes lo único que han hecho son ocurrencias, las 1366 
zapatillas, crear un ministerio, planes y más planes, el 1367 
alquiler… señor… Rodríguez Zapatero, lo que hay que hacer es un 1368 
gran acuerdo nacional en materia de vivienda para que el suelo 1369 
valga menos y hay que modificar la Ley de Haciendas Locales 1370 
para que los ayuntamientos no tengan que financiarse con el 1371 
precio del suelo.  1372 
OV: Señor Zapatero. 1373 
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ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, quiero hacer alguna matización sobre 1374 
educación muy rápidamente. Ese informe corresponde sobre todo a 1375 
8 años en los que los niños estaban bajo su dependencia como 1376 
Gobierno y su Ministerio y sus políticas, y sus cambios de 1377 
leyes y sus decretos. Y su falta de inversiones. Mi opinión es 1378 
que la educación en España necesita mejorar, pero no que la 1379 
podemos denigrar, porque no es justo; no es justo, porque si 1380 
no, este país no habría alcanzado el desarrollo y el bienestar 1381 
que ha alcanzado. Porque tenemos magníficos docentes, 1382 
magníficos profesores, padres que se sacrifican y lo que hay 1383 
que hacer es aumentar los recursos como hemos hecho nosotros en 1384 
estos 4 años. Un aumento del 80% de las becas, 2.500 centros 1385 
con profesores de apoyo y refuerzo para los niños que no 1386 
pueden. Hay que reforzar la autoridad de los profesores, 1387 
invertir en el apoyo a las matemáticas, a la lengua. Pero no 1388 
denigrar nuestro sistema educativo, y menos tratándose de un 1389 
informe que corresponde a su etapa de gobierno. Mire, en 1390 
vivienda, le voy a dar un dato: con su ley del suelo, con la 1391 
ley que empezaron a cambiar en el decreto del 96 y el 98, ¿sabe 1392 
cuánto subió los terrenos del suelo en España? Un 500% con esa 1393 
liberalización. Esa es la consecuencia de su política. Y con 1394 
ustedes la vivienda subió en esa liberalización…  1395 
RJ: ¿Qué liberalización? ¿De qué liberalización habla? [ZP: Sí, 1396 
cuando liberalizaron el suelo…] ¡Si eso no está aprobado, 1397 
hombre! [ZP: No no, en la anterior etapa, hombre, que sí] Usted 1398 
es que no se entera. Pero hombre, por favor… la liberalización 1399 
del suelo, pero ¡qué barbaridad!  1400 
ZP: Sí, un 500% con su ley del suelo. Y un 80% aumentó la 1401 
vivienda en la última legislatura. Y en esta el incremento ha 1402 
ido decreciendo hasta llegar solo al 40% [RJ: al 43% ¿y esto le 1403 
parece poco?]. Con ustedes el precio de la vivienda subía seis 1404 
veces más que los salarios [RJ: XXX] y con nosotros hemos 1405 
pasado de 50.000 viviendas protegidas cuando llegamos al 1406 
gobierno, y ahora este año vamos a construir 150.000 viviendas 1407 
protegidas. Tres veces más [RJ: Y millones en los tres próximos 1408 
años]. Y por cierto, los datos de la comunidad de Madrid son 1409 
viviendas que financia el Estado [RJ: Sí, sí], el Estado, y que 1410 
hacen ayuntamientos socialistas. Dígaselo porque la señora 1411 
Esperanza Aguirre, ya sabe lo que dijo, que lo que quería era 1412 
acabar con la vivienda protegida. Y nosotros hemos dado ayudas 1413 
a los jóvenes para el alquiler de XXX [OV: Vaya concluyendo 1414 
señor Zapatero].  1415 
OV: Señor Rajoy. 1416 
RJ: Eh… le voy a dar datos, ya que a usted le gustan los datos 1417 
(enseña un gráfico). Banco de España: en el año 1995 cuando 1418 
llegamos al Gobierno, llevábamos de cada 100 euros había que 1419 
dedicar 46 al pago de la vivienda. Cuando nos fuimos 31 euros y 1420 
ahora estamos en 46,2 euros, dato del Banco de España. 1421 
Incremento del precio de la vivienda. Porque es que usted, 1422 
claro, es que usted falta a la verdad. Éste es el problema que 1423 
tiene usted. Años 2000 a 2004, 551 euros. Año 2004-2008, su 1424 
etapa, 705 euros. Fuente: El Instituto Nacional de Industria 1425 
proporcionados por el Ministerio de la Vivienda. Entonces eche 1426 
al del INI o eche al de la Vivienda. Precio de la vivienda de 1427 
VPO (vivienda de protección oficial, n.d.r.) (enseña otro 1428 
gráfico). Cuando gobernaba el Partido Popular, 2004, 112.000 1429 
euros, ahora 200.000 euros. Viviendas protegidas, se lo dije el 1430 
otro día, Comunidad de Madrid, Andalucía y Cataluña (enseña 1431 
otro gráfico). Si estos datos no son ciertos, pues tendrá usted 1432 
que echar al de la Vivienda, al Ministerio de Economía por 1433 
decir falsedades. Pero me gustaría decirle alguna cosa, ya le 1434 
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digo… Eso de la liberalización del suelo, eso es falso. Usted 1435 
dónde est… usted no se entera. Eso no se ha producido nunca en 1436 
España [ZP: no el que no se entera debe ser usted] [OV: Por 1437 
favor]. Eso es algo que se le ha ocurrido a usted o que se lo 1438 
ha inventado. [ZP: Esa fue su ley del suelo] [OV: Por favor 1439 
señor Zapatero]. Sí, sí, pero eso no entró en vigor nunca. Es 1440 
decir, esto, es que usted no se entera de esto. Mire, le voy a 1441 
hablar de educación. Usted dice hay que hacer, hay que hacer, 1442 
hay que hacer… Pero usted no ha hecho nada [ZP: Sí hemos hecho, 1443 
se lo he contado]. Usted lo único que hizo fue derogar una ley 1444 
que había ahí y echar a la ministra al día siguiente, al día 1445 
siguiente de aprobar la ley usted echó a la ministra. Y 1446 
realmente tenía usted razón y no sé si alguien tendría que 1447 
haberse ido con la ministra. Usted habla de los padres y de los 1448 
profesores, pero no ha hecho nada. Hace poco yo me sorprendí 1449 
con unas declaraciones verdaderamente inusuales e impropias, en 1450 
fin, de una persona que está en la magistratura en la que está, 1451 
echándole la culpa de la educación de los hijos a los padres. 1452 
Comentando lo del informe PISA, usted dice que yo denigro la 1453 
educación y usted le echa las culpas a los padres, si se lo ha 1454 
echado en unas declaraciones públicas que conoce toda España 1455 
[ZP: No]. Yo digo que usted está fuera de la realidad y que 1456 
éste es el tema capital del futuro, porque no vamos a competir 1457 
con petróleo, vamos a competir con personas que tienen que 1458 
estar formadas desde los tres años en inglés, en sociedad de la 1459 
información, en nuevas telecomunicaciones, tiene que estar 1460 
formada. Y tiene que haber un nivel de exigencia que hoy no 1461 
existe. Que ustedes se lo han liquidado. Insisto este es un 1462 
tema capital para España.  1463 
OV: Senor Zapatero. 1464 
ZP: Señor Rajoy, la vicepresidenta electa… la presidenta electa 1465 
(enseña un periódico): "Voy a suprimir la vivienda protegida". 1466 
Esta es la política del Partido Popular.  1467 
RJ: pues evidentemente A juzgar por estos datos (enseña otro 1468 
gráfico) no parece que lo haya hecho… ¿eh?… 1469 
ZP: Vamos a hablar de educación. Nuestro país, 1470 
desgraciadamente, lleva 30 años de libertad y de democracia. 1471 
Muchos otros países europeos, que nos ganan en bienestar y en 1472 
renta per cápita, disfrutaron de democracia décadas antes, y de 1473 
progreso, y de libertades, y de una mejor educación. [RJ: 1474 
Hungría también y Polonia… los países del Este…] [OV: Por 1475 
favor…] Y nosotros hemos partido de una situación de retraso 1476 
histórico [RJ: Sí]. Y ahora estamos recuperando, y hemos hecho 1477 
un tramo importante de recuperación. ¿Nos queda por recuperar? 1478 
Sí, mucho, con esfuerzo. Y claro que lo hemos hecho: 80 por 1479 
ciento más de recurso en becas, apoyo a 2.500 centros y una 1480 
ley, que la nuestra sí llevaba memoria económica. Una ley con 1481 
7.000 millones. Pero yo quiero hablar de otros temas que son 1482 
capitales para el futuro. Nuevas tecnologías: Cuando llegamos 1483 
al Gobierno estábamos a la cola en Internet de Europa, por 1484 
detrás de Chipre. Hoy ya estamos al nivel de Francia y 1485 
avanzaremos más. Accederán a la banda ancha 6 de cada 10 1486 
hogares al final de la legislatura. Y en 2010 todos los 1487 
trámites con la Administración serán por Internet. En 1488 
Investigación y Desarrollo hemos triplicado el presupuesto, en 1489 
I+D+I. Vamos a aumentar en 50.000 el número de investigadores y 1490 
vamos a seguir apostando por los sectores tecnológicos de 1491 
futuro. El sector aeronáutico, del que somos líderes en 1492 
tecnología de reabastecimiento en vuelo, duplicará su tamaño en 1493 
la siguiente legislatura. El sector de las energías renovables 1494 
del que somos líderes en energía eólica y en la energía solar 1495 
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también doblará su peso. Y en biotecnología, nuestro objetivo 1496 
es ser líderes en investigación de células madre. La suma 1497 
económica de estos tres sectores será mayor en cuatro años que 1498 
el sector inmobiliario hoy. Esto es apostar por una economía 1499 
productiva, por las nuevas tecnologías... [OV: Concluya señor 1500 
Zapatero, señor Rajoy] 1501 
RJ: La pena es que no lo hayan hecho a lo largo de estos cuatro 1502 
años [ZP: Sí claro que lo hemos hecho] que por lo visto 1503 
gobernaron otros en España. Claro, ahora la culpa de la 1504 
educación la tiene la historia de España porque unas eran 1505 
democracias y otros no. Pero mire usted la República Checa, 1506 
Letonia, Estonia o Lituania, países que nos han adelantado en 1507 
buena parte de los puntos fundamentales del informe PISA pues 1508 
son democracias desde hace bastante menos tiempo que España. 1509 
Ese es el problema, señor Zapatero. Me parece muy bien todo lo 1510 
que ha dicho sobre nuevas tecnologías sobre internet pero mire, 1511 
los datos son los datos, los acaba de publicar hace poco 1512 
también la Unión Europea. En los 4 años que median entre 1999 y 1513 
2003 se subió en España la participación en el PIB en el 0,2. 1514 
En los cuatro suyos sólo subió el 0,1. Usted habla, dice, voy a 1515 
hacer... pero es que al final la realidad se impone. En 1516 
cualquier caso yo quería hablar del Ministerio de Fomento [ZP: 1517 
Hemos subido en tecnología 7.500 millones... XXX investigación, 1518 
está aquí] [OV: Por favor]. El Ministerio de Fomento que ha 1519 
sido la expresión más clara de la política de este Gobierno, es 1520 
decir, vive de la herencia, ha hecho mucha propaganda: inaugura 1521 
lo que ya estaba en construcción. Los espectáculos a los que 1522 
hemos asistido en el caso del AVE a Valladolid, o el AVE a 1523 
Málaga o el AVE a Barcelona, pues han sido impropios de una 1524 
democracia avanzada, han retrasado cosas para que pareciera que 1525 
las hizo usted. Es decir, lo que ha pasado en el Aeropuerto de 1526 
Barajas, tardar dos años en inaugurarlo por poner los 1527 
mostradores y la luz, es algo verdaderamente sorprendente. No 1528 
sabemos lo que está pasando en este momento en el aeropuerto de 1529 
Barcelona y hay algunas obras... [ZP: pues que tenemos los 1530 
mejores aeropuertos de Europa y el mundo]. Sí, Sí. Ya, ya, [OV: 1531 
Por favor señor Zapatero], pero hay muchas cosas pendientes 1532 
[ZP: y yo me siento orgulloso de ello] El AVE de Valencia, el 1533 
plan Galicia, el plan ferroviario de Canarias, el plan del 1534 
oeste de su pueblo, en León, y toda la zona del noroeste 1535 
española… De esto no ha habido nada. [ZP: Es que no se ha 1536 
enterado de nada. Usted no se ha enterado]. Ustedes lo que han 1537 
hecho es llegar al gobierno, paralizar un plan como hicieron 1538 
con otras muchas materias, por ejemplo, en el tema de agua. 1539 
Paralizar un plan, retrasarlo todo, y luego hemos visto los 1540 
espectáculos que han ocurrido. Y ese tema es capital. Yo voy a 1541 
aumentar la inversión en infraestructuras, porque creo es un 1542 
tema absolutamente capital para España, voy a aumentar la 1543 
inversión en educación porque creo que es capital para España, 1544 
pero desde luego voy a un modelo educativo más exigente porque, 1545 
si no, no vamos a poder competir en el mundo, y desde luego el 1546 
I+D+I tiene que ser uno de los retos básicos del futuro de los 1547 
españoles. Pero en los presupuestos tiene que plasmarse, señor 1548 
Zapatero, lo demás son palabras.  1549 
OV: Última intervención de un minuto en este bloque. 1550 
ZP: Sí, nosotros hemos sido los que hemos incrementado la 1551 
inversión en infraestructuras. Fíjese el compromiso: en la 1552 
próxima legislatura, a todas las comunidades llegará la Alta 1553 
Velocidad… y en educación, con los datos que le he aportado. 1554 
Pero yo quiero referirme al cambio climático, porque es uno de 1555 
los grandes retos de futuro. Nuestra apuesta es una apuesta por 1556 
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el ahorro y las energías renovables, que nos ha permitido 1557 
reducir por primera vez la emisión de gases de efecto 1558 
invernadero en 2006 y contenerlas en 2007. Para nosotros, la 1559 
lucha contra el cambio climático es una gran oportunidad, no 1560 
sólo una prioridad, sino una gran oportunidad económica para 1561 
mejorar la competitividad de nuestra economía, para generar 1562 
investigación, para aportar más valor añadido. Y también 1563 
tenemos un compromiso con el desarrollo rural, con el ámbito 1564 
rural, con ciudadanos que tienen exactamente el mismo derecho a 1565 
tener infraestructuras, equipamientos y servicios que los que 1566 
viven en los ámbitos urbanos. Por eso hemos hecho la Ley de 1567 
Desarrollo rural, que vamos a aplicar en cooperación con las 1568 
comunidades autónomas. Y también un programa de agua: de aquí 1569 
al 2011 me comprometo a que haya ochocientos hectómetros 1570 
cúbicos más en toda la cuenca del Mediterráneo con desalación, 1571 
[OV: Vaya terminando señor Zapatero] que equivale a tres 1572 
millones de personas más que pueden abastecerse.  1573 
OV: Su minuto señor Rajoy. 1574 
RJ: Bien… eh… son, evidentemente, muchos los temas que se han 1575 
planteado. Tengo que decir que yo haré una apuesta muy 1576 
importante, como he dicho antes, por la educación, una apuesta 1577 
muy importante por las infraestructuras: me parece sorprendente 1578 
lo que ha dicho el presidente del Gobierno. Dice que han 1579 
invertido mucho en infraestructuras. En 2004, se invertía el 1580 
2,02% en España y ustedes sólo fueron capaces de ejecutar el 1581 
1,43. Y éste, en el 2007, su inversión es del 1,58. Ha bajado 1582 
la inversión en infraestructuras en España… [ZP: No, no.] no, 1583 
no, no, si estos son los datos pero para mí, las 1584 
infraestructuras serán una prioridad. Ha hablado usted de los 1585 
agricultores, o de los ganaderos, o del campo. Mire usted: 1586 
después de las negociaciones que han hecho ustedes en la Unión 1587 
Europea no tiene usted ninguna autoridad moral para hablar ni 1588 
de agricultores ni de ganaderos. Y desde luego lo que ha 1589 
ocurrido en el tema del agua es sorprendente: han liquidado un 1590 
proyecto y han dejado sin agua Aragón, Cataluña [ZP: Y usted 1591 
mantiene…] Barcelona tiene unos problemas enormemente 1592 
importantes [ZP: ¿Usted mantiene el transvase del Ebro?] [OV: 1593 
Por favor], Castellón, Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, Almería… Yo 1594 
mantengo lo que he dicho en todos los sitios: yo voy a llevar 1595 
agua a todos los sitios, empezando por el pacto del agua y 1596 
llevándolo luego desde las cuencas excedentarias… Haré un 1597 
trasvase, sí, si es eso lo que quiere saber. Usted no ha hecho 1598 
nada y no va a hacer nada y las desaladoras emiten CO2 y van 1599 
contra el cambio climático. Esa es su política. 1600 
 
7. CIERRE  
 
OV: Gracia señor Rajoy, bueno usted seguiría seguramente, pero 1601 
hemos agotado los cinco bloques, los cinco temarios, ya saben 1602 
que disponen ahora de tres minutos para dirigirse a los 1603 
ciudadanos para decir lo que quieran lo que estimen oportuno, 1604 
como cierre de debate. Señor Zapatero.  1605 
ZP: Muchas gracias. Hace cuatro años recibí el apoyo de más de 1606 
once millones de españoles. Quiero aprovechar esta ocasión para 1607 
expresar mi profundo agradecimiento a los que me dieron la 1608 
confianza en aquella ocasión. Mi agradecimiento también a los 1609 
que en estos años, han expresado el apoyo a las acciones de 1610 
Gobierno y también mi agradecimiento a los que han discrepado 1611 
con respeto. Quiero que todos los españoles sepan que tanto el 1612 
apoyo como la crítica me han servido de estímulo para 1613 
esforzarme y trabajar por mis compatriotas. En estos debates he 1614 
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explicado la tarea de Gobierno, he defendido con convicción la 1615 
tarea de gobierno. Ahora quiero pedirles el apoyo para un 1616 
proyecto para los próximos cuatro años. Porque estoy convencido 1617 
que un país es fuerte si da las mismas oportunidades a todos 1618 
los ciudadanos y apoya a los más débiles, porque estoy 1619 
comprometido con terminar con todas las discriminaciones, 1620 
empezando por las que afectan a las mujeres, porque estoy 1621 
convencido que el crecimiento económico nos debe llevar al 1622 
pleno empleo. Porque estoy comprometido con que la mayoría de 1623 
los recursos públicos se dediquen a la educación, a la sanidad, 1624 
a subir las pensiones, a apoyar a los jóvenes para que 1625 
encuentren empleo, a apoyar a los trabajadores y a sus 1626 
familias. Porque tengo el compromiso de afrontar un desarrollo 1627 
sostenible, de luchar contra el cambio climático, de hacer que 1628 
nuestro país lidere esta nueva etapa. Porque estoy comprometido 1629 
con la defensa de la paz, con una España europeísta, con la 1630 
defensa de la legalidad internacional, Porque estoy 1631 
comprometido con una España unida, en convivencia y que respete 1632 
la diversidad. Porque el futuro es la convivencia y no la 1633 
división, porque llegaremos mejor al futuro si tenemos 1634 
confianza y no pesimismo. Por todas estas razones les pido su 1635 
voto y su apoyo para los próximos cuatro años. Gobernaré para 1636 
todos y con respeto a todos. Gobernaré con firmeza, gobernaré 1637 
con convicción. Mejoraré las cosas bien hechas y corregiré los 1638 
errores. Gobernaré con sensibilidad, y estaré muy cerca de los 1639 
que no tienen de todo. Buenas noches y buena suerte.  1640 
OV: Última intervención de tres minutos, señor Rajoy.  1641 
RJ: Buenas noches. Yo creo que España es un gran país, una gran 1642 
nación, una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales que en estos 1643 
momentos tiene problemas, pero creo que si actuamos con 1644 
realismo, si actuamos con trabajo y si actuamos con humildad, 1645 
vamos a superarlo en el futuro. Yo quiero que la próxima 1646 
legislatura no sea la legislatura de la tensión y de la 1647 
división entre los españoles. Quiero que sea una legislatura de 1648 
consenso entre todos. Le voy a proponer al principal partido de 1649 
la oposición acuerdos en los temas importantes. Quiero que 1650 
España sea lo que todos los españoles queremos que sea. Una 1651 
gran nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales. Sé que hay muchos 1652 
votantes del partido socialista, la inmensa mayoría de los 1653 
partidos socialistas… de los votantes del partido socialista 1654 
que creen que España es una gran nación de ciudadanos libres e 1655 
iguales, y hay cosas que no se han hecho bien. Voy a ofrecer al 1656 
líder de la oposición un pacto para derrotar a ETA, no para 1657 
negociar a ETA. También voy a ofrecer un acuerdo en materia de 1658 
política exterior y también un acuerdo en un tema que a mí me 1659 
parece capital de cara al futuro, un acuerdo para modernizar y 1660 
para consolidar nuestro sistema de protección social, sobre 1661 
todo en lo que se refiere a las pensiones y a la sanidad. Y en 1662 
el resto de los temas quiero decir que yo no seré el presidente 1663 
del Partido Popular. Yo seré fundamentalmente el presidente del 1664 
Gobierno de todos los españoles porque mi objetivo es gobernar 1665 
sin generar tensiones, ni confrontaciones, ni divisiones. Me 1666 
ocuparé de la economía. La economía es capital. La economía lo 1667 
es todo y de la economía, de una buena política económica 1668 
depende todo. Yo me ocuparé de luchar contra los precios. Me 1669 
ocuparé de luchar contra el desempleo. Mi gran objetivo, el 1670 
reto básico es que puedan trabajar en España tantas mujeres 1671 
como hombres: hoy trabajan sólo fuera de casa ocho millones de 1672 
mujeres y trabajan doce millones de hombres. Ese es el objetivo 1673 
básico de la próxima legislatura y a él me aplicaré. La 1674 
economía es fundamental para poder mantener las políticas 1675 
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sociales, para la educación, para la sanidad. Por eso, debemos 1676 
prestarle toda la atención y no enredarnos con debates sobre 1677 
Naciones o alianzas de civilizaciones como ha ocurrido en esta 1678 
legislatura. La economía por encima de cualquier otra 1679 
consideración. Hay que hacer reformas, las vamos a hacer, vamos 1680 
a bajar los impuestos, reformas en el I+D+i, en las 1681 
infraestructuras. Son fundamentales para competir en el futuro. 1682 
Y en la educación. El tema de la educación es el más 1683 
importante, pero se necesita exigencia, se necesita calidad, 1684 
que se valore el trabajo, el mérito y el esfuerzo. No podemos 1685 
vivir de otra manera. Se necesita que todos los españoles 1686 
estemos unidos, que España esté unido en sus tierras y esté 1687 
unido en sus gentes. Eso es fundamental. El Estado de las 1688 
autonomías es lo que yo defiendo, pero hay que hacer que 1689 
funcione bien y que sirva para fortalecer al conjunto. Es muy 1690 
importante también que apostemos por la derrota de ETA. No por 1691 
los atajos, ni por lo apaños, ni por las negociaciones. Que no 1692 
se pierda la dignidad del Estado. La clave es derrotar al 1693 
terrorismo, y se puede hacer con la ley. Señoras y señores. Ya 1694 
termino. El otro día hablé de una niña. En esa niña pienso, en 1695 
esa niña que va a crecer, que tiene que estudiar, que quiere 1696 
tener una vivienda. Esa niña está en mi cabeza, esa niña es la 1697 
que mueve mi sentimiento y mi corazón. Esa niña.  1698 
OV: Muchas gracias caballeros. Hasta aquí este segundo y 1699 
también intenso debate. Llegarán ahora los comentarios, los 1700 
titulares, las tertulias, pero la ventaja de todo esto es que 1701 
todos los que lo han visto tienen su propia opinión. Les doy 1702 
las gracias a los dos por haber ofrecido a la ciudadanía este 1703 
intercambio de opiniones, estos dos cara a cara. La Academia de 1704 
la Televisión les quiere agradecer a ustedes y a sus 1705 
colaboradores su confianza por aceptar nuestra propuesta de 1706 
organizar estos debates. Gracias también a todos los que han 1707 
colaborado en las televisiones y en los medios de comunicación, 1708 
a los académicos voluntarios que han prestado su experiencia y 1709 
su trabajo. Créanme que para la Academia esto ha sido un 1710 
verdadero honor. Y creo interpretar un deseo general si digo 1711 
que no tengan que pasar otros quince años para que esto se 1712 




Transcriptions of the electoral videos of IU 
 
Video: Rimsky Korsakof 
[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]  
Hola soy Rimsky Korsakof, El que toca el violin tiritititin… Entonces quería yo con m 
violín apoyar a izquierda unida, Porque voy  a votarla claro, Rimsky siempre vota a 
izquierda unida y Korsakov también los dos vamos a votar ambos. Pero además hay un 
acto muy bonito de fin de campaña que… 
…bueno cuéntalo tu Gaspar porque yo en eso 
[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking] 
Bueno el acto es en el auditorio Pilar Bardem, en Rivas Vacías Madrid, el viernes 7 a 
las 10 de la noche 
PT: Yo voy a tocar el violín… tu que tú que tú que tocas, tío? 
LL: Yo el violín no porque eso lo toca Zapatero que lo coge con la izquierda y luego lo 
toca con la derecha 
PT: Anda 
LL: Y la trompeta tampoco que la trompeta la toca Rajoy que nos tiene los XXX 
PT: Y qué tal la toca la trompeta? Como el arcángel san Gabriel lo mismo muy fuerte 
muy fuerte muy fuerte XXX 
LL: Terrible muy fuerte ahora le pone sordina en campaña para que no se le note 
PT: Ya más a lo Miles Davies 
LL: Pero no nos engaña 
PT: No nos engaña es verdad ¿eh? es que los trompetistas son un peligro 
LL: No no Yo más bien la voz humana 
PT: Ahí estoy contigo estoy contigo […] Y con un caramelito con un caramelito XXX 
LL: XXX Carmina Burana y eso 
PT: Ahí me gusta me gusta 
LL: Ahahah 
[slogan: Que no te cambien el juego 
Vota útil 
Vota IU 
Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)] 
 
 
Video: Acueducto de Segovia 
[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]  
Buenos días eh… soy el Acueducto de Segovia… y... la verdad voy me gusta me gusta 
apoyar Izquierda Unida. No solo yo ¿eh? que viene también la Catedral de Burgos y el 
Alcázar de Toledo. Pfff a ese le ha costado… ha habido que estar ahí venga venga 
vamos… Menos mal que la Plaza de toros de Las Ventas le dijo ¡coño anímate! Y 
entonces pues bueno bien al final pues pues que estaremos ahí apoyándoles en el fin de 
fiesta en el ya en el el final el final el final… Entonces yo creo que va a ser cosa muy 
bonita… Porque van a salir la Laguna de Ruidera, van a venir también me parece el 
Ebro, al menos una parte, una parte, la que pasa por Tarragona, O sea que bueno, que va 
a ser muy entretenido… ¿Dónde va a ser esto oye? 
[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking] 
Va a ser en el auditorio Pilar Bardem, en Rivas Vacías Madrid, el día 7 viernes a las 10 
de la noche 
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PT: Va a ser XXX meterlo ahí va a ser complicado 
LL: Eso va a ser, pero se hace, si hay que hacerlo se hace 
PT: Y ¿sabes que vamos a hacer además? Piragüismo ¿Te gusta a ti el piragüismo? 
LL: A mí me gusta el piragüismo 
PT: Es bonito es bonito tío es bonito. Yo me gusta eso muchísimo y… el embutido. Es 
que está bueno ¿verdad?  
LL: Primero el embutido y luego el piragüismo 
PT: O viceversa si nos valen las dos cosas… Joder como va a estar eso ¿eh? 
[SLOGAN: Que no te cambien el juego 
Vota útil 
Vota IU 
Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)] 
 
 
Video: El pensador de Rodin 
[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]  
Hola! Amiguitos amiguitas. Soy soy el pensador de Rodin. Todas las esculturas van a 
dar su apoyo a Izquierda Unida. Y lo van a hacer además acudiendo a un acto, un acto 
muy bonito. ¿Dónde y cuándo va a ser eso? 
[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking] 
En el auditorio Pilar Bardem, en Rivas, el viernes día 7 a las 10 de la noche 
PT: Te gusta a ti Copérnico? 
LL: Sobre todo los giros copernicanos 
PT: Sabes hacerlo? 
LL: Un giro… ueeee 
[Llamazares gira sobre sí mismo] 
PT: Ahahaha 
[slogan: Que no te cambien el juego 
Vota útil 
Vota IU 
Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)] 
{un consejo www.iloveiu.org} 
 
 
Video: Symca 1000 
[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]  
Treiegnnn grannbbb... Hola soy un Symca 1000…Y me gustaría dentro de lo que es el 
mundo del automóvil., del motor, pues apoya a IU y además estar en el acto en el acto 
este final. ¿Cuándo lo va a haber cuando va a ser el acto? 
[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking] 
Bueno va a ser en Rivas Vacías, Madrid, en el auditorio Pilar Bardem, el día 7 viernes a 
las 10 de la noche. 
PT: XXX un symca1000 para hacer eso y para hacer el amor también 









[Slogan: Que no te cambien el juego 
Vota útil 
Vota IU 
Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)] 
{un consejo www.iloveiu.org} 
 
 
Video: Voto útil 
[Y ahora izquierda unida] 
[Jingle of IU] 
[Pilar Bardem speaking:] Vota izquierda unida porque es el voto útil que necesitamos 
toda España para que haya un gobierno de izquierdas. Siempre juntos. Por Izquierda 
Unida. 
[Xx Xx:] queridos amigos el verdadero voto útil es el de izquierda unida no os dejéis 
engañar. 
[Xx Xx: makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then puts the finger below his eye, miming 
the Spanish expression “ojo”, i.e. ‘attention’] que no te engañen el voto útil izquierda 
Unida 
[Xx Xx: makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then puts the finger below his eye, then into 
his nose for poking fun] es que como no sé  muy bien cómo se hace esto… pues en fin 
que hago esto, pero bueno, si queréis, si verdaderamente creéis en el voto útil y para la 
que la izquierda este representada en el parlamento a pesar de esta ley electoral que hace 
que la izquierda esté un poco emarginada, pues votad a IU el auténtico voto útil 
[Almudena Grandes: makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then puts the finger below her 
eye] que no te engañen, el voto útil, izquierda unida 
[Xx Xx:] oye hay que tener mucho ojo [puts the finger below his eye] mucho ojo, ¿eh? 
que no utilicen el voto útil [hace gesto de la ceja] para inutilizar a la izquierda 
[Xx Xx:] hay una cosa que se escurre por aquí [makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then 
puts the finger below his eye] que hay que estar ojo abierto… a ver dónde ponemos el 
ojo [puts his finger into his nose for poking fun] y donde ponemos el dedo 
[Xx Xx: makes the gesture of the eyebrow] oye que no te engañen, de verdad el voto 
útil útil es de izquierda ese es el útil, y lo demás [makes the gesture of the eyebrow] son 
tonterías 
[Guillermo Toledo:] vota Izquierda Unida ¡coño! ¡Hala! ¡hasta luego! 





porque invadir un país y asesinar a su pueblo 
no es solución a ningún conflicto 
[student] 
porque no me he pasado la vida trabajando 
para acabar cobrando cuatro perras de pensión 
[businesswoman] 
porque estoy harta de hacer contratos basura 
[priest] 
porque nadie puede decidir qué significa estar enamorado 
o qué es una familia 
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[posh youngster] 
porque yo defiendo una educación pública y laica 
[middle-aged housewife] 
porque quiero que se respete mi derecho 
a decidir sobre mi maternidad 
[children with the Spanish Republican flag] 
porque tengo memoria y no olvido 
[Llamazares] 
vota Izquierda Unida 
Izquierda Unida es más izquierda 
[slogan: izquierda unida + izquierda] 
 
 
Video: Sin parafernalias 
[a Young man, in smart casual dress comically mimes what politicians do in campaign: 
speeches, photos with babies, blow kisses, has a case full of Money, jumps, plays with 
balloons, throws confetti up in the air, laughs, shakes hands, etc.] 
[the character speaking] 
podríamos hacer una campaña así, 
pero no queríamos espectáculos ni parafernalias 
para Izquierda Unida, lo importante son las ideas 
y las personas 
[jingle] 


















Transcripciones videos PP: 
 
Video embargo 
[Zapatero speaking from a TV, while a family is shockingly observing their furniture 
being forcefully seized, due to their bankrupt] 
Y sabéis que en estos cuatro años hemos mejorado los derechos y libertades de los 
ciudadanos. No hay crisis estamos en la Champions League de la economía no hay 
crisis nuestra economía es una de las más sólidas del mundo estamos mejor que hace 
cuatro años. ¿Donde está la crisis? 
...and you know that in these last 4 years we improved right and freedoms there is no 
crisis our economy is in the Champions League there is no crisis our economy is one of 




Sabias que con el gobierno Zapatero el precio medio de un litro de leche ha subido más 
de un 35%? 
El kilo de pan ha subido más de un 30% y lo mismo pasa con el pollo la ternera y la 
pasta 
Los yogures cuestan casi cuatro veces más 
Los números hablan 
En los últimos 3 años la cuota de una hipoteca media ha subido más de 400 euros al mes 
Los precios suben más que los salarios con el gobierno de Zapatero 
Te sorprendería saber que España es el país de la Unión Europea en el que los salarios 
han perdido más poder adquisitivo en los últimos años y la presión fiscal ha aumentado 
dos puntos desde que Zapatero gobierna 
Ya supera el 40% del producto interior bruto 
Por todas estas razones y muchas más [Cambio de música] el Partido Popular pondrá en 
marcha la mayor rebaja de impuesto de la historia de la democracia 
Una reforma fiscal en beneficio de las familias y especialmente de aquellas que tienen 
rentas más bajas 
Con nuestra reforma los trabajadores y pensionistas que ganan menos de 16000 euros al 
año dejarán de pagar el impuesto sobre la renta 
Y además aprobaremos una rebaja adicional de impuestos a las mujeres que trabajan 
fuera del hogar 




Video: Conejos y chisteras 
En los últimos meses Zapatero se ha gastado 20 millones de euros al mes en propaganda 
y autobombo. 
Escuchar "Gobierno de España" al final de un anuncio nos cuesta 600 mil euros al día 
100 millones de las antiguas pesetas 
Para tapar los socavones de la gestión de Zapatero 
Zapatero gasta 20 veces más en autobombo que en la lucha contra la violencia de 
género 
25 veces más que en guarderías y el doble que en ayudar a las personas dependientes 
Con ese dinero se podría pagar la pensión mensual de 26 mil españoles, se podría 
construir 1 km de autovía a la semana y comprar 3 pisos al día 
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100 millones al día es lo que gastan 1300 mileuristas españoles durante todo un mes en 
la cesta de la compra 
Con 600 mil euros se pueden comprar más de 120.000 conejos 
En 4 años Zapatero no se ha ocupado de los problemas reales de los españoles 
Ahora pretende sacarse conejos de la chistera 
[Shift in music, colors and voice tone] 
El Partido Popular bajará los impuestos y subirá las pensiones 
Otro gobierno de España con Rajoy es posible 
 
 
Video: Castillo de naipes 
Durante 4 años Zapatero ha estado jugando con el bienestar de todos 
Los precios suben, aumenta el paro, la economía empeora y él no hace nada 
Ninguno de sus problemas ha merecido su atención 
Desde que llegó a la Moncloa no sabe lo que cuesta un café 
No tiene problemas para pagar su piso y ha olvidado lo difícil que es llegar a fin de mes 
Pero hay cosas que caen por su propio peso 
[Slogan: Vota PP] 
 
 
Video: Mujer desengañada 
[a Young woman talks with a friend of hers about her relationship] 
A: ¡Hola guapa! ¿Qué tal? 
B: Bueno... ahí vamos... muy decepcionada la verdad 
A: ¿En serio? Con lo contenta que estabas al principio 
B: Ya pero es que cada vez es peor  
Pasa de mí no le interesan mis problemas  
Está todo el día hablando de cosas que solo le importan a él 
Me ha fallado  
Le he pillado mintiéndome 
A: Y ¿Qué vas a hacer? 
B: No tengo ningún motivo para creer en él 
No volveré a votar a Zapatero 
Yo necesito a alguien que tenga las ideas claras 
[Slogan: Vota PP] 
 
  
Video: Rajoy precios 
[Rajoy speaking]: La vida ha subido mucho en los últimos años. Mucho. 
Por eso creo que si algún esfuerzo tendremos que hacer en los próximos 4 años es 
atender a eso: a los precios, a los sueldos, a las pensiones. 
Porque eso es lo que de verdad afecta a las personas. 
Eso es su vida. 
Y ayudarles en eso, pues es ayudarles a ser un poco más felices 
[Slogan: Con cabeza y con corazón Mariano Rajoy] 




Video: Rajoy: Gobierno no habla de economía, inmigración, seguridad ciudadana 
 
[Rajoy speaking in a meeting]: Y mientras hablan de lo malos que somos los del PP, de 
las catástrofes naturales que se pueden producir si el PP llega al gobierno, de economía 
nada, de inmigración nada, de seguridad ciudadana nada.  
De eso no hablan, cierran el pico, no les conviene 
Pero eso es lo que les interesa a los españoles y de eso es de lo que voy a hablar yo. 
 
 
Video: ¡Rompe con Zapatero! ¡Rompe con los titiriteros! 
[many current people appear in front of the TV in a médium shot saying the sentence “I 
break up with Zapatero”] 
Yo rompo 
Y yo 
Rompo con Zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Nosotras rompemos con zapatero 
Nosotras también 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo 
Rompo con zapatero 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
[voice off screen]: Ninguno de ellos es famoso 
Pero ellos y tú pagáis injustamente el Canon Digital con el que el PSOE ha beneficiado 
a los artistas de la Plataforma de Apoyo a Zapatero. 
Yo rompo con zapatero 
 
 
Video: ¡Rompe con Zapatero! 








No pidas justicia 






No te comprometas 
No llegas  
No te indignes  
No bebas  
No digas la verdad 
¡Que zapatero no viva por ti! 
[slogan: Rompe con Zapatero] 
 
 
Video: ¡yo rompo con Zapatero! 1984 
[Zapatero speaks during a meeting] 
¡No son derechos de los ciudadanos! ¡Más política social! ¡Más cohesión! Porque el 
crecimiento es para todos los ciudadanos… Alguien puede entender porque la derecha 
hace una batalla por una asignatura como Educación por la Ciudadanía, que intenta que 
nuestros hijos no solo aprendan conocimientos en la escuela sino que aprendan a tener 
un carácter democrático, tolerante, de respeto a los derechos humanos, a la libertad, a la 
diversidad a la paz, porque les molesta que nuestros niños puedan aprender la 
Constitución, la democracia, los derechos humanos, la libertad, la tolerancia, si esto es 
la esencia de la democracia… y queremos para los españoles la mejor democracia y 
sabemos... 
[voice off screen:] Bajo las palabras democracia, libertad y derechos humanos, el 
gobierno socialista está tratando de imponer una asignatura propia de un régimen 
totalitario. El 9 de marzo rompe con el adoctrinamiento de Zapatero. Tú puedes lograr 
que 2008 no sea otro “1984”. 




[a text appears on the black background forming the following sentences] 
Las letras se unen para formar palabras y expresar ideas 
Pero solas también tienen personalidad 
ADN algunas letras son únicas 
I otras son minimalistas 
ETC algunas implican mucho más de lo que dicen 
SI pueden ser positivas  
NO o negativas 
IQ otras pueden ser muy inteligentes 
IQ o todo lo contrario 
KG pueden tener mucho peso 
GR o casi ninguno 
T las hay sobrias 
S sinuosas 
H que no dicen nada 
BUM otras son muy ruidosas 
ETA también las hay asesinas 
RIP definitivas 
LEY hay letras que merecen respeto y acatamiento 
LEY aunque para algunos solo son 'papelitos' 
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¡AH! las hay expresivas 
¿EH? que no entienden nada 
¡OH! que te dejan boquiabierto 
PSOE algunas letras pretenden decir mucho 
PSO pero se van  
PS desdibujando... 
P 
^^ hasta llegar a perder todo significado 
Z algunas letras nos hablan de crisis 
Z de falta de ideas de pactos oscuros 
Z de 'tensión' 
Z de fracaso 
Z de final 
[Cambio de música: sintonía del PP y color: azul del PP] 











Con Rajoy es posible 
[Video de blog pro Rajoy para PP] 
 
 
Video: con Z de Chapuzero 
[a puppet caricaturing Zapatero speaks with his accent] 
Palabridaz, inseguridad y calamidaz 
más catastrofidaz, mas torpecidaz y menos formalidaz 
penosidaz ... chapucidaz 
si la verdaz es que meto mucho al pata 
debe ser una cosa innata o quizá que soy gafe 
y bueno pienso que la culpa es vuestra por haberme votado así que mira 
haberlo pensado mejor 
no tenemos ni puñetera idea de cómo vamos a solucionar el caos de Barcelona 
nos gusta improvisar con una sonrisa 
intentamos sacar adelante como sea las obras del AVE pero aparecen socavones 
por todos lados 
quedan muchas cosas por estropear y mucha gente que cabrear 
me gusta el país en que sufrimos 
me gusta la España de hoy catastrófica 
esto es la verdad 
[con z zapatero sin c de cercanías]  
(video broadcast on IntereconomiaTV) 
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Transcriptions of videos of PSOE 
 
El segundo mejor país para ser niño 
España 2004-2008 
con z de zapatero 
 
[policía guardia civil] 
¿sabías que con el gobierno de zapatero hay diecisiete mil policías y guardias civiles 
más que con el gobierno del PP? 
[x17000 policías más 
seguridaz 
con z de zapatero] 
 
los números hablan 
 
en los últimos años la economía española ha crecido el doble que Alemania, el triple 
que Italia, un 50% más que Gran Bretaña y un 25% más que Estados Unidos 
[la economía española crece mas 
competitividaz 
con z de zapatero] 
 
España se ha convertido en la 8ª potencia económica del mundo 
[8ª potencia económica del mundo 
prosperidaz] 
 
y lo ha hecho sin perder de vista el respeto por el planeta 
España ha conseguido por primera vez reducir la emisión de los gases que producen el 
cambio climático 
[responsabilidaz 
con z de zapatero] 
 
en estos años hemos vivido el periodo con menos huelgas desde que hay democracia en 
España 
[estabilidaz 
con z de zapatero 
periodo con menos huelgas] 
 
el gobierno de zapatero ha triplicado la contribución de España al desarrollo de los 
países pobres 
[España ha triplicado la contribución  
solidaridaz con z de zapatero] 
 
¿te sorprendería saber que en los últimos 3 años uno de cada tres empleos creados en 
Europa se ha creado en España? 
[la tasa de paro más baja de los últimos treinta años 
3000000 empleo 
empleo de calidaz  




¿y que un millón y medio de trabajadores con empleo precario han pasado a tener un 
empleo estable? 
[la tasa de paro más baja de los últimos treinta años 
1500000 empleos estables 
empleo de calidaz  
con z de zapatero] 
 
con el gobierno de zapatero las pensiones más bajas y el salario mínimo han subido el 
triple que con el gobierno del PP 
[el salario mínimo ha subido el triple 
empleo de calidaz  
con z de zapatero] 
 
3 millones y medio de autónomos han visto reconocidos sus derechos 
[más derechos 3.500.00 
igualdaz  
con z de zapatero] 
 
la ley de dependencia beneficiará a un millón doscientas mil personas y creara 
trescientos mil puestos de trabajo 
[dignidaz 
con z de zapatero 
ley de dependencia/300000 puestos de trabajo] 
 
este gobierno ha dedicado a la educación un 75% más que el gobierno del PP 
[sensibilidaz  
con z de zapatero] 
 
[modernidaz  
con z de zapatero] 
 
e invierte más del doble en investigación y desarrollo tecnológico 
 
para 2010 España será el país del mundo con mas kilómetros de AVE 
y el país de Europa con mas kilómetros de autovías 
[alta velocidaz  
con z de zapatero] 
 
1er país del mundo con más Km de AVE 
2090km Japón 
1890km Francia 
2230 km España 
 
el gobierno de zapatero ha bajado el impuesto sobre la renta al 95% de los ciudadanos 
dos millones de personas no tendrán que volver a pagar 
[equidaz  
con z de zapatero 
ha bajado el impuesto sobre la renta al 95% de los ciudadanos] 
 
el año que viene setecientas mil familias podrán desgravarse el alquiler de su vivienda 
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[PSOE 700000 familias podrán desgravarse el alquiler de su vivienda] 
y trescientos cincuenta mil jóvenes recibirán ayudas directas para el alquiler de las 
suyas 
[accesibilidaz con z de zapatero 
350000 jóvenes recibirán ayudas directas para el alquiler] 
 
por todas estas razones y otras más 
España es según la OCDE el 2º mejor país del mundo para ser niño 
[2º niño] 
 
y el primer destino que elegirían los europeos si tuvieran que irse a trabajar a otro país 
 
¿a qué no es una sorpresa? 
[...a qué no es una sorpresa?] 
 
españa 2004-2008 
con z de zapatero 
 
[españa 2004-2008 




Con z de Zapatero 
modernidaz, seguridaz, y equidaz 
más baloncestidaz, más dialoguidaz, y menos crispacidaz 
lealtaz, solidaridaz, humildaz 
sí la verdad es que uso mucho la z 
debe ser una cosa de familia o quizá de mi tierra 
y bueno, hemos preparado una explicación de la tarea del gobierno más desenfadada 
habitualmente los políticos tenemos un lenguaje que se aleja de los ciudadanos 
y todo se puede decir con una sonrisa 
lo importante es que todos los españoles conozcan lo que hemos hecho en estos años 
los hechos y los datos 
quedan muchas cosas por resolver 
pero hay muchas cosas que celebrar 
me gusta el país en el que vivimos 
me gusta la España de hoy 
la España democrática 
esto es la verdaz 
[españa 2004-2008 
con z de Zapatero] 
 
 
Con Zapatero vuelve a creer en la política 
[cuando habla dice algo] 
si vivimos juntos, juntos debemos decidir 
 
[defiende a sus adversarios] 
el ex presidente Aznar fue elegido por los Españoles y exijo ese respeto 
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[no genera crispación] 
a cada insulto que recibamos, nosotros una propuesta 
a cada, a cada descalificación, una idea 
y a cada exageración, una sonrisa 
 
[reconoce sus errores] 
quiero reconocer el claro error que cometí ante todos los ciudadanos españoles 
 
[se moja] 
hemos dedicado leyes, esfuerzos, medios y recursos 
y dedicaremos aun muchos más 
para combatir con toda la energía la lacra intolerable de la violencia machista 
que hace sufrir a tantas mujeres 
 
[no miente] 
la verdad en democracia siempre se abre camino 
 
[sabe reírse de sí mismo] 
más baloncestidaz, más dialoguidaz, y menos crispacidaz 
 
[cumple lo que promete] 
estas circunstancias me han llevado a adoptar la decisión de ordenar el regreso de 
nuestros soldados con la máxima seguridad, por lo siguiente, en el menor tiempo 
posible 
 
[y tiene un plan] 
celebrar los avances sociales de los más débiles y sentirnos orgullosos de que España 
pueda en el mundo por fin después de siglos estar entre los mejores en el siglo veintiuno 
 
[¿qué clase de político es éste?] 
acepto la candidatura del partido socialista a la presidencia del gobierno de España 
 
[con Zapatero vuelve a creer en la política] 
 
 
No seas él 
[a person shows a picture of supposedly her wife]  
[the character, dressed and behaving as an unlucky, says]  
pues ayer la vi cenando con otro 
[a person shows the character her new dress, the character says] 
 te hace como más gorda ¿no? 
[the character leaving a cinema addresses a person in the line for buying the ticket] 
al final el chico se muere 
[the character in a bar with a friend, eating a sandwich says] 
¿no te sabe un poco raro? 
[the character step into his home door, on the stairs he meets his concierge and says] 
qué mala cara ¿eh? 
[the character passes behind two elderly playing chess and says to one of them] 
¡te va a hacer mate! 
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[the character watching live a football match with another person; they support the same 
team; while the other supports the players about to score, the character says] 
lo falla 
[the character at work, after having listened to a colleague’s business presentation says]  
¿no es un plan demasiado optimista? 
[the character with another person in the car of the latter; the car does not switch on, and 
he says]  
puf eso va a ser la caja de cambios 
[the character visiting a sick person in a hospital] 
 seguro que es grave 
[Zapatero speaks from a TV in a bar] 
los ciudadanos confiaron en nosotros para trabajar por la paz para alcanzar nuevos 
derechos, para que el progreso económico 
[the character drinking a beer at the counter says, addressing the TV] 
vaya hombre, ya verás 
[slogan: no seas él] 
[slogan: PSOE la mirada positiva] 
 
 
Defender la alegría 
¿qué tal?¿cómo estás? 
 
muy bien encantado me alegro gusto 
hola qué tal 
guapa 
...democrático, al día siguiente... 
defender la alegría 
nos encontramos en plena forma 
defender la alegría contra los cenizos, ¿no? 
 
[defendemos la alegría 
frente al catastrofismo, 





Defender la alegría como una trinchera, 
defenderla del caos y de las pesadillas, 
de la ajada miseria y de los miserables, 
de las ausencias breves y las definitivas. 
Defender la alegría (x 4). 
Defender la alegría como un atributo, 
defenderla del pasmo y de las anestesias, 
de los pocos neutrales y los muchos neutrones, 
de los graves diagnósticos y de las escopetas. 
Defender la alegría como un estandarte, 
defenderla del rayo y la melancolía. 








Estoy con Zapatero 
[así empezó todo] 
 
perdón señor presidente 
dime Concha 
antes de terminar este acto 
ya que usted ha dedicado este ultimo parrafo a las personas que o pueden hablar y oír y 
que se expresan con las manos 
que nos digan como se dice "presidente Zapatero" 
estoy con Zapatero 
estoy con Zapatero 
estoy con Zapatero 
estoy con Zapatero 
estoy con Zapatero 
estoy con Zapatero 
estoy con Zapatero 
 






Que el tiempo no te cambie 
[14 de marzo de 2004 
noche electoral] 
 
[crowd] no nos falles, no nos falles, no nos falles, no nos falles 
[Zapatero] y os aseguro que el poder no me va a cambiar, gracias 
[cuatro años después] 
[María San Miguel] zapatero no me ha fallado: dijo que sacaría las tropas de Irak y el 
tío lo hizo, con un par! 
[Rubén Fernández] antes quitaban las becas, ahora te puedes ir de ERASMUS con los 
6000 euros que te da Zapatero, vaya punto ¿eh? 
[María López y Camino Orejas] 
[ML] a mí no me ha fallado en el compromiso contra el cambio climático 
[CO] ya pero hay que llegar más lejos 
[David Muñoz] ha tenido el coraje de sacar adelante leyes como al del matrimonio 
homosexual: a mí no me ha fallado 
[Elena Moreno] yo creo que se ha preocupado por los que no pueden valerse por sí 
mismos; si somos una potencia mundial, pues, que lo notemos todos ¿no? 
[Carlos San Martín y Beatriz Curieses] 
[BC] pues yo veo que hay más ayudas, se construye más vivienda protegida, los precios 
están un poco mejor 
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[CSM] ya vale, vale pero esto sigue siendo un problema eh? zapatero aún queda mucho 
por hacer 
[Elena de las Heras] ahora me garantizan que por el mismo trabajo cobraré igual que un 
hombre por ley 
[Oscar Sánchez] yo soy autónomo, antes era invisible, ahora tengo los mismos derechos 
que todo el mundo 
[Rubén Blanco] ahora si tienes un hijo tienes una ayuda y 15 días para cuidarlo a él  a su 
madre. Zapatero: no me has fallado 
[Maria del Prado] sobre todo valoro una cosa, Zapatero no nos ha mentido 
[music] no no que el tiempo no te cambie,  
no no que el tiempo no te cambie 
no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no 
no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no 
no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no 
no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no 
no no que el tiempo no te cambie  
no no que el tiempo no te cambie 
no no que el tiempo no te cambie 
no no que el tiempo no te cambie 
 




[video on the mini website lamiradapositiva] 
[Zapatero] porque ayer oí a Rajoy hablar de los currantes y decía, y decía, y decía que 
su programa era el de los currantes… sí, hombre, sí, los currantes como Pizarro1, ¡que 
tiene una indemnización de miles de millones de pesetas! 
 
 
Vota con todas tus fuerzas 
[rain and sad music] 
[sad images] 
dicen los estudios que si la participación es baja 
el PP podría ganar las elecciones 
tambien dicen que cuando hace mal tiempo 
la participación es menor 
asi que algunos desean que el domingo llueva con rabia 
nieve viento lo que sea para que te quedes en casa 
pero hay algo que no saben 
 
para los que votamos con alegría 
siempre hace sol 
 
[musica in crescendo 
Sun and cheerful music] 
                                                          
1
 Manuel Pizarro Moreno, PP MP, broker and vice-president of Madrid Stock Exchange, president of the 
bank Ibercaja, president of Spanish confederation of saving Banks, former CEO at Endesa (1996-2007), 
received from this company a millionaire compensation when he left; PP responsible of Economy, during 




[red background] el domingo vota con todas tus fuerzas 
 
[slogan: vota con todas tus fuerzas] 
 
 
Vota con todas tus fuerzas 2 
[Young man speaking] hace 4 años millones de españoles fuimos a votar para cambiar 
las cosas 
ahora siento que mi voto ha valido para mucho 
pero hay que continuar 
para mí votar es sagrado 
por eso voy siempre a buscara a mi madre al pueblo 
son trescientos kilómetros sólo por un voto 
para que ella vote 
y eso que sé que va a votar al PP 
[mom] qué hijo, has cambiado de opinión 
[son] no mamá sabes que no, y tú 
[mom] yo tampoco 




Vota con todas tus fuerzas 3 
[Elderly speaking] tengo 94 años 
he visto casi todo 
he vivido grandes esperanzas y también grandes decepciones 
pero ahora es diferente 
ahora que España empieza a estar donde tenía que estar hace mucho tiempo 
quiero vivir para verlo 
no me preguntéis porque pero este tío me ha devuelto la ilusión 
[Zapatero speaking] celebrar los avances sociales de los más débiles y sentirnos 
orgullosos de que España 
pueda en el mundo por fin después de siglos estar entre los mejores 
voy a ir a votar como si fuera la primera vez 




Vota con todas tus fuerzas 4 
[Young woman speaking] me acabo de ver en las listas del censo 
ya puedo votar 
estoy nerviosa 
deseando que llegue el día nueve 
mi padre dice que esa ilusión se pasa con el tiempo 
que la vida me ira enseñando que los políticos son todos iguales 
puede que sea demasiado joven 
pero no soy estúpida 
yo miro los políticos 
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[Internet newspaper with picture of PP MPs Eduardo Zaplana, Miguel Ángel Acebes y 
Mariano Rajoy laughing from their seats in the Spanish parliament, under the headline: 
“Rajoy’s cousin. Rajoy neglects climatic change advised by his scientist cousin] 
los escucho y veo lo que hacen 
[image of a building with  poster of Rajoy and the slogan “las ideas claras”] 
[the character riding a bicicle turns her head] 
[image of a building with the poster of Zapatero and the slogan “vota con todas tus 
fuerzas”] 




Video del acto de presentación de la Plataforma de Apoyo a Zapatero y de la 
canción Defender la Alegría. 
[different famous Spanish film-makers, actors, singers, TV presenters, etc., speaking] 
Soy José Luis Cuerda, de vez en cuando hago películas y se me ha encargado que 
presente a esta amplísima plataforma de personas del mundo de la ciencia, de la 
investigación, de la universidad, de la literatura, de las artes plásticas, del cine, del 
teatro, de la cultura en general y estamos aquí como ciudadanos y lo único que 
queremos propugnar es un apoyo a Zapatero primero porque creemos que lo ha hecho 
razonablemente bien… pienso y uso en la medida de lo posible con toda justeza el 
término 'razonable' porque creo que creemos que se pueden razonar cuales han sido sus 
aciertos y han sido suficientes como para que queramos que vuelva a presidir un 
gobierno; segundo para que no vuelva esa turba mentirosa humillante que piensa desde 
su imbecilidad que todos somos más imbéciles que ellos y tercero puesto que Rajoy no 
piensa pelearse con ellos para que los obispos no nos echen encima una teocracia 
igualmente humillante y estúpida. 
 
Defender la Alegría 
Antes las elecciones generales del 9 de marzo los hombres y mujeres que suscriben este 
manifiesto expresan públicamente su apoyo al presidente José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 
porque en estos 4 años al frente del gobierno de España Zapatero cumplió su palabra de 
retirar las tropas españolas de una guerra inmoral e injusta y ha recuperado una política 
internacional basada en la cooperación, el multilateralismo y la defensa de los derechos 
humanos ha acompañado los logros en política económica con la mejora del bienestar 
de todos los ciudadanos, ha situado la defensa de la igualdad entre hombres y entre 
mujeres en el centro de su acción de gobierno, ha promovido la ampliación de los 
derechos civiles más importante de nuestra historia reciente, ha profundizado en un 
modelo de estado plural dentro del marco de la constitución, las mujeres y los hombres 
que suscribimos este manifiesto hacemos publico nuestro apoyo y nuestro deseo de que 
el 9 de marzo los ciudadanos vuelvan a apoyar a José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero para que 
desde el gobierno se mantenga una forma de hacer política basada en el dialogo, la 
búsqueda de acuerdos y el respeto a las instituciones democráticas, para que la 
solidaridad siga siendo el eje de la acción de gobierno, y tengan continuidad las 
políticas sociales impulsadas en esta legislatura, para que todos los ciudadanos tengan 
los mismos derechos y los mismos deberes, para que ningún credo, opción política o 
grupo social goce de privilegios, para que todos participen en el progreso de la sociedad 
y nadie se vea excluido de sus logros, para que el mundo siga mirando a España como 
un referente en la defensa de la paz y la solidaridad internacional. Las mujeres y los 
hombres que firmamos este manifiesto confiamos en la capacidad de la sociedad 
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española para avanzar en paz y en libertad sin tutelas ni imposiciones, una sociedad que 
mire al futuro con esperanza y sin miedo y con la firme voluntad de no dar un paso 
atrás. Desde la independencia y la pluralidad de ideas, con espíritu crítico, sin 
adhesiones inquebrantables confiamos en la capacidad de JLRZ para seguir liderando 
este proyecto colectivo. 
 
Hola buenos días ya somos casi 5000 vamos a ser muchísimos más, del cine, del teatro, 
de la música, de la TV: vamos a luchar para que Z sea el próximo presidente de 
gobierno, y vamos a luchar con lo único que sabemos hacer todos nosotros, con la 
palabra… a luchar y a ganar. En la clausura del acto se va a pasar un video que han 
hecho unos grandísimos artistas… y ante la tristeza de esa derecha nosotros luchamos 
por la alegría y apostamos por la alegría. Cuando se acabe el video hemos acabado el 
acto. Muchas gracias. 
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Transcriptions of the two main electoral songs 
 
PP: Revolución Popular 
Si tienes nuevas ideas 
y piensas que algo debe cambiar, 
si crees que todo es posible, 
ven a la revuelta popular. 
Buscamos gente valiente, 
soñadores que puedan imaginar, 
soñar con una España nueva, 
vivir en un mundo de igualdad. 
Uniremos nuestras ilusiones, 
lucharemos por defender nuestros valores, 
por el futuro de los españoles, 
avanzaremos en todas direcciones. 
Sabes que es nuestro momento, 
no podemos dejarlo escapar. 
No, no esperes más tiempo, 
ahora te tienes que mojar. 
Uniremos nuestras ilusiones, 
lucharemos por defender nuestros valores, 
por el futuro de los españoles, 
avanzaremos en todas direcciones. 
Hoy queremos invitarte, 
a un proyecto de justicia y libertad, 
la historia está de nuestra parte, 
juntos vamos a revolucionar. 
Habrá que currar muy duro, 
no nos lo van a regalar, 
somos la apuesta del futuro, 
nos llaman Partido Popular. 
Uniremos nuestras ilusiones, 
lucharemos por defender nuestros valores, 
por el futuro de los españoles, 
avanzaremos en todas direcciones. 
Con cabeza y con corazón, 
viviremos todos esta canción, 
con cabeza y con corazón, 
montaremos esta revolución. 
 
 
PSOE: Defender la Alegría 
Defender la alegría como una trinchera, 
defenderla del caos y de las pesadillas, 
de la ajada miseria y de los miserables, 
de las ausencias breves y las definitivas. 
Defender la alegría (x 4). 
Defender la alegría como un atributo, 
defenderla del pasmo y de las anestesias, 
de los pocos neutrales y los muchos neutrones, 
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de los graves diagnósticos y de las escopetas. 
Defender la alegría como un estandarte, 
defenderla del rayo y la melancolía. 
Defender la alegría (x 12). 
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Glossary of the main parties (1977-2011) 
 
AFA  Agrupación de electores Frente Autonómico 
AHI  Agrupación Herreña Independiente 
AIC  Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias 
AIC-ATI Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias 
AM  Asamblea Majorera 
AMAIUR 
AP-PDP-PAR Alianza Popular + Partido Aragonés Regionalista 
AP-PDP-UPN Alianza Popular + Unión del Pueblo Navarro 
AP-PDP-UV Alianza Popular + Unión Valenciana 
BNG  Bloque Nacionalista Galego 
CC  Coalición Canaria 
CC-AHI-NC Coalición Canaria-Agrupación Herreña Independiente-Nueva Canarias  
CC-NC-PNC Coalición “Coalición Canaria-Nueva Canarias” 
CC-PNC Coalición Canaria-Partido Nacionalista Canario 
CD  Coalición Democrática  
CDS   Centro Democrático y Social 
CD-UCD Centristes de Catalunya-UCD 
CG  Coalición Galega 
CHA  Chunta Aragonesista 
CIC  Candidatura Independiente del Centro  
CIP  Coalición “La Izquierda Plural” 
CiU  Convergencia i Unió  
Compromís-Q Coalición “Bloc-Iniciativa-Verds-Equo-Coalició Compromís” 
CP  Coalición Popular 
CP  Coalición Popular 
CP-AP  Coalición Popular-Alianza Popular 
CP-CG  Coalición Popular Centristas de Galicia 
CPM   Candidatura Progresista Menorquina 
CS  Catalunya al Senat 
EA  Eusko Alkartasuna 
EA-EUE Coalición Eusko Alkartasuna - Euskal Ezkerra 
EC-FED Esquerra de Catalunya - Front Electoral Democratic  
EE   Euskadiko Ezquerra 
EE  Euskadiko Ezquerra  
EE  Euskadiko Ezquerra 
EE  Euskadiko Ezquerra 
EFS  Agrupación de electores Eivissa y Formentera al Senat 
Entesa   Per L’Entesa 
ENTESA  = IU 
Entesa Catalana de Progrés 
Entesa CP Entesa Catalana de Progrés (PSC-PSOE, ERC, IC-V) 
ERC   Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya amb Front Nacional de Catalunya i Partit 
Social Demócrata de Catalunya 
FAC  Foro de Ciudadanos 
GBAI  Geroa Bai 
HB   Herri Batasuna 
IC  Iniciativa per Catalunya 
ICV-EUiA Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa 
ICV-EV Iniciativa per Catalunya - Els Verds 
Independiente Candidato independiente (Soria) 
Independiente Independiente Lanzarote 
Independientes Candidatos independientes 
IU  Izquierda Unida 
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NA-BAI Nafarroa Bai 
PA  Partido Andalucista 
PAR   Partido Aragonés Regionalista 
PAR  Partido Aragonés Regionalista 
PDC  Pacte Democrátic per Catalunya  
PDL  Coalición Popular 
PDP  Coalición Popular 
PIL  Partido de Independientes de Lanzarote 
PNV   Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
PP  Partido Popular 
PP-CG  PP - Coalición Centristas de Galicia 
PP-PAR Partido Popular - Partido Aragonés 
PP-UE  Coalición “Partido Popular-Extremadura Unida” 
PSA-PA  Partido Socialista de Andalucía - Partido Andaluz 
PSC-PSOE  Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya 
PSD  Por un Senado Democrático 
PSdG-PSOE Partido Socialista de Galicia 
PSE-EE Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezquerra 
PSE-PSOE Partido Socialista de Euskadi 
PSE-PSOE Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE-PSOE) 
PSOE  Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
PSOE-A Partido Socialista Obrero Español de Andalucía 
PSP-US  Partido Socialista Popular - Unidad Socialista  
PSP-US Partido Socialista Popular - Unidad Socialista  
PSUC  Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya  
SM  Senadores Majoreros 
SPD  Senadores para la Democracia 
UCD  Unión de Centro Democrático 
UCD-CD Coalición Electoral Unió del Centro i la Democracia Cristiana de Cataluña  
UEC  Unió de L’Esquerra Catalana 
UN  Unión Nacional 
UPC   Unión del Pueblo Canario 
UPN   Unión del Pueblo Navarro 
UPN  Unión del Pueblo Navarro - Coalición PP 
UPyD  Unión, Progreso y Democracia 
UV  Unión Valenciana 
 
